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FM AMEMBASSY YEREVAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0051
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 YEREVAN 000098 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2030 
TAGS: PGOV PREL TU AM
SUBJECT: EX-ARMENIAN FOREIGN MINISTER PESSIMISTIC ON 
RAPPROCHEMENT WITH TURKEY 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Marie Yovanovitch. Reasons 1.4(b & d) 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1. (C) Vartan Oskanian, Armenia's foreign minister from 
1998-2008, expressed skepticism to the Ambassador about the 
fate of the Turkey-Armenia protocols, and accused President 
Sargsian of mishandling the entire process.  He suggested 
that Turkey, as the senior partner, make a unilateral move to 
get the protocols back on track.  He also recommended that 
the Turks and Armenians talk directly, rather than through 
the media or third parties.  In Oskanian's view, the 
controversy surrounding the protocols has prevented any 
movement on Nagorno-Karabakh and even jeopardized its 
potential resolution.  He said the key going forward will be 
how the GOAM handles the expected failure of the  protocols 
-- will the government simply allow them to languish, or will 
the GOAM be able to manage the process so that another effort 
at rapprochement can begin after a suitable interval. END 
SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (C) The Ambassador met with ex-Foreign Minister Oskanian 
on February 10 to discuss the current state of Armenia-Turkey 
relations, prospectrs for ratification of the protocols, and 
efforts to resolve the Nagorno Karabakh conflict.  After 
serving as foreign minister under President Kocharian, 
Oskanian now runs the Civilitas Foundation, an NGO that 
promotes civic involvement and institution building in 
Armenia. 
 
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ARMENIA - TURKEY RELATIONS AND THE PROTOCOLS 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Oskanian restated his concerns about the future of 
Armenia-Turkey rapprochement.  While still opposed to the 
protocols' content, he strongly believes that there must 
eventually be closure of some sort, and that the protocols 
cannot be allowed simply to languish through inaction.  For 
if they do, it will be much harder to revive the process in 
the future.  Oskanian said that Turkey will then demand more 
specifics and add more requirements that will make any future 
negotiations much more difficult.  He is concerned that the 
GOAM will simply give up.  According to Oskanian, the Turkish 
contacts of Civilitas also believe that the protocols will 
not move forward, absent Armenian concessions on 
Nagorno-Karabakh, such as the return of one or two of the 
occupied territories to Azerbaijan.  Oskanian added that such 
a condition is a non-starter for Armenia. 
 
¶4. (C) Oskanian criticized the manner in which President 
Sargsian has handled the entire process.  In his view, the 
President "put the cart before the horse."  Oskanian did not 
understand why President Sargsian began the process with 
Turkey so publicly, and how unprepared he was for the 
negative public reaction.  Prior to embarking upon 
normalization with Turkey, the GOAM had a document for 
solving the Nagorno Karabakh conflict -- the Madrid 
Principles -- that was promising to both sides.  The 
President should have expended his political capital with 
Armenian citizens and the diaspora to persuade them that some 
of the Nagorno-Karabakh territories must be returned to 
Azerbaijan.  With Nagorno-Karabakh settled, he could have 
then turned to the issues with Turkey.  Oskanian said this 
had been his plan as Foreign Minister: first reach agreement 
on Nagorno-Karabakh, and then bring in Turkey.  (Comment: 
This may have been the plan, but neither Oskanian nor 
ex-President Kocharian expended capital on promoting such 
compromises, nor did they consult the Armenian public, 
preferring to cloak the NK negotiations in the utmost 
secrecy.  End Comment.) 
 
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TURKS MUST BE THE FIRST TO MAKE A MOVE NOW 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) In response to the Ambassador's question on how to 
move the process forward, Oskanian responded that there must 
be some movement from Turkey, and that the protocols cannot 
be left in abeyance while the parties shift their attention 
to the Nagorno Karabakh conflict.  He believes the GOT must 
be the first to take action, perhaps opening the border for 
limited movement of pedestrian traffic or third-country 
nationals.  However, based on Oskanian's conversations with 
his Turkish contacts, the GOT is not offering room to 
maneuver and they are not interested in moving the process 
forward.  Oskanian argues that communication between Turkey 
 
YEREVAN 00000098  002 OF 003 
 
 
and Armenia should not be occurring through the media or 
third parties.  A reset to this process is needed, with 
additional high-level meetings between the presidents that 
would be kept confidential and focused on reaching an oral 
agreement.  (COMMENT: Few in Armenia, and perhaps not even 
Oskanian, expect that the GOT will make a unilateral move to 
end the current impasse. END COMMENT) 
 
¶6. (C) The increasingly bellicose rhetoric from Azerbaijani 
President Ilham Aliyev is not helping matters with Turkey. 
In Oskanian's view, Turkey and Azerbaijan are "tightening the 
screws" on Armenia from both sides.  While a new war over 
Nagorno-Karabakh would be a risky proposition for Azerbaijan, 
Oskanian sees two elements that indicate the situation there 
is worsening: 1) people are losing hope in the diplomatic 
process to settle the issue; and 2) the military balance in 
the area is shifting in favor of Azerbaijan. 
 
