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P 051607Z FEB 10
FM USMISSION USOSCE
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INFO RUCNCFE/CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE PRIORITY
RUCNOSC/ORG FOR SECURITY CO OP IN EUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
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RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE PRIORITY
RUEASWA/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
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RHMFIUU/USAREUR POLAD HEIDELBERG GE PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 USOSCE 000033 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR VCI/CCA, VCI/NRRC, EUR/RPM, EUR/PRA, EUR/CARC, 
SCA/CEN, SCA/RA, PM/WRA, ISN/CPI 
NSC FOR SHERWOOD-RANDALL, HAYDEN, MCFAUL, HOVENIER, 
NILSSON, FRIEDT 
OSD FOR ISA (WALLENDER, KEHL) 
JCS, EUCOM, USAREUR AND CENTCOM: FOR J-5 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OSCE PARM PREL KCFE RS XG
SUBJECT: OSCE: 2/3 FSC HOLDS ROBUST DISCUSSION ON VIENNA 
DOCUMENT AND ON RUSSIA'S CONFLICT PREVENTION PROPOSAL 
 
REF: ELLIS-WRIGHT 1/27 EMAIL 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  The Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC) 
received a presentation on one potential way ahead for the 
Vienna Document from alumnus Col Wolfgang Richter, currently 
with the German Institute for International and Security 
Affairs.  Richter's presentation supported the currently 
tabled Danish and UK proposals for strengthening the CSBM 
regime, which will be discussed on 10 February.  There were 
lengthy, but positive reactions from FSC delegates to 
Richter's presentation.  The Russian proposal for a new 
Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Decision in Working 
Group "B" also generated many but less generous 
interventions.  We noted our concerns about the procedural 
issues raised by the Russian proposal (see paras 9-11).  End 
Summary. 
 
But first, the UK's Food for Thought 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶2. (SBU) The 602nd Meeting of the Forum for Security 
Cooperation (FSC) on February 3 featured under Agenda Item 2, 
Security Dialogue a presentation on the role of the Vienna 
Document in an evolving Security Environment by Germany's Col 
Wolfgang Richter.  Prior to Richter's address, the UK (Gare) 
introduced under Agenda Item I, General Statements its 
Food-for-Thought paper (FSC.DEL.13/10)on "A Way Forward" on 
negotiation procedures for strengthening Vienna Document 1999 
(VD99).  The UK proposed a negotiation package of Chapters 
Five (Prior Notifications) and Nine (Compliance and 
Verification) for strengthening the CSBM regime.  The UK 
emphasized its "good faith commitment" to address the 
directive from the Athens Ministerial Council Decision 16/09 
and requested inclusion of its paper on the February 10 
agenda for Working Group "A".  Gare explained her "unorthodox 
approach" for introducing the UK paper under this agenda item 
was to inform the pS during the presentation and discussion 
of Richter's address to the FSC.  France (Alabrune) expressed 
strong support for the UK proposal, especially for opening 
the door to other "packages." 
 
"Enhancing Vienna Document" 
--------------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) Richter, an FSC alum currently with the German 
Institute for International and Security Affairs (circulated 
as FSC.DEL/16/10), gave a tour d' horizon on the added value 
of the Vienna Document and set forth some concrete 
suggestions on how to keep it relevant (circulated as 
FSC.DEL/16/10).  Some highlights: 
 
-- Arms Control and confidence building built the framework 
for stability and strategic reassurances for not only ending 
the cold war, but for the ensuing political transformation of 
Europe. 
 
-- Originally the West insisted on hard arms control to 
offset the ethereal character of political intentions by 
focusing on the facts of military capabilities. 
 
-- Modifications to the Vienna Document in the 1990s 
reflected political will and conceptual imagination to 
address changes in the strategic environment; and these 
elements are still needed in order to fulfill the pledges 
made at the 1999 Istanbul Summit. 
 
-- VD99 information requirements are insufficient for 
transparency on evolving force structures based on smaller 
military unit levels with increased capabilities and 
short-term, rapid developments. 
 
 
USOSCE 00000033  002 OF 005 
 
 
-- Inspection quotas and evaluation visits need adaptation to 
current unit structures and military activities to retain 
their integrity in assuring transparency and confidence. 
 
-- The acquisition of military capabilities by internal 
security Forces are excluded though they play an important 
role in intra-state conflict, 
 
-- The small unit levels, including manpower and hardware, 
also change the effective value for prior notification and 
observation of certain military activities. 
 
-- CSBM verification mechanisms cannot contribute to conflict 
prevention and crisis management if inspection quotas are 
depleted when they are most needed.  Also ambiguities 
regarding Force Majeure can have a similar negative impact on 
conflict prevention and crisis management. 
 
--The negotiation process to achieve the goal of improving 
VD99 should not be held hostage to solving the CFE crisis but 
undertaken on its own merits. 
 
