Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 251287 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AEMR ASEC AMGT AE AS AMED AVIAN AU AF AORC AGENDA AO AR AM APER AFIN ATRN AJ ABUD ARABL AL AG AODE ALOW ADANA AADP AND APECO ACABQ ASEAN AA AFFAIRS AID AGR AY AGS AFSI AGOA AMB ARF ANET ASCH ACOA AFLU AFSN AMEX AFDB ABLD AESC AFGHANISTAN AINF AVIATION ARR ARSO ANDREW ASSEMBLY AIDS APRC ASSK ADCO ASIG AC AZ APEC AFINM ADB AP ACOTA ASEX ACKM ASUP ANTITERRORISM ADPM AINR ARABLEAGUE AGAO AORG AMTC AIN ACCOUNT ASECAFINGMGRIZOREPTU AIDAC AINT ARCH AMGTKSUP ALAMI AMCHAMS ALJAZEERA AVIANFLU AORD AOREC ALIREZA AOMS AMGMT ABDALLAH AORCAE AHMED ACCELERATED AUC ALZUGUREN ANGEL AORL ASECIR AMG AMBASSADOR AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL ADM ASES ABMC AER AMER ASE AMGTHA ARNOLDFREDERICK AOPC ACS AFL AEGR ASED AFPREL AGRI AMCHAM ARNOLD AN ANATO AME APERTH ASECSI AT ACDA ASEDC AIT AMERICA AMLB AMGE ACTION AGMT AFINIZ ASECVE ADRC ABER AGIT APCS AEMED ARABBL ARC ASO AIAG ACEC ASR ASECM ARG AEC ABT ADIP ADCP ANARCHISTS AORCUN AOWC ASJA AALC AX AROC ARM AGENCIES ALBE AK AZE AOPR AREP AMIA ASCE ALANAZI ABDULRAHMEN ABDULHADI AINFCY ARMS ASECEFINKCRMKPAOPTERKHLSAEMRNS AGRICULTURE AFPK AOCR ALEXANDER ATRD ATFN ABLG AORCD AFGHAN ARAS AORCYM AVERY ALVAREZ ACBAQ ALOWAR ANTOINE ABLDG ALAB AMERICAS AFAF ASECAFIN ASEK ASCC AMCT AMGTATK AMT APDC AEMRS ASECE AFSA ATRA ARTICLE ARENA AISG AEMRBC AFR AEIR ASECAF AFARI AMPR ASPA ASOC ANTONIO AORCL ASECARP APRM AUSTRALIAGROUP ASEG AFOR AEAID AMEDI ASECTH ASIC AFDIN AGUIRRE AUNR ASFC AOIC ANTXON ASA ASECCASC ALI AORCEUNPREFPRELSMIGBN ASECKHLS ASSSEMBLY ASECVZ AI ASECPGOV ASIR ASCEC ASAC ARAB AIEA ADMIRAL AUSGR AQ AMTG ARRMZY ANC APR AMAT AIHRC AFU ADEL AECL ACAO AMEMR ADEP AV AW AOR ALL ALOUNI AORCUNGA ALNEA ASC AORCO ARMITAGE AGENGA AGRIC AEM ACOAAMGT AGUILAR AFPHUM AMEDCASCKFLO AFZAL AAA ATPDEA ASECPHUM ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ETRD ETTC EU ECON EFIN EAGR EAID ELAB EINV ENIV ENRG EPET EZ ELTN ELECTIONS ECPS ET ER EG EUN EIND ECONOMICS EMIN ECIN EINT EWWT EAIR EN ENGR ES EI ETMIN EL EPA EARG EFIS ECONOMY EC EK ELAM ECONOMIC EAR ESDP ECCP ELN EUM EUMEM ECA EAP ELEC ECOWAS EFTA EXIM ETTD EDRC ECOSOC ECPSN ENVIRONMENT ECO EMAIL ECTRD EREL EDU ENERG ENERGY ENVR ETRAD EAC EXTERNAL EFIC ECIP ERTD EUC ENRGMO EINZ ESTH ECCT EAGER ECPN ELNT ERD EGEN ETRN EIVN ETDR EXEC EIAD EIAR EVN EPRT ETTF ENGY EAIDCIN EXPORT ETRC ESA EIB EAPC EPIT ESOCI ETRB EINDQTRD ENRC EGOV ECLAC EUR ELF ETEL ENRGUA EVIN EARI ESCAP EID ERIN ELAN ENVT EDEV EWWY EXBS ECOM EV ELNTECON ECE ETRDGK EPETEIND ESCI ETRDAORC EAIDETRD ETTR EMS EAGRECONEINVPGOVBN EBRD EUREM ERGR EAGRBN EAUD EFI ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ETRO