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Viewing cable 10USNATO48, NATO SHOULD FACTOR NORTHERN STRATEGY INTO KFOR

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10USNATO48 2010-02-02 16:55 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Mission USNATO
VZCZCXRO4453
PP RUEHSL
DE RUEHNO #0048/01 0331655
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 021655Z FEB 10
FM USMISSION USNATO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3826
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHPS/AMEMBASSY PRISTINA PRIORITY 3330
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 0038
RUEHSQ/AMEMBASSY SKOPJE PRIORITY 3513
RUEHVJ/AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO PRIORITY 0221
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 0288
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 0882
RUEHYE/AMEMBASSY YEREVAN PRIORITY 0095
RUEHSW/AMEMBASSY BERN PRIORITY 0431
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUDKSR/EUCOM PLANS AND ANALYSIS STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1136
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USDELMC BRUSSELS BE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/USNMR SHAPE BE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USNATO 000048 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2020 
TAGS: PREL NATO PGOV MOPS MARR KV YI AFDB
SUBJECT: NATO SHOULD FACTOR NORTHERN STRATEGY INTO KFOR 
DRAWDOWN 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ivo Daalder.  Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY:  On January 29, the North Atlantic Council 
(NAC) and non-NATO KFOR contributors discussed with EU 
representatives the situation in Kosovo and NATO's way ahead 
on the KFOR drawdown after reaching Gate 1 (10,000 troops) of 
deterrent presence.  Stressing the importance of integrating 
the north into the rest of Kosovo, International Civil 
Representative/EU Special Representative (ICR/EUSR) Feith 
asked NATO not to draw down forces precipitously while the 
Northern Strategy was being addressed.  Ambassador Daalder 
supported Feith's request, saying the Alliance needed to keep 
sufficient forces in place while key political issues were 
being tackled in the north.  The UK challenged Feith's 
request and said NATO should continue with the drawdown. 
This issue will come up at the Istanbul Defense Ministerial. 
END SUMMARY 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
Northern Kosovo is Stagnant and Unsustainable 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
2. (C)  ICR/EUSR Feith told the North Atlantic Council and 
non-NATO KFOR contributors on January 29 that the situation 
was stable and improving in southern Kosovo but stagnant and 
unsustainable in the north.  Feith said Belgrade's takeover 
of electricity distribution and reinforcement of parallel 
institutions in the north were clear violations of UNSCR 1244 
and possible steps toward functional partition.  Against this 
backdrop, he assessed that the upcoming ICJ ruling and KFOR's 
drawdown would critically affect the possibility for 
strategic change. 
 
3. (C) EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) Head de 
Kermabon said EULEX was reaching the limits of its technical 
mandate in the north and was dependent on key stakeholders 
addressing political problems in order to do more.  He 
protested Belgrade's appointment of parallel judges and 
reinforcement of parallel institutions and asked Allies to 
convey to Belgrade the imperative of standing down on the 
judiciary issue in Mitrovica.  He said the electricity issue 
had escalated from a commercial to a political problem that 
was not in EULEX's mandate but needed attention.  Switzerland 
responded that EULEX must continue to show resolve and 
advance its work in the north. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Taking the Northern Strategy Forward 
------------------------------------ 
 
4. (C) Feith said the International Civil Office (ICO) 
Strategy for the North aimed to deal with issues that had 
been left unaddressed for 10 years.  He said the strategy was 
not intended to destabilize the region but to provide better 
public services and improve the quality of life.  He said he 
would consult with Belgrade but not give it a veto.  The four 
key strands would be extending the rule of law in the north, 
promoting decentralization beginning with municipal elections 
in Mitrovica around September, improving social and economic 
conditions, and maintaining security.  Feith said he was 
looking to move forward in the coming weeks and planned to 
tackle easier problems first before moving on to more 
difficult issues.  He asked NATO to consider the situation in 
the north as it looked to drawdown KFOR, with an eye to 
maintaining sufficient forces in the country. 
 
5. (C) Ambassador Daalder said the U.S. agreed that the 
situation in the north was stagnant and unsustainable and, 
along with the German PermRep, pledged full support for the 
ICO Northern Strategy.  Ambassador Daalder said the U.S. 
understood implementation would take time.  The German 
PermRep said the Mitrovica courthouse would be a key test of 
 
USNATO 00000048  002 OF 003 
 
 
EULEX readiness.  Albania advised that the prospect of EU 
integration should be used to induce Belgrade's cooperation. 
The Italian PermRep said the international community could 
not allow 10 years of work in Kosovo to fail -- it needed to 
move Kosovo from "fragile stability" to "stable stability." 
 
