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FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0645
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000075 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2035 
TAGS: KNNP AORC IAEA IR
SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAN:  TECHNICAL BRIEFING SIGNALS TOUGHER 
APPROACH OF NEW DIRECTOR GENERAL 
 
Classified By: Ambassador GLYN DAVIES for reasons 1.4(b) and (d) 
 
 
------------------- 
Summary and Comment 
------------------- 
 
¶1.   (C//NF)  On February 24, Ops B Director Herman Nackaerts 
provided Member States a technical briefing on the Director 
General's (DG) February 18 report on Iran.  The briefing 
reprised the points covered in the report, but also offered 
more details about the IAEA's proposals for adjusted 
Safeguards measures for the new 20 percent enrichment line at 
the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) at Natanz and aired 
helpful new details regarding Iran's unprepardness to 
manufacture fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor.  With 
respect to the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP) at Qom, 
heavy water-related issues, and UNSC requirements, Nackaerts 
highlighted that Tehran asserts the IAEA's requests were 
"beyond Iran's obligations under its Safeguards Agreement." 
The briefing further underlined the credibility and 
consistency of what Nackaerts described as an "avalanche of 
information" related to possible military dimensions (PMD) to 
Iran's nuclear program.  Overall, the briefing was tougher in 
tone and more direct than recent technical briefings in 
relaying the IAEA's frustration with Iran's noncooperation on 
a number of fronts, with a marked absence of "balance" 
between calls on Iran to comply with its obligations and 
calls on member states to allow the Agency to share more 
intelligence information with Iran.  This was the Safeguards 
Department unfettered -- no longer fearing  the 
IAEA  Director General should they speak directly to Iran's 
noncooperation. 
 
¶2.  (C//NF)  The question and answer session focused on 
Iran's move to 20 percent enrichment, the chronology of the 
development of the Fordow enrichment plant, and the uranium 
metal pyroprocessing activities at the Jabr Ibn Hayan 
Laboratory.  Iranian Ambassador Soltanieh delivered an 
aggressive retort in which he tried to bully Nackaerts with a 
series of yes/no questions.    Nackaerts tried not to engage 
Soltanieh, though  DDG Safeguards Heinonen  felt obliged to 
intervene at one point to correct  Soltanieh's 
mischaracterizations  of safeguards applying to only declared 
nuclear material,  the level of access the Additional 
Protocol (AP) provides, the correspondence between the IAEA 
and Iran on the move to 20 percent enrichment, and the facts 
and chronology of IAEA-Iran interactions regarding the 2007 
Iran "workplan" and PMD issues. 
 
¶3.  (C//NF)  New and noteworthy was Soltanieh's repeated 
characterization that the IAEA's approach to the Iran report 
under the past DG contrasted with the approach now under DG 
Amano.  Soltanieh's first yes/no question was to ask for 
confirmation that, apart from Iran's enrichment to 20 
percent, "nothing has changed since the last report except 
there is a new DG."  He repeatedly  contrasted  this first 
report by  DG Amano to those of his predecessor and  invoked 
ElBaradei's refrain  on the need to verify the "authenticity" 
 of the alleged studies documents on weaponization. 
Soltanieh continued to dismiss possible military dimensions 
as disinformation based on "the stupid American laptop." The 
Iranians also circulated a non-paper to Member States (Ref A) 
explaining Tehran's negative views of the DG's report and 
citing discrete areas of cooperation by Iran, and including 
copies of Safeguards Confidential correspondence related to 
Iran's notification to the IAEA of 20 percent enrichment at 
Natanz.  In an uncharacteristically combative quip, Nackaerts 
disputed an inference by Soltanieh that, although such 
details were "OK" for a technical briefing, the inclusion of 
specific technical details in the DG's report would create 
obstacles for future cooperation with the IAEA.  Nackaerts 
pointedly said that if that is the case, the IAEA will give 
more details on the PMD issues in the next Technical 
Briefing. 
 
¶4.  (C//NF)  The change in the tone  of the briefing was not 
lost upon  Member States as well as others in the IAEA 
Secretariat, many  of whom welcomed Heinonen's bluntness  in 
correcting Iranian Ambassador Soltanieh's outlandish 
statements.  Privately, Heinonen said he felt he needed to 
defend the IAEA and was pleased that he can finally say what 
he thinks to Soltanieh.  That said, the IAEA's new found 
assertiveness is certain to draw criticism from NAM members 
at next week's Board meeting.  End Summary and Comment. 
 