ENRGY EGAR ESSO EGAD ENV ENER EAIDXMXAXBXFFR ELA EET EINVETRD EETC EIDN ERGY ETRDPGOV EING EMINCG EINVECON EURM EEC EICN EINO EPSC ELAP ELABPGOVBN EE ESPS ETRA ECONETRDBESPAR ERICKSON EEOC EVENTS EPIN EB ECUN EPWR ENG EX EH EAIDAR EAIS ELBA EPETUN ETRDEIQ EENV ECPC ETRP ECONENRG EUEAID EWT EEB EAIDNI ESENV EADM ECN ENRGKNNP ETAD ETR ECONETRDEAGRJA ETRG ETER EDUC EITC EBUD EAIF EBEXP EAIDS EITI EGOVSY EFQ ECOQKPKO ETRGY ESF EUE EAIC EPGOV ENFR EAGRE ENRD EINTECPS EAVI ETC ETCC EIAID EAIDAF EAGREAIDPGOVPRELBN EAOD ETRDA EURN EASS EINVA EAIDRW EON ECOR EPREL EGPHUM ELTM ECOS EINN ENNP EUPGOV EAGRTR ECONCS ETIO ETRDGR EAIDB EISNAR EIFN ESPINOSA EAIDASEC ELIN EWTR EMED ETFN ETT EADI EPTER ELDIN EINVEFIN ESS ENRGIZ EQRD ESOC ETRDECD ECINECONCS EAIT ECONEAIR ECONEFIN EUNJ ENRGKNNPMNUCPARMPRELNPTIAEAJMXL ELAD EFIM ETIC EFND EFN ETLN ENGRD EWRG ETA EIN EAIRECONRP EXIMOPIC ERA ENRGJM ECONEGE ENVI ECHEVARRIA EMINETRD EAD ECONIZ EENG ELBR EWWC ELTD EAIDMG ETRK EIPR EISNLN ETEX EPTED EFINECONCS EPCS EAG ETRDKIPR ED EAIO ETRDEC ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ERNG EFINU EURFOR EWWI ELTNSNAR ETD EAIRASECCASCID EOXC ESTN EAIDAORC EAGRRP ETRDEMIN ELABPHUMSMIGKCRMBN ETRDEINVTINTCS EGHG EAIDPHUMPRELUG EAGRBTIOBEXPETRDBN EDA EPETPGOV ELAINE EUCOM EMW EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM ELB EINDETRD EMI ETRDECONWTOCS EINR ESTRADA EHUM EFNI ELABV ENR EMN EXO EWWTPRELPGOVMASSMARRBN EATO END EP EINVETC ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID ELTRN EIQ ETTW EAI ENGRG ETRED ENDURING ETTRD EAIDEGZ EOCN EINF EUPREL ENRL ECPO ENLT EEFIN EPPD ECOIN EUEAGR EISL EIDE ENRGSD EINVECONSENVCSJA EAIG ENTG EEPET EUNCH EPECO ETZ EPAT EPTE EAIRGM ETRDPREL EUNGRSISAFPKSYLESO ETTN EINVKSCA ESLCO EBMGT ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EFLU ELND EFINOECD EAIDHO EDUARDO ENEG ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EFINTS ECONQH ENRGPREL EUNPHUM EINDIR EPE EMINECINECONSENVTBIONS EFINM ECRM EQ EWWTSP ECONPGOVBN
KFLO KPKO KDEM KFLU KTEX KMDR KPAO KCRM KIDE KN KNNP KG KMCA KZ KJUS KWBG KU KDMR KAWC KCOR KPAL KOMC KTDB KTIA KISL KHIV KHUM KTER KCFE KTFN KS KIRF KTIP KIRC KSCA KICA KIPR KPWR KWMN KE KGIC KGIT KSTC KACT KSEP KFRD KUNR KHLS KCRS KRVC KUWAIT KVPR KSRE KMPI KMRS KNRV KNEI KCIP KSEO KITA KDRG KV KSUM KCUL KPET KBCT KO KSEC KOLY KNAR KGHG KSAF KWNM KNUC KMNP KVIR KPOL KOCI KPIR KLIG KSAC KSTH KNPT KINL KPRP KRIM KICC KIFR KPRV KAWK KFIN KT KVRC KR KHDP KGOV KPOW KTBT KPMI KPOA KRIF KEDEM KFSC KY KGCC KATRINA KWAC KSPR KTBD KBIO KSCI KRCM KNNB KBNC KIMT KCSY KINR KRAD KMFO KCORR KW KDEMSOCI KNEP KFPC KEMPI KBTR KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNPP KTTB KTFIN KBTS KCOM KFTN KMOC KOR KDP KPOP KGHA KSLG KMCR KJUST KUM