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Viewing cable 10TOKYO343, DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 02/22/10

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10TOKYO343 2010-02-22 23:03 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Tokyo
VZCZCXRO0207
PP RUEHFK RUEHKSO RUEHNAG RUEHNH
DE RUEHKO #0343/01 0532303
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 222303Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9528
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/USDOJ WASHDC PRIORITY
RULSDMK/USDOT WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5//
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHHMHBA/COMPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
RHMFIUU/HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HI//CC/PA//
RHMFIUU/USFJ //J5/JO21//
RUYNAAC/COMNAVFORJAPAN YOKOSUKA JA
RUAYJAA/CTF 72
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA 1267
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA 8935
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE 2753
RUEHNAG/AMCONSUL NAGOYA 5935
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO 9421
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 3175
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 9856
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 9202
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 10 TOKYO 000343 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA; 
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION; 
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; 
SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, 
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA 
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR; 
CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
 
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 02/22/10 
 
INDEX: 
 
(1) Okinawa alarmed at settling the Futenma relocation issue in 
defiance of its wishes; government shifting weight to a site within 
prefecture (Asahi) 
 
(2) Anti-U.S. position of pro-U.S. advocates (Mainichi) 
 
(3) "Kazamidori (Weathercock)" column: Did Mr. Campbell make a 
mistake in inviting Ozawa to visit U.S.? (Nikkei) 
 
(4) DPJ Secretary General Ozawa's intention in "lecturing" U.S. 
Assistant Secretary of State Campbell (Weekly Bunshun) 
 
(5) Political scene - Power of DPJ: Ozawa style gains ground through 
battles (Yomiuri) 
 
(6) Recommended plan to cut base workers' salaries up in the air 
(Tokyo Shimbun) 
 
(7) Japan-hosted APEC to get underway: Working-level meeting to 
start on Feb. 22 (Asahi) 
 
ARTICLES: 
 
(1) Okinawa alarmed at settling the Futenma relocation issue in 
defiance of its wishes; government shifting weight to a site within 
prefecture 
 
ASAHI (Page 3) (Abridged) 
February 21, 2010 
 
Akira Uchira, Tsukasa Kimura, and Atsushi Matsukawa 
 
Chief Cabinet Secretary Hirofumi Hirano's Feb. 20 comment that the 
government might end up making a better choice (not the best choice) 
than the existing plan to relocate the U.S. Marine Corps' Futenma 
Air Station, now located in Ginowan, Okinawa Prefecture, is creating 
a stir. The reason is because Hirano's comment can be taken to mean 
that the government intends to pick a site within Okinawa. Okinawa 
is especially alarmed at the government and the ruling parties that 
are looking into such plans as relocating Futenma to the inland area 
of Camp Schwab in Nago in the prefecture and the continued use of 
the Futenma base. In his talks with Hirano, Okinawa Gov. Hirokazu 
Nakaima warned the government not to make a decision in defiance of 
local wishes. 
 
With a bitter experience in mind Nakaima warned Hirano on Feb. 20. 
 
Meeting the press after his talks with Hirano, Nakaima said 
regarding the process that led to Tokyo's decision in 2006 to 
relocate Futenma to the Henoko district in Nago: "I felt that 
Okinawa was forced to accept the central government's decision." 
Nakaima emphasized that the government should take Okinawa's wishes 
into full consideration before making a decision. 
 
In 2006 then Okinawa Gov. Keiichi Inamine presented such conditions 
as a 15-year time limit on the use of a Futenma replacement facility 
and the joint military-civilian use of the new base. But none were 
accepted by Japan and the United States. People in Okinawa seethed 
with discontent and, in the end, disrupted an environmental impact 
assessment and other procedures. 
 
TOKYO 00000343  002 OF 010 
 
 
 
This time around the prospects are also poor that the government 
will give priority to local wishes. Seeking local consent will be 
the last step, according to a senior official of the Prime 
Minister's Official Residence (Kantei). Some in the Hatoyama 
administration have begun talking about the sequence of events to 
occur - monitoring Washington's reaction and then seeking the 
consent of the ruling parties and the affected municipalities. "No 
matter where the government decides to move the base, the candidate 
site opposes it," another Kantei official said. "Unless people of 
the candidate site oppose the plan tooth and nail, their wishes will 
not be reflected." 
 
