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DE RUEHUNV #0035/01 0351312
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 041312Z FEB 10
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0539
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1835
INFO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1048
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0097
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0975
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0334
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0270
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0940

UNCLAS UNVIE VIENNA 000035 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV UN AU KCRM KCOR RS CH PK EG AG SZ
SUBJECT: NEW CONSTELLATION POSES CHALLENGES FOR ADVANCING ANTI-CRIME 
AND ANTI-DRUG GOALS IN VIENNA 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  Our partial success in negotiating a U.S.- backed 
review mechanism for an anticorruption convention last year has 
inspired a group of countries -- Russia, Iran, Algeria, China and 
Pakistan -- to coordinate more closely in Vienna at UN-related 
meetings on anti-crime and anti-drug issues.  Following the 
departure of their sophisticated Egyptian leader last year, the 
group has taken on a more blunt and obstructionist character as they 
pursue their common negative agenda.  In turn, this has charged the 
atmosphere with delegations such as Argentina, Mexico and several 
European Union members that do not share their goals.  Post will 
monitor the progress of the alliance and determine if it can be 
broken through outreach to select individual members, to G-77 
"bridge" delegations such as Indonesia and South Africa, or whether 
it will self destruct under the weight of its polarizing tactics. 
END SUMMARY 
 
--------------------------------- 
Russia Takes on an Egypt's Mantle 
--------------------------------- 
¶2. (U) On January 25-26, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) 
hosted an expert group meeting to discuss the development of a 
review mechanism for the UN Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime (UNTOC)(Note. Septel provides a readout of the 
substantive results of the meeting.  End Note).  At this meeting, 
U.S. delegation members were struck by a negative multilateral 
dynamic spearheaded by Russia, with assistance from Pakistan, Iran, 
Algeria, and China, that could possibly affect our work in key 
UNODC-related gatherings scheduled over the next several months, 
including the March UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs, the April UN 
Crime Congress, the May UN Commission on Crime Prevention and 
Criminal Justice and the ongoing Financial and Governance Working 
Group for UNODC.  Throughout the two-day meeting, Russia produced a 
series of delay tactics aimed at halting discussions regarding a 
review mechanism.  These tactics were a pale imitation of previous 
efforts by a recently-departed Egyptian delegation member, who was 
able to argue the hardliner point of view more persuasively.  With 
the departure of the sophisticated Egyptian diplomat, Russia and its 
partners are now resorting to rough procedural objections to promote 
their negative multilateral objectives. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) The current hardline alliance appears to be an offshoot of 
a group assembled during last year's negotiations to create a new 
review mechanism for the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC). 
That group, which also included Egypt and Cuba (which also lost one 
of its most able diplomats this past fall), was partially effective 
in limiting the scope of the U.S.-led UNCAC mechanism.  In 
hindsight, however, these countries are unhappy with agreeing to any 
peer review process in Doha, and want to ensure that the UNTOC does 
not follow the same path.  The result is that the group (minus Egypt 
and Cuba) began coordinating more closely on UNTOC and is now 
transplanting its negative agenda to other Vienna meetings and 
issues. 
 
-------------------- 
Blunt but Effective 
Obstructionism 
-------------------- 
¶4.  (U) Led primarily by the Russians, a coordinated hardline 
alliance of Russia, Algeria, Iran and China, with occasional help 
from Pakistan, delayed and blocked progress throughout the two-day 
UNTOC meeting.  Their actions moved Member States backwards in their 
efforts to create a mechanism to review implementation of UNTOC. 
The alliance refused to accept any reference in the final 
conclusions to a "review mechanism," despite the fact that the 
convention authorizes the States Parties to create any such 
"mechanisms" needed to review implementation, and the COP had 
specifically tasked the expert group to provide options for "review 
mechanisms." 
 
¶5.  (U) A local Russian delegate led the charge with lengthy and 
numerous interventions during the two-day meeting, many timed to 
overturn extended efforts to reach compromise language on key 
issues.  For example, the Russians intervened at 8:00 PM on the 
final day to reopen compromise language that had already been 
approved by the delegates and gaveled as accepted by the Chair.  The 
reason for reopening the language was to further water down 
reference to the possibility of the October COP charging a new 
working group with developing terms of reference for a review 
mechanism.  The language had been the subject of extensive 
negotiations and was already riddled with conditional caveats aimed 
at mollifying the nay sayers.  Iran then further extended the late 
hour of the meeting by demanding that the report of the meeting be 
issued as a "report of the chair," notwithstanding the fact that the 
 
chair had made perfectly clear during the day, without objection, 
that the report would not be a chair's report. 
 
------------------------- 
Raising Hackles among 
Constructive Delegations 
------------------------- 
¶6.  (SBU) Generally, multilateral negotiations on crime and drug 
issues in Vienna have benefited from considerable collaboration 
among delegations.  Faced with the very unhelpful slow-rolling 
tactics of this small group of hardliners, a number of active 
delegations, including Argentina, Mexico, and several European Union 
countries, reacted quite strongly and openly expressed frustration. 
Other G-77 delegations, from which the hardliners would 
traditionally look for allies, took no steps to encourage these 
countries in their obstructionist pursuits.  Such G-77 "bridge" 
countries, for example, Indonesia and South Africa, could play a 
role in pressuring the hardliners to desist with their bullying 
tactics.  We will work closely with these countries to try to 
moderate the negative influence of Russia and its cohorts in the 
weeks ahead. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) COMMENT: The rough procedural tactics have already been 
noticed elsewhere; for example, they were evident during a 
subsequent expert meeting on trafficking in persons last week.  The 
UNCAC experience has clearly galvanized Russia, Algeria, Iran, China 
and Pakistan.  However, with the loss of their capable Egyptian ring 
leader, their tactics have become more blunt and obstructionist. 
Although Russia is notorious in other multilateral venues for using 
such tactics, in the drugs and crime context, Russia has generally 
played a more moderate role emphasizing shared interests with the 
U.S.  Therefore, the frustration with Russia in the room among the 
more constructive delegations was palpable.  As the former Egyptian 
leader originally provided the substantive glue for the hardliners, 
we believe that the current alliance  may be more vulnerable to 
efforts to pick apart the group.  We will work with likeminded 
countries and bridge G-77 countries to assist in deflating the 
hardliners before their bullying tactics reach other drugs and crime 
fora.  END COMMENT 
 
 
DAVIES