KMSG KHPD KREC KIPRTRD KPREL KEN KCSA KCRIM KGLB KAKA KWWT KUNP KCRN KISLPINR KLFU KUNC KEDU KCMA KREF KPAS KRKO KNNC KLHS KWAK KOC KAPO KTDD KOGL KLAP KECF KCRCM KNDP KSEAO KCIS KISM KREL KISR KISC KKPO KWCR KPFO KUS KX KWCI KRFD KWPG KTRD KH KLSO KEVIN KEANE KACW KWRF KNAO KETTC KTAO KWIR KVCORR KDEMGT KPLS KICT KWGB KIDS KSCS KIRP KSTCPL KDEN KLAB KFLOA KIND KMIG KPPAO KPRO KLEG KGKG KCUM KTTP KWPA KIIP KPEO KICR KNNA KMGT KCROM KMCC KLPM KNNPGM KSIA KSI KWWW KOMS KESS KMCAJO KWN KTDM KDCM KCM KVPRKHLS KENV KCCP KGCN KCEM KEMR KWMNKDEM KNNPPARM KDRM KWIM KJRE KAID KWMM KPAONZ KUAE KTFR KIF KNAP KPSC KSOCI KCWI KAUST KPIN KCHG KLBO KIRCOEXC KI KIRCHOFF KSTT KNPR KDRL KCFC KLTN KPAOKMDRKE KPALAOIS KESO KKOR KSMT KFTFN KTFM KDEMK KPKP KOCM KNN KISLSCUL KFRDSOCIRO KINT KRG KWMNSMIG KSTCC KPAOY KFOR KWPR KSEPCVIS KGIV KSEI KIL KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KQ KEMS KHSL KTNF KPDD KANSOU KKIV KFCE KTTC KGH KNNNP KK KSCT KWNN KAWX KOMCSG KEIM KTSD KFIU KDTB KFGM KACP KWWMN KWAWC KSPA KGICKS KNUP KNNO KISLAO KTPN KSTS KPRM KPALPREL KPO KTLA KCRP KNMP KAWCK KCERS KDUM KEDM KTIALG KWUN KPTS KPEM KMEPI KAWL KHMN KCRO KCMR KPTD KCROR KMPT KTRF KSKN KMAC KUK KIRL KEM KSOC KBTC KOM KINP KDEMAF KTNBT KISK KRM KWBW KBWG KNNPMNUC KNOP KSUP KCOG KNET KWBC KESP KMRD KEBG KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KPWG KOMCCO KRGY KNNF KPROG KJAN KFRED KPOKO KM KWMNCS KMPF KJWC KJU KSMIG KALR KRAL KDGOV KPA KCRMJA KCRI KAYLA KPGOV KRD KNNPCH KFEM KPRD KFAM KALM KIPRETRDKCRM KMPP KADM KRFR KMWN KWRG KTIAPARM KTIAEUN KRDP KLIP KDDEM KTIAIC KWKN KPAD KDM KRCS KWBGSY KEAI KIVP KPAOPREL KUNH KTSC KIPT KNP KJUSTH KGOR KEPREL KHSA KGHGHIV KNNR KOMH KRCIM KWPB KWIC KINF KPER KILS KA KNRG KCSI KFRP KLFLO KFE KNPPIS KQM KQRDQ KERG KPAOPHUM KSUMPHUM KVBL KARIM KOSOVO KNSD KUIR KWHG KWBGXF KWMNU KPBT KKNP KERF KCRT KVIS KWRC KVIP KTFS KMARR KDGR KPAI KDE KTCRE KMPIO KUNRAORC KHOURY KAWS KPAK KOEM KCGC KID KVRP KCPS KIVR KBDS KWOMN KIIC KTFNJA KARZAI KMVP KHJUS KPKOUNSC KMAR KIBL KUNA KSA KIS KJUSAF KDEV KPMO KHIB KIRD KOUYATE KIPRZ KBEM KPAM KDET KPPD KOSCE KJUSKUNR KICCPUR KRMS KWMNPREL KWMJN KREISLER KWM KDHS KRV KPOV KWMNCI KMPL KFLD KWWN KCVM KIMMITT KCASC KOMO KNATO KDDG KHGH KRF KSCAECON KWMEN KRIC
PREL PINR PGOV PHUM PTER PE PREF PARM PBTS PINS PHSA PK PL PM PNAT PHAS PO PROP PGOVE PA PU POLITICAL PPTER POL PALESTINIAN PHUN PIN PAMQ PPA PSEC POLM PBIO PSOE PDEM PAK PF PKAO PGOVPRELMARRMOPS PMIL PV POLITICS PRELS POLICY PRELHA PIRN PINT PGOG PERSONS PRC PEACE PROCESS PRELPGOV PROV PFOV PKK PRE PT PIRF PSI PRL PRELAF PROG PARMP PERL PUNE PREFA PP PGOB PUM PROTECTION PARTIES PRIL PEL PAGE PS PGO PCUL PLUM PIF PGOVENRGCVISMASSEAIDOPRCEWWTBN PMUC PCOR PAS PB PKO PY PKST PTR