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FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3755
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC//OSAC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 000080 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCA, L/NPV, IO/MPR, 
SECDEF FOR OSD/GSA/CN,CP> 
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC 
COMMERCE FOR BIS (BROWN, DENYER AND CRISTOFARO) 
NSC FOR LUTES 
WINPAC FOR WALTER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2020 
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CWC: WRAP-UP FOR THE WEEK OF FEBRUARY 5, 2010 
 
REF: A. THE HAGUE 79 
     ¶B. THE HAGUE 65 
     ¶C. THE HAGUE 51 
     ¶D. THE HAGUE 29 
     ¶E. STATE 7592 
 
Classified By: Janet E. Beik for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) 
 
This is CWC-10-10 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (SBU) The main meeting of the week was a three- 
hour marathon consultation on February 3 on 
"situations not foreseen" by the Chemical Weapons 
Convention (CWC).  The Western European and Others 
Group (WEOG) regular meeting on February 2 was 
largely devoted to discussion of that issue, and 
Delreps had private discussions with the 
Australian, UK, and French delegations as well. 
German Ambassador Werner Burkart hosted ambassadors 
from the ten WEOG states that will be members of 
the Executive Council (EC) beginning in May; the 
key agenda item was selection of the WEOG chair for 
the EC for the next year. 
 
¶2. (C) Delreps also met with Iraqi Ambassador 
Siamand Banaa and Delegate Muhannad Al-Miahi on 
February 3 to follow up on the January technical 
discussions for amending Iraq's declaration and 
preparing a destruction plan for its remaining 
chemical weapons (reported in Ref A). 
 
------------------------------- 
WEOG ON SITUATIONS NOT FORESEEN 
------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) German Ambassador Burkart chaired the 
regular weekly WEOG meeting on February 2 with 
discussions focusing on the "situations not 
foreseen" consultations and lack of movement on 
industry issues.  Irish Delegate Michael Hurley, 
facilitator for "situations not foreseen", gave his 
impressions on the state of play, suggesting that 
EC members are not fully comfortable with what they 
decided during EC-58 in October when the 
consultation was mandated.  He said that lots of 
lingering doubt remains and that confusion 
surrounding the issue probably will linger for a 
while.  Hurley noted that the consultation's title 
has added to the confusion and raised the need to 
change the title, reiterating his preference for 
the term "discovery" over "possession and control." 
He proposed agreeing first on the conceptual basis 
for the consultation and suggested, "To agree on 
guidelines to aid implementation of the CWC in 
certain circumstances beyond the control of a State 
Party which render strict adherence to the 
procedures prescribed by the Verification Annex to 
the CWC materially impossible." 
 
¶4. (SBU) French Delegate Rabia stridently responded 
that Hurley's draft guidelines are unacceptable and 
that his proposed concept further complicates the 
situation.  She offered the assistance of French 
experts in drafting a shorter text of best 
practices rather than binding guidelines.  In 
contrast, Spanish Delegate Narbona agreed with 
Hurley's proposed concept and its focus on 
complementing the CWC.  Similarly, Dutch Ambassador 
Lohman said that the proposed concept will help to 
frame discussions, though he still wondered about 
South Africa's motivations.  He said that a common 
understanding in response to the basic question -- 
"What do we want to prepare guidelines for?" -- is 
needed before even discussing possible guidelines. 
¶5. (SBU) Delrep suggested three touchstones to re- 
focus the scope of the consultation: conflict 
situations, chemical weapons found in non-States 
Parties, and verification of destruction.  Burkart, 
Australian Delegate Byers and UK Delegate 
Wolstenholme all agreed with the three touchstones. 
Burkart suggested that considering possible cases 
would help in determining the scope and direction 
for the consultation.  Byers stated that the 
guidelines should permit less than full compliance 
rather than impose new obligations, and he opined 
that territorial states -- rather than occupying 
states -- should have responsibility in cases of 
occupation.  Wolstenholme said that South Africa is 
key in the discussion, noting that no one else 
wanted the consultation.  Burkart added that South 
Africa should clarify its intentions and then 
convince the rest of the Council on the need and 
utility of having any guidelines.  Italian Delegate 
Cornacchia spoke in favor of a shorter, less 
detailed paper than Hurley's and said that no 
progress will be possible as long as the draft 
remains in its current form. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Hurley said he would be happy to shorten 
his draft paper but needs to know what delegations 
want first.  And, while his draft appears to be 
binding, he stated that it is less binding than the 
Verification Annex.  He reasserted that his mandate 
from EC-58 is specific and that the EC must correct 
or amend the scope of the consultation but that, as 
facilitator, he cannot.  Hurley explained that 
South Africa is concerned with correcting a "blind 
spot" in the Verification Annex.  Timelines, rather 
than concepts of practicability, are vital for 
South Africa to ensure against another "seven-year 
gap" before a possible material breach is raised in 
the Council. 
 
