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P 261552Z FEB 10
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 USOSCE 000068 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR VCI/CCA, VCI/NRRC, EUR/RPM, EUR/PRA, EUR/CARC, 
SCA/CEN, SCA/RA, PM/WRA, ISN/CPI 
NSC FOR SHERWOOD-RANDALL, HAYDEN, MCFAUL, HOVENIER, 
NILSSON, FRIEDT 
OSD FOR ISA (WALLENDER, KEHL) 
JCS, EUCOM, USAREUR AND CENTCOM: FOR J-5 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OSCE PARM PREL KCFE RS XG
SUBJECT: OSCE/FSC ON 2/24: DIFFERENCES OVER CODE OF 
CONDUCT; NO MOVEMENT YET ON VD99 PROPOSALS 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  The February 24 Forum for Security 
Cooperation focused on the Code of Conduct, which drew out 
differences between U.S. and Russian approaches to dealing 
with conflict prevention and crisis management.  It also 
underscored ambiguities within the Code and the tension 
between consensus and action by the OSCE in response to a 
potential crisis.  Russia's proposal for OSCE conflict 
prevention was discussed in Working Group "B."  Discussion of 
the British and Danish Vienna Document Food-for-thought 
papers in Working Group "A" made little headway.  End Summary. 
 
-------------------------------- 
Presentations on Code of Conduct 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) The 605th Meeting of the Forum for Security 
Cooperation on February 24 focused on the Code of Conduct on 
Politico-Military Aspects of Security, fulfilling in part the 
third tasking from ministers under the Issues Relevant 
decision (MC.DEC/16/09).  As part of the Security Dialogue, 
the FSC received presentations from Wolfgang Zellner, Acting 
Head of the OSCE Center for OSCE Research; Andrei Zagorski, 
Lead Researcher at the Moscow State Institute for 
International Relations; and David Law, Senior Fellow at the 
Geneva Center for Democratic Control of the Armed Forces. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Zellner's presentation focused on the Code's 
"ground-breaking" language that applies the principle of 
democratic controls, individual accountability, and the 
extension of essentially national norms to international 
applicability for all security forces within a State. 
Zagorski explored the concept of indivisible security and its 
manifestation within a framework of cooperative, external and 
internal security.  He noted so-called "positive ambiguities" 
and the absence of a binding dispute resolution mechanism 
that would force participating States to seek common 
understanding at critical intervals in their relationships. 
With respect to CSBMs, Zagorski emphasized that updating VD99 
and taking conventional arms control to the next level would 
constitute a first step in considering further measures aimed 
at solidarity within the OSCE. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Law focused his remarks on the need to apply 
democratic control principles, including human rights and an 
effective division of labor between civilian leadership and 
the security forces to extend norms to private security 
forces that are outside the Code of Conduct oversight 
mechanisms.  Besides the importance of incorporating private 
and traditional security providers into an agreed set of 
standards and norms, Law also underscored the added value of 
public-private partnerships in building accountability 
mechanisms. 
 
------------------------------- 
Responses by States on the Code 
------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) Russia (Ulyanov) noted the plenary discussion 
demonstrated the consistency between the Russian proposal for 
a European Security Treaty and the concept of comprehensive 
security.  Ulyanov pointed out that the EST ) like the Code 
of Conduct - need not be discussed outside the 
political-military dimension "as some have suggested."  He 
then raised the prospect for a Europe-based missile defense 
system as an example of the violation of the Code's principle 
that no state should strengthen its security at the expense 
of another (presumably Russia).  Ulyanov said this justified 
the need for a legally-binding charter since its absence 
created different security spheres in that indivisible 
security has a legal character in NATO, but not for the OSCE 
Code of Conduct; he referred to the difference as "abnormal." 
  Ulyanov ended his remarks pleased the U.S. had incorporated 
elements of the Russian proposal for conflict prevention but 
 
USOSCE 00000068  002 OF 004 
 
 
said the U.S. proposal was vague and Russia's was a more 
precise elaboration of this concept. 
 