PRM POUS PRELIZ PGIC PHUMS PAL PNUC PLO PMOPS PHM PGOVBL PBK PELOSI PTE PGOVAU PNR PINSO PRO PLAB PREM PNIR PSOCI PBS PD PHUML PERURENA PKPA PVOV PMAR PHUMCF PUHM PHUH PRELPGOVETTCIRAE PRT PROPERTY PEPFAR PREI POLUN PAR PINSF PREFL PH PREC PPD PING PQL PINSCE PGV PREO PRELUN POV PGOVPHUM PINRES PRES PGOC PINO POTUS PTERE PRELKPAO PRGOV PETR PGOVEAGRKMCAKNARBN PPKO PARLIAMENT PEPR PMIG PTBS PACE PETER PMDL PVIP PKPO POLMIL PTEL PJUS PHUMNI PRELKPAOIZ PGOVPREL POGV PEREZ POWELL PMASS PDOV PARN PG PPOL PGIV PAIGH PBOV PETROL PGPV PGOVL POSTS PSO PRELEU PRELECON PHUMPINS PGOVKCMABN PQM PRELSP PRGO PATTY PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PGVO PROTESTS PRELPLS PKFK PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PARAGRAPH PRELGOV POG PTRD PTERM PBTSAG PHUMKPAL PRELPK PTERPGOV PAO PRIVATIZATION PSCE PPAO PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PARALYMPIC PRUM PKPRP PETERS PAHO PARMS PGREL PINV POINS PHUMPREL POREL PRELNL PHUMPGOV PGOVQL PLAN PRELL PARP PROVE PSOC PDD PRELNP PRELBR PKMN PGKV PUAS PRELTBIOBA PBTSEWWT PTERIS PGOVU PRELGG PHUMPRELPGOV PFOR PEPGOV PRELUNSC PRAM PICES PTERIZ PREK PRELEAGR PRELEUN PHUME PHU PHUMKCRS PRESL PRTER PGOF PARK PGOVSOCI PTERPREL PGOVEAID PGOVPHUMKPAO PINSKISL PREZ PGOVAF PARMEUN PECON PINL POGOV PGOVLO PIERRE PRELPHUM PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PBST PKPAO PHUMHUPPS PGOVPOL PASS PPGOV PROGV PAGR PHALANAGE PARTY PRELID PGOVID PHUMR PHSAQ PINRAMGT PSA PRELM PRELMU PIA PINRPE PBTSRU PARMIR PEDRO PNUK PVPR PINOCHET PAARM PRFE PRELEIN PINF PCI PSEPC PGOVSU PRLE PDIP PHEM PRELB PORG PGGOC POLG POPDC PGOVPM PWMN PDRG PHUMK PINB PRELAL PRER PFIN PNRG PRED POLI PHUMBO PHYTRP PROLIFERATION PHARM PUOS PRHUM PUNR PENA PGOVREL PETRAEUS PGOVKDEM PGOVENRG PHUS PRESIDENT PTERKU PRELKSUMXABN PGOVSI PHUMQHA PKISL PIR PGOVZI PHUMIZNL PKNP PRELEVU PMIN PHIM PHUMBA PUBLIC PHAM PRELKPKO PMR PARTM PPREL PN PROL PDA PGOVECON PKBL PKEAID PERM PRELEZ PRELC PER PHJM PGOVPRELPINRBN PRFL PLN PWBG PNG PHUMA PGOR PHUMPTER POLINT PPEF PKPAL PNNL PMARR PAC PTIA PKDEM PAUL PREG PTERR PTERPRELPARMPGOVPBTSETTCEAIRELTNTC PRELJA POLS PI PNS PAREL PENV PTEROREP PGOVM PINER PBGT PHSAUNSC PTERDJ PRELEAID PARMIN PKIR PLEC PCRM PNET PARR PRELETRD PRELBN PINRTH PREJ PEACEKEEPINGFORCES PEMEX PRELZ PFLP PBPTS PTGOV PREVAL PRELSW PAUM PRF PHUMKDEM PATRICK PGOVKMCAPHUMBN PRELA PNUM PGGV PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PBT PIND PTEP PTERKS PGOVJM PGOT PRELMARR PGOVCU PREV PREFF PRWL PET PROB PRELPHUMP PHUMAF PVTS PRELAFDB PSNR PGOVECONPRELBU PGOVZL PREP PHUMPRELBN PHSAPREL PARCA PGREV PGOVDO PGON PCON PODC PRELOV PHSAK PSHA PGOVGM PRELP POSCE PGOVPTER PHUMRU PINRHU PARMR PGOVTI PPEL PMAT PAN PANAM PGOVBO PRELHRC