-------------------- 
MORE BILATERAL VIEWS 
-------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) On the margins of meetings, Delreps have 
spoken with a number of other delegations to gauge 
views on "situations not foreseen."  Australian 
Delegate Byers has said that Australia is still 
formulating its position but that the Department of 
Defense shares U.S. concerns.  According to Byers, 
the guidelines should excuse States Parties for not 
fully complying with the Verification Annex; States 
Parties should be held to a lower standard in 
conflict situations.  UK Delegate Wolstenholme 
believes that Facilitator Hurley could address a 
narrower, consensus issue within the scope of his 
mandate without needing formally to refine the EC 
mandate. 
 
¶8. (SBU) French Delegate Rabia phoned Delrep later 
on February 2 to discuss how to handle the 
consultation the following day.  Delrep noted that 
Washington has similar reservations about the draft 
guidelines but that it would be better to re-direct 
the discussion toward agreeing on the basis for the 
guidelines, rather than tearing apart Hurley's 
draft or launching into an intensive drafting 
exercise.   Following the consultation on February 
3, Japanese Delegate Hayakawa told Delrep that 
Toyko's response to Hurley's draft guidelines was 
very negative, and she questioned the need for the 
facilitation when "only one delegation is 
Qfacilitation when "only one delegation is 
interested in the issue." 
 
--------------------------------------- 
CONSULTATION ON SITUATIONS NOT FORESEEN 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) The three-hour consultation on February 3 
on "situations not foreseen" was generally more 
productive than the previous meeting (Ref B). 
Despite lingering questions and confusion, 
Facilitator Hurley (Ireland) seemed to receive 
general support for moving forward with a focus on 
conflict situations and promised to continue 
working on the concept to be addressed. 
 
¶10. (SBU) At the start of the meeting, Hurley 
announced his intention to put aside his draft 
guidelines for the time being and to focus instead 
on the concept behind the facilitation.  Hurley's 
starting point is Article IV para 9 of the 
Convention ("CW discovered...shall be destroyed in 
accordance with Part IV(A) of the Verification 
Annex"). He laid out five elements to guide the 
consultation and any eventual guidelines: 
 
a) a defensible basis with clear circumstances and 
a threshold for triggering the use of the 
guidelines; 
 
b) satisfactory alternative means of verification, 
which must be in line with the spirit, if not the 
letter, of the Convention and the Verification 
Annex; 
 
c) an acceptable level of transparency, to include 
timely reporting; 
d) protection of the role and authority of the 
policy-making organs; 
 
e) eventual disclosure of the full facts to the 
Executive Council for review and discussion. 
 