-------------------------------- 
Safeguards Approach for the PFEP 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C//NF)  In the technical briefing of February 24, 2010, 
open to all Member State delegations, Safeguards Ops B 
Director Herman Nackaerts provided a timeline for Iran's 
further enrichment to 20 percent at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment 
Plant (PFEP) at Natanz, which  detailed the correspondence 
between the IAEA and Iran (as released by the IAEA as GOV/INF 
documents)  as well as initial operation preparations.  He 
emphasized that Iran had ignored the IAEA's request that Iran 
not begin 20 percent enrichment until the IAEA had developed 
a new Safeguards approach for the PFEP>  Nackaerts also 
described the following details about the current status of 
cascades at the PFEP: 
 
-Cascade 1 contains 164-IR1 centrifuges, with a feed of 3.47 
percent enriched uranium and a 20 percent product; 
-Cascade 2 contains 8 single centrifuge machines and a 
20-machine cascade; 
-Cascade 3 contains 4 single centrifuge machines, a 
10-machine cascade, and a 20 machine cascade; 
-Cascades 4, 5, and 6 are empty. 
 
¶6.  (C//NF)  In addition, Nackaerts noted there currently are 
5 surveillance cameras installed at the PFEP to observe its 
activities.  He explained that the IAEA believes it needs to 
adjust the Safeguards measures in preparation for the 
increase to 20 percent enrichment. These measures include the 
repositioning of cameras; unannounced inspections; load cell 
verification for the feed, product, tails, and dump 
cylinders; and destructive analysis on samples from the 
operator's mass spectrometer sampling point.  Regarding the 
construction status of the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant 
(FFEP) at Qom, Nackaerts said no nuclear material had yet 
been introduced, but all centrifuge mounting pads are 
installed, all the header and sub-header pipes are installed, 
and the utilities are erected with transformers and chillers 
in place.  Iran also plans to redesign the withdrawal system 
to fit a 30B cylinder. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Question and Answer Session Spotlights 
Iran's Noncooperation 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C//NF)    Nackaerts, expecting that Soltanieh would try 
to hijack the Technical Briefing as he has attempted in the 
past (Ref B), suggested to Msnoff on February 22 that the 
like-minded work together to immediately raise placards once 
his briefing ends so that he could call on others first. 
When it came time for the question and answer session 
Nackaerts, as promised, called on Australia and Canada before 
recognizing Ambassador Soltanieh. 
 
¶8.  (C//NF)  Australia, Canada, Germany, and the U.S. asked 
questions following Nackaerts' presentation.  The U.K. and 
Switzerland also had their placards raised to ask questions 
but were unable to as time ran short given a lengthy 
intervention by Ambassador Soltanieh.  Australia started off 
the question period by asking about the overall chronology of 
the FFEP and for more information about design and 
construction work the IAEA says may have begun as early as 
¶2006.  Specifically, Australia wanted to know if the 2006 
date was derived from the information the IAEA received from 
Member States on the facility which the DG's report noted 
matched up with the actual design of the facility, thus 
suggesting the date was credible.  Nackaerts affirmed that 
Member State information on the FFEP was detailed and proved 
to be correct during the design information verification 
(DIV) visits.  He said that the information about the 2006 
start of design and construction work was, indeed, referenced 
in the briefings provided by 
the Member States. 
 
¶9.  (C//NF)  Australia also asked about the dialogue between 
the IAEA and Iran on the establishment of new safeguards for 
the PFEP, specifically questioning whether there was an 
understanding between the IAEA and Iran as to what that new 
agreement would look like from the meeting Nackaerts said had 
taken place that day.  Nackaerts replied that according to 
his understanding, Iran had not yet agreed to the new 
safeguards approach, but was considering it.  Iran  may be 
able to provide the IAEA a response within a week; Nackaerts 
hoped to finalize the issue in meetings with  the Iranian 
delegation in Vienna for the coming Board meeting. Nackaerts 
added that with the low enriched uranium hexafluoride (LEUF6) 
stored in a sealed container, the IAEA is comfortable for the 
time being that there is no diversion of material.  He noted, 
however, that the PFEP was designed and declared as a 
research and development facility, not as a production 
facility as it is now being used for 20 percent enriched 
uranium.  As such, the layout is "flexible" and the design of 
 
long-term safeguards covering the facility must account for 
ensuring against undeclared use in light of such flexibility. 
  In response to a later question from Canada Nackaerts 
reinforced his point that the IAEA will take care in 
formulating the safeguards approach because the Agency has 
only one other facility under safeguards at which nearly 20 
percent enriched uranium is being produced. 
 
