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INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000066 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/19/2035 
TAGS: KNNP AORC IAEA IR
SUBJECT:  IAEA/IRAN:  DG AMANO GIVES FAILING GRADE TO 
TEHRAN IN HIS FIRST REPORT 
 
Classified By: Ambassador GLYN DAVIES for reasons 1.4(b) 
 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1.   (SBU)  On 18 February, Director General (DG) Amano 
released the IAEA's latest reports on its investigations in 
Iran in preparation for the IAEA Board of Governors meeting 
the week of March 1.  The report was the toughest seen in 
years and concluded Iran's cooperation has been insufficient 
to resolve the serious concerns and outstanding issues that 
remain about its nuclear program.  The report is sharper in 
tone and more clinical than those produced during former IAEA 
DG ElBaradei's tenure.  As the first such report of the Amano 
era, it creates a positive precedent for how he intends to 
run Safeguards investigations.  The IAEA, once more, reported 
that Iran has failed to suspend its enrichment- and heavy 
water-related programs, as required by the UNSC and Board. 
Instead, Iran has increased its stockpile of low enriched 
uranium hexafluoride (UF6) product at Natanz to approximately 
2,065 kilograms, which is more than enough for one nuclear 
weapon if enriched further to weapons-grade.   Iran also has 
moved quickly to achieve near-twenty percent enrichment, 
shifting almost all of its available UF6 (more than Iran 
would need to supply the Tehran Research Reactor even if it 
could fabricate the requisite fuel assemblies) to the 
aboveground Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) at Natanz to 
support enrichment operations there. 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  The remainder of the DG's report is a recitation 
of the many areas in which Iran has refused to answer the 
IAEA's questions or provide the requested level of access. 
This includes providing access to documents and individuals 
associated with the decision to construct the Fordow Fuel 
Enrichment Plant (FFEP) near Qom, confirmation that there are 
no new enrichment facilities under construction in Iran, or 
acknowledgement that Iran has a continuing obligation to 
declare new nuclear facilities when the decision is made to 
construct them (Code 3.1 Modified).  The report concludes by 
spelling out in detail the IAEA's questions concerning 
possible military dimensions (PMD) to Iran's nuclear program, 
noting there are indications that Iranian nuclear 
weaponization-related work may have continued beyond 2004 and 
suggesting that there are current such projects ongoing in 
Iran. 
 
¶3.  (C)  Comment:  Arguably such a tough report could be the 
premise for Board action but it is not clear what the value 
added of another Board resolution would be beyond what was 
already accomplished in the November Board of Governors 
resolution on Iran.   It is not clear the UN Security Council 
needs another negative report card from the Board, beyond 
that laid out in the DG's hard-hitting report.  The ball 
would seem to fall in New York's court to respond to the 
escalating and direct violation of previous UNSC resolutions. 
 Strong EU and E3 statements in the Board along with muscular 
national statements from the United States and Russia (as 
well as likeminded) would suffice to cue up UN Security 
Council action.  While at first blush a P5  1 joint statement 
at this juncture may appear to hold little promise (as it is 
likely to be diluted by China), we will take soundings here 
in coming days of Chinese and Russian reactions to the 
report.   Mission recommends high level intervention in 
Brasilia and Ankara to press for more unambiguous national 
statements in the Board in light of this failing report by 
the DG, as statements by these UNSC /Board members will be 
closely watched.  End Summary and Comment. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
Enriching to 20 Percent, but 
Other Operations of the IR-1 Decreasing 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  The report describes Iran's recent moves to 
further enrich its stock of 3.5 percent low enriched uranium 
(LEU) to 20 percent in one centrifuge machine cascade at the 
PFEP at Natanz.  Contrary to the IAEA's request on February 9 
to not begin feeding LEU for higher enrichment before the 
IAEA could implement additional-and necessary-safeguards 
procedures, Iran began operations anyway.  Although para 34 
of the report notes the IAEA should have been provided 
sufficient time to adjust the Safeguards at the PFEP for the 
increase from approximately 5 to 20 percent enrichment, per 
Article 45 of Iran's Safeguards Agreement,  it falls short, 
however, of calling Tehran's rush move to further enrichment 
a violation or failure of its Safeguards obligations.  In 
addition to the 20 percent enrichment activity at the PFEP, 
the report notes increased activity with Iran's advanced 
 
