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ZNR UUUUU ZZH
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FM AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA
TO RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHDC PRIORITY
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INFO RUCNCLC/CHILD LABOR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 11 TEGUCIGALPA 000117 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DOL/ILAB FOR LEYLA STROTKAMP, RACHEL RIGBY, AND TIN 
MCCARTER. DRL/ILCSR FOR SARAH MORGAN AND G/TIP FOR LUIS 
CDEBACA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ELAB EIND ETRD KTIP PHUM GOVPOI SIPDIS USAID
HO 
SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON CHILD LABOR AND FORCED 
LABOR FOR CONGRESSIONAL REPORTING REQUIREMENTS 
 
REF: A. TEGUCIGALPA 56 
     ¶B. 09 STATE 131995 
     ¶C. 09 STATE 69221 
     ¶D. 09 TEGUCIGALPA 39 
 
¶1. On June 28, 2009, Honduran President Manuel "Mel" Zelaya 
was removed from power in a coup d'etat.  The United States 
did not recognize the de facto regime that subsequently took 
over and remained in power until the January 27 inauguration 
of democratically elected President Porfirio "Pepe" Lobo.  As 
a result, it was not possible to engage in high-level 
advocacy on the issues of child labor and forced labor with 
the de facto regime and there is limited information on the 
subject due to our no contact policy with the de facto 
regime.  With the newly democratically elected government in 
place, we will reengage on this issue. 
 
TASK 1: The use of forced labor and/or exploitive child labor 
in the production of goods: 
-------------------- 
 
¶2. The Department of Labor's 2009 "List of Goods Produced by 
Child Labor or Forced Labor" included coffee, lobsters, and 
melons as products produced in Honduras with the use of child 
labor.  As outlined in paragraph 13 and 14 of ref B, there is 
no new information to report with regard to forced labor and 
exploitive child labor in the production of goods. 
 
¶3. As directed, the Embassy contacted non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) that work with child labor issues, 
including the International Labor Organization (ILO), and 
various other stakeholders to inquire about new cases 
involving forced labor or exploitive child labor in the 
production of goods.  Under the Department's no contact 
policy, the Embassy did not contact the Ministry of Labor 
(MOL) regarding task 1 or task 2 (ref B).  Many other 
organizations had limited information on these issues, 
including the ILO, due to limitations placed on their contact 
with the MOL following the June coup. 
 
Task 2: Additional information on exploitive child labor 
-------------------- 
 
PREVALENCE AND SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION OF EXPLOITIVE CHILD LABOR 
 
¶1. In what sectors were children involved in exploitive labor? 
 
--There was anecdotal evidence to suggest children were 
involved in domestic service, street vending, including 
dangerous activities such as juggling flaming batons in order 
to earn tips,  private transportation companies, child 
prostitution, and the sale of drugs.  An April 20 article in 
the national daily newspaper, "La Tribuna," reported 
community efforts to move children selling food on the 
streets to the classroom in the Department of Olancho.  A 
June 13 report in the national daily newspaper, "La Prensa," 
reported children were working as fare collectors on private 
urban bus lines in Tegucigalpa. Finally, in a March 16 
investigate report in the national daily newspaper, "La 
Tribuna," Public Prosecutor Reina Valerio said that her 
office was processing cases in which "high risk" children 
were found to be working as drug mules and selling drugs in 
the streets of La Ceiba, San Pedro Sula, and Tegucigalpa. 
NGOs that work with at risk children, such as USAID's "Youth 
Regional Aliance," reported to Poloff that there were 
anecdotal cases of children being used as drug mules in urban 
areas, however there were no known ongoing investigations or 
prosecutions. 
 
--The National Institute of Statistics (INE) published the 
results of a national household survey in May 2009 that 
includes a list of sectors in which children work, however 
there was no breakdown according to age and the survey 
numbers included children aged 5-17. The report found that of 
the 391,195 minors aged 5-17 working, 75.6 percent work in 
rural areas and 60.6 percent work in the agriculture sector. 
 
¶2. Did the government collect or publish data on exploitive 
child labor? 
 
