VZCZCXRO1641
RR RUEHSL
DE RUEHNO #0065/01 0421556
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 111556Z FEB 10
FM USMISSION USNATO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3857
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RHMFISS/USNMR SHAPE BE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHNO/USDELMC BRUSSELS BE
RUDKSR/EUCOM PLANS AND ANALYSIS STUTTGART GE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 USNATO 000065 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2020 
TAGS: PREL NATO MOPS PGOV MARR EUN
SUBJECT: SWEDISH EU PRESIDENCY AND TURKEY TRADE DUELING 
NATO-EU LETTERS 
 
Classified By: USNATO Political Advisor Kelly Degnan.  Reasons 1.5 (b) 
and (d). 
 
¶1. (SBU) This is a joint USNATO-USEU cable. 
 
¶2. (C)  Summary:  A letter from Sweden's Permanent 
Representative to the EU to the Turkish Ambassador to the EU 
proposing an updated framework for NATO-EU relations and 
effective arrangements for cooperation in Afghanistan 
elicited a negative response in January.  The Turkish 
response recycles familiar complaints against the EU's lack 
of openness that will once again fall on deaf ears in 
downtown Brussels.  The letter exchange highlights that the 
NATO-EU relationship is bedeviled by Turkey-Cyprus and 
Turkey-EU problems that we believe are compounded by 
institutional rivalries and divergent national objectives for 
the two organizations.  End Summary. 
 
¶3.  (C) Shortly before the conclusion of Sweden's term as EU 
President, Swedish Permanent Representative to the EU, 
Ambassador Christian Danielsson wrote to Turkey's Ambassador 
to the EU describing EU efforts to improve NATO-EU relations 
under the Swedish Presidency.  Throughout Sweden's EU 
Presidency, we found Stockholm's commitment and efforts to 
improve NATO-EU relations impressive, even if the outcome was 
modest.  The Swedes coordinated their approach closely with 
us and succeeded in raising the visibility of the issue. 
Unfortunately, the letter reveals the continuing shallowness 
of NATO-EU cooperation: Sweden's most obvious accomplishment 
was NATO-EU agreement on two capabilities papers.  Moreover, 
we have not yet seen evidence that the Spanish intend a 
similarly concerted and coordinated effort during their 
Presidency.  With the Spanish Presidency focused on standing 
up new EU foreign policy structures, Madrid may simply be 
unable to play an active role in promoting NATO-EU relations. 
 
¶4. (C) The letter, while expressing appreciation for Turkey's 
contributions to EU operations and status as an EU candidate 
country, does not seem intended to allay Turkish concerns 
about the EU or spur tangible operational cooperation between 
the two organizations.  Instead, it appears to respond to 
familiar Turkish complaints about the EU attitude toward 
Turkey by underlining that while the EU is acting in good 
faith, new arrangements between the two organizations are 
required in order to make real progress. (Comment: Turkey is 
deeply committed to NATO's formal decisions on Berlin Plus 
and on NATO-EU Strategic Cooperation -- which exclude Cyprus 
from formal NATO-EU relations, and which EU officials now 
consider in need of updating.  Turkey will continue to resist 
strongly any effort to put new formal arrangements in place. 
End Comment)  Danielsson's highlighting of the PSC 8 meetings 
-- a practical forum for broad policy discussion that 
includes all NATO and EU members, and which Greece and Turkey 
do not favor -- is noteworthy in this context. The letter 
begins by using its first operative paragraph to point out 
the need for "a long-term solution as regards high-level 
policy matters" and to find effective arrangements for 
NATO-EU cooperation in Afghanistan -- two areas where Turkey 
has opposed new formal arrangements. 
 
