VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTG #0159/01 0502346
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 192346Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1714
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 0001
RHMFISS/DIRJIATF SOUTH PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR JTF-BRAVO  PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMSOCSOUTH  PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEIDN/DNI WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUMIAAA/USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEGUCIGALPA 000159 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/04/2020 
TAGS: PREL PGOV EAID SNAR CA HO
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH VISITING CANADIAN 
MINISTER OF STATE KENT 
 
REF: A. TEGUCIGALPA 154 
     ¶B. TEGUCIGALPA 153 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Hugo Llorens, reason 1.4 (B and D) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: The Ambassador met with visiting Canadian 
Minister of State for the Americas Peter Kent on February 18. 
 The Ambassador briefed Kent on the current political, 
diplomatic and economic environment in Honduras following the 
January 27 inauguration of President Porfirio "Pepe" Lobo. 
Kent expressed Canadian support for the principled approach 
the United States took regarding the coup d'etat of June 28, 
2009, and subsequent efforts to resolve the political crisis. 
 The Ambassador expressed gratitude for Canada's support and 
leadership in the diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis, 
and noted that President Lobo had already made great strides 
toward healing the social and political rifts in the country, 
and normalizing Honduras' relations with the international 
community and the international financial institutions, but 
that more work needed to be done.  The Ambassador highlighted 
the continued need for President Lobo to show the world that 
the civilian Honduran authorities were in charge of the armed 
forces (HOAF) by naming a new Minister of Defense (MOD) and 
Chief of the Armed Forces (CHOD).  End summary. 
 
¶2. (C) The Ambassador briefed Kent on the events that led up 
to the June 28, 2009 coup, the efforts made to resolve the 
political crisis and the situation since the inauguration of 
President Lobo.  Kent was accompanied by Canadian Ambassador 
to Honduras Neil Reeder, who is resident in Costa Rica.  The 
Ambassador noted that the United States had taken a 
principled approach to the crisis, always supporting the 
restoration of the democratic and constitutional order.  He 
noted that this approach included suspension of U.S. 
assistance to and contact with the de facto regime and the 
HOAF, and had applied direct pressure on individuals in the 
regime and those who carried out the coup, including 
revocation of U.S. visas.  The Ambassador noted however, that 
the United States also acknowledged the complexity of the 
crisis, and the fact that President Jose Manuel "Mel" Zelaya 
shared responsibility for creating the political environment 
that led up to the coup.  The Ambassador said the Secretary 
had maintained that a negotiated solution was the best way 
forward, which is why she supported the Arias-led mediation 
that culminated in the Tegucigalpa-San Jose Accord.  The 
Ambassador acknowledged the important role Canada played in 
the process of finding a solution, both in the discussions 
among the Organization of American States (OAS) foreign 
ministers and in encouraging the Honduran negotiating teams 
to come to the table and eventually sign the accord.  The 
Ambassador added that the United States valued Canada's 
continued leadership, and said Kent's visit was important to 
building political stability and forward progress in Honduras. 
 
¶3. (C) The Ambassador said that the United States had 
supported the Honduran people's right to select their 
political leaders through elections, and noted that the 
November 2009 elections had enjoyed solid participation by 
the population, and had been sufficiently free, fair, and 
transparent in their execution to allow the United States to 
acknowledge their outcome.  However, the Ambassador noted 
that human rights had remained a front-burner issue 
throughout the crisis, and the United States had made 
frequent statements regarding human rights concerns.  He said 
President Lobo and his National Party had won a strong 
mandate at all levels, but expectations were extremely high 
across the social and political spectrum for the new 
administration and National Party-controlled Congress to 
repair the damage done to the country by the crisis. 
 
¶4. (C) The Ambassador said that while the United States was 
in the process of restoring law enforcement cooperation and 
assistance, and was working with the U.S. Congress to take 
the necessary legal steps to resume other civilian 
assistance, the United States would not move forward with 
military assistance or contact until President Lobo 
demonstrated that he had control over the HOAF by appointing 
a MOD and CHOD not connected to the coup or the de facto 
regime.  The Ambassador said that thus far, the United States 
 
had been impressed by President Lobo's political and 
diplomatic skills, and said President Lobo was making 
excellent progress and doing the right things to mend 
international relations.  The Ambassador said that 
politically, President Lobo had succeeded in forming a unity 
government that included leaders from all five political 
parties. 
 
