VZCZCXYZ0004
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHVC #0100/01 0540133
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 230132Z FEB 10
FM AMCONSUL VANCOUVER
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0191
RUEHPNH/NVC PORTSMOUTH 0001
INFO RUEHVC/AMCONSUL VANCOUVER

UNCLAS VANCOUVER 000100 
 
SIPDIS 
DEPT FOR CA/FPP 
DHS FOR CIS/FDNS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: CVIS KFRD ASEC CPAS CMGT CA
SUBJECT: CALGARY AND VANCOUVER FRAUD SUMMARY FEBRUARY 2010 
 
REF: 08 STATE 074840 
 
¶1. (U) SUMMARY. There are no significant fraud incidents to report 
for this period.  Note that this report is on behalf of Calgary and 
Vancouver.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (U) COUNTRY CONDITIONS. Vancouver and Calgary are low-fraud 
posts. Malafide travelers find it less difficult to attempt entry 
across the vast land border than apply for a visa.  Vancouver, 
Canada's third largest city, is one of the most affluent and 
culturally diverse cities in North America. Recent immigrants from 
Asian countries including India, China, the Philippines, Korea, and 
Taiwan have flocked to the city in the past decade.  In fact, a 
third of the city is of Chinese origin and Vancouver International 
Airport services daily flights from many Asian capitals.  Eastern 
Europeans and Russians have also moved to Vancouver recently in 
significant numbers. Blaine, Washington, the closest land border, 
is a mere thirty minutes by car from downtown. 
 
 
 
¶3. (U) Recent economic development and population growth have led 
to a skyrocketing real estate market and major ethnic diversity. 
The migration from abroad has also brought in criminal elements and 
Vancouver is becoming home to an increasing number of ethnic gangs. 
Vancouver has the highest 
 
density per square mile in the entire country. Foreign immigration 
remains the principal growth factor, reflected in the fact that 
less than half of all residents in the Vancouver area speak English 
at home. The application process for Canadian documents, including 
passports and local birth certificates, is fairly well-controlled. 
Post has not seen cases of fake Canadian permanent resident card, 
which has similar security features to 
 
the U.S. legal permanent resident card. However, local authorities 
recently acknowledged that counterfeiting is becoming a major 
problem in the province and post has seen cases of individuals 
obtaining British Columbia identification cards when they were not 
entitled to them. 
 
 
 
¶4. (U) NIV FRAUD. Vancouver and Calgary detected fraud most notably 
in the H1B category. 
 
 
 
¶5. (U) Although visitor visa (B1/B2) fraud appears less organized 
and less complicated, there continues to be incidences where 
applicants try to cover up prior orders of removal or unlawful 
presence in the U.S. They do so by changing names or other 
identifying information after leaving the U.S. and 
 
entering Canada either as immigrants or asylum claimants. Usually, 
these applicants have only recently arrived in Canada to seek legal 
status after residing unlawfully in the U.S. for years. They will 
also present brand-new passports to hide their previous travel. If 
IAFIS and IDENT do not catch these applicants, their American 
regional accent or better-than-average English will reveal that 
they have been residing in the U.S. for a long time. 
 
 
 
¶6. (U) Since Calgary and Vancouver rarely see first-time H1B 
applicants who are not landed immigrants in Canada, there are 
usually no concerns about an applicant's skill or experience. 
 
 
 
¶7. (U) Most H1B fraud in Vancouver occurs when applicants come to 
renew their H1B visas and the consular officers discover that they 
are actually doing something other than working for their 
Petitioner, or they have not been paid what they should and we 
discover that they are being "benched". Vancouver has seen fewer 
fraudulent H1B cases in this reporting period than in previous 
periods. Since Vancouver started scrutinizing H1B cases more 
heavily in 2008, post appears not to be targeted as being an "easy" 
place to apply for H1B visas anymore.  Post regularly requests 
additional documentation, such as earnings and leave documents, 
monthly bank statements, unemployment wage reports, and pay records 
of applicants that have not earned the correct year-to-date 
salaries. 
 