¶6. (SBU) The U.S. (Neighbour) underscored the Code's 
continued relevance for adapting the comprehensive security 
concepts of the Helsinki Final Act to addressing 21st century 
threats in inter- and intra-state relations.  He also posed a 
question to Zagorski about the tension between consensus and 
the ability to act to avert crisis.  Spain (Anson), speaking 
for the EU Presidency, emphasized the Code's stipulation 
against forces that are "not accountable to or controlled by 
their constitutionally established authorities."  Switzerland 
(Von Arx) noted the Code called for respecting the sovereign 
right of states to choose their relationships including 
neutrality, but added there was room to develop the concept 
of solidarity of action such as how to address a violation of 
commitments.  Von Arx speculated that a reconfirmation of the 
Code of Conduct, including all principles contained therein, 
would do much to underscore the basic principles of European 
security, and avoid a selective reading of those principles. 
Georgia (Giorgazde) questioned Zellner's characterization of 
the Russian proposed European Security Treaty as "sharing the 
same vision as the Corfu Process," because Georgia sees the 
two as incompatible since Russia was not offering a 
comprehensive approach to security. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Germany (Genrich) said the Forum needed to return to 
the beginning of the Code, recognizing the tensions among its 
principles, and consider how to address those tensions in the 
new security environment including review of the capacity for 
oversight.  As a way to address these tensions, he proposed 
that perhaps the OSCE should think about new mechanisms of a 
consultative nature.  Genrich added that dealing with the 
Code in the AIAM was not the best solution.  Ireland 
(O'Leary) expressed strong support for Austria's proposed 
reference list for completing the Code of Conduct 
Questionnaire. Not surprisingly, Belarus (Krayushkin) 
emphasized that the principles in the Code of Conduct were 
only politically binding, which was why a document to ensure 
implementation was needed, such as Russia's proposal for a 
legally-binding EST.  Latvia (Nilsons) called for "faithful 
implementation" of current mechanisms and concrete proposals 
in the field of CSBMs and Arms Control as a good basis for 
furthering cooperation. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
"Consensus Minus" and the Code of Conduct 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) In their closing remarks, Law advocated for the OSCE 
to press for a better dialogue between the armed forces and 
the public.  In response to a U.S. question about the tension 
between consensus and the ability to act to avert crisis, 
Zagorski noted that the Human Dimension allowed for consensus 
minus one as a way for OSCE to take action, albeit 
temporarily and not as a substitute for building consensus. 
He added this was important in that the OSCE has other 
impediments like no enforcement mechanisms and a dependence 
on the political will of the states concerned. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Zagorski noted the OSCE should be able to act with 
the widest possible support but only until consensus was 
achieved to ensure all participating states own a decision to 
act.  Zellner called for exploring tangible proposals on how 
to use in a positive way the tensions built into the Code, 
including possibly holding a seminar to consider how to 
bridge the gulf between consensus, solidarity of action, and 
conflict prevention.  In response to Georgia, Zellner pointed 
out that Russia and the Corfu Process shared a vision for a 
security dialogue that supported greater cooperation: "the 
vision is agreed but not the path to achieve it." 
 
¶10. (SBU) Russia, returning to the question of "consensus 
 
USOSCE 00000068  003 OF 004 
 
 
minus" raised in part by the U.S. intervention, called the 
point "crucial" that, although theoretically possible, 
consensus minus could only be achieved within a more mature 
organization that has codified its institutional mandate. 
Ulyanov said, "We would need a European Charter first, with 
clear rules of play, before we could take seriously a 
'consensus minus' mechanism in conflict prevention." 
 