¶5. (C) The Ambassador noted that on the economic front, 
Honduras had suffered a double blow, first from the global 
economic crisis, and the second from the severe economic 
impact of the political crisis, and so President Lobo needed 
to rebuild relations with the international community in 
order to reestablish economic assistance and opportunities. 
The Ambassador said the deterioration of public finances 
during the crisis along with a surge in debt made the 
potential for financial dislocation high.  The Ambassador 
noted that efforts to rebuild social and political stability 
would be undermined by the economic problems.  He said that 
President Lobo was doing a good job rebuilding regional 
re-engagement, and the Central American Bank for Integration 
(CABEI) had just normalized relations with the Government of 
Honduras (GOH)  (Ref A). 
 
¶6. (C) Kent said that Canada agreed with the U.S. policy and 
its principled approach to resolving the crisis.  He said he 
had productive meetings during his visit, in particular with 
President Lobo.  He said he believed President Lobo was 
genuinely committed to mending Honduras' social and political 
rifts, and praised his rapid forward progress, in particular 
in forming a national unity government and his progress 
toward establishing a truth commission.  Kent said he had 
highlighted to President Lobo the importance of human rights 
in Honduras.  He said President Lobo had assured him that his 
administration would be taking a tough stand on law and 
order, but with careful attention to respecting human rights 
in the process.  Kent said he had also stressed the 
importance of combating corruption.  He said President Lobo 
stated his commitment to ensuring a more transparent 
government that would be responsive to the people's needs. 
He stated that President Lobo had told him that he would 
ensure a full investigation into the recent Nacaome Dam 
scandal (Note: details of this scandal will be reported 
septel.  End note) implicating members of the de facto 
regime, and that if the evidence supported it, he would not 
hesitate to prosecute Micheletti and other members of his 
regime. 
 
¶7. (C) Kent said he had other productive meetings, in 
particular with former Guatemalan Vice President Eduardo 
Stein, who has been selected by President Lobo to be the 
international coordinator of the truth commission (Ref B). 
Kent said he was extremely impressed by Stein, who along with 
Honduran commission head Jorge Casco is doing work preparing 
the terms of reference for the commission.  Kent said that 
President Lobo has moved back the date to inaugurate the 
commission from February 25 to mid-March, noting this would 
allow time for former Chilean President Ricardo Lagos and 
Secretary of Labor Hilda Solis, the international 
Verification Commission members to be present.  Kent said 
President Lobo had mentioned (U.S.-born) former Peruvian 
Foreign Minister and current magistrate on the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights Diego Garcia Sayan as the likely second 
international member of the truth commission. 
 
¶8. (C) Regarding reintegration, Kent was doubtful Honduras 
would be allowed back into the OAS any time soon, although he 
said Canada would support an early vote.  He said he did not 
believe the votes were there to achieve the necessary 
two-thirds margin.  More likely, he said, the Honduran issue 
would be dealt with by the General Assembly in June.  Kent 
stressed that we needed to assiduously work Brazil and the 
Caribbean nations.  He remarked he was disappointed with 
Mexico and its unwillingness to provide leadership on 
Honduras. 
 
¶9. (C) Kent said Canada had a small development assistance 
program in Honduras, and was in the process of reviving it in 
a step by step approach.  He said their primary focus would 
 
be on an administration of justice program, and they had 
signed an accord with Attorney General Rubi to provide 
assistance to Honduran prosecutors.  Kent said it was 
important to strengthen Honduran law enforcement capabilities 
in order to counter the international crime threat. 
 
¶10. (C) Comment: Canada has been an effective partner in 
seeking a negotiated solution to the political crisis, using 
their perceived neutrality in the eyes of the de facto regime 
to push the Micheletti team to the negotiating table at 
critical points.  It was clear from the meeting with Kent 
that Canada will continue to play an important role in 
Honduras' social and political healing process.  End comment. 
LLORENS