¶11. (SBU) South African Delegate Marthinus van 
Schalkwyk dominated discussion.  In his initial 
intervention, he said South Africa's bottom line is 
that the Convention needs to be implemented and 
that the Executive Council must address situations 
where it is not in order to prevent the emergence 
of a crisis for the Organization.  He agreed with 
the facilitator on Article IV para 9 as the basis 
for discussion and added, "A situation has 
happened, we are not imagining abstractly out of 
thin air."  It was clear from his multiple 
interventions that South Africa does not see the 
guidelines as providing a "get out of jail free 
card" or allow for exceptions or exemptions to 
destroying chemical weapons in accordance with the 
Convention.  Rather, the guidelines should help 
States Parties which choose to destroy CW without 
following the Convention to come "back into 
compliance."  The guidelines could also help the 
Executive Council -- which van Schalkwyk portrayed 
as sitting in judgment -- deal with a situation 
where the Convention was not followed.  At one 
point, van Schalkwyk said the goal is to avoid 
having to invoke Article IX for addressing possible 
non-compliance.  He was clear that South Africa's 
concern is not with the discovery of CW but with 
subsequent destruction that is inconsistent with 
the Convention and the Verification Annex, claiming 
that there is no situation where such destruction 
is acceptable.  Unexpectedly, van Schalkwyk also 
raised the General Purpose Criterion, saying that 
the use of non-traditional CW could result in an 
"unforeseen situation." 
 
¶12. (SBU) Iranian Delegate Esfahaninejad delivered 
a short, prepared statement in which he said the 
Convention foresees all situations and is clear on 
the obligations of States Parties which control, 
own or possess CW.  While noting the need for the 
concept of "unforeseen situations" to be clarified, 
be said that situations should be dealt with on a 
Qbe said that situations should be dealt with on a 
case-by-case basis.  He finished with a blast 
against Hurley's guidelines, saying they depart 
from the Convention and need to be reviewed and 
amended.  In a surprisingly ironic turn, another 
Iranian delegate, Ali Gholampour, said that 
transparency, rather than the timely destruction of 
CW, is of greatest importance.  He insisted that 
security and safety concerns cannot exist in a 
conflict situation and therefore would not be valid 
reasons for not following the Verification Annex or 
for not informing the EC immediately. 
 
¶13. (SBU) Lebanese Delegate Rami Adwan spoke at 
length and seemed to be uninstructed.  His focus 
veered back to the past when he obliquely referred 
to two States Parties involved in a conflict 
situation in a non-State Party which has since 
become a State Party.  Adwan said that the two 
States Parties (i.e., the U.S. and the UK) came 
into possession of CW and destroyed some of it.  He 
then specifically referred to Iraq, saying that 
Lebanon is interested in the remaining CW 
stockpiles which were not destroyed during 
conflict.  He later said that storage of CW is 
Lebanon's main concern.  (Del Note:  While there 
did not appear to be much, if any, substance behind 
what he was saying, he could prove to be less than 
helpful in future discussions.  End Note.)  Iraqi 
Delegate Al-Miahi countered that Iraq is a full 
member meeting its obligations and should not be 
brought into the discussion.  Hurley stressed that 
Adwan's point on Iraq was outside the scope of the 
facilitation.  Van Schalkwyk also stressed the 
forward-looking nature of the consultation, but he 
allowed for using the example of "the one specific 
case that there has been." 
 
¶14. (SBU) German Ambassador Burkart said that 
Berlin still is not clear what to provide guidance 
on.  To clarify what the consultation should 
discuss, Burkart called for pragmatism and 
suggested considering practical examples, such as 
terrorists on a subway or conflict on the Korean 
Peninsula.  He also raised force majeure as a key 
element in explaining why destruction might not 
follow the Convention.  In response to South 
Africa's claim that a "situation has happened," he 
said that that situation involved conflict and that 
force majeure could be invoked. 
 
¶15. (SBU) Delrep noted that the genesis of the 
consultation was a past situation and that 
discussion should focus on future verification of 
destruction of CW in non-States Parties during 
conflict situations.  While noting that Tokyo has 
provided only preliminary views, Japanese Delegate 
Hayakawa agreed on the need for a pragmatic 
approach and with the focus proposed by the U.S. 
She said that a guide to best practices would be 
preferable to guidelines creating new obligations; 
Italian Delegate Cornacchia and French Delegate 
Rabia agreed.  While agreeing on the need for 
pragmatism and a narrow focus, Russian Delegate 
Gavrilov said that Moscow first wants answers to 
its many legal questions, particularly on the 
nature of the guidelines.  Unlike other guidelines 
specifically mandated by the Convention, he noted 
there is no such mandate for the current guidelines 
being discussed.  On force majeure, he said that 
combat does not fall within its scope.  Indian 
Delegate Sharma said that New Delhi shares Berlin's 
and Moscow's concerns and asked what is unforeseen 
Qand Moscow's concerns and asked what is unforeseen 
in the Convention.  Until that can be answered, he 
said that it would be premature to work on 
guidelines. 
 
