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INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 000281 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/05/2020 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KWBG IS
SUBJECT: NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR ARAD ARTICULATES ISRAELI 
FOREIGN POLICY SUCCESSES 
 
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Luis G. Moreno, reasons 1.4 (b), 
 (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  In a February 5 article in the Israeli 
newspaper Yisrael Ha-yom, National Security Advisor Uzi Arad 
articulated the Netanyahu Government's foreign policy 
successes over the past year, including helping prevent Iran 
from obtaining a nuclear weapon and promoting negotiations to 
resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict.  Arad's foreign policy 
article may in part represent a response to critics who 
panned PM Netanhayu's February 3 speech at the Herzliya 
Conference for its lack of foreign policy focus.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) In an unusual article in the February 5 edition of 
the Israeli newspaper Yisrael Ha-yom, National Security 
Advisor Uzi Arad laid out the Netanyahu Government's foreign 
policy successes over the last year.  Arad noted that in the 
political sphere, if something is "not publicized, the 
likelihood that it will happen increases."  In this respect, 
he argued that the GOI has made progress in two main efforts: 
preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, and 
promoting negotiations to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
 
¶3. (SBU) On Iran, Arad noted GOI efforts to apply pressure to 
change Tehran's bid to obtain nuclear weapons, while at the 
same time deferring to U.S. diplomatic efforts.  He 
referenced a "very high level of compatibility between Israel 
and the international community led by the United States" in 
"tightening the noose around Iran in terms of economic 
pressure and its global isolation." 
 
¶4. (SBU) On the Arab-Israeli conflict, Arad acknowledged 
those who might view 2009 as a failure due to the lack of 
high-level Israeli-Palestinian political contacts.  However, 
Arad said he advised caution during the past summer regarding 
expectations of a breakthrough in negotiations, primarily 
because of what he described as a Palestinian "rejectionist 
position" that manifested during the Olmert administration. 
Nevertheless, Arad pointed to U.S. efforts to resume talks, 
and restated GOI interest in this regard without 
preconditions, as indicated by "gestures" and "various 
measures." 
 
¶5. (SBU) Arad described a difficult international environment 
facing Israel, including a "tough anti-Israel campaign" 
consisting of four planes: the public information-media 
campaign, the legal front, the political front, and the 
economic arena.  Nevertheless, he highlighted improved 
relations with Egypt, Russia, and China, and continued 
contacts with European leaders.  Arad noted that many 
analysts predicted a "head-on collision" with the United 
States last year, which has not transpired due to the 
U.S.-Israeli mutual understanding.  He pointed to the 
creation of the "Septet" -- or the seven-member inner 
security cabinet -- which brings experience to the national 
security and foreign policy arena, while affording legitimacy 
to consensus decisions reached by this forum.  Finally, he 
noted the Israeli National Security Council's new role as the 
focal point in a strengthened decision-making process. 
 
¶6. (C)  Comment: Arad's foreign policy op-ed is 
uncharacteristic of his usual behind-the-scenes style, and 
would for the most part seem out of place.  However, many 
critics panned PM Netanyahu's Feburary 3 speech at the annual 
Herzliya Conference for its lack of foreign policy focus. 
Some critics charged that the speech resulted from 
Netanyahu's lack of a political vision and/or uncertainty how 
to proceed in a largely hostile international environment. 
Arad's articulation of the Netanyahu administration's foreign 
policy accomplishments over the past year may be in part in 
response to such criticism. 
 
¶7. (U)  The below includes an unofficial translation of the 
February 5 Yisrael Ha-yom article. 
 
Begin Text: 
 
Every Israeli Government's main effort channels involve the 
attempt to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear capability and 
weapons, and the promotion of negotiations to resolve the 
Arab-Israeli conflict.  In both these channels, far greater 
progress than meets the superficial eye has been made. 
 
As a prelude to a discussion of these subjects, it would be 
worthwhile to paraphrase the statement from bureaucratic life 
that goes like this: "if you reported on something but did 
not actually do anything - you have in fact done something; 
but if you have done something but failed to take credit for 
it - you are as good as not having done anything."  In the 
political sphere, if something is publicized, it will not 
happen; and if it is not publicized, the likelihood that it 
will happen increases.  Quite often, what does not make 
 
TEL AVIV 00000281  002 OF 003 
 
 
headlines and is not accounted for is exactly what actually 
happens. 
 
The effort on the Iranian path is directed toward persuading 
Tehran pleasantly -- this is, after all, the U.S. dialogue 
policy -- but at the same time while applying pressure to 
change the course it is treading in a bid to accumulate a 
military nuclear potential and shift instead to a peaceful 
course. 
 
In this path, progress has been made with a very high level 
of compatibility between Israel and the international 
community lead by the United States.  In this quarter, a 
quantum leap is expected in tightening the noose around Iran 
in terms of economic pressure and its global isolation.  Iran 
will face the following dilemma: it will have to decide 
whether it wants to continue to flout the world, or if it 
understands that if it continues this way, the price might be 
high. 
 