¶10.  (C//NF)  Nackaerts then called on Canada, which asked 
what the technical challenges would be of further enriching 
the 20 percent to weapons-grade uranium.    Nackaerts said he 
was not in position to respond directly to the question and 
discussed further the safeguards issue (as noted above). 
 
¶11.  (C//NF)  In response to the second question from Canada, 
Nackaerts said that the IAEA had received hundreds of pages 
of information on the alleged studies issue in which the work 
seemed to have ended in 2004.  However, since then, the IAEA 
has received new information suggesting that the work has 
continued since 2004.  He described the information as 
"sufficiently credible to confront Iran with," but noted that 
the IAEA needed to give Iran an opportunity to see/consider 
the new material before presenting it to the Board in more 
detail. He said it was consistent with the alleged studies in 
terms of the people, entities, and type of work involved. 
 
----------------------- 
"But ElBaradei Said..." 
----------------------- 
 
¶12.  (C//NF)  Nackaerts then called on Iranian Ambassador 
Soltanieh, who noted that since he had received complaints 
last time for not actually asking questions, this time he 
would structure his remarks in a series of yes or no 
questions.  Soltanieh proceeded to rhetorically ask a series 
of aggressive questions for over 25 minutes, beginning with 
whether there was any non-diversion of declared nuclear 
material or any new development since the last DG's report on 
Iran, noting that apart from the move to 20 percent 
enrichment, nothing has changed "except the DG."   Soltanieh 
took issue with how the new DG report was written, both on 
the amount of technical details in the report (which he 
claimed had caused confusion in Tehran and with Board of 
Governors members who lack technical expertise) and on the 
document's tone.  He argued that other than the new Director 
General, little was new since the November 2009 report that 
would warrant such different text.  Soltanieh also launched 
an almost adhominum attack on DG Amano,  repeatedly 
contrasting  this first report by Amano to those of his 
predecessor and  invoking  ElBaradei's refrain  with respect 
to the need to verify the "authenticity"  of the alleged 
studies on weaponization, 
 
¶13.  (C//NF) As usual, Soltanieh complained that the document 
had been leaked in its entirety and again noted that all of 
this had made Iran less interested in working with the IAEA. 
In particular, he said Iran saw no benefit resulting  from 
its "early and voluntary" disclosure of the FFEP to the IAEA 
and would now only notify the IAEA of new facilities 180 days 
prior to the introduction of nuclear material.  (Comment: 
While Iran has said this before, Soltanieh's reiteration may 
be of greater note in light of recent press announcement that 
Iran will begin construction soon of two additional 
enrichment plants.)  End comment.)  Soltanieh argued that 
Iran had been cooperative on its move to 20 percent 
enrichment, and in particular disputed the implication in the 
report and in the Technical Briefing that Iran had 
disregarded the IAEA's request to put new Safeguards measures 
in place before further enriching.  (Comment:  The IAEA on 
February 10 in a GOV/INF circular documented that had on 
February 8 it had requested Iran to forego enrichment until a 
revised safeguards approach was agreed.  End comment.) 
According to Soltanieh, he did not receive the IAEA's request 
until the next week, and by then it was too late.  Soltanieh 
also said that an IAEA inspector's comment that one of the 
tunnels at the FFEP was not correctly configured for 
centrifuges was proof that it had originally been intended 
for a different purpose. 
 
¶14.  (C//NF)  Soltanieh argued that verifying Iran's heavy 
water-related activities was beyond the scope of Iran's 
Safeguards Agreement.  He noted that the Agency argues it 
needs access to verify the UNSC-mandated suspension.  If that 
is the case, Soltanieh said, he could resolve the issue by 
"telling you now that  Iran will never suspend these 
activities."  Thus, he concluded, the IAEA does not have to 
continue wasting time and resources trying to determine 
whether or not Iran has done so.  Soltanieh said he was 
surprised to see that the IAEA had quoted from a UNSC 
resolution regarding the Heavy Water Production Plant, which 
 
was the first time a UNSCR had been quoted in an IAEA 
document, and said that he will formally complain to DG Amano 
about this change (Note:  The title of the DG report has long 
referred to implementation of IAEA Safeguards and UNSC 
resolutions. End note. ) Always looking for a laugh from the 
crowd, Soltanieh said he had been happy to provide these 
"cost-free explanations"--a slight to 
ward cost-free experts, the use of which in the Safeguards 
Department he has repeatedly denounced in various IAEA 
meetings. 
 