--The National Institute of Statistics (INE) published the 
results of a national household survey in May 2009 that found 
170,046 children aged 5-14 worked in some form or another. 
As in the past, the INE survey showed that 140,088 working 
children lived in rural areas compared to 29,957 working 
 
TEGUCIGALP 00000117  002 OF 011 
 
 
children in urban areas.  The largest single group (73,915) 
was 10-14 year olds working while attending schools in rural 
areas. The next largest group was children aged 10-14 working 
and not attending school in rural areas (58,409). 
 
--The report was broken down into the following categories of 
types of work:  173 children aged 10-14 were working in the 
"public sector," 29,456 in the "private sector," and 2,399 as 
 domestic workers.  A total of 6,964 children aged 5-14 
worked in their own business while a total of 131,053 
reportedly worked without payment.  This last group are 
crompised of children that work on family farms and in other 
enterprises.  There was no indication this group constituted 
children working in forced labor conditions. 
 
--A copy of the detailed results of the May 2009 household 
survey is available and Post can transmit it separately to 
the Department of Labor. 
 
2B) LAWS AND REGULATIONS 
------------------------ 
 
¶1. What new laws or regulations were enacted in regard to 
exploitive child labor over the past year? 
 
--According to ILO and Democracy without Borders, there were 
no known changes or additions in 2009 to the legal framework 
addressing exploitive child labor in Honduras. 
 
¶2. What is the adequacy of the country/territory's legal and 
regulatory framework for addressing exploitive child labor? 
 
--Honduras is a signatory to ILO Convention 182 regarding the 
worst forms of child labor and its Child Labor Code precludes 
participation by minors in unhealthy or dangerous conditions. 
 Honduran law regulates child labor and provides that minors 
between the ages of 14 and 18 cannot work unless authorities 
determine that the work is indispensable for the family's 
income and will not conflict with schooling.  The 
constitution and the law establish the maximum work hours for 
children under 18 as six hours daily and 30 hours weekly. 
Parents or a legal guardian can request special permission 
from the MOL to allow children between the ages of 14 and 15 
to work, so long as the MOL performs a home study to ensure 
that the child demonstrates economic necessity to work and 
that the child will not work outside of the country or in 
hazardous conditions, including offshore fishing.  In 2008, 
the Government of Honduras reformed Article Eight of the 
Child Labor Code to include a list of tasks considered too 
dangerous for children under 18 years of age.  The change 
bans minors from engaging in activities such as forestry, 
fishery, hunting, mining, quarrying, manufacturing, 
construction, transportation, morgue activities, and street 
cleaning.  Despite these limitations, minors aged 16 and 17 
may receive authorization from the Office of Labor and Social 
Security to perform dangerous labor under certain 
circumstances. 
 
--The law prohibits night work and overtime for minors under 
the age of 16 and requires that employers in areas with more 
than 20 school-age children working at their business 
facility provide a location for a school.  In practice, the 
vast majority of children worked without MOL permits. 
 
--The law prohibits forced or bonded labor but there is no 
specific provision for children trafficked into exploitive 
labor situations.  The Special Prosecutor for Children, Nora 
Urbina, commented to Poloff on January 19 that from her point 
of view, the lack of laws covering trafficking into 
exploitive labor situations is a shortcoming in the Honduran 
law. 
 
--By law, individuals who violate child labor laws in 
traditional work sectors may receive prison sentences of 
three to five years along with a fine.  There were no 
reported changes in the maximum 5,000 Lempira (USD 260) fine 
for those responsible for violating the child labor code. 
There were no known changes to the practice of the MOL giving 
violators a probationary period to correct the violation 
instead of levying fines. 
 
--ILO staff told Poloff on January 14 the legal framework to 
combat exploitive child labor in Honduras is adequate, but 
enforcement is lacking.  The Special Prosecutor for Children, 
Nora Urbina, told Poloff on January 19 that she understood 
 
TEGUCIGALP 00000117  003 OF 011 
 
 
that the Congressional Commission for Family and Childhood 
and the National Commission for the Gradual and Progressive 
Eradication of Child Labor would work in the future to pass a 
law that specifically targets trafficking for the purposes of 
exploitive labor. 
 
