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DE RUCNDT #0106/01 0560044
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FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8228
INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL IMMEDIATE 1262
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000106 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/24/2020 
TAGS: PREL PHUM ETTC MCAP KN UNSC
SUBJECT: DPRK: IMPROVING THE UN'S RESPONSE TO DPRK 
SANCTIONS VIOLATIONS 
 
Classified By: Amb. Alejandro Wolff for Reasons 1.4 (B), (D) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: U.S., UK, French and Japanese missions have 
urged the UN Security Council's North Korea Sanctions 
Committee ("1718 Committee") to streamline and improve its 
response to reported sanctions violations.  Missions have 
urged the chair (Turkey) to encourage vigorous Committee 
investigation and follow-up to each incident.  These 
delegations have also developed with the chair a non-paper 
(para 8) to help standardize the Committee's response to 
violations, thereby making the process more predictable and 
user-friendly.  USUN has also discussed with the chair the 
need to brainstorm specific actions the Committee can take 
after these incidents to tighten sanctions enforcement, as 
well as the need to develop supplemental guidance that the 
Committee can release on its website to help Member States 
enforce sanctions.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (C) On February 19, the Turkish Perm Rep Apakan, chair of 
the Security Council's North Korea Sanctions Committee ("1718 
Committee") asked his staff to convene a meeting with 
Committee representatives from the U.S., UK, French and 
Japanese missions to discuss ways to improve the Committee's 
response to reported sanctions violations.  Apakan had noted 
that during Council consultations the previous week, a number 
of delegations had encouraged the Committee to respond more 
effectively to these violations.  The Turkish mission noted 
that the recent sanctions violation reported February 18 by 
South Africa (tank parts aboard the vessel 'Westerhever') 
marked the fifth such violation reported to the Committee 
since UNSCR 1874 was adopted in June 2009.  Other violations 
have been reported by the UAE (arms-related materiel aboard 
the vessel 'ANL Australia), South Korea (chemical protective 
suits aboard the vessel 'MS Rachele'), Thailand (DPRK arms 
seized aboard an aircraft), and Austria (luxury yachts being 
transferred to the DPRK).  On most of these cases the 
Committee has engaged in some correspondence with involved 
states, but has not yet taken additional actions in response. 
 
¶3.  (C) The U.S., UK, French and Japanese representatives 
unanimously urged the Turks to encourage a vigorous Committee 
response to all of these cases.  Such responses could include 
corresponding with the involved states (including alleged 
violators), investigating the facts of each violation, 
reporting regularly to the Security Council about the 
incidents and, in a final stage, taking effective action to 
help deter and detect future violations.  All agreed that the 
chair should also encourage the Panel of Experts (POE), a 
team mandated in UNSCR 1874 to monitor and improve sanctions 
implementation, to investigate these cases aggressively.  On 
this latter point, the Japanese representative noted that the 
POE -- whose mandate expires in June 2010 -- may wish to 
tread carefully on these incidents so as to avoid politically 
sensitive findings that could jeopardize chances of renewing 
the POE's mandate for another year. 
 
¶4.  (C) USUN suggested that the Committee standardize its 
procedures to respond to these reported violations.  USUN 
explained that a number of states, in particular Thailand, 
were confused about the Committee's exact procedures and had 
complained that the Committee took so long to respond to 
correspondence.  A degree of standardization, USUN argued, 
would reassure Member States that the Committee will deal 
predictably with each reported violation and also accelerate 
Committee response time -- as a result, Member States might 
be more willing to report violations. 
 
¶5.  (C) Working with the Turkish chair, the U.S., UK, French 
and Japanese missions developed a short non-paper (para 8) to 
illustrate the steps the Committee should follow after 
receiving a report of a sanctions violations.  This informal 
paper was intended to spell out the current practice that has 
developed via precedents established in both the Committee 
and the Iran sanctions context.  The Turks agreed that this 
paper could serve as a rough guide for responding to future 
violations. 
 
¶6.  (C) USUN has also encouraged the Turks to help the 
Committee brainstorm options for effective actions the 
Committee can take to improve sanctions implementation in the 
wake of a reported violation.  For example, the Committee 
could determine ways to "name and shame" companies that 
repeatedly facilitate sanctions violations or post 
Implementation Assistance Notices on the Committee's website 
to share lessons learned and urge enhanced vigilance in 
certain circumstances.  U.S., UK, French and Japanese 
missions agreed to seek further ideas from capitals for 
effective responses. 
 
 
 
¶7.  (C) To further assuage Member State concerns about 
reporting incidents, USUN also volunteered to work with the 
Turkish chair to develop publicly-releasable fact sheets 
describing in clear language the role of the Committee and 
the Panel of Experts (POE).  Similarly, USUN suggested the 
Committee help resolve confusion among some states about how 
they should "dispose" of seized contraband, as is required in 
UNSCR 1874.  For example, the Committee could draft 
releasable guidance on this issue to help states understand 
the range of permissible disposal options.  The Turkish chair 
reacted favorably to these suggestions. 
 
¶8.  //BEGIN NON-PAPER// 
 
1718 COMMITTEE: THE LIFE CYCLE OF A SANCTIONS VIOLATION 
 
(1) INTIIAL REPORT: A Member State reports a sanctions 
violation to the 1718 Committee. 
 
(2) POE OUTREACH: Panel of Experts (POE) reaches out to the 
UN mission of the reporting state to ask follow-up questions 
and discuss possibility of a site visit to inspect seized 
cargo. 
 
(3) COMMITTEE OUTREACH: 1718 Committee writes first round of 
letters to involved states: 
 
-- Response letter to reporting state (includes references to 
POE and suggest that cargo be retained for inspection) 
 
-- Request for an explanation from alleged violators within 
thirty days. 
 
-- Request for further information from all other states 
(e.g., vessel's flag state, state of incorporation of 
shipping company, etc.) within thirty days. 
 
(4) POE INVESTIGATION: POE researches the case thoroughly, 
including through: 
 
-- Analyzing information supplied by Member States to the 
Committee in response to the first round of letters. 
 
-- Gathering information from other sources (e.g., press 
accounts, personal interviews, independent research). 
 
-- Consulting with Member States. 
 
-- Site inspections / travel. 
 
(5) INCIDENT REPORT: POE submits to the Committee a 
confidential "Incident Report" that includes: 
 
-- Summary of the facts of the incident. 
 
-- Analysis of trends/patterns involved in the violation. 
 
-- Recommendations for Committee action to respond 
effectively to incident. 
 
(6) COMMITTEE REVIEW/RESPONSE: Committee reviews Incident 
Report and takes appropriate action in response. 
 
(7) END OF INITIAL INVESTIGATION: Committee writes back to 
the reporting state to explain that the Committee has 
completed its initial investigation and that the reporting 
state may dispose of cargo pursuant to UNSCR 1874. 
 
(8) ONGOING CONSIDERATION: The Committee may at any time 
review "lessons learned" and study patterns of sanctions 
violations (e.g., identify companies or states linked to 
multiple violations).  The Committee may decide to issue 
additional advisory notices / guidance to Member State or 
engage in outreach/assistance where appropriate. 
 
// END TEXT OF NON-PAPER // 
RICE