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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 USOSCE 000055 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2030 
TAGS: PGOV PREL OSCE PINR KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN AT THE REINS OF THE  OSCE 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Carol Fuller for reasons 1.4 (b) and ( 
d). 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
¶1. (C) Representing the Chair in Office (CiO) at the OSCE, 
Kazakhstan's Vienna representatives have begun to show their 
mettle in dealing with conflict and their intentions for the 
coming year.  Led by seasoned diplomat Kairat Abdrakhmanov, 
the Kazakhstani delegation is off to a shaky start in Vienna, 
appearing to have only a superficial understanding of the 
OSCE and frequently bumbling while hoping - above all - never 
to lose face.  Abdrakhmanov is often disengaged, reluctant to 
make decisions, reliant on underlings and, despite generally 
projecting a congenial, cosmopolitan image, occasionally 
revealing a steely intransigence. 
 
¶2. (C) (Summary continued) It is still early days to assess 
whether Kazakhstan seeks to have a meaningful impact on the 
development or direction of the OSCE but early indications 
are that more than anything, it hopes to hold a high profile 
summit and make it through the year without any major 
embarrassments.  The Government of Kazakhstan (GOK) has 
committed substantial resources - in both funding and 
personnel - to this endeavor.  On the other side of the coin, 
however, it has already instituted some unwelcome changes to 
long-standing OSCE traditions and customs.  How much of this 
can be attributed to cultural differences between an 
authoritarian country and the long-standing democratic 
traditions of the west and how much to political intention is 
not yet clear.  Multi-vector Kazakhstan has an opportunity to 
be an honest broker with the West while retaining Moscow's 
trust, but so far, at least in Vienna, the overriding goal is 
to burnish the GOK's international image through the holding 
of a Summit.  At the same time, we will need to counter 
Kazakhstan's declared intention to provide "balance" of 
greater emphasis on hard security and less on the human 
dimension.  As we seek to work with Kazakhstan at OSCE, this 
message is provided to offer initial insights into the 
Kazakhstani actors in Vienna.  End summary. 
 
ABDRAKHMANOV LEADS, WITH DIFFIDENCE -- OR INTRANSIGENCE 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
¶3. (C) The Permanent Representative of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan to the OSCE is Ambassador Kairat Abdrakhmanov: a 
seasoned diplomat who has previously held top-level 
positions, including Ambassador to Israel (2003-2006), Deputy 
Foreign Minister (1999-2001 and 2006-2007) and bilateral 
Ambassador to Austria (2007)- which he ceded for the 
undoubtedly career enhancing possibility of representing 
Kazakhstan's chairmanship of the OSCE.  With over a year to 
get prepared for the Chairmanship, Abdrakhmanov has ably 
fashioned a figurative role of a visiting orchestral 
conductor - waving his hands over the orchestra, while not 
paying much attention to the preparatory work behind the 
stage.  He appears to rely inordinately on those beneath him 
expecting all will go smoothly.  This has contributed to him 
and his team getting off to a shaky start in Vienna, 
frequently bumbling and appearing to have (and not to be 
bothered about having) no more than a superficial 
understanding of the OSCE or its institutions, while striving 
- above all - to deliver the promised summit decreed by 
Kazakhstan's President Nazarbayev without ever losing face. 
 
¶4. (C) Abdrakhmanov's behavior is in some ways reminiscent of 
Soviet models.  He is authoritarian yet disengaged.  He is 
often unable to make decisions and fears being called to 
account by his superiors.  Director of the OSCE Conflict 
Prevention Center German Ambassador Herbert Salber told 
USOSCE CDA that Abdrakhmanov was visibly reluctant to remain 
in the car with FM Saudabayev during the minister's January 
2010 visit to Vienna.  His inability to make decisions is 
very frustrating to OSCE delegations.  For example, the 
Austrian Ambassador to the OSCE repeatedly asked Abdrakhmanov 
for information about the 2010 Ambassadors' Retreat - an 
event traditionally paid for by the Austrian government. 
After each request, she received no response.  In 
exasperation, she finally announced publicly that due to the 
lack of consultation Austria could not cover the costs of the 
event.  Even the OSCE Secretary General (SYG) Marc Perrin De 
Brichambaut told USOSCE CDA that it is nearly impossible to 
get a decision out of Abdrakhmanov - even on simple 
logistical issues like the date and venue for the retreat. 
The event finally took place February 12-13 and was paid for 
lavishly by the CiO. 
 
¶5. (C) Abdrakhmanov relies inordinately on underlings and 
cultivates the image of himself as a congenial, debonair 
socialite.  He delights in showing off the riches of his 
country at social events.  However, when confronted with 
unpleasantness or disagreements, Abdrakhmanov drops that 
 
USOSCE 00000055  002 OF 004 
 
 
facade to reveal an intransigent streak.  While his English 
is good, he can also be difficult to understand sometimes 
because he mumbles and speaks very softly or in a convoluted 
style.  Abdrakhmanov has also perfected the ability to talk 
at great length while saying very little of substance.  In 
weekly meetings with USOSCE, he will often speak in general 
terms for nearly all the meeting until pushed to get down to 
specifics of the week's agenda. 
 