--The ILO reported that the MOL took two significant steps in 
2009 to support the 2008 revision of Article Eight of the 
Child Labor Code.  The MOL first issued an internal memo 
instructing all inspectors to follow the changes and secondly 
issued an announcement to the National Commission for Sport 
Installations of Honduras (CONAPID) informing them of the 
change and of a new ban on the use of children in the sale of 
alcoholic beverages at sporting events. 
 
2C, Section I: Hazardous child labor 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶1. What agency or agencies was/were responsible for the 
enforcement of laws relating to hazardous child/forced child 
labor? 
 
--The Ministry of Labor is the primary government agency that 
is responsible for the inspection of labor conditions and 
enforcement of laws relating to hazardous child/forced child 
labor.  Government-wide coordination is managed under the 
National Plan for the Eradication of Child Labor (NPECL), a 7 
year plan passed in May 2008.  An ILO-led initiative called 
the "Roadmap for the Eradication of Child Labor in Honduras" 
(RECL) was in progress prior to the June coup.  In a December 
2009 internal report by the de facto regime's Ministry of 
Labor provided to a local ILO representative, the RECL 
program was listed as "pending due to the situation in the 
country."  The RECL was a joint effort between the ILO and 
the MOL to organize the objectives and targets to better 
coordinate the GOH response to child labor and was placed on 
hold by the ILO following their decision to reduce contact 
with the MOL after the June coup.  The report also stated 
that a pending action for the MOL is the coordination and 
execution the NPECL. 
 
--The Public Ministry's Office of the Special Prosecutor for 
Children (OSPC) prosecutes criminal charges against those 
involved in hazardous and forced child labor as well as those 
suspected of sexual exploitation of children. 
 
--The Honduran Institute for Children and the Family (IHNFA) 
leads government efforts to care for children that are 
victims of child labor.  Other internationally funded 
programs fight child labor, including programs funded by the 
World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the 
Spanish government to build opportunities for children at the 
margins of society.  Many of these programs were on hold or 
suspended following the June coup. 
 
¶2. Mechanisms for exchanging information and their 
effectiveness. 
 
--In January 2009, the MOL released a "Procedure for the 
Integral Attention to the Child Worker from the Ministry of 
Labor and Social Security."  The procedure outlines the 
appropriate response of MOL inspectors and coordination 
between various government actors, including special 
procedures when a child worker is found to be in a hazardous 
situation.  For example, if found to be working in a 
pre-defined "worst forms of child labor" the case skips a 
number of steps involved in a normal labor inspection and 
instead is passed to the Public Ministry for immediate 
attention by the OSPC.  The National Commission for the 
Gradual and Progressive Eradication of Child Labor (NCECL) 
was the primary tool utilized to share information on the 
topic and the NPECL provided government ministries with 
benchmarks in order to combat child labor.  According to the 
OSPC, the technical council of the NCECL met on a monthly 
basis during 2009. 
 
¶3. Did the country/territory maintain a mechanism for making 
complaints about hazardous and forced child labor violations? 
 
--The MOL maintains a process for making complaints about 
hazardous and forced child labor violations.  ILO reported 
that in 2009 the MOL received 24 complaints against companies 
for violating child labor laws.  OSPC reported on January 19 
that the Public Ministry had not received any cases of child 
labor referred to them by the MOL for criminal prosecution. 
 
TEGUCIGALP 00000117  004 OF 011 
 
 
 
¶4. Funding for agencies responsible for inspections of child 
labor cases. 
 
--A December 2009 internal report by the de facto Ministry of 
Labor provided to a local ILO representative lists the office 
that handles inspections as using 95 percent of its budget to 
pay for salaries and benefits, which leaves only 5 per cent 
to carry out inspections.  According to the same report, the 
office of inspections at the MOL had a 2009 budget of 
6,685,057 lempiras (approximately USD $351,845), of which 
6,082,152 lempiras (approximately USD $320,113) went to the 
payment of salaries.  The same internal report stated the 
budget for inspections was insufficient and recommended an 
increase in the budget. 
 
--Similarly, in April, UNICEF representative Sergio Guimaraes 
told national daily newspaper, "La Prensa," that a large 
problem facing IHNFA is that over 90 percent of its budget 
goes to salaries for employees and that IHNFA needed a 
recomplete overhaul, including an increased budget in order 
to fully carry out its mandate.  IHNFA's mandate is to 
provide care to child labor victims. 
 