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HOW TO MANAGE THE FAILURE OF THE PROTOCOLS 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶7. (C) The challenge that Oskanian now sees for the GOAM is 
managing the possible failure of the protocols.  If it 
appears that the protocols will not be ratified by either 
country, then it would be best for the GOAM to admit that and 
try again later.  The GOAM should manage the process and 
salvage what it can. It would be worse in his view if the 
GOAM simply allowed the process to collapse with no thought 
given to future steps. 
 
 
¶8. (C) Salpi Ghazarian (Amcit, please protect), Director of 
Civilitas, added that the protocols are in trouble because 
the GOAM ignored the "two large elephants in the room" when 
negotiating the terms: the claim for recognition of the 1915 
massacres as "genocide" and the situation in 
Nagorno-Karabakh.  The GOAM and Turkey could not reasonably 
expect to move the protocols forward without addressing these 
issues.  Oskanian agreed, arguing that the GOAM is now faced 
with two documents -- the protocols and the recently revised 
Madrid Principles -- that are detrimental to Armenia but from 
which neither Turkey nor Azerbaijan will retreat. 
 
¶9. (C) While Oskanian believes that the GOAM will not ratify 
the protocols unless it is assured that the GOT will follow 
suit, he believed it would be best for President Sargsian to 
use his majority in the Armenian Parliament to ratify the 
protocols now, while there is still some support and there 
are no explicit links between the protocols and Nagorno 
Karabakh. He added that he takes no pleasure in the current 
predicament in which Sargsian finds himself: He truly hopes 
the protocols will be ratified by both sides.  (COMMENT: This 
is a new line from Oskanian and hard to believe, as he has 
consistently and publicly worked against the protocols in 
Armenia and with the diaspora. END COMMENT) 
 
-------------------------------------- 
NAGORNO-KARABAKH AND THE MINSK GROUP 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (C) Oskanian vented that the protocols are preventing any 
resolution of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict.  If not for the 
protocols, Oskanian said, he could see President Sargsian 
pushing for the return of five of the seven Nagorno-Karabakh 
regions to Azerbaijan while keeping the remaining two for 
future discussions.  But now it would be "political suicide," 
because such a move would be seen as giving credence to the 
conspiracy theories that claim there is a hidden provision in 
the protocols that link them to concessions on NK. 
 
¶11. (C) On the Madrid Principles, the Ambassador reiterated 
the USG position that it is more beneficial to continue to 
move forward than to stop completely, which is what it 
appears Armenia is doing.  Oskanian said he understands that 
the revised Madrid Principles indicate clear linkages with 
all the territories, but do not provide status, a situation 
Armenia cannot accept.  That said, he agreed that if the GOAM 
does not like the revised wording of the Madrid Principles, 
then it should propose its own revisions and not simply 
reject the principles out of hand.  In Oskanian's view, the 
GOAM should write its own proposal in such a way that is 
"logical," and so the Minsk Group Co-Chairs will understand 
that Armenia is committed to the process even if the proposed 
revisions would be unacceptable to Azerbaijan. 
 
¶12. (C) If the protocols do fail, Oskanian believes the Minsk 
Group will have to take a hiatus.  But he sees pressure 
growing on President Aliyev to take action on Nagorno 
 
YEREVAN 00000098  003 OF 003 
 
 
Karabakh.  In his view, Azerbaijan will not accept 
indefinitely what it sees as an occupation of its territory. 
As for the original Madrid Principles, Oskanian said the GOAM 
had been satisfied with the wording, and it would not have 
been the end of the world if Armenia had been forced to 
accept it. 
 
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COMMENT 
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 ¶13. (C) On the outside looking in, Oskanian has been an 
early and forceful critic of President Sargsian's 
normalization initiative with Turkey and his handling of NK. 
He did say, however, that recently he had been sharing views 
with someone "close to the process."  Hints from other 
sources suggest that that person may be former NK President 
Gukasian, who we have heard has become a close advisor to 
Sargsian, has played a role in healing the rift that had 
separated the President and his predecessor,  who was 
attempting to do the same with Oskanian.  If the former 
Foreign Minister is in fact newly engaged and, to some 
extent, invested, perhaps those were not crocodile tears he 
was shedding for the foundering normalization process.  While 
we retain our skepticism, we do hope that this impressive 
former diplomat just might be applying his intellect to 
creative problem-solving on the inside rather than sniping 
from without. 
 
 
 
YOVANOVITCH 
YOVANOVITCH