------------------------- 
Heinonen Defends the IAEA 
------------------------- 
 
¶15.  (C//NF)  Once Soltanieh was finished, Heinonen responded 
that the text of the report was warranted because the lack of 
timely or complete responses from Iran in response to IAEA 
questions and its obligations, for example under Code 3.1 
Modified, had led the IAEA to have lower confidence that all 
nuclear material was adequately safeguarded and that the IAEA 
was aware of all nuclear sites in Iran.  He also reiterated 
that the IAEA had indeed informed Iran of its request not to 
further enrich at the PFEP until new safeguards were in place 
and provided Soltanieh with the reference citation of the 
IAEA's request. 
 
--------------------- 
Back to the Questions 
--------------------- 
 
¶16.  (C//NF)  Nackaerts then called on Charge d'Affaire  who 
asked whether Iran had indicated whether it planned to enrich 
all of the 1950 kgs of LEUF6 it has moved to the PFEP, and 
also asked if Iran has provided the IAEA with its plans and 
intentions regarding the actual fabrication of nuclear fuel 
for the TRR, including whether the IAEA was aware of a 
facility in which Iran could safely turn the 20 percent 
enriched material into nuclear fuel.  Nackaerts responded 
that the IAEA had not received from Iran any stated plans or 
intentions regarding the production of nuclear fuel and thus 
was in no position to comment on safety.  He noted that the 
Fuel Manufacturing Plant (FMP) was only equipped and declared 
to handle up to 5 percent enriched material and that it was 
not clear to the IAEA where Iran would convert the LEUF6 gas 
into reactor fuel.  (Comment:  In regard to our first 
question on whether Iran had informed the Agency if it plans 
to enrich all 1950 kgs of LEUF6 to 20 percent, DDG Safeguards 
Heinonen told us privately that Iran has not provided 
information on the future use of the total amount.  He said 
states are normally obliged via the Subsidiary Arrangements 
to their Safeguards Agreement to provide such information in 
advance on a semi-annual basis.  He undertook to "remind" 
Iran about this obligation.  End comment.) 
 
¶17.  (C//NF)  Nackaerts then called on Germany, which sought 
to better understand the comment made in the DG's report 
regarding Iranian interest in pyroprocessing LEUF6 into 
uranium metal asking if Iran had identified a civilian 
purpose for this research.  Nackaerts responded that Iran had 
not provided any such information.  Germany also asked why 
Iran refused to provide original design documents for the 
FFEP.  Nackaerts responded that the Agency believes Iran 
could have responded quicker to the IAEA's still outstanding 
request for original design information, and that it would 
help if the IAEA had access to designers and construction 
officials responsible for the facility.  Furthermore, since 
the facility is nearing completion, Nackaerts said, updated 
design information should be available and should be provided 
to the IAEA.  He added that Iran should provide some evidence 
that would support its statements that the facility was only 
converted to nuclear purposes after mid-2007. 
 
------------------- 
New Sheriff in Town 
------------------- 
 
¶18.  (C//NF) Comment:  The presumed "Amano Factor" in the 
frankness of both last week's report and the technical 
briefing is at the forefront of conversation here, not just 
with our like-minded who welcome it but with many NAM 
counterparts.  Moderates in the NAM fear the stoking of 
confrontation, in which they will be compelled to show 
solidarity.  We understand, for instance, that Iran has 
received NAM backing for a statement that "expresses concern 
that the DG has deviated from the standard verification 
language"--this is a reference to para 46 "cannot confirm 
that all nuclear activity is in peaceful use."  (Note: 
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements us the formulation 
"nuclear activity" without a qualifier as to declared or 
 
undeclared, so the NAM is technically correct. End Note.) 
We are emphasizing to such delegations that what is most 
significantly new on the Iran file since the November 2009 
Board is a seriesctions in the wrong direction. 
Further, we are focusing them on the technical foundation for 
the Agency's assessment and reinforcing Amano's own message 
that he aims for a dispassionate bilateral implementation 
with Iran of its obligations.  End Comment. 
DAVIES