Twenty-two Interventions! 
------------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) Most of the 22 interventions made by pS with few 
exceptions following Richter's remarks were expansive 
expressions of appreciation and pledges to work 
constructively to strengthen VD99.  France (Alabrune) 
proposed the FSC focus on addressing observation and 
verification mechanisms and all but gave a complete 
endorsement of the UK paper.  Germany (Genrich) warmly 
welcomed the Food-for-thought papers presented by the UK and 
Denmark, and aligned itself with the French proposal. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Drawing on the Secretary,s 29 January remarks in 
Paris, the U.S. (Neighbour) underlined the importance of 
transparency. Inter alia, he said the U.S. supports a more 
open exchange of military data, including visits to military 
sites and observation of military activities and exercises. 
Thanking Richter for his remarks and the UK for its paper, he 
said both would be studied carefully in Washington. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Russia's representative Ulyanov said he personally 
thought the UK and Danish proposals contained "some 
attractive and intriguing elements that merit further 
attention.", but that he had no instructions yet from Moscow 
on how to respond.  He further opined that they would likely 
need some &modifications.8 
Turkey (Begec) underscored closing loopholes that allowed 
circumvention of VD99 provisions, and proselytized about 
being attentive to Russian proposals even on issues that may 
lead to "discomfort." He also focused on including internal 
security forces so that they could not be used to circumvent 
VD. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Latvia (Nilsons) emphasized the importance of 
reciprocity and suggested a possible Food-for-thought that 
would change the inspection quota procedures to provide the 
right to inspection/evaluation based on receiving an 
inspection or evaluation visit.  Sweden (Byren) noted it no 
longer uses regiments or brigades as units, especially within 
the framework of EU "battle groups."  Georgia (Giorgazde) 
elicited a brief Russian response after it described the 
failure of VD99 mechanisms to prevent conflict in the events 
leading up to the August 2008 clash. Georgia asked how to 
improve the VD99 mechanisms which in 2008 had yielded 
¬hing positive for either Russia or Georgia. Ukraine 
(Yelchenko) was especially supportive of the proposal to 
improve information exchange which was in line with its own 
proposal last year. He also said that they agreed with 
 
USOSCE 00000033  003 OF 005 
 
 
Richter,s statement that VD99 not be held hostage to CFE, 
but dealt with on its own merits. 
 
¶8. (SBU) In response to delegations, Richter cautioned pS not 
to lose sight of the requirement to improve transparency in 
the changing European security environment.  He described 
VD99 Chapters five and nine as the most urgent for improving, 
and cautioned that VD99 is only one piece of the useful 
political military toolbox of the OSCE.  Richter was 
"encouraged" there was a way forward to improve VD99 based on 
the discussions and active participation in the FSC. In 
answer to Georgia,s question about improving VD conflict 
prevention mechanisms, Richter opined that challenge 
inspections over and above the quota in such conflict 
situations would by &their mere presence8 have a 
de-escalating effect. 
 
Russia's Conflict Prevention Proposal in Working Group "B" 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) Russia (Ulyanov) referred to his introductory 
remarks at the Opening Session of the FSC (see FSC.JOU/606). 
He stated the aim of the Russian proposed "joint" Draft 
Decision on Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management 
(FSC-PC.DEL/1/10/Corr.1) was to strengthen the OSCE's 
potential and avoid the double standards of applying OSCE 
rules to conflict situations.  Several delegates remarked on 
the need for discussion on this issue within the Corfu 
Process framework before engaging on substantive elements 
within the Russian draft.  France (Simonet) observed the 
Russian proposal did not address the use of OSCE mechanisms 
to prevent conflict and asked for clarification of the phrase 
"parties to the conflict."  Italy (Negro) said the proposal 
was still being studied, and while agreeing with France that 
there was room for further clarifications on some phrases in 
the draft decision, it was not opposed to considering new 
mechanisms.  Germany (Risse) questioned the applicability of 
the Russian proposal on the sub-regional level.  Hungary 
(Toth) noted the topic required a comprehensive review to 
understand the relationship of the Russian proposal to other 
applicable tools. Switzerland (Halter) noted the Russian 
draft was not the only proposal on the table, argued for 
better implementation of the documents that have already been 
approved, including the Code of Conduct. 
 
¶10. (SBU) The UK, Latvia, Romania, Moldova and Azerbaijan 
made interventions varying on the themes previously noted. 
Georgia (Giorgazde) was very blunt criticizing the Russian 
draft as an attempt to "legalize violations of international 
law."  Giorgazde said Russia's draft ignores principles of 
territorial integrity, sovereignty, internationally 
recognized borders and other elements of the Helsinki Final 
Act.  He accused Russia of attempting "to deconstruct the 
Corfu Process instead of consolidating a dialogue to put into 
effect flexible functional mechanisms."  That said, Giorgazde 
noted, Georgia stood ready to engage in "constructive 
dialogue." 
 