generation centrifuges-specifically theIR-2 modified and IR-4 
models. 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  While Iran pushes ahead with its 20 percent 
enrichment, its other centrifuge operations at the Fuel 
Enrichment Plant (FEP) at Natanz have continued to decline. 
As of January 31, Iran was feeding UF6 gas into 3772 
centrifuges--a decrease from the 3936 that were being fed 
with UF6 as of November 2009.  There also was a decrease in 
centrifuges under vacuum and installation, with several 
cascades being disconnected or removed.  Per the annual 
physical inventory verification (PIV) at the FEP in November 
2009, the IAEA confirmed the production of 1808 kg of LEU UF6 
since the beginning of operations in 2007.  Since then, Iran 
has estimated that an additional 257 kg of LEU has been 
produced bringing the total to approximately 2065 kg LEU UF6. 
The report also notes that Iran has moved practically its 
entire product-1950 kg of LEU UF6-from the underground (FEP) 
halls to the above ground PFEP for the 20 percent enrichment 
operations. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Iran Must Explain Chronology of Fordow 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  Regarding the FFEP at Qom, the IAEA reiterated its 
request for Iran to explain the timing of the decision to 
construct the facility because Tehran had not fully addressed 
the IAEA's questions.  Noting that Iran told the IAEA in 
October 2009 that the FFEP construction decision was made in 
the second half of 2007, the report explains that a number of 
sources allege the design work on the facility started in 
2006, when Iran itself accepts it was bound by Code 3.1 
Modified, and insists Iran provide the additional information 
and access to individuals and companies involved in the 
design of the facility.  The report provides confirmation of 
the credibility of these "sources" by stating the "extensive 
information from a number of sources detailing the design of 
the facility was consistent with the design verified by the 
IAEA." 
 
¶7.  (SBU)  The IAEA has verified that construction of the 
FFEP is ongoing, but no centrifuges have yet been introduced 
into the facility.  The IAEA also conducted environmental 
samples of the facility and equipment, and discovered the 
presence of a small number of depleted uranium particles. 
This contamination is similar to the particles found at 
Natanz, and Mission agrees that the presence of these 
particles likely are a result of cross contamination from 
Natanz, since some of the equipment at the FFEP had been 
transferred from Natanz. 
 
-------------------------------- 
IAEA Firm that Code 3.1 Modified 
Remains in Force 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (SBU)  The report states that despite Iran's refusal to 
adhere to Code 3.1 Modified, it remains in force, as Article 
39 of Iran's Safeguards Agreement affirms that agreed 
Subsidiary Arrangements cannot be changed unilaterally nor 
suspended.  The report goes on to describe Iran's failure to 
notify the IAEA  in a timely manner about the planned reactor 
at Darkhovin and the FFEP at Qom as inconsistent with its 
safeguards obligations, which also raises concerns about the 
completeness of Tehran's declarations.  The DG also draws 
attention to Iran's declaration, during the October 2009 
initial visit to the FFEP, that no other nuclear facilities 
currently exist in Iran and that Tehran will submit to the 
IAEA any plans for future facilities in accordance with its 
Safeguards Agreements, but then calls out Iran's public 
statements in December 2009 of its intention to construct 10 
new facilities -5 of which locations had already been 
decided-noting that the IAEA has not been provided any 
further information.  Iran responded, stating that it had 
suspended Code 3.1 Modified in March 2007. 
 
 
--------------------------- 
Concern that PMD Activities 
Continued Past 2004 
--------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (SBU)  The report shows that although Iran has refused to 
cooperate with the IAEA on the possible military dimensions 
(PMD) issues since 2008, the IAEA has continued its efforts 
to investigate and study the material available to it.  The 
IAEA identifies a handful of new items not previously 
mentioned, including, project and management structure, 
nuclear related safety arrangements, component manufacturing 
 
for high explosive initiation systems, and neutron generation 
and detection experiments.  The report also indicates these 
activities seem to have continued beyond 2004. 
 
