VZCZCXRO2796
RR RUEHAG RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHVI #0169/01 0431526
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 121526Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4178
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 VIENNA 000169 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2025 
TAGS: EFIN PTER KTFN PREL EUN AU
SUBJECT: SENIOR CONSERVATIVE MEP ON TFTP/FMDA OUTCOME, NEXT 
STEPS 
 
REF: VIENNA 137 
 
Classified By: DCM Chris Hoh.  Reason: 1.4(b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  The leader of the Austrian conservative 
group in the EP (a former Austrian Interior Minister) 
reported Feb. 12 that he believes there are good prospects 
for reaching agreement on a permanent TFTP/FMDA by July, 
provided however that the agreements incorporate the 
conditions the EP proposed in its September 17 resolution on 
the subject and provided the Commission (EC) be more open in 
engaging the EP during the course of negotiations.  He also 
suggested the U.S. consider confidence building measures to 
address serious skepticism about U.S. reliability in parts of 
the EP.  End Summary. 
 
Background 
---------- 
 
¶2. (C) MEP Ernst Strasser, leader of the Austrian 
conservatives in the EP and a substitute member of the LIBE 
Committee, told DCM Feb. 12 that the U.S. should not be 
surprised at the outcome of the Feb. 11 vote.  He recalled 
the EP's Sept. 19, 2009 resolution which set out (operative 
para 7) various conditions that a TFTP/FMDA agreement would 
contain.  He acknowledged that the EP's condition had been 
80-90% fulfilled, but that was not enough.  Moreover, the EP 
did feel itself misinformed and badly treated by the EC, 
which had only submitted the accord to it on Jan. 26 and 
which did not provide related texts until after the LIBE 
Committee's negative recommendation on a Feb. 4 vote.  He 
noted that the Spanish Interior Minister's and new 
Commissioner's presentations to the EP inadvertently served 
to strengthen opposition to the accord.  In contrast, 
Strasser praised USG efforts to inform the EP in the final 
days before the vote, including the letter form Secretaries 
Geithner and Clinton.  However, EC and U.S. efforts were too 
little and too late. 
 
Next Steps 
---------- 
 
¶3. (C) Strasser said he believed it should be possible to 
negotiate a permanent agreement and pass it through 
parliament before the summer recess, provided the terms of 
the Sept. 17 resolution are incorporated.  He believes a 
clear majority of the EP -- including the conservatives, 
Social Democrats (SD), and Liberals -- would back such an 
agreement.  While many Liberals were skeptical about such 
agreements in principle, he thought the Liberals' rapporteur 
on the LIBE Committee would be supportive and be able to 
carry his party.  The Greens, far-right, and others were in 
his view, hopeless. 
 
¶4. (C) Strasser cautioned that there were other factors the 
U.S would need to address.  About 150 members of the EP, he 
estimated, including some SDs, had a deep seated mistrust of 
the U.S.  He felt they would almost always oppose measures 
the U.S. sought.  Moreover, the many security (PNR, ESTA, 
PCSC, HSPD-6) and non-security (ESTA fee) programs imposed by 
the U.S. on Europeans since Sept. 11 have created a climate 
of anger and fear in the media and public that burdens the 
negotiation of further counter-terrorism measures of any 
sort. To address these, he suggested various confidence 
building measures (CBMs): 
 
A) He noted that in Secretary Napolitano's meeting with the 
LIBE Committee in November, the Committee had proposed a 
joint review of all the new security measures adopted by the 
U.S. since 9/11 that affect EU citizens.  Strasser said the 
Secretary had responded positively to the idea.  LIBE has 
also raised the idea with new Justice Commissioner Reding, 
who Strasser said also supported the idea.  Such a review 
would be very useful in dispersing the cloud of mistrust 
surrounding U.S. proposals for new security measures, he felt. 
 
B) LIBE members should be given an opportunity to speak with 
the lead negotiators from the U.S and EU, both for a briefing 
and to convey EP views on the content of a permanent 
agreement. 
 
C) The EP should be briefed throughout the negotiating 
process, particularly on troublesome issues, so that when 
compromises between the two sides are necessary, the EP would 
have a clear understanding of why these were necessary. 
 
D) Recalling an autumn 2009 visit to Washington during which 
he had met House Homeland Security Committee Chair Thompson, 
Strasser thought it would be useful to invite Thompson and 
Committee members to Europe for discussions with EP 
 
VIENNA 00000169  002 OF 002 
 
 
counterparts, or if not possible to arrange a follow-up visit 
to Washington for LIBE members. 
 
¶5. (C) DCM raised the possibility of Embassy Vienna offering 
briefings for Austrian MEPs.  Strasser thought that for the 
time being the focus of U.S. effort should be in Brussels -- 
he praised USEU's engagement with the EP.  He indicated that, 
when the issue again reaches the stage where media/public 
interest resurfaces, the role of bilateral embassies would 
again become important. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶6. (C) Embassy finds Strasser a serious interlocutor.  We 
cannot judge the depth of his knowledge of the details of the 
TFTP/FDMA agreement, but he appears to have a solid sense of 
the internal dynamics of the EP.  His analysis tracks with 
what we have heard from other MEPs (e.g. Reftel).  As a 
former Interior Minister who cooperated closely with U.S. 
agencies after 9/11, we believe he sincerely supports 
enhancing trans-Atlantic data-sharing.  We can also confirm 
his description of the mistrust and anger in the Austrian 
media and public with regard to proposed new security 
measures.  We would encourage Washington agencies and USEU to 
look seriously at the types of "CBMs" he proposes for 
smoothing the way to passage of a permanent TFTP/FDMA in 
July. 
EACHO