6. (C) EU Civilian Operations Commander Klompenhouwer said 
these problems could be solved only by dialogue and not by 
force.  The Greek PermRep stressed Athens' view that the 
northern strategy was not an EU document.  He said that while 
Belgrade did not have a veto in the north, it had an 
important role to play.  He called for Pristina to do a 
better job of facilitating refugee returns.  The Czech 
PermRep expressed concern that the northern strategy had 
already elicited a threat of force by Belgrade and said steps 
needed to be taken to de-escalate the rhetoric. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
Factor Northern Strategy into KFOR Drawdown 
------------------------------------------- 
 
7. (C) Feith said that these critical issues in the north 
needed to be addressed before KFOR completed its drawdown 
(Gate 3 - 2,500 troops) and requested that NATO factor this 
into its deliberations regarding the move to Gate 2 (5,500 
troops).  He said the KFOR move to deterrent presence was a 
positive development for Kosovo but asked that KFOR retain 
the ability to act with strategic effect.  Klompenhouwer 
added that EULEX expects resistance as it works to extend the 
rule of law and would need KFOR back-up. 
 
8. (C) Ambassador Daalder and the German PermRep supported 
Feith's request.  Amb. Daalder stressed that while it was not 
KFOR's role to implement the northern strategy, KFOR needed 
to maintain sufficient forces on hand as political issues 
were tackled.  He warned that the international community 
needed to address the north now or there would be no safe and 
secure environment in the future.  Albania, Croatia, and 
Norway also advocated caution. 
 
9. (C) The UK disputed Feith's comments, saying that a steady 
KFOR drawdown would send a positive message, there was no 
reason to attach specific conditions to specific gates, and 
perceptions of risks should not interfere with the drawdown. 
The UK called for NATO to take a more strategic view, saying 
the Alliance faced global issues, not just Kosovo, and should 
also consider NATO's severe resource constraints.  The 
Italian PermRep said NATO did need to take a strategic view, 
but the drawdown must remain conditions-based.  He stressed 
that conditions on the ground must be right before moving to 
Gate 2. 
 
------------------ 
Unfix with Caution 
------------------ 
 
10. (C) Feith said he fully supported KFOR transfer of 
responsibility for protecting the Gazimestan monument -- one 
of nine KFOR-guarded sensitive patrimonial sites -- to the 
Kosovo Police (KP).  He said the KP was ready and cautioned 
Allies not to be unnerved by protests or other propaganda 
efforts.  De Kermabon said EULEX was working closely with the 
KP on Gazimestan and was confident of success.  De Kermabon 
said EULEX was giving the unfixing process its utmost 
attention and would continue to participate in joint meetings 
and planning with KFOR and the KP. 
 
11. (C) Germany, Czech Republic, Albania, and Norway 
cautioned that unfixing the other eight patrimonial sites 
would be more difficult.  Spain and Greece stressed the need 
to address Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) concerns.  Greece 
said NATO must remember that the patrimonial sites would 
 
USNATO 00000048  003 OF 003 
 
 
continue to need protection even after unfixing.  Feith and 
de Kermabon advocated a gradual approach, active consultation 
with the SOC, and a proactive media campaign to build 
confidence.  De Kermabon recommended unfixing Pec and Decani 
last and said he was pushing the KP in Decani to deepen 
relations with the SOC leaders there. 
 
12. (C) De Kermabon said turning over border monitoring 
duties from KFOR to the KP would also be a sensitive process. 
 He noted that the KP was increasing the number of officers 
in the border police but said these officers needed training. 
 He said EULEX would collaborate with KFOR to ensure a good 
turnover. 
 
------------------------------------- 
NATO-EU Cooperation Working in Kosovo 
------------------------------------- 
 
13. (C) Feith and de Kermabon expressed appreciation for 
excellent cooperation with KFOR.  Feith said the ICO, EULEX, 
and KFOR shared a common vision.  De Kermabon added that the 
KP, EULEX, and KFOR have a common understanding of their 
respective first, second, and third responder roles.  Turkey 
noted that it was taking a constructive approach to 
KFOR-EULEX coordination in theater, but this did not change 
its main lines with regards to NATO-EU relations. 
 
14. (C) Klompenhouwer praised EULEX-KFOR cooperation as well 
as NATO-EU cooperation in Afghanistan.  Klompenhouwer, 
supported by Croatia, said NATO and the EU should increase 
cooperation at the operational level and pursue more informal 
contacts given the two organizations' common challenges. 
 
 
 
DAALDER