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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0605
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S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000059 
 
SIPDIS 
 
ISN/RA FOR NEPHEW AND DANIEL, IO/T FOR DETEMPLE, NEA FOR 
ABELL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/19/2035 
TAGS: PREL PARM SY KN IAEA KNNP
SUBJECT: IAEA/SYRIA: TOUGH BOARD REPORT CALLS INTO QUESTION 
CORRECTNESS AND COMPLETENESS OF SYRIA'S DECLARATIONS 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR GLYN DAVIES FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1.  (S) Director General Amano's first report on Syria, 
released February 18 in tandem with his report on Iran, 
provides a convincing, comprehensive account of the Agency's 
investigation of both Dair Alzour (Al-Kibar) and of the 
Miniature Neutron Source Reactor (MNSR), highlighting 
continued non-cooperation in both areas.  The Agency's report 
identified a failure by Syria to meet its safeguards 
obligation in terms of reporting requirements, though it does 
not term it a "failure" as such, noting rather that Syria has 
not "met its nuclear material reporting obligations."  This, 
in conjunction with the IAEA's doubts about the correctness 
and completeness of Syria's declaration (due to the findings 
of anthropogenic uranium of a type not in Syria's declared 
inventory of nuclear material at two sites and possible but 
not yet substantiated links between the two) raises serious 
concerns about the nature of Syria's nuclear activities in 
stronger terms than previous DG reports and sets the stage 
for possible Board action, (see Guidance Request, paras 4-7.) 
 The report also reads like the precursor to a possible 
special inspection request by the Secretariat. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) No progress is reported on the Dair Alzour 
investigation since the last DG report.  With regards to the 
MNSR investigation, the IAEA sample results from the 
mid-November inspection confirmed the characteristics of the 
uranium contamination as coming from yellowcake produced at a 
pilot phosphoric acid purification plant at Homs (a facility 
that received TC assistance from the IAEA), previously 
undeclared uranyl nitrate compounds derived from the 
yellowcake (i.e. in undeclared experiments involving the 
yellowcake), and/or from small quantities of previously 
undeclared imported uranyl nitrate materials.  The Agency 
notes that Syria "has not yet provided a full explanation of 
the activities and experiments involving nuclear material 
conducted at the MNSR" and requested further clarification 
from Syria to resolve the issue and to exclude any possible 
link to the contamination at Dair Alzour.  However, Syria did 
not respond to two Agency letters for more information and 
denied a request for a meeting. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) The Agency again offered to establish the necessary 
modalities to protect military and other information at the 
sites.  In possible efforts to lay the groundwork for a 
forthcoming special inspection request, the report provides a 
laundry list of outstanding requests on the Dair Alzour 
investigation and requests "prompt access" to all relevant 
information which could be affected by the "passage of time 
and possible degradation of information," this making a 
potential argument for "urgent and essential" (i.e., 
compulsory) nature of a special inspection request. End 
Summary. 
 
 
Guidance Request 
---------------- 
 
¶4.  (S) This hard-hitting report on Syria, from a safeguards 
perspective, arguably provides a basis for a Board action -- 
the safeguards reporting failures and suspicious experiments 
at the MNSR coupled with unaccounted for uranium and almost 
two years of stonewalling the IAEA investigation of Dair 
Alzour beg a response.  While that response could eventually 
come in the form of a Special Inspection request from the 
IAEA Secretariat, there is no guarantee this will be the case 
and a Board of Governors resolution pressing for Syrian 
cooperation is probably long overdue.  Nor is there any 
guarantee that IAEA inspectors will continue to uncover 
further evidence of safeguards failures, or that the 
investigation might not eventually run out of steam. 
Already, there has been significant Board "fatigue" on Syria 
with the battle-lines clearly drawn between NAM and WEOG in 
scripted exchanges of national and group statements that 
sound the same as the previous Board session - the NAM blame 
Israel and exonerate Syria while WEOG and a handful of others 
call upon Syria to cooperate.  The findings at the MNSR have 
breathed new life into the stalemated Syria safeguards 
investigation and raise the potential for Board action.  In 
short, we could defer Board action to a later time but there 
may be no time like the present absent a special inspection 
request. 
 
¶5.  (S) Prior to the release of the report, Canadian and 
 
French nonproliferation experts agreed with our assessment 
that considered "in a vacuum" the Board should pursue a 
resolution in response to potential safeguards failures and 
lack of Syrian cooperation which has tested the credibility 
of the Agency safeguards system.  That said, EU and U.S. 
efforts to engage Syria on issues outside the IAEA context 
and split Iran and Syria may complicate the political 
calculus.  Raising the stakes on Syria could also further 
polarize the NPT RevCon. 
 
¶6.  (S) There are practical considerations in considering 
Board action.  Given the Board divisions on this issue, the 
margin for victory would be much narrower than on Iran - we 
can count on 14-15 votes (EU, JUSCANZ, ROK, Ukraine plus 
Argentina).  While an 18-vote majority is required, the 
threshold would be lower with abstentions, which we would 
expect from Russia and China, for example.  In order to bring 
potential fence-sitters such as Switzerland and  middle of 
the road NAM along, preambular reference to Israel's 
destruction of the suspect reactor at Dair Alzour would 
probably be unavoidable. 
 
¶7.  (S) A further consideration is who would be the sponsor 
of such a resolution?  Given its pursuit of an association 
agreement with Syria, we would not expect the EU to take the 
lead, nor would Japan as it remains closely associated with 
the Director General.  The most likely sponsor might be 
Canada or possibly Australia.  A capital-based Canadian 
expert informally told DepCouns that Ottawa may consider 
taking the lead on a Syria resolution if it looked like such 
a resolution would succeed.  However, should there be no 
takers, Mission will need guidance as to whether the U.S. 
would be willing to lead such an effort against Syria in the 
context of bilateral and regional factors. 
 