¶16. (SBU) Australian Delegate Byers said that the 
focus should be on conflict situations and 
suggested taking an incremental approach without 
needing to amend the EC-58 mandate.  Van Schalkwyk 
(South Africa), Burkart (Germany), Rabia (France) 
and Delrep all supported Byers on narrowing the 
focus to conflict situations. 
 
¶17. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST:  Del requests 
constructive input from Washington on what the U.S. 
can accept in any guidelines.  Hurley privately has 
asked Delreps for thinking on the issues of 
timelines and of reporting, specifically how and 
when information comes to the EC.  Del also 
requests guidance on Hurley's five elements 
outlined on February 3 as a basis for proceeding 
with this consultation. 
 
-------------------------------- 
WEOG EC CHAIR -- THE SHORT STRAW 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶18. (C) As previously reported (Refs C and D), 
German Ambassador Werner Burkart has been sounding 
out the WEOG delegations that will be members of 
the EC beginning in May for a nomination for 
Chairman.  No one has come forward for the post. 
Burkart hosted a lunch on February 4 for the 
ambassadors of the ten EC member states from WEOG 
to come to a decision on who would take the chair. 
Three of the current Ambassadors (Germany, Denmark 
and Canada) will be leaving The Hague this summer. 
Two countries have a perceived conflict of 
interest, the U.S. as a possessor state (also 
currently without an ambassador), and Turkey as the 
country of the new Director-General. 
 
¶19. (C) Spain held the EC Chair for WEOG during the 
last rotation, and currently holds the EU 
presidency. 
London had opposed the UK Ambassador taking the 
chairmanship, after chairing the preparations for 
the Second Review Conference for over 18 months. 
The Italian Ambassador said that he would like to 
have volunteered but cannot for personal reasons. 
The Luxembourg Ambassador said that he has a tiny 
staff and has just received new duties as his 
country's representative to the African Union; he 
could not possibly also take on the additional work 
of the EC Chair. 
 
¶20. (C) French Ambassador Blarel stated that he 
also lacked staffing for this additional burden, 
but that he would accept to take the role in the 
absence of any other candidate.  Blarel had not yet 
cleared this with Paris, but said "they would not 
care."  He also noted that he would conduct all 
formal meetings in French, as his government 
requires.  All present at the lunch thanked him and 
expressed their support for his leadership. 
 
¶21. (C) Del Comment:  The EU Ambassadors appear to 
have hammered out this arrangement beforehand, but 
this discussion finalized the nomination which will 
be put before the entire WEOG membership once 
Blarel has received approval from Paris. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
RUSSIAN INVITATION FOR NEW DG TO VISIT 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶22. (SBU) During Delreps' meeting with the Russian 
delegation on other issues (Ref C), the Russians 
had asked whether the U.S. had invited future 
Director-General Ambassador Ahmet Uzumcu (Turkey) 
to visit Washington.  Delrep responded that both 
Amb. Uzumcu and DG Pfirter had been invited both to 
Washington and to visit the Anniston CW destruction 
facility in mid-February.  On February 5, Russian 
Delegate Ladanov phoned Delrep to inquire about the 
specific dates of the DGs' visit to the U.S. and 
said Moscow was sending an invitation to Amb. 
Uzumcu to visit Russia, including a destruction 
QUzumcu to visit Russia, including a destruction 
facility, sometime later this spring. 
 
¶23. (U) BEIK SENDS. 
LEVIN