¶5. (C) Indeed, Turkish Ambassador to the EU Selim Kuneralp 
sent a response letter on January 15 outlining Turkish 
complaints.  This letter highlights that the NATO-EU problem 
is not simply a Turkey-Cyprus issue but more broadly a 
Turkey-EU problem.  Turkish representatives to the EU almost 
reflexively review a list of complaints about the EU's 
exclusive practices and lack of transparency, a list repeated 
in this letter.  Contacts at the Turkish Delegation to NATO 
told us the same day that while Ankara appreciated the effort 
Stockholm put into improving NATO-EU relations during its EU 
Presidency, it viewed the Swedish letter as an inadequate and 
late response to Turkey,s December 2008 NATO-EU relations 
non-paper.  Further, when we queried our Turkish 
interlocutors about holding more informal transatlantic 
meetings, they indicated that Ankara was unwilling to 
consider concessions on this score until the EU delivers 
something for Turkey, such as approval of Turkey's 
administrative arrangement with the European Defense Agency 
(EDA) (Comment:  We note that the Turkish letter rules out 
informal meetings of Allies and EU member states beyond the 
existing Foreign Ministerial Transatlantic Dinners.  Based on 
conversations at NATO, we believe, however, that Turkey 
 
USNATO 00000065  002 OF 004 
 
 
ultimately will not block the NATO Secretary General's 
proposal to create a High Level Group with key EU 
institutional counterparts because this move arguably is 
allowable within the Agreed Framework.  End Comment). 
 
¶6. (SBU) Sweden sent a copy of the letter to the EU, to the 
NATO Secretary General, and to all NATO Allies on January 8, 
¶2010. Text follows: 
 
Dear Ambassador, 
 
EU-NATO cooperation has been a priority for the Swedish 
Presidency and we have kept the issue high on the Presidency 
agenda with the objective to further enhance transparency and 
cooperation on issues of common interest.  Since we share 
this priority with you, and on the basis of earlier 
correspondence, taking into account the importance of Turkey 
as a partner to the EU as well as your much appreciated 
contributions to EU-led operations, I wanted to provide you 
with an update on our efforts during the Swedish Presidency. 
 
Regarding the overall EU-NATO cooperation, it is our strong 
belief that there is a need to work in parallel on finding a 
long-term solution as regards high-level policy matters, and 
to address concrete short-term measures.  On the latter the 
PSC, in December, agreed a set of measures aimed at improving 
the cooperation.  We believe these recommendations would 
imply a pragmatic contribution to reinforcing EU-NATO 
relations.  As a matter of priority, the need to pursue 
agreements on effective arrangements between EUPOL 
Afghanistan and ISAF is one of the suggestions highlighted. 
We look forward to continue the discussion with NATO in the 
coming weeks on these and other matters in a spirit of 
cooperation.  The recommendations will be communicated to 
NATO by the High Representative Ashton. 
 
During the Presidency we have put a distinct emphasis on the 
EU-NATO Capability Group, an issue of high interest, as we 
understand also for Turkey.  Joint staff papers were produced 
on two topics of mutual interest; helicopters and rapid 
response.  We believe these joint background papers provided 
real value-added and hope that the two secretariats will 
continue to work to identify future relevant subjects for the 
group.  We have also continued the Czech initiative to invite 
Defence Policy Directors to participate in a meeting in the 
Capability Group.  Let me underline in this context that we 
have appreciated your very active participation and 
contributions to the discussions in the Capability Group 
meetings. 
 
Defence Policy Directors from all EU Member States and NATO 
Allies were also invited to an informal Transatlantic dinner 
to discuss current challenges in crisis management.  NATO SG 
was furthermore invited to an informal GAERC meeting with the 
EU Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence to discuss crisis 
management and joint challenges with a particular focus on 
Afghanistan. 
 
Since transparency between EU and NATO is an imperative, the 
Swedish EU Presidency took the initiative to brief the NAC at 
an informal session on operation ATALANTA last October.  I 
hope that this will encourage future exchange of similar 
briefings on operational issues of common interest, including 
from NATO to the PSC. 
 
While straying a bit outside of the EU-NATO context let me 
just underline our continued appreciation of the PSC 8 format 
as a useful platform for sharing information and I am happy 
to note that the tradition of these meetings was upheld 
during our Presidency as was the PSC 6 meetings. 
 