 
 
¶8. (U) Calgary has continued to work aggressively in the last 
 
reporting period to identify possible H1-B fraud based on the 
information that was promulgated by Toronto in 09 Toronto 000193. 
Using the tools provided, Calgary has looked more effectively at 
possible "benching" of applicants and has been able to better 
respond to adverse PIMS reports prepared by Kentucky Consular 
Center's (KCC) FPU.  In these cases we have not developed any 
clear-cut instances of fraud, but have been able to ask additional 
questions to resolve inconsistencies and have hopefully avoided 
visa shopping within the mission and applicants coming to Calgary 
expecting a less thorough review of the applications. In addition, 
the Local Fraud Investigator from Vancouver made a trip to Calgary 
in January 2010 and shared H1B investigation methods used in 
Vancouver. The Fraud Investigator was able to see what kind of 
cases are appearing in Calgary and is now better able to assist 
Calgary remotely. 
 
 
 
¶9. (U) Vancouver sees occasional fraud in treaty investor and 
trader visa categories. Sometimes the fraud involves the 
concealment of criminal ineligibilities that are usually revealed 
in secondary inspection at the border when a CBP officer accesses 
the applicant's Canadian criminal record. Other times, it appears 
that the applicant is filing for an E visa so that their children 
can attend school in the U.S. These applicants tend to be recently 
naturalized Canadian citizens who are looking to start small 
businesses in the U.S. while their children attend high school or 
college there. They are generally refused for not meeting the 
marginality requirement. Post has seen E applicants who were former 
asylum seekers in the U.S. who buy a small business in the U.S. 
upon becoming a Canadian citizen after three years of permanent 
residency in Canada. 
 
 
 
¶10. (U) Vancouver continues to monitor international student 
applicants for possible fraud. Post conducted a validation study in 
the last year for Mexicans who are on student status in Canada. The 
results of the study seem to indicate that these students tend to 
abide by the terms of their B1/B2 visas. 
 
 
 
¶11. (U) IV FRAUD. Vancouver does not process immigrant visas but 
does accept "clearly approvable" I-130 petitions. Post processes K 
visas for applicants who are resident in the consular district. 
K-visa applications are generally good with a few 
immigration-purposes only cases. 
 
 
 
¶12. (U) DV FRAUD. Calgary and Vancouver do not process DV visas. 
 
 
 
¶13. (U) ACS AND PASSPORT FRAUD. As border controls strengthen and 
visa applicants are more rigorously screened, post believes 
attempted ACS and passport fraud will increase. One ACS fraud 
scenario involves the creation of a false identity. Historically, 
Canada has been a haven to Americans wishing to escape US 
authorities. Consequently, the ACS Unit encounters several people 
each year with outstanding warrants in the United States. New 
Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI) passport requirements 
for all travelers, as well as the fact that Citizenship & 
Immigration Canada is now requiring Canadian permanent residents to 
have a valid passport, means American fugitives, as well as others 
seeking to cut ties with U.S., may try to assume false identities 
in order to obtain national identification at the Consulate. 
 
 
 
¶14. (U) Vancouver's FPM was informed by the 2010 Olympic Joint 
Operations Center Supervisor of a possible U.S. passport fraud case 
in British Columbia.  Diplomatic Security in Bellingham was 
informed by RCMP that a suspicious package was received at the 
Burnaby, British Columbia UPS office. The UPS account had been 
opened by a male with a U.S. passport and a Nevada driver's 
license, which are presumably fraudulent. The package contained 
solar panels. The passport number provided to FPU belongs to a 
female from Ohio. We will continue to gather details from the 
Vancouver Police Department investigation. 
 
¶15.  (U) In most of Calgary's ACS fraud cases, they have worked 
directly with the appropriate domestic FPMs and CA to help resolve 
questions. In fact, most potential cases have proven to be fairly 
easily resolved.  As an example, Calgary has had several cases 
where applicants have denied having any previous lost or stolen 
 
passports or even any previously issued passports, but name checks 
revealed these claims to be incorrect.  Similarly, many of 
Calgary's fraud cases dealt with suspicions about possibly 
questionable birth certificates.  In all of these cases, the birth 
certificates were satisfactorily verified. 
 