¶5. How many inspectors did the government employ? 
 
--A December 2009 internal report by the de facto Ministry of 
Labor provided to a local ILO representative lists 120 
inspectors being employed at the end of the year 2009. 
 
¶6. How many inspections involving child labor were carried 
out? 
 
--ILO reported that 14,795 workplace inspections were carried 
by MOL inspectors in 2009.  Of this nationwide total, there 
were 377 child labor inspections carried out in the country's 
capital, Tegucigalpa.  There was no information available on 
the break-down of complaint-driven versus random, 
government-initiative inspections and there was no 
information available on the number of specific inspections 
concerning child labor abuses outside of Tegucigalpa. 
However, it is commonly understood that inspectors are 
looking for child labor violations during regular workplace 
inspections. 
 
¶7. How many children were removed/assisted as a result of 
inspections?  Were these children actually provided or 
referred for services as a result (as opposed to simply 
fired)? 
 
--ILO estimates that at least six children were removed from 
the workplace for child labor violations in 2009, given that 
MOL authorities sanctioned six companies.  There was no 
information available on the treatment received by these 
minors.  However, the MOL's "Procedure for the Integral 
Attention to the Child Worker from the Ministry of Labor and 
Social Security," which was released in January 2009, 
instructs inspectors to refer the child worker to IHNFA for 
care after a case of child labor is discovered. 
 
¶8. How many child labor cases or "prosecutions" were opened? 
 
--ILO reported that in 2009 the MOL received 24 complaints 
against companies for violating child labor laws.  The OSPC 
told Poloff on January 19 that in 2009 the Public Ministry 
had not received any cases of child labor referred to them by 
the MOL for criminal prosecution. 
 
¶9. How many child labor cases were closed or resolved? 
 
--The ILO reported that during 2009, the MOL sanctioned six 
companies with administrative fines for employing minors. 
The names of three of the companies were available and are: 
Chevez Comercial, CONHSA PAISA, and Constructora CERO (the 
later two are both construction companies).  The names of the 
other three are unknown. 
 
¶10. How many violations were found or "convictions" reached? 
 
--See answer to questions 8 and 9. 
 
¶11. What is the average length of time it took to resolve 
child labor cases? 
 
--ILO estimates that during 2009, on average, it took 9 
 
TEGUCIGALP 00000117  005 OF 011 
 
 
months to resolve child labor cases in Honduras. 
 
¶12. In cases in which violations were found, were penalties 
actually applied, either through fines paid or jail sentence 
served? Did such sentences meet penalties established in the 
law? 
 
--The OSPC told Poloff on January 19 that the Public Ministry 
had not received any cases of child labor referred to them by 
the MOL for criminal prosecution.  This information suggests 
that the MOL continued sanctioning companies for child labor 
infractions with fines without passing cases for criminal 
investigation to the Public Ministry.  By law, individuals 
who violate child labor laws in traditional work sectors may 
receive prison sentences of three to five years with a fine. 
It was also a common practice to give violators a 
probationary period to correct the violation in lieu of a 
fine. 
 
¶13. Did the experience regarding questions 7 through 10 above 
reflect a commitment to combat exploitive child labor? 
 
--Based on the 2008 INE household survey, there were 144,412 
working children between the ages of 5-14, of which 29,219 
worked in urban areas and 115,194 worked in rural areas.  The 
2009 INE household survey showed an increase of approximately 
25,634 children aged 5-14 working in Honduras.  The majority 
of children in this age group continued to work in rural 
areas, where formal MOL inspections are typically carried 
out.  However, the National Plan of Action for the Prevention 
and Eradication of Child Labor addresses this population and 
according to the ILO, institutions within the Honduran 
government continued working to meet benchmarks outlined in 
the plan. 
 
--Honduras faced a serious political crisis in 2009 with the 
June coup and a subsequent decrease in the general protection 
of the rights of vulnerable communities.  This undoubtedly 
impacted working youth.  However, it appears that the 
institutions in Honduras maintained a commitment to combat 
exploitive child labor with the continuance of labor 
inspections and the continued existence of a national 
commission and plan to address the problem.  As with many 
challenges in Honduras, the various Honduran institutions 
that comprise the commission struggled with resource 
limitations in achieving their goals to address child labor. 
 