¶11. (SBU) In reaction, Ulyanov explained that its proposal 
was a clear link between the Corfu Process and the FSC, and 
its proposal, which he admitted was "unorthodox" procedurally 
since it called for a joint FSC and PC decision, was 
complementary to the Corfu formula and in response to the 
West's call for comprehensive approaches.  He expressed a 
willingness to delay the next round of discussion of the 
Russian draft decision until after OSCE ambassadors have had 
a chance to discuss conflict prevention.  Ulyanov added that 
Russia was not attempting to make its proposal complete, 
since its draft reflected "only one element" of the crisis 
management problem.  Referring to Georgia's intervention, 
Ulyanov noted that if the principles as contained within the 
 
USOSCE 00000033  004 OF 005 
 
 
Russian draft were respected, then there would have been no 
August 2008 "tragedy."  Russia is trying to put order in 
place of chaos. 
 
Procedural Issues Raised 
------------------------ 
 
¶12. (SBU) The U.S. (Ellis) raised the point of whether it was 
appropriate for Working Group "B" to discuss a proposed draft 
decision in view of the fact that Russia previously submitted 
the exact same proposal at the January 21 Permanent Council. 
In addition to the point that as a cross-dimensional issue 
that should be discussed first in the broader context in 
order to inform the way ahead in Working Group "B", the U.S. 
noted it was unclear how Russia expected to proceed with its 
proposal for a decision in the FSC while simultaneously 
seeking a decision in the PC, which is a separate autonomous 
OSCE decision-making body.  Furthermore, the U.S. noted the 
political-military tools and instruments that are within the 
competency of the FSC were not explicit in the Russian 
proposal.  It was not inconceivable that in the process of 
working on the Russian draft, the Prepcom and the Working 
Group could arrive at two distinct texts without a procedure 
in place for reconciling differences.  The U.S. underscored 
that the introduction of any new decision-making process must 
first be agreed through consensus. 
 
¶13. (SBU) Note: The Greek Chair (Sourani) appealed to the 
Secretariat to explain the principle behind a "joint FSC-PC 
decision."  The Secretariat's senior coordination officer 
Yerzhan Birtanov confirmed that because the procedure was not 
addressed within OSCE rules of procedure, it could be created 
by delegates "if they collectively decide to do so," adding 
"it could be a useful tool to develop a joint decision-making 
process."  The Greek Chair acknowledged that what was being 
advanced would require some mechanism for joint FSC-PC 
decisions, such as through a combined Prepcom-Working Group 
"B" format, but the FSC will not have to cross that bridge 
until perhaps the June time frame!  Ulyanov acknowledged 
Russia was taking an "unorthodox approach," ensuring that no 
decision would be taken without consensus, and that if/when 
progress was made on the Russian text, perhaps there would be 
a requirement to engage in the PC's Prepcom. 
 
¶14. (SBU) Comment:  Russia's motives for a joint decision are 
not clear, other than we suspect they do not want to engage 
in cross-dimensional discussions in the PC alone, preferring 
to keep the focus on "hard security."  Greece, on the other 
hand, would like to have a new decision-making format in 
support of cross-dimensional conclusions that come out of the 
Corfu Process.  The irony of this discussion following Col 
Richter's presentation that noted differences between the 
weighted value of military capabilities and the risk of 
inconstant political intentions was lost on the FSC.  A new 
proposed tandem decision making process, if not carefully 
managed, could blur the lines between PC (intentions) and FSC 
(capabilities) mandates, risking forum shopping for any issue 
deemed multi-dimensional, with unpredictable implications for 
the Corfu Process.  End Comment. 
 
Working Group "A" ) SALW 
------------------------ 
 
¶15. (SBU) There were no issues for discussion under Agenda 
Item 2, Vienna Document.  Sweden (Byren) made a general 
presentation on the meeting of the Friends of the Small 
Arms/Light Weapons Informal Working Group held on January 29 
(ref a).  Sweden and the UK (Hartnell) and FSC Troika member 
Hungary (Toth) urged delegates to provide specific, concrete 
proposals in order to facilitate the FSC efforts on 
developing a Plan of Action by May 2010 as directed by 
 
USOSCE 00000033  005 OF 005 
 
 
Ministers. The U.S. reminded delegations of its points raised 
at the January 27 discussion and again at the Informal 
Working Group. 
 
¶16. (SBU) The Austrian Food for Thought paper on a reference 
guide on the questionnaire on the OSCE Politico-Military Code 
of Conduct (FSC.DEL/14/10) was discussed cursorily. 
(Comment:  this was a particularly long FSC plenary and 
Working Group "B" discussion that delayed convening Working 
Group "A" until late afternoon; Austria's representative left 
for another obligation.  End comment.)  The issue will remain 
on the agenda for the next Working Group "A" on February 10. 
Nonetheless, Canada (Linteau) announced it was prepared to 
co-sponsor the Austrian draft.  Hungary (Toth) also expressed 
strong support. 
 
¶17. (SBU) Under "Any other business," the CPC (Salber) 
reported distribution of its monthly report (FSC.GAL.13/10), 
its briefing of the FSC Information Exchange procedures 
(FSC.GAL.12/10), and the availability of a new set of 
"melange" guides in the Russian language. 
 
¶18. (U) The 603rd Meeting of the FSC and its Working Groups 
are scheduled for February 10.  USDel notes that in Working 
Group "A" that day, currently tabled Danish and UK proposals 
for strengthening the VD99 regime will be discussed in more 
detail. 
FULLER