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 10USNATO64, JAN 28, 2010 HLTF: ALLIES CONSIDER BROAD EURO

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #10USNATO64.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10USNATO64 2010-02-10 13:42 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Mission USNATO
VZCZCXRO0606
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHLA RUEHMRE RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHNO #0064/01 0411342
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 101342Z FEB 10
FM USMISSION USNATO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3852
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNOSC/ORG FOR SECURITY CO OP IN EUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 6597
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUDKSR/EUCOM PLANS AND ANALYSIS STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USDELMC BRUSSELS BE PRIORITY
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 0631
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 USNATO 000064 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2020 
TAGS: KCFE NATO PARM PREL
SUBJECT: JAN 28, 2010 HLTF: ALLIES CONSIDER BROAD EURO 
SECURITY AGENDA AND AWAIT U.S. LEAD ON CFE NEXT STEPS 
 
REF: STATE 8267 (JAN 28 HLTF GUIDANCE) 
 
Classified By: D/POLAD Alejandro "Hoot" Baez for reasons 1.4(B)&(D). 
 
1. (C)  SUMMARY.  Allies used the January 28 HLTF and related 
meetings to touch base on CFE in the wake of the December 
2009 NATO and OSCE Ministerials, as well as SYG Rasmussen's 
mid-December trip to Moscow.  Allies welcomed and evinced 
considerable interest in the information that senior U.S. 
officials are focused on thinking through the way ahead on 
CFE and European security generally.  The need to reassure 
Allies about the thrust of U.S. thinking, and engage them as 
our views develop, was a central message.  During the brief 
HLTF discussion and in more robust meetings on the margins, 
Allies endorsed the U.S. assessment that we need to examine 
our goals for European security broadly, as NATO considers 
how to shape an effective approach that encompasses CFE, and 
Russia's proposed European Security Treaty (EST) and 
NATO-Russia Treaty.  Some expressed the hope that positive 
momentum from the Corfu process for engaging Russia on EST 
would have a positive impact on CFE, while others underscored 
a disconnect between how NATO Allies and Russia regard the 
Corfu process. 
 
2. (C)  SUMMARY, cont'd. Several Allies underscored that new 
thinking on CFE was desirable given that the way forward in 
the broader European security context was unclear, but they 
also stressed support for the Parallel Actions Package as a 
balanced and thoughtful approach.  SYG Rasmussen's report 
from his Moscow visit that Russia was ready to engage on CFE 
drew a tepid response, with none feeling this signaled any 
real change in Russia's position.  There was no/no support 
for an informal International Staff (I.S.) idea to break the 
substantial combat forces issue out of the CFE package, and 
negotiate a definition in the NATO Russia Council (NRC) 
context, in order to prime the pump for achieving a CFE 
solution.  At the same time, a number of Allies who spoke on 
the way ahead noted one of the reasons we need to consider 
next steps is because the parallel actions approach, so far, 
has not yielded a deal.  A few Allies indicated during 
bilateral meetings that the prospect of NATO not agreeing to 
exchange data with Russia in December 2010 (which was 
implicit in the December 2009 Ministerial statement) meant 
that we have limited time to see progress on CFE. 
 
3. (C)  SUMMARY, cont'd.  In the Quad meeting prior to the 
HLTF, the UK, supported by Germany, emphasized the need to 
table a Vienna Document 99 (VDoc 99) proposal in the FSC 
immediately in order to take a proactive stance, limit an 
initial round of discussions of VDoc 99 enhancement, and test 
Russian intentions with regard to concrete measures on 
military transparency.  The U.S. team did not object to the 
UK tabling its proposal due to tactical considerations, but 
noted Washington would need to review its specifics in light 
of other issues in play.  END SUMMARY. 
 
----------------------- 
CONTACTS and BILATERALS 
----------------------- 
 
4. (C)  As expected, reporting on contacts and bilaterals 
with Russian interlocutors was minimal but provided some 
insights: 
 
-- The main report was the account by the HLTF Chair (Robert 
Simmons) of CFE discussions during SYG Rasmussen's 
mid-December Moscow trip.  Simmons noted that FM Lavrov 
signaled Russia's continued readiness to engage on the basis 
of the parallel actions package while laying down a clear 
marker that Russia would not implement CFE at present. 
Simmons underscored that Prime Minister Putin engaged 
extensively on CFE stressing the need to resolve it and 
belaboring familiar complaints: the failure of Allies to 
ratify the adapted Treaty; the bloc to bloc nature of the old 
Treaty; flank restrictions on Russia (asserting that these 
limits should not be necessary if Russia does not pose a 
threat); the need for all current Allies that are not CFE 
States Parties to accede; and continued linkage between 
Istanbul commitments and CFE. 
 