¶14. Did the government offer any training for investigators 
or others responsible for enforcement? If so, what (if any) 
impact have these trainings had? 
 
--Training was offered by MOL for inspectors prior to the 
June coup; however, many of these activities were suspended 
due to funding terminations by international donors after the 
June coup.  ILO supported six workshops between January-June 
2009 for IHNFA staff that offer care to child labor victims 
as well as 17 educational workshops on child labor, 
especially sexual exploitation, for university students, 
government employees, police, and journalists.  No 
information was available on training offered after the June 
coup. 
 
 
2C, Section II: Forced Child Labor 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶1. What agency or agencies was/were responsible for the 
enforcement of laws relating to hazardous child/forced child 
labor? 
 
--Please see section 2 C, Section I, question 1.  The same 
Honduran institutions are responsible for forced child labor 
as are responsible for hazardous child labor. 
 
¶2. If multiple agencies were responsible for enforcement, 
were there mechanisms for exchanging information? Assess 
their effectiveness. 
 
--Please see section 2 C, Section I, question 2.  The same 
Honduran institutions are responsible for forced child labor 
as are responsible for hazardous child labor and their 
effectiveness in exchanging information on forced child labor 
was the same for other child labor issues. 
 
¶3. Did the country/territory maintain a mechanism for making 
 
TEGUCIGALP 00000117  006 OF 011 
 
 
complaints about hazardous and forced child labor violations? 
 If so, how many complaints were received in the reporting 
period? 
 
--Please see section 2 C, Section I, question 3.  The same 
complaint mechanism is in place for institutions that are 
responsible for forced child labor as are responsible for 
forced child labor as for other child labor issues. 
 
¶4. What amount of funding was provided to agencies 
responsible for inspections?  Was this amount adequate?  Did 
inspectors have sufficient office facilities, transportation, 
fuel, and other necessities to carry out inspections? 
 
--Please see section 2 C, Section I, question 4. The same 
Honduran institutions are responsible for forced child labor 
as are responsible for hazardous child labor. 
 
¶5. How many inspectors did the government employ?  Was the 
number of inspectors adequate? 
 
--Please see section 2 C, Section I, question 5. The same 
inspectors are responsible for forced child labor as are 
responsible for hazardous child labor. 
 
¶6. How many inspections involving child labor were carried 
out? If possible, please provide breakdown of 
complaint-driven versus random, government-initiated 
inspections. Were inspections carried out in sectors in which 
children work? Was the number of inspections adequate? 
 
--Please see section 2 C, Section I, question 6. There were 
no known inspections in the formal work sector of alleged 
forced child labor. 
 
¶7. How many children were removed/assisted as a result of 
inspections?  Were these children actually provided or 
referred for services as a result (as opposed to simply 
fired)? 
 
--Please see section 2 C, Section I, question 7. There were 
no known inspections in the formal work sector of alleged 
forced child labor. 
 
¶8. How many child labor cases or "prosecutions" were opened? 
 
--The only known reports of forced child labor were those 
cases that involved minors trafficked for sexual 
exploitation.  The office of the OSPC had 83 pending 
investigations at the end of 2009 into allegations of 
trafficking and sexual exploitation of children.  The total 
number of new cases opened in 2009 was not known. 
 
¶9. How many child labor cases were closed or resolved? 
 
--According to the office of the OSPC, 10 cases of child 
trafficking or sexual exploitation were closed in 2009. 
 
¶10. How many violations were found or "convictions" reached? 
 
--According to the OSPC, 9 convictions were handed down in 
cases for the crime of trafficking or commerical sexual 
exploitation. 
 
¶11. What is the average length of time it took to resolve 
child labor cases? 
 
--The OSPC reported that the length of time to resolve a 
child trafficking case was between one and two years. 
 
¶12. In cases in which violations were found, were penalties 
actually applied, either through fines paid or jail sentence 
served? Did such sentences meet penalties established in the 
law? 
 
--In the cases in which violations were found, penalties were 
applied, including fines and jail sentences. 
 