Some in the cabinet think relocation to the inland area of Camp 
Schwab, an existing U.S. military base, will not draw strong local 
objections. "When the U.S. Navy's Sobe Communications Site (commonly 
called the "elephant cage," in Yomitan Village) was moved to Camp 
Hansen (in Kin Town), there wasn't a major opposition movement," 
Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa said on Feb. 19. Nevertheless, it 
is inappropriate to compare an airfield, associated with noise and 
the danger of crashes, to a telecommunications site. 
 
In response to Nakaima who said that it would be best if the Futenma 
base were relocated outside Okinawa, Hirano also said, "We are 
looking for the best option, but we might end up only making a 
better choice (than the existing plan)." Hirano's comment, which can 
be interpreted as the government's public indication that it may 
come up with a plan to relocate the Futenma facility within the 
prefecture, is certain to draw s strong backlash from the people in 
Okinawa. 
 
Asked about Hirano's remarks by the press corps on Feb. 20, Prime 
Minister Yukio Hatoyama explained: "We will seek the best option, 
not a better one. The three ruling parties will cooperate in mapping 
put a plan that is acceptable to Okinawa and the United States." 
 
(2) Anti-U.S. position of pro-U.S. advocates 
 
MAINICHI (Page 2) (Full) 
Evening, February 18, 2010 
 
Hidetoshi Kaneko, special editor 
 
For some reason, both newspapers and TV stations adopt the viewpoint 
of the prosecutors when reporting on Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) 
Secretary General Ichiro Ozawa. While this is not surprising for 
reports on the investigation (into Ozawa's fund scandal), taking the 
same approach even in political reporting will result in losing 
sight of important points. 
 
During a recent visit to Japan, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State 
Kurt Campbell, accompanied by Ambassador to Japan John Roos, paid a 
visit to the DPJ secretary general's office at the Diet. They met 
with Ozawa for one hour. While the substance of the conversation has 
not been revealed, the U.S. officials went home satisfied with this 
"good discussion." 
 
After returning to the U.S., Campbell said that he asked Ozawa to 
visit Washington in May at the head of a DPJ delegation and also 
told him that he will make efforts to set up a meeting with 
President Barack Obama. 
 
 
TOKYO 00000343  003 OF 010 
 
 
The timing of this meeting is significant. This was two days before 
the Tokyo District Prosecutors Office made a formal decision on 
whether or not to indict Ozawa. If Ozawa had been prosecuted, this 
would have been a serious blunder detrimental to the U.S.'s 
credibility. It is also unthinkable that the Japanese prosecutors 
would leak (the decision on the indictment) to foreign diplomats 
ahead of time. Even if the U.S. side had had a sense from contacts 
with related sources, there was always the possibility of "what if." 
It must have been very risky for senior U.S. officials representing 
their government to meet with Ozawa at that stage. Yet, Campbell 
went to see Ozawa. 
 
The relocation of the Futenma Air Station has been the sticking 
point in Japan-U.S. relations. The channel for negotiations is 
Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada. The coordinator on the Japanese side 
is Chief Cabinet Secretary Hirofumi Hirano. Prime Minister Yukio 
Hatoyama is the one who will make the final decision. 
 
Yet, Campbell requested that the secretary general of the ruling 
party meet with the President. Ozawa has been invited to visit the 
U.S. in May, just at the time Prime Minister Hatoyama will be making 
his decision. 
 
U.S. economic friction with China is intensifying, so the U.S. does 
not want to be in dispute with Japan over the Futenma issue. 
 
Although Prime Minister Hatoyama said "trust me" last November, the 
present situation is such that the ruling coalition barely controls 
a majority in the House of Councillors. If the DPJ loses seats in 
the Upper House election in July, the Diet will not approve any 
relocation site the Prime Minister picks. President Obama is also 
one seat short of controlling a majority in the U.S. Senate. He 
understands this situation very well. 
 
