VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUNV #0024 0321010
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 011010Z FEB 10
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0519
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0147
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL 0021

C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000024 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2024 
TAGS: PREL IR TU PARM
SUBJECT: TURKISH AMBASSADOR INDICATES IRAN STAGNANT ON 
NUCLEAR ISSUE 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Glyn Davies for reasons 1.4 (c) and (e) 
 
¶1. (C)  In a January 12 conversation with DCM and poloff, 
Turkish Ambassador Bayer gave a readout of the Iran 
discussion at the recent Turkish Ambassador's conference in 
Ankara and his take on the Iranian issue more generally. 
Bayer noted that he took part in a four-hour working group on 
Iran at the Ambassador's conference that "barely scratched 
the surface." At that event, the ambassadors were debriefed 
on the close contact the Turkish government currently has 
with Iran and said that their Foreign Minister had recently 
spoken to President Ahmadinejad. Bayer reported the Turkish 
Prime Minister had been to Iran twice of late (once being the 
high-profile meeting in Tabriz). He also said that SCNS 
Secretary Jalili was in Ankara in December, but the meeting 
produced no new "openings." 
 
¶2. (C)  Bayer shared that the Turks have talked to 
Ahmadinejad twice and that he continues to try to find an 
opening on the TRR proposal, but he remains in a difficult 
position because of opposition from hardliners in the 
government. Bayer did not further push the Tehran Research 
Reactor (TRR) proposal or Turkey's potential role in the deal 
with the DCM, but the DCM reiterated U.S. points on the TRR 
proposal and noted that the IAEA proposal on the table is "as 
good as it gets." Bayer thought that Iran had moved on the 
issue given that its proposal in early January offered to 
send its LEU out of Iran for the first time and was the first 
time Iran had advocated a position itself rather than 
reacting to the IAEA's proposal. Nevertheless, Bayer said he 
realizes that Iran's counter-offer is still unacceptable to 
the U.S. and others and seemed to understand why and accept 
that position. 
 
¶3. (C)  Bayer repeated familiar Turkish points on Iran's lack 
of confidence in the P5 1 (to match the lack of confidence 
the six have in Iran) and argued that Iran wants to keep its 
options open. Iran has never invaded another country, he 
noted, professing an understanding for Iran's need to keep 
options open. Nevertheless, Turkey does not want to see Iran 
get nuclear weapons, which would tilt the balance in the 
region even if Iran has no intention to actually use the 
weapon. Bayer also argued that Iran wants to deal directly 
with the U.S. and that the more that the UK and France are 
involved, the more Iran is dissatisfied. 
 
¶4. (C)  Bayer noted Turkey's impression that Jalili is not 
fully authorized to "solve" the nuclear issue. He is probably 
empowered to make a deal, but he is not sure how any deal he 
reached would go over in Tehran, so he is inclined to drag 
his feet. Turkey believes Jalili is afraid any deal would go 
over poorly, affecting his standing internally. When former 
IAEA Director General ElBaradei called Bayer in to discuss 
his suggestion for storing Iranian LEU in Turkey, the DG 
asked that Turkey pass this suggestion to Tehran. ElBaradei 
also called Jalili to ask for the same message to be passed. 
(Note: IAEA contacts suggest that he may have contacted 
Salehi, not Jalili, so this may be a garble.) According to 
Bayer, Jalili told ElBaradei he would not take the message to 
Ahmadinejad himself, but encouraged the Turks to do so. 
DAVIES