 
Reporting Failures at the MNSR 
------------------------------ 
 
¶8.  (S) New in this report are developments related to the 
MNSR investigation.  The IAEA inspected the MNSR on November 
17, 2009, the week before the November Board meeting.  The 
sample results (obtained and shared with Syria on January 21) 
confirmed the characteristics of the uranium contamination as 
coming from yellowcake produced at a pilot phosphoric acid 
purification plant at Homs, previously undeclared uranyl 
nitrate compounds derived from the yellowcake (i.e. in 
undeclared experiments involving the yellowcake), and/or from 
small quantities of previously undeclared imported uranyl 
nitrate materials.  (Comment: Mission understands from a key 
Agency official that this does not confirm the uranyl nitrate 
or yellowcake from Homs are the source of the uranium, rather 
that the characteristics of the material are consistent with 
this explanation.  End Comment.) 
 
¶9.  (SBU) The MNSR is a declared facility and "Syria is 
required to provide complete reporting of all nuclear 
material in Syria and to provide the Agency with access to 
all relevant documentation."  Syria "has not provided design 
information concerning the irradiation of uranium at the 
MNSR" (i.e. the experiments involving yellowcake or uranyl 
nitrate should have been declared) or "met its nuclear 
material reporting obligations under the Safeguards Agreement 
(INFCIRC/407)" (i.e. the material involved and/or produced by 
these experiments should have been declared.) While this 
assessment stops short of using the term "failure," the 
implication is clearly there. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) The Agency notes that Syria "has not yet provided 
a full explanation of the activities and experiments 
involving nuclear material conducted at the MNSR" and 
requested further clarification from Syria to resolve the 
issue and to exclude any possible link between the 
contamination at Dair Alzour. (Note:  This is the first time 
in a DG report where such a link is implied. End note.) 
However, Syria did not respond to two Agency letters for more 
information and denied a request for a meeting.  The Agency 
noted in the reports that it has a planned inspection at the 
MNSR on February to "verify nuclear material at the MNSR and 
examine relevant source documents related to the 
experiments."  Taken in tandem, the undeclared uranium and 
failure to meet reporting requirements amount to more than 
just a "misdemeanor." 
 
 
Investigating Scientific Publications 
------------------------------------- 
 
 
¶11.  (SBU) In addition to the sampling at the MNSR in 
November, the IAEA provided Syria with a list of experimental 
activities involving nuclear material that, according to open 
sources, had been performed in Syria and could be of 
relevance in determine the origin of the particles found at 
the MNSR.  The IAEA requested access to persons involved in 
the activities and detailed information regarding the nuclear 
material and equipment used during the November 17 
inspection.  Syria made one of the requested persons 
available and "discussions were held" on the experimental 
activities.  (Note: During the November technical briefing, 
Section Head Max Aparo showed a list of four publications 
from the Syrian Atomic Energy Commission that he indicated 
may be related to the experiments at the MNSR.  Two of the 
papers were titled: "Preparation of in-house neutron 
detectors and the software needed to process experimental 
data, April 2007," and "Measure of the fast neutron flux in 
the MNSR, 2007."  End note.) 
 
 
Yellowcake Originates from TC and UNDP Project 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶12.  (SBU) The report indicates that yellowcake was produced 
at a pilot plant for the purification of phosphoric acid, 
which was constructed and commissioned in 1997 at Homs, 
Syria.  This was done through the support of the IAEA and the 
United Nations Development Program.  Inspectors, during a 
July 2004 visit, observed "some hundred of kilograms of 
yellowcake" at Homs.  (Note: The objective of the Technical 
Cooperation project, SYR3003, was to recover uranium from 
phosphoric acid.) 
 
 
Renewing the Case on the Syrian Reactor 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶13.  (SBU) No progress is reported on the Dair Alzour 
investigation since the last DG report.  Unlike previous 
reports under DG ElBaradei, this report repeats the full case 
on the reactor investigation, and does not rely on Board 
members to seek out previous reports and figure out the 
implications for themselves.  Mission expects this report, 
which makes a compelling case for the presence of a nuclear 
reactor under construction in conjunction with the MNSR 
safeguards failures, could help garner renewed support in the 
Board room for Syrian cooperation on the Dair Alzour 
investigation.  Mission in particular notes that the last 
development in this IAEA investigation was the finding of 
anthropogenic uranium reported in November 2008 and March 
¶2009. 
 
¶14.  (SBU) The report reviews the case noting building 
features, a connected and adequate water pumping capacity, 
procurements of graphite and barium sulphate, and unexplained 
uranium contamination.  The report says "the presence of such 
particles points to the possibility of nuclear-related 
activities at the site and adds questions concerning the 
nature of the destroyed building."  It is worth noting that 
the report retains the qualifier "while it cannot be excluded 
that the destroyed building was intended for non-nuclear 
use..." before going on to review the case.  Israel is also 
still referenced in the destruction of the facility and more 
surprisingly in not providing clarifying information on 
missiles, despite the "low probability" the uranium could 
originate from Israeli munitions. 
 
¶15.  (SBU) Comment: Although the report makes a compelling 
case, we do not expect the NAM proponents of Syria on the 
Board to remove their blinders or stop castigating Israel. 
In this regard, the gratuitous reference to Israel providing 
information is unfortunate. 
DAVIES