It is the job of the ruling party's secretary general to pass bills 
in the Diet. If the ruling parties lose control of a majority in the 
Upper House, some extraordinary political maneuvering, such as the 
realignment of the coalition government or a grand coalition with 
the Liberal Democratic Party, will be necessary. The U.S. has judged 
that Ozawa is the only person capable of doing that, so it placed 
its bets on him. That must have been how things looked from the U.S. 
standpoint. 
 
Pro-U.S. newspapers advocating the importance of the Japan-U.S. 
alliance are now strongly demanding Ozawa's resignation as secretary 
general. This is a position that runs counter to the U.S.'s 
interest. Have they not overlooked this contradiction? 
 
(3) "Kazamidori (Weathercock)" column: Did Mr. Campbell make a 
mistake in inviting Ozawa to visit U.S.? 
 
NIKKEI (Page 2) (Full) 
February 21, 2010 
 
Hisayoshi Ina, editorial staff member 
 
It was probably a mistake U.S. Assistant Secretary of State (for 
East Asian and Pacific Affairs) Kurt Campbell made from impatience. 
I'm referring to his extending to Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) 
Secretary General Ichiro Ozawa at a meeting with him at the Diet on 
Feb. 2 an invitation to visit the U.S. before prosecutors had 
decided whether or not to prosecute him over a money scandal. 
 
TOKYO 00000343  004 OF 010 
 
 
 
Campbell holds a position equivalent to the director general of the 
Asian Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Japan. 
Yet, when he comes to Tokyo, Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada meets 
him as if he were his U.S. counterpart. On this point, the 
Japan-U.S. relationship under the Hatoyama administration is far 
from "equal." For sure, there is significance in according Campbell 
special treatment so that Japanese circumstances are accurately 
understood. Yet it appears that the result is different than 
expected. 
 
The Japan-U.S. relationship is strained over the Futenma issue. So 
it is natural to think that bringing around Japan's political 
kingpin, Ozawa, would be a shortcut to a solution. U.S. Ambassador 
to Japan Michael Armacost approached then Liberal Democratic Party 
Secretary General Ozawa for the same reason. 
 
But if Campbell were an expert on Japan, he would have noticed the 
difference in Ozawa's position then and now. Opinion polls by 
various media organizations have shown that 70 percent of the people 
want Ozawa to resign as secretary general. This raises the question 
of Campbell's sensitivity to the gravity of this fact. 
 
The media is also speculating that Ozawa may resign as secretary 
general before the House of Councillors election in July. Was 
Campbell unaware of this? 
 
Last year, Ozawa resigned as DPJ president and took charge of the 
election campaign, bringing about the DPJ's victory in the House of 
Representatives election. At that time, the DPJ was an opposition 
party. Public opinion at present wants him to leave his position of 
power, both in name and reality. It now seems that a pro forma 
resignation like last year will no longer be sufficient. 
 
If that is the case, even if Ozawa makes a visit to the U.S., which 
reportedly will take place in May, no agreement he concludes would 
have any teeth. This is because even if Ozawa is able to withstand 
the pressure of public opinion and cling to power after the visit, 
the legitimacy of any agreement would be questioned in Japan. 
 
The opposition parties would criticize an Ozawa agreement with the 
U.S. as proof of his "control" of the Hatoyama administration. The 
Hatoyama administration can only refute that accusation in one of 
two ways: 
 
One is to distance itself from the agreement on the grounds that an 
agreement reached between Mr. Ozawa and the U.S. is not an agreement 
between governments. The agreement would be a private one, and it 
would be politically difficult for the Japanese government to 
implement. 
 
The other way is not to make the agreement public, keeping it 
secret. Neither would such an agreement be binding on the 
government, since Foreign Minister Okada abhors secret agreements 
("they undermine the credibility of Japanese diplomacy"). 
 
Ozawa is concealing his true intentions, saying "policy 
consultations should take place between governments; the purpose (of 
the trip) is friendship and goodwill." He is asserting that even if 
he meets President Barack Obama, which would be nearly tantamount to 
a Japan-U.S. summit, policies will not be discussed. 
 