-- Slovenian rep Slapnicar reported on a routine political 
directors meeting in Moscow during which MFA Director Antonov 
 
USNATO 00000064  002 OF 005 
 
 
repeated familiar Russian positions.  U.S. rep Rich Davis per 
reftel reported on limited bilateral CFE discussions in 
December with MFA Director Anton Mazur as well as between U/S 
Tauscher and DFM Ryabkov.  Davis also noted that MFA Director 
Antonov had indicated to A/S Gottemoeller, on the margins of 
START negotiations, that he would be prepared to engage on 
CFE as soon as START was completed. 
 
-- During the Quad meeting which preceded the HLTF, German 
rep Banzhaf commented on a meeting with Mazur on the margins 
of the late November Berlin seminar.  Mazur repeated Russian 
arguments but noted that "everything is negotiable" without 
offering any specifics.  Of particular interest, the German 
rep stressed that Germany urged patience and tried to "pour 
water" on any notion of a special Russian-German relationship. 
 
------------- 
THE WAY AHEAD 
------------- 
 
5. (C)  HLTF Chair Simmons launched the way ahead discussion 
by noting Russia continues to claim interest in resolving CFE 
and has not rejected the parallel actions package but also 
has not acknowledged the December NATO Ministerial statement 
call to implement CFE.  Specifically on the issue of defining 
"substantial combat forces" as Russia seeks to do within its 
proposed NATO-Russia Treaty proposal, Simmons recounted that 
Lavrov expressed to Rasmussen a lack of understanding of 
NATO's reluctance to engage on this and unwillingness to link 
it to Russia's concerns with NATO enlargement.  Simmons 
sought views on the question of whether Allies should 
consider defining "substantial combat forces" in the NRC in 
connection with NATO's request for Russia to provide its CFE 
data. 
 
-- European Security Initiatives and CFE:  U.S. rep Davis 
broadened the discussion up front with an assessment that 
Allies need to examine our goals for CFE together with our 
broader response to Russia's European Security Treaty (EST) 
and NATO-Russia Treaty proposals, as well as our overarching 
goals for European security.  He underscored that Secretary 
Clinton would give a speech in Paris on January 29 that would 
cover the broad range of themes and principles Allies share, 
and the challenges we face, to include CFE, but that there 
would be no surprise on specifics. In the HLTF and on the 
margins, all Allies who spoke endorsed the U.S. assessment 
that issues addressed in CFE and in these other areas 
overlap, and NATO needs to consider how to shape an effective 
approach that encompasses all these areas.  Allied reps also 
honed in on the Corfu process, its role in the bigger 
picture, and the positive impact it could have on CFE. 
Greece (Daskorolis), echoed by Spain (Salazar) and Slovenia 
(Slapnicar), stressed that arms control and CFE were a part 
of the Corfu process and that discussions needed to be 
mutually reinforcing as we move forward.  Turkey (Tuzel), 
supported by the Netherlands (Kleinjan), reminded all that 
the Corfu process means different things to different 
players, highlighting that Russia takes a selective view and 
has yet to embrace it as an all-encompassing process.  France 
(Raharinaivo) and Romania (Stoica) noted that Allies should 
emphasize the Corfu process as the platform for engaging in 
EST discussions and called for Allies to continue stressing 
this message to Russia. 
 
-- SYG Moscow Report and the Parallel Actions Package:  HLTF 
Chair Simmons reported that SYG Rasmussen was personally 
energized by his meetings in Moscow - including the featured 
Putin lecture on CFE - and expressed interest in engaging 
actively to find a solution.  Greece was pleased with the 
SYG's report on Russia's interest in CFE and called for 
delivering a clear message to Russia and the international 
community that CFE was irreplaceable and we must continue our 
support of the parallel actions package.  Romania was a bit 
more skeptical of Russia's continued interest, noting it was 
Russia's "leitmotif," but elaborated during bilateral 
discussions (see below) on the package as the only path 
forward that would preserve NATO's principled positions. 
Others refrained from general comments on CFE next steps in 
the HLTF plenary deferring to the U.S. assessment on the need 
for a comprehensive approach, but Allies were clear that the 
I.S. informal idea of defining substantial forces in the NRC 
context was not the next step. 
 
USNATO 00000064  003 OF 005 
 
 
 
-- Defining Substantial Combat Forces (SCF):  All Allies who 
spoke - in the full HLTF and on the margins - said that 
negotiating a definition of SCF in isolation from the other 
elements of the CFE package was a recipe for failure. 
Romania stressed the need for a broad dialogue on all 
elements of the package and noted concern that engaging on a 
definition prematurely could result in Russia using it to 
hold the package hostage.  German rep Banzhaf, seconded by 
Turkey, was clear in the HLTF: substantial combat forces 
should not/not be discussed in isolation as it is part of the 
package.  (Germany provided a very detailed elaboration of 
its position during Quad discussions. See para 6.)  The 
Netherlands (Kleinjan) and Italy (Pugliese) agreed that 
Russia was playing games by calling for an NRC discussion on 
this with Kleinjan adding that there should be no discussion 
of any details of the package without first achieving overall 
agreement and Pugliese calling for no "cherry-picking" and 
pre-coordination for any discussion in the HLTF.  (The list 
of Allies who spoke against this idea in the plenary 
included:  RO, GER, TU, NETH, IT, CZ, UK, ES; the same point 
was made on the margins by a number of allies, including CAN, 
PO, and GR.) 
 