¶6. (C) While every Chairmanship brings its own unique style 
to the OSCE's helm, Kazakhstan has sometimes disturbed 
delegations by changes to OSCE traditions.  In a departure 
from established practice, Abdrakhmanov refused to permit 
Georgia - the country under discussion at a Permanent Council 
meeting - to be the final speaker as is both custom and 
courtesy.  In that instance, in what appeared to all to be a 
slap in the Georgian ambassador's face, Abdrakhmanov 
permitted the Russians to speak last.  Abdrakhmanov has 
abandoned another OSCE tradition to let all participating 
States make Permanent Council remarks before any partner 
state does so.  Other cultural differences appear as well. 
Female OSCE support staff have complained to U.S. delegates 
that the "non-European Kazakhstanis treat women as if they 
are good for only two things: getting coffee and the oldest 
profession in the world." 
 
¶7. (C) Abdrakhmanov is disorganized, or deliberately lax 
about, sharing information in a timely manner.  Announcements 
of meetings, schedule changes or invitations to 
representational events often arrive late.  Although it is 
possible that the CiO is just going through normal "growing 
pains," the impression given is clear: when the Chair issues 
a document or an invitation, all delegations are expected to 
be immediately attentive and responsive.  OSCE SYG De 
Brichambaut told CDA that the cycle of consultations and the 
pressure of building consensus likely would start to wear on 
the Kazakhstani delegation relatively quickly and recommended 
interlocutors be "discreet" and avoid surprises, particularly 
given Abdrakhmanov's preoccupation with "face" and image.  De 
Brichambaut said he expected an "authoritarian streak" to 
show itself in Abdrakhmanov (noting that Chairmanships often 
suffered from a "master of the universe" syndrome). 
 
¶8. (C) This tendency was particularly pronounced in early and 
mid-February as USOSCE worked with the Kazakhstani delegation 
and others to shape a workable agenda for the Human Dimension 
in 2010.  As CiO, Kazakhstan bears the responsibility for 
developing a Human Dimension agenda by setting forth topics 
for the seven Human Dimension events to take place throughout 
the year.  However, the Kazakh proposal lacked almost any of 
the priorities the U.S., the EU, Canada, Norway, and other 
like-minded missions presented to them earlier.  Instead, the 
proposal was heavy on non-controversial tolerance and 
nondiscrimination topics (Russian and Central Asian 
favorites) and bereft of fundamental freedoms or basic human 
rights.  The Kazakhstani delegation initially presented their 
package of ideas as being sacrosanct, warning delegations not 
to "open the package."  Under pressure to broker a 
compromise, they held repeated formal and informal meetings, 
but negotiations fell apart on February 17.  USOSCE learned 
that the delegation had just received instructions from 
Astana to reaffirm the CiO's initial draft and refuse to 
negotiate any changes, insisting that it is a take it or 
leave it deal.  In an interchange with the Charge and Senator 
Ben Cardin of the Helsinki Commission at the OSCE 
Parliamentary Assembly February 18, Abdrakhmanov insisted 
that freedom of religion is a fundamental freedom and that 
that should be good enough for us.  Senator Cardin assured 
him again that including fundamental freedoms is a priority 
for the U.S. 
 
OTHER PLAYERS 
------------- 
¶9. (C) Kazakhstan dramatically increased the size of its 
Mission to the OSCE after receiving the chairmanship at the 
Madrid Ministerial Council in 2007.  It now has three Deputy 
Permanent Representatives (DCMs), approximately 15 other 
accredited diplomats and six support staff.  The primus inter 
pares among the three DCMs is widely seen as Yerkin 
Akhinzhanov.  An information sheet provided by the 
Kazakhstani delegation lists his portfolio as encompassing a 
wide range of responsibilities, including general 
coordination, the OSCE Summit, the Corfu Process, the 
Preparatory Committee and the Political Military Dimension. 
Akhinzhanov, an extrovert, is seen as a capable and 
gregarious interlocutor who speaks good English.  He shares a 
great variety of information (maybe even more than a more 
seasoned diplomat would do).  While he is largely seen as 
being good at what he does, it is frequently evident that he 
is operating above his level of experience or comfort.  He 
has made painstaking, but sometimes inept, efforts to 
 
USOSCE 00000055  003 OF 004 
 
 
coordinate the timing for the OSCE's largest security-related 
events on the Corfu Process, constantly revising the timing 
to suit this or that concern voiced by various delegations. 
This stands in sharp contrast to Abdrakhmanov's more 
authoritarian approach, but it also contributes to 
undermining the Chair's effectiveness in an organization 
where gaining a balance between progress and universal 
acceptance is more of an art than a science. 
 