 
TOKYO 00000343  005 OF 010 
 
 
There was a similar case in the past. In September 1972, when Prime 
Minister Kakuei Tanaka went to China to normalize diplomatic 
relations between Japan and China, he met Communist Party of China 
(CPC) Chairman Mao Zedong after he wrapped up negotiations with 
Premier Zhou Enlai. Mao started off the meeting by stating: "Are you 
done quarreling?" That remark seemed to reflect a condescending 
attitude toward Tanaka and Zhou. 
 
Did Ozawa remind Campbell of the Chinese leader? Did he think that 
as a result of the change of administration, Japan is no longer 
ruled by the government and has shifted to a political regime 
similar to the CPC's rule of China? 
 
The world was astounded by the unusually large delegation Ozawa led 
to China last December. His leading a similar delegation to 
Washington would probably revive the theory that Japan is a peculiar 
country. 
 
If an Ozawa-Obama meeting fails to take place, Ozawa will 
increasingly lean toward China, and this will not be in the U.S.'s 
interest. Campbell's shift from "strategic patience" with Japan to 
requesting Ozawa's visit to the U.S. is understandable. 
 
However, people in Japan, who are fed up with Ozawa and abandoning 
him, take a cynical view of this affair. By the way, Campbell's 
predecessor was Christopher Hill, who was known for bungling North 
Korean policy. 
 
(4) DPJ Secretary General Ozawa's intention in "lecturing" U.S. 
Assistant Secretary of State Campbell 
 
WEEKLY BUNSHUN (Page 50) (Full) 
February 25, 2010 
 
The U.S. government, which has been troubled by its worsening 
relations with Japan, is trying to woo Democratic Party of Japan 
(DPJ) Secretary General Ichiro Ozawa, who has won his "last war" 
with the Tokyo District Public Prosecutors Office's special 
investigation team. The reason is because in order to settle the 
U.S. Marine Corps' Futenma relocation issue and other bilateral 
issues with Japan, the United States has no other option but to pin 
high hopes on Japan's most influential lawmaker who is known for his 
high-handed approach. 
 
"The United States is considering a format (for a visit by Ozawa) in 
which the Senate Foreign Relations Committee will extend an 
invitation and talks will be held with Vice President Biden at the 
White House," a U.S government source said. "It has been decided 
that President Obama will drop by and hold talks with him then." 
 
This plan was mapped out by Assistant Secretary of State Kurt 
Campbell, who is responsible for East Asia, including Japan and 
China. Since sending Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to Japan 
last February, the Obama administration has been making moves to 
create communication channels to Japan, setting up talks with Ozawa, 
who was an opposition leader back then. It was decided that Ozawa 
would visit the United States during the Golden Week holiday period 
last year to hold talks with Secretary Clinton. But a meeting with 
President Obama was not set, and Ozawa's U.S. visit was called off 
as a result. 
 
"Conversely, the U.S. side got the impression that Mr. Ozawa would 
 
TOKYO 00000343  006 OF 010 
 
 
visit the United States if he could hold talks with the President," 
a source familiar with Japan-U.S. relations explained. "It took one 
year to plan for the upcoming U.S. visit." The U.S. side has 
suggested Ozawa's U.S. visit because Japan-U.S. relations are taking 
a turn for the worse and being used as a political tool. 
 
A Washington Post correspondent offered this view: "The Obama 
administration is struggling with sagging support ratings and is 
also expected to face an uphill battle in the upcoming midterm 
elections. Even former Alaska Gov. Sarah Palin, who was a Republican 
vice presidential candidate in the presidential race two years ago, 
began criticizing the Obama administration, saying, 'U.S.-Japan 
relations are in bad shape because the administration's foreign 
policy has failed.' The prevailing view in the United States is that 
the relationship with Japan is so bad that even Sarah Palin, who is 
sexy and charismatic but is hopeless at foreign policy, has 
described it as the Obama administration's mistake. 
 