Sweden as an active troop contributor and partner to NATO 
fully appreciates the importance also of creating an inviting 
environment for third state participation to missions and 
operations.  In this context we recognize that Turkey as a 
candidate country and strategic partner provides substantial 
and valuable contributions to EU-led operations.  On this 
subject the Swedish Presidency initiated work within the EU 
to review the ways and means by which the EU interacts with 
partners.  We also invited your country, together with other 
important third state contributors, to share your views on 
this subject.  This is an important dialogue which I hope 
 
USNATO 00000065  003 OF 004 
 
 
will become even more regular in the future.  While I foresee 
that these discussions will continue beyond our Presidency, I 
do hope that the conclusions drawn already during the autumn 
semester will provide a solid basis for further work on this 
important matter. 
 
Finally, let me once again underline that we highly value 
Turkey's commitment to CSDP and to improving the EU-NATO 
cooperation and I look forward to continue working together 
with you and our other colleagues to keep this issue 
continuously high on our common agenda. 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
Christian Danielsson 
 
End text. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Turkey sent a copy of its response letter to the 
NATO Secretary General and all NATO Allies on January 25. 
Text follows: 
 
Dear Ambassador, 
 
I would like to thank you for your letter of 21 December 2009 
concerning NATO-EU cooperation.  The efforts of the Swedish 
EU Presidency clearly demonstrated the significance that 
Sweden attaches to the enhancement of transparency and 
cooperation in the context of NATO-EU relations.  We continue 
to appreciate your efforts and share the belief that there is 
still room for the improvement of cooperation between the two 
organizations. 
 
Turkey has so far displayed a constructive stance and utmost 
flexibility to make its own contributions to NATO-EU 
relations despite well-known political problems.  We believe 
that the Turkish Non-Paper on NATO-EU Relations which was 
circulated in December 2008 on the occasion of the meeting of 
the NATO Foreign Ministers and which was subsequently 
distributed to PSC Ambassadors constitutes a clear 
illustration of Turkey's constructive attitude to solve the 
pending issues.  However, I should draw your attention to the 
fact that Turkey's concerns have not been addressed and the 
practical proposals put forward in the said non-paper are yet 
to be taken into consideration.  Such unfortunate factors 
have consequently caused a deep frustration for the Turkish 
side. 
 
Further enhancement of NATO-EU relations requires 
full-fledged cooperation by all parties.  Nevertheless, 
Turkey has been the sole actor that is expected to display 
flexibility to overcome the long-standing shortcomings in the 
relations between NATO and the EU.  At this point, I should 
state that the EU has failed to properly fulfill its 
commitments vis-a-vis its partners such as Turkey, despite 
the fact that Turkey is one of the biggest contributors to 
the missions and operations carried out within CSDP.  It is 
also important to note that the Nice Implementation Document 
has not been fully and properly put into effect by the EU, 
which still fails to adequately address the subsequent 
shortcomings. 
 
The EU does not fully reciprocate the clear and transparent 
approach favoured by NATO in the context of enhancing 
relations between the two organizations.  The imbalance 
between the degree of transparency and openness accorded by 
NATO to the EU and the narrow interpretation that the EU 
applies when it comes to its dealings with NATO remains 
significant. 
 
Turkey fully supports the enhancement of NATO-EU cooperation 
in line with the Agreed Framework and has done its utmost to 
translate its support into concrete action.  Turkey is of the 
view that efforts that aim at the institutionalization of 
some informal transatlantic activities would not bear 
fruitful results.  Under no circumstances should informal 
arrangements be utilized to amend or replace the existing 
official mechanisms. 
 
The EU should initiate, as a matter of priority, a process to 
eliminate the existing limitations to more effective 
participation by non-EU allies such as Turkey in CSDP.  This 
 
USNATO 00000065  004 OF 004 
 
 
would also entail the enhancement of NATO-EU relations. 
 
I would like to highlight once again that Turkey will 
continue to positively consider any constructive idea or 
initiative and offer its own contributions to the improvement 
of NATO-EU cooperation.  In this vein, we look forward to 
continue to work together with our Allies to realize our 
shared objectives. 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
Selim Kuneralp 
 
End text. 
DAALDER