¶10.  (SBU)  In an effort to build a more solid base for the 
PMD accusations and to deflate Iran's continued insistence 
that these "studies are baseless fabrications," the DG 
explains the "information available to the IAEA in connection 
with these outstanding issues is extensive and has been 
collected from a variety of sources over time.  It is also 
broadly consistent and credible in terms of technical detail, 
the time frame in which the activities were conducted and the 
people and organizations involved.  Altogether, this raises 
concerns about the possible existence in Iran of past or 
current undisclosed activities related to the development of 
a nuclear payload for a missile."    Also, unlike in the 
previous DG's reports, the IAEA does not mention the need for 
Member States to provide their original documentation to 
Iran. 
 
--------------------------------- 
New Developments with Heavy Water 
 and UCF Activities 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶11.  (SBU)  Explaining the IAEA's duties to verify the 
suspension of uranium enrichment- and heavy water related 
activities via the UNSC resolutions, the IAEA repeated its 
request for Iran to allow it to take environmental samples of 
the proclaimed indigenously produced heavy water stored at 
the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) at Esfahan, since the 
IAEA was denied sampling during its last visit.  The IAEA 
also requests access to the Heavy Water Production Plant 
(HWPP), which is co-located with the IR-40 Heavy Water 
Research Reactor (HWRR) at Arak. 
 
¶12.  (SBU)  The report for the first time details several 
process lines intended for or currently at the UCF, most of 
which are new, including the lines for the IR-40 reactor 
fuel, 5 percent enriched light water reactor fuel, and 
uranium metal lines to be used in research and development 
and storage and shielding  purposes.  The IAEA noted that no 
UF6 has been produced since August 2009, although the process 
line cleaning resulted in an additional 5 tons of UF6.  Also, 
only 42 tons of uranium in the form of uranium ore 
concentrate (of its original approximately 500 tons imported 
from South Africa) remains at the UCF for Iran to process. 
 
¶13.  (SBU)  In addition, Iran informed the IAEA that it was 
undertaking pyroprocessing research and development 
activities at the Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Research 
Laboratory (JHL) in Tehran in order to study the 
electrochemical production of uranium metal.  The IAEA is 
seeking additional information regarding these activities. 
 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶14.  (C)  Although Iran's repeated failure to heed to the 
multiple calls by the UNSC and Board of Governors and its 
continued lack of cooperation with the IAEA on a number of 
issues of serious concern would suggest action on Iran is 
warranted at the March 1-5 Board meeting , efforts at the 
UNSC may trump any action in Vienna.  Arguably such a tough 
report could be the premise for Board action but it is not 
clear what the valued added of another Board resolution would 
be beyond what was already accomplished in the November Board 
of Governors resolution on Iran.  In terms of substance, a 
Board resolution could underline concerns about: the 
escalation of enrichment activities and condemn Iran's 
decision to go to 20 percent; failure to clarify possible 
military dimensions (which seem to have continued beyond 2004 
and may be current); failure to substantiate the chronology 
and purpose of the Fordow plant; and failure to apply Code 
3.1 Modified and the AP.  It could also register regret that 
Iran has not accepted the IAEA's offer of assistance on the 
Tehran Research Reactor.   This would amount to a report card 
with a failing grade for Iran. 
 
¶15.  (C)  However, it is not clear the UN Security Council 
needs another report card from the Board, as this is already 
contained in the DG report.  The ball would seem to be in New 
York's court to respond to the IAEA Board's November 
resolution and the escalating and direct violation of 
previous UNSC resolutions.  Strong EU and E3 statements in 
the Board along with muscular national statements from the 
United States and Russia (as well as likeminded) would 
suffice to cue up UN Security Council action.  We anticipate 
 
a P5 plus 1 joint statement would likely to be diluted by 
China, but will weigh our recommendation after learning local 
Chinese and Russian views on the DG's findings.   We 
recommend straightaway high-level intervention in Brasilia 
and Ankara to press for more unambiguous national statements 
in the Board in light of this failing report by the DG, as 
statements by these UNSC /Board members will be closely 
watched.   Another key consideration arguing against a Board 
resolution is that its impact would be measured by 
proponents' success in replicating if not improving on the 
decisive November tally -- the stakes would be higher now as 
likely abstentions by Turkey and Brazil in particular would 
be read as direct indicators of their UNSC votes. 
DAVIES