The U.S. side pins high hopes on Ozawa, who helped open up the 
Japanese market through the liberalization of the construction 
market and telecommunications talks in the past. To Assistant 
Secretary of State Campbell, who invited him to visit the United 
States, Ozawa issued a warning, saying: "If an unstable situation 
occurs in Far East Asia, it will be nothing like the situation in 
Iraq, Iran, or Afghanistan. The United States should deal with the 
region more firmly." He also made a request about his meeting with 
President Obama, saying, "Please make sure that a sufficient amount 
of time is set aside." Will the talks take place at the Oval Office 
in accordance with Ozawa's intentions? 
 
(5) Political scene - Power of DPJ: Ozawa style gains ground through 
battles 
 
YOMIURI (Page 4) (Full) 
February 19, 2010 
 
We were optimistic - an aid to Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) 
Secretary General Ozawa's Ozawa made this comment, reflecting on the 
allegation Ozawa's political fund management body "Rikuzan-kai 
violated the Political Funds Control Law in connection with a land 
purchase, in which three former secretaries of Ozawa were indicted. 
Ozawa was exempted from indictment. 
 
The Tokyo District Public Prosecutors Office on Jan. 5 asked Ozawa 
to respond to voluntary questioning on the case. Ozawa told his 
aides on Jan. 9. "I have already submitted documents requested by 
public prosecutors. They are convinced. All that remains is to put 
the matter to rest." He had expected that the investigation would 
end with the submission of documents, such as bank account numbers 
recording resources used for the purchase of land. He had also 
fathomed that Lower House member Tomohiro Ishikawa could be indicted 
but without arrest. Ozawa's aides examined his submitting to 
questioning by prosecutors during the three-day holiday from Jan. 9 
through 11. However, unable to fathom the prosecutors' aims, they 
postponed a decision. Ozawa's optimism was a further reason for 
their postponing a decision. 
 
However, the Tokyo Public Prosecutors Office on Jan. 13 opened a 
criminal investigation into Rikuzan-kai for the first time since 
March last year. When he consulted with sources connected with 
Rikuzan-kai and his defense team, Ozawa explained: "The 400 million 
yen used for the purchase of the land in question includes my wife's 
 
TOKYO 00000343  007 OF 010 
 
 
money. I will also explain that at the party convention."  His aides 
views were split between a hard-line stance -- that it would be a 
serious problem if public prosecutors indict (Mr. Ozawa), with one 
saying, "We should crack down on them" -- and a soft-line stance of 
calling on Ozawa to submit to questioning by public prosecutors, 
without stonewalling them. In the end, Ozawa determined to cooperate 
with the investigation and submit a written statement. 
 
Ishikawa was arrested right after that. "I cannot believe this," 
Ozawa groaned. "I cannot possibly quit under these circumstances." 
Ozawa attended the DPJ Convention on Jan. 16, the following day, in 
a high emotional state. He skipped a sentence ("I am sorry that I 
have caused trouble and so much concern") in the text of his speech. 
He instead began, "The prospects for Japanese democracy are gloomy." 
The audience exploded with applause. A female Upper House member 
echoed Ozawa's stance, saying: "This is a total war between the 
bureaucracy and the DPJ administration, which represents the 
people." 
 
However, Ozawa suddenly became discouraged. He said to his aides, "I 
have not broken the law. However, if a case were built against me, 
it would be the will of Heaven." 
 
He submitted to questioning on Jan. 31, following questioning by 
prosecutors on Jan. 23. He was to hold a regular press conference on 
Feb. 1. Ozawa could not decide whether he should mention on that 
occasion that his responsibility would be heavy if he were 
criminally charged. He consulted his attorneys. He was not confident 
that he would be exempted from indictment, as he said to his aides 
who hinted at the possibility of his being indicted, "Perhaps you 
are right." 
 
Sandwiched between those who opposed his making such a statement, 
because it would be conveying an intention to step down to the 
anti-Ozawa group in the party, and those who supported his making 
such a statement, because it would reinforce the impression of his 
innocence, Ozawa in the end used the phrase "my own responsibility." 
Ozawa might have been confused about where supreme power lies. 
 