¶10. (C) Next in authority is Usen Suleimenov who is 
responsible for, inter alia, the Human Dimension, the OSCE 
Troika, the Office of the Secretary General, field missions 
in Central Asia, Asian Partners for Cooperation and protocol. 
 Suleimenov is considered the toughest negotiator of the 
top-tier Kazakhstani team.  His negotiating style can 
frequently shift (even in a single meeting) from bullying, to 
pleading, to pretending to have been offended or insulted, to 
serious negotiator.  He quickly personalizes issues and 
depicts even minor setbacks as impassable disagreements which 
will sink the Chairmanship and inevitably lead to the 
ruination of his diplomatic career. 
 
¶11. (C) Suleimenov is not above blatant efforts to 
horse-trade unrelated issues.  In an effort to get USG 
agreement to his preferred language in a draft decision at 
the December 2009 Athens Ministerial, prior to the Kazakh 
Chairmanship, Suleimenov essentially offered a bribe: 
Kazakhstan would create a personal representative of the CiO 
for gender issues and staff it with an American if we would 
withdraw our objections.  We did not, and Kazakhstan is again 
seeking to fill the post with an amcit - this time, without a 
bribe.  Suleimenov is also occasionally boorish, and has been 
overheard by U.S. delegates making sexist remarks to female 
delegates. 
 
¶12. (C) Third in line is Akan Rahkmetullin who is responsible 
for the Economic and Environmental Dimension (EED), the 
External Cooperation Department, and field missions in South 
Eastern Europe, among other things.  Akan is seen by some as 
an intellectual lightweight who is more interested in making 
friends and being liked than taking hard-line positions or 
forging difficult compromises.  In a recent conversation with 
Poloff, he mentioned he has been in the MFA since 1992, but 
it is not uncommon for those meeting him for the first time 
to assume him to be younger or less experienced than this 
would indicate.  In his work on the EED, Akan so far has not 
taken the lead on providing proposals or substance, 
preferring to rely, instead, on other delegations to provide 
extensive written input first.  A number of pS have expressed 
privately to USOSCE (and somewhat openly in a recent 
committee meeting) frustration that the Kazakhstani handling 
of energy security, expected to be a salient part of the EED 
agenda for 2010, has been passive and slow-moving.  On the 
Balkans, Akan admits readily that he does not have a deep 
knowledge of the region (a region where Kazakhstan is without 
diplomatic representation) and in two recent meetings with 
USDEL and visiting USG officials to discuss Balkans issues he 
has been almost entirely in listening mode. 
 
LEADERSHIP OPPORTUNITY AWAITS 
------------------------------ 
¶13. (C) A coincidental irony for Kazakhstan is that it 
assumed the Chairmanship just as the OSCE moved into higher 
gear on a comprehensive review of European security and 
ongoing threats to it.  Geographically and historically 
removed from the issue, Kazakhstan has an opportunity to be 
an honest broker while retaining Moscow's trust.  Or, as 
seems increasingly likely as time goes by, Ambassador 
Abdrakhmanov can step back and orchestrate the process from a 
comfortable distance, seeking only to obtain some sort of 
initial step worthy of presenting to a Summit.  By tapping 
ten other Ambassadors as "Corfu Coordinators" to follow 
specific issues and work with the Chair, Abdrakhmanov has 
skillfully spread out the work (and the responsibility) for 
the success or failure of the project.  Since eight of these 
are EU ambassadors, this bodes well for keeping the process 
on track with the spirit of the Corfu process.  Nevertheless, 
as with other components, the hard work of butting heads and 
forging compromises - the responsibility of the OSCE CiO - 
lies ahead, and Abdrakhmanov cannot afford to continue as a 
passive player. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
¶14. (C) It is apparent that Kazakhstan's prime interest is to 
burnish its international credentials, notably with the 
crowning achievement of a first-in-a-decade OSCE Summit - no 
matter the topic or outcome - rather than leaving a lasting 
imprint on the organization.  To achieve that, the Kazakhstan 
Delegation seems keen to avoid major embarrassments and 
political turmoil.  At the same time, there is still a 
 
USOSCE 00000055  004 OF 004 
 
 
possibility that their actions may reflect political 
intention.  Kazakhstani President Nazarbayev and Foreign 
Minister Saudabayev have both stated on numerous occasions 
that Kazakhstan wants to see 'balance' restored to the OSCE - 
words echoed by Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov in his 
February 6 address at the Munich Security Conference.  This 
is largely code for reducing focus on the Human Dimension and 
reemphasizing traditional, hard security or first dimension 
issues.  We will continue to state our clear priorities to 
the Kazakhstani representatives in Vienna as we proceed with 
this year's OSCE agenda.  We believe it is important, more 
than with past Chairmanships, that our messages be carefully 
synchronized between Vienna, Washington and Astana, and that 
we stay in close contact with our EU and NATO allies. 
FULLER