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DE RUEHUNV #0077/01 0571721
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 261721Z FEB 10
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0651
INFO RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 0243

C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000077 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR T, P. ISN, IO, NEA, ISN/RA, IO/GS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/24/2020 
TAGS: AORC PARM KNNP IAEA SY
SUBJECT: IAEA TECHNICAL BRIEF ON SYRIA LAYS IT ON THE LINE 
 
REF: UNVIE 059 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Glyn T. Davies for reasons 1.4 b and d 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1. (C)  At the February 24 technical briefing on the DG's 
Syria report, the IAEA underscored the need for Syrian 
cooperation on an increasing number of issues, some involving 
Syria's failure to report nuclear material under its 
Safeguards Agreement.  In particular, Director of Safeguards 
Operations B Herman Nackaerts noted the Agency's rights and 
responsibilities with respect to verifying the correctness 
and completeness of Syria's declarations.  In addition to 
recounting the repeated requests for information related to 
the Dair Alzour former reactor site, Nackaerts also 
highlighted the information Syria must provide the Agency to 
meet its reporting requirements for design and nuclear 
material changes at the Miniature Neutron Source Reactor 
(MNSR) in Damascus.  He informed Member States that the 
planned FeQuary 23 inspection at the MNSR did not take 
place; Syria had informed the Agency it could not accommodate 
the request because of the Board obligations of key people. 
During the question and answer session, Charge asked whether 
it is typical to refuse the IAEA access to a declared 
facility and whether doing so in this manner was a safeguards 
violation.  DDG Safeguards/Heinonen acknowledged that 
inspections typically can shift by a day or two (for 
technical reasons) from what the Agency requests, but 
normally a state offers an alternative day well in advance; 
to his recolleQion no other date was offered in Syria's 
case.  Responding to the question of whether or not a 
violation was occurring, Legal Advisor Johan Rautenbach 
admitted that a flat out refusal would "not be consistent 
with safeguards obligations," but quickly added that in this 
case he understood discussion was underway to reschedule the 
inspection. 
 
¶2. (C) Comment: Following the briefing, Heinonen privately 
expressed frustration with the Legal Advisor's downplaying of 
Syria's refusal of the IAEA request to visit the declared 
MNSR facility.  He commented that we had been handed a 
"golden ticket" with respect to Syria's refusal and it was up 
to the Board to do something about it, as this was a real 
"test." Syria could have postponed, he noted, but had 
miscalculated with its flat out refusal.  Heinonen described 
how he had proposed the MNSR inspection as a means to keep 
the pressure on Damascus; he was pleased that Amano had 
approved their gambit, even after others in the Secretariat 
had counseled a less confrontational approach.  Several 
likeminded colleagues noted that the Legal Advisor had caught 
himself and stopped just short after audibly beginning to 
articulate the word "violation."  In a further development 
Heinonen relayed that he had received a green light from DG 
Amano to request access at the Homs facility, where Syria 
produced the uranium yellowcake used in the undeclared 
experiments at the MNSR.  (Note: The IAEA wants to ensure 
that the yellowcake at Homs, a quantity of at least 
"hundreds" of kilograms, has not also been processed in 
undeclared activities. End note.)  This request for access at 
Homs would not, at least initially, be in the form of a 
special inspection and would not be in lieu of a broader 
special inspection request advocated by Heinonen.  Heinonen 
told Mission, however, that he would need to see evidence of 
strong support from member states to IAEA efforts to ensure 
Syria accepts immediately the routine inspection at the MNSR 
if he is to believe member states would support a subsequent 
special inspection request.  In this regard, we note DG Amano 
reportedly told Gordon Brown's Foreign Policy advisor that 
with respect to a special inspection in Syria, he "cannot 
slay too many dragons at once," implying that the ongoing 
Iran investigation complicated his ability to proceed on 
Syria. 
 
¶3.  (C) Notably, the briefing was attended by the new Syrian 
Ambassador Bassam Sabbagh, who we have learned from 
likeminded had been one of the escorts on the IAEA's sole 
visit to Dair Alzour in June 2008.  For the second time in a 
row, Syria did not speak at the technical briefing and Syrian 
Atomic Energy head Ibrahim Othman sat discretely in the back 
of the room.  End summary and comment. 
 
 
Laying out the Safeguards Case 
------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) IAEA Director of Safeguards Operations B Herman 
Nackaerts delivered the February 24 technical briefing on the 
DG's Syria report following his presentation on the Iran 
report (septel).  The majority of the briefing retold the 
verification story on both the Dair Alzour investigation and 
the findings at the MNSR.  Nackaerts underscored the Agency's 
rights and responsibilities with respect to verifying the 
correctness and completeness of Syria's declarations.  He 
reviewed the many outstanding issues and the need for Syrian 
cooperation as the key to breaking the logjam.  Syria needs 
to "urgently" provide access to Dair Alzour and other sites, 
he emphasized, provide access and reports related to the MNSR 
issue, and establish modalities with the IAEA for managed 
access that would protect sensitive material in Syria. 
Nackaerts specified outstanding issues related to the MNSR 
that need to be addressed: 
 
--  Syria must provide a full declaration of nuclear material 
(given the materials at the MNSR that need to be added); 
--  The Agency would then verify Syria's declared inventory; 
--  Examination of source documents associated with 
experiments and accounts of nuclear material; 
--  Clarification of all experimental activities performed 
with nuclear material; 
--  Clarification of design information concerning 
irradiation activities. 
 