Ozawa's stance that elections are all about (politics) is the flip 
side of a stance that an electoral victory confers carte blanche to 
do as one pleases. Some say that Ozawa does not know the meaning of 
the restrained use of power. He even declared (on Jan. 16) that he 
wanted to confront head on the way public prosecutors use their 
power as they did toward him. And yet when he turned defiant to 
public opinion seeking his resignation after public prosecutors 
decided not to indict him he hid behind their authority. He said (on 
Feb. 14), "An Impartial and fair investigation by public prosecutors 
has found that there were no irregularities." He possesses a 
versatility that allows him to use power as he pleases. 
 
At a meeting the DPJ held on Feb. 14 in Kurume City, Fukuoka 
Prefecture, in the run-up to the Upper House election, Ozawa said: 
"We have no majority in the Upper House. We must eliminate major 
resistance in order to realize a stance that can be truly described 
as revolutionary." The words "eliminate resistance" indicate that he 
is honing his political stance through the fight against public 
prosecutors. 
 
Concern that Ozawa's behavior will have a negative impact on the 
upcoming Upper House election is smoldering in the DPJ. However, 
their concern has not been manifest as overt criticism of Ozawa. 
 
TOKYO 00000343  008 OF 010 
 
 
Prime Minister Hatoyama recently said again he would restore the 
essence of the DPJ. However, asked to explain that essence, he 
evaded a reply, giving the abstract answer: "It's something like the 
clear-cut stance of the DPJ as an opposition party." 
 
The Rikuzan-kai scandal has forced the DPJ to ask itself what is the 
proper way to exercise power. The DPJ has yet to find an answer to 
that question. 
 
(6) Recommended plan to cut base workers' salaries up in the air 
 
TOKYO SHIMBUN (Page 24) (Full) 
February 22, 2010 
 
The government has decided to reduce the salaries of Japanese 
workers on U.S. military bases across the nation, including Yokosuka 
and Okinawa, given the nation's poor fiscal condition, but their 
salaries have been left unchanged. It is stipulated that base 
workers' salaries be set at the same level as national government 
employees and were scheduled to be slashed starting this January, 
based on a recommendation by the National Personnel Authority. But 
with no agreement from the U.S. military, the wage-cut plan has been 
left up in the air for two months. 
 
Under the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), the U.S. 
military uses base workers and the Japanese government is the 
employer who pays their salaries. Both sides must agree to a change 
in the workers' wage structure. 
 
In 1963, the Japanese government, the U.S. government, and All Japan 
Garrison Forces Labor Union (Zenchuro) agreed to set salaries for 
Japanese base workers at the same level as national government 
employees. It is stipulated that the wage system be revised based on 
a recommendation on public servants' salaries by the National 
Personnel Authority. 
 
Comparing with the average wage level at private firms, the National 
Personnel Authority recommended last August that salaries and 
bonuses for rank-and-file national civil service positions for 
fiscal 2009 be cut by 0.2 PERCENT  and by an amount equivalent to 
0.35 months' pay, respectively. The decreased portion was deducted 
starting from their winter bonuses paid on Dec. 10. 
 
But since the day of bonus payment for base workers was Dec. 2, the 
procedures necessary for changing the wage system were not completed 
by that day. The Defense Ministry also intended to deduct the 
decreased portion -- about 60,000 yen on average -- from their 
salaries starting in January, but the government has failed to 
obtain agreement from the U.S. military. Both the Defense Ministry 
and the headquarters of the U.S. Forces in Japan have not explained 
why the negotiations are deadlocked, merely remarking  that since 
this is a diplomatic issue, it is inappropriate to comment while 
negotiations are in progress. 
 
A senior Zenchuro member grumbled: "Setting aside bonuses, if their 
monthly salaries are reduced by tens of thousands of yen, workers' 
morale will flag. I guess the U.S. military is worried about that 
possibility." The union member added: "The strained relations 
between Japan and the U.S. over the Futenma relocation issue might 
be behind the protracted negotiations over the wage issue." 
 