¶11. (SBU) Under Any Other Business, Ukraine thanked the CPC 
for the report on implementation of cycle one of the melange 
removal project, and expressed appreciation to the donor 
countries.  Russia intervened to note that it was a Russian 
company doing the lion's share of the actual melange 
disposal, a point which Ukraine graciously acknowledged. 
Georgia called for an FSC discussion, which he hoped would 
include Heidi Tagliavini and relevant NGOs, dedicated to the 
August 2008 conflict with Russia, "not to point fingers but 
to examine lessons learned." 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
Working Group "B" ) Russia: "Never say never!" 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶12. (SBU) Following the reintroduction of Russia's proposed 
draft decision on conflict prevention 
(FSC-PC.DEL/1/10/Corr.1), Switzerland (Von Arx) raised the 
importance of considering the Russian proposal within the 
framework of the Corfu Process and looking for common 
denominators between the Russian draft and the other 
Food-for-thought proposals being circulated on the same 
topic.  Von Arx also said there was room to consider the role 
to be played by other OSCE institutions like the CPC. 
 
¶13. (SBU) The U.S. (Ellis) asked Russia for clarification on 
whether the last operative paragraph of its FFT excluded the 
possibility of the OSCE reaching consensus on a conflict 
prevention mechanism that may not need consensus before 
triggering an OSCE response to a crisis.  While noting he did 
not have official instructions on this issue, Russia 
(Ulyanov) responded with "never say never!" but the specific 
mechanism would need to be discussed along with the rules 
associated with that mechanism.  He reiterated his belief 
that "consensus minus" would be difficult to approve unless 
OSCE had a "Charter" (i.e., a legally-binding agreement) that 
would make it a well-established, serious, and mature 
organization. 
 
¶14. (SBU) The Greek Chair (Sourani), in support of a 
Hungarian comment about the important role for the FSC in 
examining a comprehensive approach to early warning, crisis 
management and conflict prevention proposals, argued that the 
procedures for engagement were less important that reaching 
consensus.  The U.S. (Ellis) noted "the devil's in the 
details" and that adherence to clear procedures is important 
for examining the specific mechanisms that can get the OSCE 
to consensus. (Comment: there is no consensus in the FSC 
regarding the attempt by Russia and Greece to create a joint 
FSC-PC decision-making mechanism.  Most delegations, however, 
are still on the sidelines, observing the exchange on not 
just the Russian draft proposal, but also the ongoing 
discussion over the procedural questions raised by Russia and 
Greece.  End Comment.) 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
Working Group "A" ) No movement on VD99 proposals 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶15. (SBU) Greece (Kalpadakis) announced Uzbekistan failed to 
respond to a VD99 evaluation visit requested on February 9 
(CBM/GR/10/003/F36/0), and that a similar request in 2009 
also went unanswered.  No delegation commented on the 
non-compliance by Uzbekistan; the Uzbeks were not present at 
the Working Group. 
 
USOSCE 00000068  004 OF 004 
 
 
 
¶16. (SBU) The UK draft on VD99-A Way Forward" 
(FSC.DEL/13/10/Rev.1) was revised to reflect Denmark's 
co-sponsorship.  The revision also reflected adjustments to 
the UK's operative paragraph 2 that successful renegotiation 
of Chapters V and IX "will supersede corresponding chapters 
of VD99," in order to complement the Danish proposal for 
"VD-plus," which includes VD Review Meetings 
(FSC.DEL/9/10/Rev.1) that would create a routine and targeted 
mechanism for incorporating future changes and updates to the 
Vienna Document. 
 
¶17. (SBU) Russia (Geyandov), though still awaiting 
instructions from Moscow, underscored that it already 
expressed overall Russian support for the paper, but sought 
clarification on whether the changes would follow the Danish 
Draft for a VD Review Meeting, or would allow for the more 
traditional format that incorporates additions at the end of 
the year.  The UK (Gare) said that procedures were up for 
discussion and it would depend on where was the FSC at the 
time.  Denmark (Petersen) noted there was sufficient 
flexibility to having a VD Review Meeting whenever there was 
consensus to do so, though it would be preferable to hold 
them in conjunction with the Annual Implementation and 
Assessment Meetings (AIAM). Ukraine, Belarus, and Finland 
said the two proposals were under consideration by their 
respective capitals. 
 
¶18. (U) The next meeting of the FSC plenary and Working 
Groups is scheduled for March 10 (the week following the 
AIAM). 
FULLER