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C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000076 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR P, T, ISN, IO, ISN/RA, IO/GS, IO/UNP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/25/2020 
TAGS: AORC PARM KNNP IAEA IR
SUBJECT: IAEA/BOARD/IRAN: RUSSIA,S TOUGHENING STANCE; PRC 
PLAYS TO TYPE 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Glyn T. Davies for reasons 1.4 b and d 
 
(C) Russian Ambassador Zmeyevskiy, in sharp contrast with his 
Chinese counterpart, took a markedly tougher stance on Iran 
than he has previously during German-hosted P5-plus-1 
informal pre-Board consultations February 26.  Essentially 
agreeing with the P3-plus-1 appraisal, Russia viewed the DG 
report as a factual, objective assessment of developments on 
Iran's nuclear program.  Going further, Zmeyevskiy underlined 
that the report confirmed that what we had initiated with the 
November Board resolution on Iran "was not groundless."  He 
referenced a recent comment by President Medvedev that Iran 
must correlate its actions with Agency requirements, and 
affirmed that Russia will support those requirements.  The 
Russian Ambassador also expressed concern that Iran has been 
successful in imposing "its interpretation" of events, 
including with respect to the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) 
deal, on ill-informed G-77/NAM delegations.  He feared that 
there would be voices of support for Iran on the Board and 
suggested outreach to NAM delegations.  Zmeyevskiy 
underscored the responsibility of the P5-plus-1 to give an 
objective version of developments to the Board of Governors 
and counter Iranian misrepresentations.  (Comment: Coming 
from a super-cautious Zmeyevskiy, who never oversteps his 
brief on IAEA matters -- typically deferring to capital-based 
Russian Governor Berdennikov - these remarks are a telling 
indication of an evolution in the Russian position on Iran. 
Drawing him out further on Iran's claim to some NAM 
delegations that Russia had agreed only to provide a reactor 
load of fuel for Bushehr thus justifying Iran's indigenous 
enrichment, German Ambassador Luedeking elicited a disdainful 
huff from Zmeyevskiy: "We have a different interpretation." 
End Comment). 
 
¶2. (C) By contrast, Chinese Ambassador Hu spoke once to relay 
China's position, which was clearly out of step with the 
other P5-plus-1.  He began by noting that China had not 
co-sponsored the November Board resolutioQon Iran and that 
the situation had gone from bad to worse since then with 
Iran's announcement of its intent to build more facilities 
and the move to 20 percent enrichment.  China will take note 
of the DG report and Iran's views in the Board, Hu said, and 
was not surprised by the more critical tone of the report, 
attributing this to Amano's influence (rather than Iran's 
actions).  China will deliver a short statement similar in 
tone to previous Chinese statements, Hu specified, on the 
need for dialogue and negotiations.  China would urge "all 
sides" to engage and believed that there was still hope for 
reaching agreement on the TRR, as all solutions had not been 
exhausted.  The Chinese Ambassador added that the Iran issue 
should be handled by Political Directors.  Germany pushed 
back, citing the Board's obligation to uphold safeguards 
requirements and respond to Iran's failure to live up to 
them.  Luedeking underlined that calling for dialogue is 
insufficient, in that dialogue "takes two" and Iran is 
refusing dialogue with the P5-plus-1 and the IAEA, whose 
frustration with Iran's refusal to engage on possible 
military dimensions is palpable.  Ambassador also contrasted 
our willingness to engage with Iran's lack of reciprocity on 
the TRR offer. 
 
¶3. (C) The E3 and U.S. focused on the factual nature of the 
DG report and counseled against an interpretation (including 
in the media) personalizing the "new tone" as a function of 
DG Amano versus former DG ElBaradei. Germany also highlighted 
Iran's lack of cooperation with the IAEA's request to upgrade 
the safeguards approach at Natanz before proceeding to 20 
percent enrichment.  Luedeking cited this as another example 
of Iran "testing the redlines" of its safeguards agreement, 
while French Ambassador Mangin cautioned against delving into 
the legalities on this point.  France did not see a 
substantial basis for a Board resolution in the report but 
much cause for concern.  Germany recommended that all 
P5-plus-1 national statements recall the November Board 
resolution on Iran, a suggestion we should incorporate in the 
U.S. statement expected for March 3. 
DAVIES