 
New Developments 
---------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) New details were briefed on Syria's February 10 
letter to the Agency, in which Syria declined an IAEA request 
for February 8-9 meetings to discuss the results of the 
latest samples taken at the MNSR (taken November 17).  In the 
letter, Syria informed the Agency that more Homs yellowcake 
was located at the MNSR.  Nackaerts noted this material was 
on the order of kilograms, according to the letter.  Syria 
also provided a description of the process used to convert 
the yellowcake to uranyl nitrate, although no details were 
given during the technical briefing.  Nackaerts further added 
that the information, timing, and locations of the 
experiments (presumably as noted in the process description) 
are inconsistent with the information previously provided by 
Syria. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Nackaerts confirmed that the yellowcake material 
sampled during the November 17 visit to MNSR was "approaching 
the commercial standard for uranium ore concentrate feed 
material for fuel fabrication."  (Comment: This is the 
strongest statement to date on the potential use or relevance 
of the experiments conducted at the MNSR.  It should also 
serve as another point of uncertainty about the scope and 
nature of Syria's nuclear activities; as fuel fabrication 
would have direct applicability to an operating nuclear 
reactor such as Dair Alzour.  End comment). 
 
¶7. (SBU) Nackaerts also noted that the planned February 23 
inspection at the MNSR did not take place.  He said the 
Agency received a letter on February 23 (but dated February 
18) saying that Syria could not accommodate the request 
because of the IAEA Board-related obligations of key Syrian 
officials.  During the question and answer session, Charge 
asked whether it is typical to refuse the IAEA access to a 
declared facility and whether this instance was a safeguards 
violation.  DDG Safeguards/Heinonen acknowledged that 
inspections typically can change by a day or two (for 
technical reasons) from what the Agency requests, but 
normally a member state requesting the rescheduling offers 
another day well in advance; to his recollection no other 
date was offered in Syria's case.  Responding to the question 
of whether or not a violation was occurring, Legal Advisor 
Johan Rautenbach bit off the word "violation" as he began to 
use it, characterized a flat out refusal as "not consistent 
with safeguards obligations," but quickly added that in this 
case he understood discussion was underway to reschedule the 
inspection.  (Note: Heinonen told us privately after the 
briefing that, had it been him, he would have stated bluntly 
that this is noncompliance.  End Note.) 
 
 
Linkages 
--------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) In a follow up question on the possibility of a link 
between the uranium particles found at MNSR and Dair Alzour 
(as noted in the report and technical briefing), Canada asked 
what else is needed to determine a linkage (Canada sought to 
underscore the access Syria needs to provide).  Nackaerts 
noted that currently the Agency cannot conclude a linkage one 
way or the other.  He said that the Agency had identified 
activities, of which it was not previously aware.  For 
example, on the Homs material (yellowcake), the Agency needs 
to understand how this material and the experiments fit into 
Syria's nuclear program, whether Syria plans to convert this 
material and turn it into fuel or if there are other foreseen 
nuclear facilities in the future.  Canada also asked if the 
Agency could provide more details about the "use of natural 
uranium compounds" at the MNSR that might be relevant to 
allegations concerning one of the three other locations, 
asking specifically which site the Agency referred to but 
Nackaerts did not answer this question. 
 
 
Homs 
----- 
 
¶9.  (SBU) In the context of Syria's statements that 
yellowcake produced at the Homs facility, Nackaerts provided 
details on the Homs plant (Homs Phosphate Acid Purification 
Pilot Plant) not included in the DG report: 
 
-- Facility commission in 1998; 
-- 1 cubic meter/hour throughput of raw phosphoric acid with 
60 ppm uranium; 
-- Second process to purify phosphoric acid to 'food grade' - 
added in 2003; and 
-- Agency visited the site in July 2004 and inspectors 
observed hundreds of kilograms of yellowcake at that time 
(this was in a footnote to the DG report). 
 
 
Uranyl Nitrate 
-------------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) Lastly, Australia also asked a question on the 
uranyl nitrate, and how the Agency accounts for Syria's 
changing explanations on the source of the uranium 
contamination at the MNSR.  Nackaerts noted the uranyl 
nitrate could either be purchased on the open market or 
produced at the MNSR from Homs yellowcake.  As to why Syria 
did not declare this activity, Nackaerts said he did not 
know, but speculated matter-of-factly on a possible lack of 
understanding of reporting obligations on Syria's part. 
 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶11.  (C)  Mission detects a slowly increasing cognizance 
among like-minded that the Syrian portfolio at the IAEA 
remains a serious challenge with no easy end-game in sight. 
Unlike the November Technical Briefing, Canada and Australia 
joined us in pursuing questions of the Secretariat.  In the 
run-up to the meeting we urged France to do so as well, but 
were told that the French Mission was instructed not to take 
the floor in light of ongoing French efforts to engage the 
Syrians.  We reminded the French Mission that absent Syrian 
cooperation with the IAEA, we are inexorably heading toward a 
possible special inspection request on which the IAEA would 
look to France to be supportive. 
DAVIES