-- HLTF Chair Simmons concluded there was clearly broad 
support for the SCF issue to remain in the CFE discussion 
while recognizing it will surface in other fora and will have 
to be addressed even if not substantively.  Meanwhile, the 
broader question of a way forward on CFE was currently being 
reviewed in capitals in light of the broader European 
security context proposals in play. 
 
----------------------- 
MEETINGS ON THE MARGINS 
----------------------- 
 
6. (C)  On the margins of the HLTF, the U.S. met with Quad 
reps from Germany, France and the UK, as well as conducted 
bilateral meetings with Turkey, Romania, and Poland. 
Additionally, during the Heads of Delegation lunch and 
subsequently, several representatives took the opportunity to 
share views directly with the U.S. rep.  While Allies 
reviewed points they made in the main HLTF meeting, there was 
a greater tendency at this HLTF to engage with the U.S. team 
directly and especially to confirm that they understood 
correctly what the U.S. had said in the plenary about 
reviewing CFE in the broader context of European security. 
 
-- The need to reassure Allies about the thrust of U.S. 
thinking, and engage them as our views develop, was a central 
message in many sidebar discussions.  While several Allies 
underscored that new thinking was desirable given that the 
way forward on CFE was unclear, they reiterated a familiar 
theme, that Allies support the Parallel Actions Package as a 
balanced and thoughtful way ahead.  Romanian rep Stoica 
stressed this approach had been hard to agree in NATO and 
setting it aside would be a serious step.  He warned against 
any approach that might be read as intended to mollify Russia 
at the price of real NATO interests.  Turkish rep Tuzel 
explicitly underscored that while Turkey supports U.S.-Russia 
engagement, CFE is an Alliance issue.  Dutch rep Kleinjan 
said privately that while the U.S. had a change of 
Administration last year, other NATO Allies had not, and 
Allies stand by the positions on CFE that were painstakingly 
developed over the last few years.  German rep Banzhaf 
remarked privately that Germany 
 was keenly interested in supporting U.S. efforts to "save" 
the legally binding CFE Treaty regime, and not a lesser 
alternative.  He commented, again privately, that Germany was 
eagerly awaiting a green light from Washington so it could 
circulate to the Quad its ideas on CFE that had been shared 
with U/S Tauscher on November 30. 
 
-- Quad:  In the CFE Quad in particular, Allies were open to 
considering next steps on CFE in the broader European 
security context as the way forward evolved.  UK rep Clark 
suggested 2010 would be the "year of arms control" and that 
now was a good time to reflect on how CFE would contribute to 
this wider European security context and whether there were 
opportunities to reopen negotiations.  Clark added that 
London was also considering what might happen if we "jump off 
the CFE boat." What would be the implications if Allies 
 
USNATO 00000064  004 OF 005 
 
 
stopped implementing CFE?  German rep Banzhaf specified that 
arms control and disarmament were high on the German agenda, 
and though the focus now is more on nuclear disarmament, 
conventional arms control maintains a prominent role.  The 
UK, Germany and France all noted there was much thinking 
underway in capitals, while acknowledging they were anxiously 
awaiting the outcome of U.S. thinking - in light of progress 
on START and NPT - in addition to further consultations to 
elaborate positio 
ns on CFE. 
 
-- Defining substantial combat forces (SCF) in the NRC:  The 
German rep agreed with U.S. thinking that Russia could view a 
legal agreement to define SCF as a substitute for the CFE 
Treaty; engaging on a definition prematurely could have an 
adverse impact on a package approach to CFE.  The German rep 
said that if a definition of SCF was important to Russia, 
then it was one of the few "bargaining chips" NATO possessed. 
 When played, we should get something comparable for it.  It 
emerged that Berlin had done some thinking about the 
substance of an SCF definition that had reinforced their 
concerns about going forward precipitately and shared an 
informal paper laying out factors for consideration regarding 
this issue. The German team commented that a brigade might be 
hugely significant in some parts of Europe, and a minor 
matter in others.  Additionally, the SCF commitment had been 
conceived alongside the national and territorial ceilings of 
the Adapted CFE Treaty.  The ambiguity of the NATO-Russia 
Founding Act language had been complemented by the structure 
of Adapted CFE ceilings, which define the "headroom" that 
would be available on any state's territory to host foreign 
forces temporarily or permanently.  Use of that headroom 
would have been considered to be consistent with the SCF 
commitment, and the available headroom differed considerably 
from one area to another. (The Polish rep made this same 
point in a bilat meeting noting that Warsaw considers A/CFE 
headroom to essentially be the SCF definition.)  Others 
recalled that for some Allies, Russian forces on Russian 
territory were a direct concern; a limit on Allied stationing 
that was not matched by a limit on Russia's regional presence 
would be problematic.  Discussion led to the conclusion that 
although SCF is a topic for the NRC, it is an issue that must 
be left open to work into the overall solution on CFE. 
 