As for the second plane -- promoting agreements and the peace 
process -- no doubt this entails great disappointment since 
2009 was marked by the absence of high-level political 
contacts.  Only few educated commentators and members of the 
intelligence community correctly predicted the current 
situation.  When I dared, back in July, to calm down those 
who thought we were on the brink of intensive talks, someone 
immediately jumped up and called me to order for being such a 
skeptic and furthermore explained that I do not understand 
the great potential. 
 
The potential is indeed great, except that even though this 
is the case, the Palestinians have assumed a rejectionist 
position.  This stance did not begin when the incumbent 
Israeli Government was established.  Some 18 months ago, the 
former prime minister made an extremely generous offer to Abu 
Mazen in an effort to move forward toward arrangements.  The 
latter, however, turned him down.  Six months later, Abu 
Mazen explained that the gaps were still too wide. 
 
So whatever the reason for this rejectionist Palestinian 
stand may be -- once Abu Mazen is too strong, another time he 
is too weak; once he is going to elections, or he is in a bad 
mood, or is awaiting the Arab League summit -- the reasons 
may vary, but the rejectionist policy continues, and this is 
disappointing. 
 
Despite the disappointment, the U.S. has been making efforts 
to bring about Israeli-Palestinian talks.  The Israeli 
Government has already announced that it was interested in 
this, without preconditions, and has made gestures and taken 
various measures to prove this. 
 
Combined Effort 
 
Meanwhile, a tough anti-Israel campaign is underway.  It 
consists of four planes with reciprocal links to one another: 
the public information-media campaign; the legal effort; the 
political front; and, finally, the economic arena.  More and 
more boycotts are imposed on Israeli products, to the point 
where they are burned.  I do not know of anyone who is 
familiar with Jewish history whose guts would not churn upon 
watching such a bonfire. 
 
Here Israel is required to adopt an educated and carefully 
thought-out strategy: create obstructive blocs when the 
phenomenon is negative, and support blocs when the initiative 
is positive, or apply the brakes. 
 
In the past year, Israel put an emphasis on several anchors. 
In the region nearest to us, one cannot avoid noticing the 
tighter cooperation with Egypt.  As far as the United States 
-- the superpower without which nothing can be done -- is 
concerned, a year ago, people prophesied that we were heading 
toward a head-on collision.  Well, one year later, we are not 
at this point.  Sometimes, our views differ, but this is part 
of a mutual understanding, as among friendly countries.  In 
Europe, one most note the upgrading of relations with several 
countries: Germany, Poland, and Italy -- whose prime minister 
arrived here last week at the head of a group of ministers. 
Note the frequency of visits to such key countries as 
Britain, France, Spain or such traditionally friendly 
countries as the Netherlands and the Czech Republic.  Where 
Brazil is concerned -- President Lula will arrive soon and 
his defense minister visited Israel a week ago; and with 
respect to Russia -- Netanyahu will travel to that country in 
two weeks, this time openly; and there are also China and 
India.  In terms of relations with China, everyone, including 
the United States, feels it wants more. 
 
In addition to external support, it is also necessary to have 
support at home.  A change has taken place that not many have 
 
TEL AVIV 00000281  003 OF 003 
 
 
noticed, but as an eyewitness, I can attest to the fact that 
it is far-reaching in its importance.  This government has 
established a de facto council of ministers -- the "Septet." 
This is the assembly of people who hold consultations in the 
most intensive way and it is also the most significant.  The 
rate at which it holds deliberations is frequent, although 
this not done publicly, and this is where the key issues are 
discussed. 
 
Who is in that group: the four heads of the coalition's major 
factions, two former prime ministers, and two former chiefs 
of staff, and all of them have held ministerial positions 
more than just once or twice.  The "Septet" represents a 
broad range of views and grants decisions consensus and 
legitimacy. 
 
There is further bolstering and it has to do with the staff 
work.  It was Netanyahu, who, during his first term as prime 
minister, established the National Security Council.  Now he 
has transferred the Council from a side position in the 
decision-making process to the focal point of the process. 
This strengthens the decision-making process, as required by 
the National Security Council Law and as demanded by various 
commissions of inquiry. 
 
Faced with such phenomena as Goldstone, we encounter a 
comment that is a typical show of Israeli defiance: what 
would we rather be -- right or smart?  No Israeli would ever 
agree to be "not smart," even if we may be able to live with 
the "not right."  Yet when someone employs this statement to 
attack us bluntly, this dilemma sometimes pushes us into 
something that may be portrayed as smart, but which meanwhile 
sacrifices the element of justness. 
 
I would like to propose two principles by which to conduct 
our policy.  One principle is not to offer solutions that 
balance off being smart versus being right -- marry the two. 
This is the prudent way.  The second principle is to exercise 
caution.  Let us engage in less swashbuckling, avoid 
incitement or threats, and engage more in doing, in modesty, 
and in earnestness.  Let us work quietly because where 
politics are concerned, being quiet does not mean filth but 
quality.  All these could help us reinforce Israel because in 
our region, there is no alternative to strength. 
 
End text. 
Cunningham