 
 
16 (U) Vancouver reported in last period's fraud summary about an 
American citizen resident on Vancouver Island who wished to renew 
her passport from 1999, the first ever issued to her, because she 
could not find out what happened to her mail-in renewal application 
in the United States. Post discovered that there is a fraud-hold on 
her case because the ID and social security number of the applicant 
is reported as matching a woman who died in the 1970's. In 
addition, the applicant purporting to be the American citizen 
helped her daughter to get her first American passport in 2000. 
Post was able to get the woman into the Consulate and take her 
fingerprints. RSO sent the fingerprints to Seattle for analysis. 
FPU has been informed that there is no criminal record associated 
with the prints, so it is still unknown who the purported American 
is. DS in Seattle has indicated that they do not intend to pursue a 
case against the woman and post is waiting to hear if another DS 
office will. 
 
 
 
¶17. (U) Lost and stolen passports are numerous.  Statistics are 
difficult to compile, as many lost/stolen passports are either not 
reported or are returned to authorities other than the Consulate. 
Vancouver has a particular problem regarding stolen passports, as 
it has one of the highest property theft rates of any urban area in 
North America.  More Americans carry passports now due to the WHTI 
requirements, so we expect the number will continue to rise. 
 
¶18. (U) The historically open US-Canadian border often makes 
documenting physical presence in the United States difficult, if 
not impossible. Neither side of the border stamps entries in US 
passports. Proof of physical presence is, of course, required for 
transmitting citizenship to Canadian-born children. Within the past 
year, post has detected several individuals fabricating physical 
presence claims in order to meet the time requirements. Some 
applicants apply years after being refused an initial time, 
submitting different data and hoping for a different ruling. For 
this reason, posts very rarely accept affidavits as proof of 
physical presence. 
 
 
 
¶19. (U) Canadian authorities go to great lengths to conceal 
adoptions on official records to protect individual privacy. 
Biological parent information on birth documents is routinely 
replaced with the details of the adopting parents with no evidence 
that a change ever took place. This makes concealing 
 
adoptions for the purposes of claiming derivative citizenship 
fairly easy. Post must scrutinize birth documents very carefully 
and always ask to see the "long" birth form, when available. 
 
 
 
¶20. (U) ADOPTION FRAUD. No fraud to report. 
 
 
 
¶21. (U) DNA TESTING.  No DNA testing this reporting period. 
 
 
 
¶22. (U) ASYLUM AND OTHER DHS BENEFITS FRAUD. No fraud to report. 
 
 
 
¶23. (U) COOPERATION WITH HOST COUNTRY AUTHORITIES. Post enjoys a 
good working relationship with authorities from all levels of the 
host government. They are generally accessible and responsive to 
consular needs. 
 
 
 
¶24. (U) AREAS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN. Given Vancouver's proximity to 
the U.S. border, there are significant concerns that foreign 
nationals view the region as a transit center for ultimate illegal 
entry into the United States. 
 
¶25. (U) Calgary is currently working with the Department on 
reported incidents of internet scammers who are using apparently 
photo-shopped American passports as proof of their identity to 
would-be targets. While these documents do not appear to have been 
used for travel (and most likely only exist in digital form), they 
have been sent to people with whom they have developed contacts 
with over the internet.  After building the relationship, the 
scammer will then ask for money and send the passport image as 
proof of who they are.  In the two most recent cases, it appears 
that the scammers have used the same background template for the 
passport, and digitally substituted different pictures and 
biographic data.  Afraid that something might be amiss, the 
potential victims have sent the passport images to the Consulate 
for verification. Vancouver had one person try and verify a U.S. 
passport due to this kind of scam during this period. 
 
 
 
¶26. (U) Posts routinely refer cases to CBSA whenever applicants 
reveal information during a visa interview that indicates they 
committed fraud against Canadian immigration authorities. 
Similarly, CBSA counterparts refer cases to post whenever they 
believe the individual has committed fraud against U.S. 
authorities. 
 
 
 
¶27. (U) STAFFING AND TRAINING. Vancouver and Calgary have part-time 
Fraud Prevention Managers (FPM) who are also NIV line officers. 
Calgary has a locally engaged staff member who serves as Fraud 
Prevention Manager Assistant and Vancouver hired a full-time fraud 
prevention investigator last year. The current investigator started 
work in Vancouver in February 2009 and went to Calgary in January 
2010 to conduct fraud training. 
CHICOLA