(7) Japan-hosted APEC to get underway: Working-level meeting to 
 
TOKYO 00000343  009 OF 010 
 
 
start on Feb. 22 
 
ASAHI (Page 11) (Full) 
February 20, 2010 
 
A meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC) will 
be held in Japan after a hiatus of 15 years. The first senior 
working-level officials' meeting is set to be held in Hiroshima City 
on Feb. 22-23. This is the first official meeting leading up to the 
summit talks to be held in Yokohama City in mid-November. This year 
marks the Bogor Goal year of achieving the liberalization of trade 
in industrialized countries and areas, adopted in 1994. The APEC 
meeting in Japan will likely become a venue for member nations to 
search for a new goal. 
 
Senior officials of Japan's Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of 
Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) will serve as the co-chairmen of 
the senior working-level meeting. Working-level officials 
responsible for economic and foreign affairs from various countries 
and areas will discuss issues to be taken up in a summit 
declaration. 
 
Issues Japan envisages include assessing the achievement of the 
Bogor Goals. With focus on ten countries and areas in the region, it 
plans to submit a draft report noting that trade liberalization has 
been advanced as a whole, although efforts fell short of the 
commitments in some sectors, such as agriculture." 
 
A stance of aiming at trade liberalization within the region had 
been dominant until the mid-1990s, when the Bogor Goals were set. 
However, with APEC itself losing its unifying force, as it was 
unable to come up with an effective means to deal with the Asian 
currency crisis, in 1997 and 1998, calls for liberalization have 
disappeared, as Waseda University Graduate School Professor Shujiro 
Urata explained. 
 
Even after that APEC's major focus of attention continued to shift 
away from economics due to the Sept.11, 2001, terrorist attacks on 
the US. As a result, the Bogor Goals will not be completely achieved 
by their target year of 2010. 
 
In the meantime, economic measures have once again shot into the 
limelight since the financial crisis in 2008. Discussions for 
forging a fresh vision to succeed the Bogor Goals will likely make 
headway. The Japanese government has made growth strategy a key 
theme. 
 
The Japanese government wants to put forward a common vision for the 
growth of both industrialized countries and areas, and developing 
countries and areas, citing the promotion of upgraded energy saving 
and environmental policies, measures to help small- and medium-sized 
businesses enter foreign markets or introduce new technologies, and 
the standardization of intellectual property. 
 
Free trade zone initiative likely to become topic of discussion 
 
A potential region-wide Free Trade Area in the Asia Pacific, or 
FTAAP, will be defined as a framework for post-Bogor Goal trade 
liberalization. 
 
The Japanese government in the outline of the Growth Strategy, which 
it formulated late last year, mentioned that the goal is to achieve 
 
TOKYO 00000343  010 OF 010 
 
 
FTAAP by 2020. As a stepping stone for the realization of the 
initiative, it sees the APEC meeting this year as a golden 
opportunity, according to a senior METI official. 
 
While the future of the multilateral trade liberalization talks 
(Doha Round) under the World Trade Organization (WTO) is unclear, 
the signing of bilateral or multilateral free trade agreements is 
gaining momentum in the Asia-Pacific region as well. A senior 
Foreign Ministry official said: "The base for discussion on the free 
trade zone initiative is more consolidated than several years ago." 
 
However, there already exist some free trade initiatives in the APEC 
region. Leadership struggles to realize FTAAP will likely become 
fierce. 
 
In ASEAN plus three (Japan, China and South Korea) and ASEAN plus 
six (the further addition of India, Australia and New Zealand) it 
was confirmed last August that there will be a shift from private 
sector research to official inter-government talks. 
 
In the meantime, the U.S. in 2008 proclaimed its decision to enter 
into talks with the Trans-Pacific Economic Strategic Partnership 
(TPP) formed by Singapore, New Zealand, Chile and Brunei. At 
present, Australia, Peru and Vietnam are also hoping to join. The 
first round of talks is to be held in March. 
 
Hitotsubashi University Honorary Professor Ippei Yamasawa pointed 
out: "One possible way is for countries that can do so, such as 
Japan and South Korea, is to take part in discussions to enhance 
calls for trade liberalization in the region. The starting point of 
APEC is, after all, advancing trade liberalization, which is its 
major role." 
 
ROOS