-- Proposal on HLTF and VCC:  The UK noted that a review of 
NATO committee structures was underway and that this 
streamlining initiative could have implications for the HLTF. 
 It includes suggestions for the NAC to have greater 
visibility of the HLTF and for the VCC to be directly 
subordinated to the HLTF.  This topic was left to further 
discussion at the next HLTF pending release of an expected 
proposal. 
 
-- UK Vienna Document 99 Proposal:  In the Quad, the UK 
emphasized that it felt the need to go ahead with tabling in 
Vienna its proposal to limit an initial round of discussion 
of VDoc 99 enhancement to a package on Chapters V and IX, 
which would encompass quotas, inspection teams, and 
thresholds - and benefit the Allies.  The idea is that Allies 
would have a proactive stance in calling for such a focus, 
and at the same time test Russian intentions with regard to 
enhancements that would produce actual gains in military 
transparency.  The Germans were supportive, stressing the 
need for a proactive stance in Vienna, as well as the need to 
give structure to the process and provide a litmus test for 
Russian intentions.  The U.S. team noted appreciation for the 
tactical concerns and did not object to tabling the proposal, 
while emphasizing that Washington would need to review its 
specifics and might have future input. 
 
-- Turkey:  During bilateral discussions with Turkish Rep 
Tuzel, it was evident Turkey is interested in further 
elaboration of U.S. thinking on the way ahead.  Tuzel noted 
2010 should be the year for action on CFE; considering the 
December NATO statement, no forward movement will mean 
serious consideration of the data exchange.  He suggested 
Allies need to consider this in the coming months and develop 
a strategy. 
 
--  Romania:  In side meetings, Romanian rep Stoica remarked 
at length that Allies needed to carefully consider even 
subtle changes in statement language or risk flagging nuanced 
 
USNATO 00000064  005 OF 005 
 
 
changes in Alliance agreed positions.  He underscored that 
Romania remains a firm supporter of the Parallel Actions 
Package which contains elements that are intertwined and must 
be addressed as a whole.  Stoica cautioned against 
interlinking the range of issues in play as it could lead to 
further deadlock and feed into Russia's tactic of dividing 
positions and pocketing gains.  Stoica expressed a preference 
for compartmentalizing issues noting that the NATO Strategic 
Concept review would address how NATO will shape the future 
security environment, that the Corfu process was the place 
for discussions on Russia's European Security Treaty 
proposal, and that Allies should exercise patience regarding 
CFE and the package approach by waiting for Russia to signal 
readiness to honor the principle of host nation consent.  He 
indicated Romania could not support any approach to "start 
fresh" on CFE as it carries considerable risk of appearing as 
if the Alliance were giving in.  Regarding the data exchange 
in December, he noted our next move largely depended on 
Russia's openness to deal on CFE once START negotiations were 
finalized. 
 
-- Poland:  Polish rep Przenioslo indicated interest in the 
outcome of U.S. thinking on CFE noting that Warsaw was 
starting to consider what the way ahead could look like since 
the Russians appeared very unlikely to agree on the current 
CFE deal.  He expressed hope that a START deal would soon be 
concluded so that other matters such as CFE could be 
addressed.  He noted that Warsaw remains uncertain as to 
whether or not Russia is willing to engage seriously on CFE 
as Russia is comfortable with the current situation and is 
likely losing military interest in CFE.  This translates into 
no means to oblige Russia to return to CFE.  Przenioslo 
posited it may be time for a new negotiation and a new 
solution that would salvage the key aspects of the regime and 
address the range of issues in the parallel actions package. 
When pressed for Poland's view of the purpose of CFE, 
Przenioslo offered his personal assessment that arms control 
was critical for providing predictability and transparency in 
Europe which promotes cooperation and rational military 
planning.  He added that limits remain important as well, 
even if currently a second-order issue since all States 
Parties are currently under overall CFE limits. 
 
-- On the margins, a number of Allies (Poland and UK among 
others) asked about reports that former USNATO Ambassador 
Victoria Nuland would be taking responsibility for CFE issues 
and expressed interest in the status of those plans and the 
potential scope of her position. 
 
7. (SBU) NEXT MEETING.  Allies agreed on March 18, 2010 for 
the next HLTF. 
DAALDER