¶13. Did the experience regarding questions 7 through 10 above 
reflect a commitment to combat exploitive child labor? 
 
--The Public Ministry continued to investigate and prosecute 
the only known reported forced child labor, that of 
trafficking children for sexual exploitation.  Through the 
efforts of the Public Ministry and the National Plan Against 
 
TEGUCIGALP 00000117  007 OF 011 
 
 
the Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Minors, there was a 
commitment by authorities to combat forced child labor in 
Honduras.  The number of cases brought to trial in 2009 was 
consistent with the number processed in 2008 (ref D). 
 
¶14. Did government offer any training for investigators or 
others responsible for enforcement? If so, what (if any) 
impact have these trainings had? 
 
--Please see section 2 C, Section I, question 14.  The topic 
of forced child labor was covered in many of the trainings 
offered to labor inspectors and others that are responsible 
for enforcement. 
 
2D, Section I, II, and III: Child trafficking/Commercial 
Sexual Exploitation of Children/ Use of Children in Illicit 
Activities 
--------------------------------- 
 
Note: the same institutions, investigators, and prosecutors 
are assigned to cover child trafficking, commercial sexual 
exploitation of children, and the use of children in illicit 
activities.  Responses to questions 1-14 have been combined 
for Sections I, II, and III of 2D.  End note. 
 
¶1. Did the country/territory have agencies or personnel 
dedicated to enforcement of child trafficking/CSEC/use of 
children in illicit activities? 
 
--The OSPC within the Public Ministry employed one 
prosecutor, one assistant prosecutor, and four analysts 
committed solely to the commercial sexual exploitation and 
trafficking of minors.  In approximately July 2009, the 
Attorney General approved the consolidation of all 
trafficking (children and adults) investigations under the 
authority of the newly named "Unit to Combat Commercial 
Sexual Exploitation and Trafficking" located within the OSPC. 
 The OSPC reported that an increase in staff could result in 
speedier processing of child trafficking and CSEC cases. 
 
--Honduras enacted in May 2008 a National Plan of Action to 
Eradicate Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children.  The 
plan is meant to coordinate the efforts of various government 
agencies.  According to the OSPC, the technical council of 
the Inter-Institutional Commission to Combat Commercial 
Sexual Exploitation and Trafficking of Children, the entity 
that oversees the national plan to combat CSES, met during 
¶2009.  The most recent meeting of the commission was held in 
January 2010. 
 
--The OSPC relied on national police to investigate 
trafficking/CSEC/cases of children in illicit activities. 
The OSPC reported that at times, there was difficulty in 
obtaining an adequate amount of investigate support given 
that the police investigators did not report directly to the 
Public Ministry.  OSPC told Poloff on January 19 that they 
continued to support the creation of a proposed investigative 
arm for the sole use of the Public Ministry. 
 
¶2. How much funding was provided to agencies responsible for 
investigating child trafficking/CSEC/use of children in 
illicit activities? Was this amount adequate? Did 
investigators have sufficient office facilities, 
transportation, fuel, and other necessities to carry out 
investigations? 
 
--There was no information available on the level of funding 
provided in this area.  UNICEF assisted the OSPC by financing 
four temporary lawyers to document and process cases 
involving CSEC and trafficking.  The OSPC reported in a 
January 2010 report that this assistance was a "significant 
advance" in their fight against CSEC and trafficking. 
 
¶3. Did the country/territory maintain a hotline or other 
mechanism for reporting child trafficking/CSEC/use of 
children in illicit activities violations?  If so, how many 
complaints were received in the reporting period? 
 
--The national commission to eradicate CSEC worked in 2009 
toward the creation of a national toll free telephone hotline 
to report child trafficking, CSEC, and the use of children in 
illicit activities.  The hotline, which will be staffed by 
police officers, was set to be launched in early 2010. 
 
--In 2009, ILO launched an initiative with six of the primary 
 
TEGUCIGALP 00000117  008 OF 011 
 
 
unions in Honduras in which the regional offices of those 
unions create a network to advocate for the eradication of 
commercial sexual exploitation of children as well as provide 
a location to facilitate the filing of violations with the 
OSPC.  The program is called the Worker's Commissioner for 
the Prevention and Eradication of Child Labor and Commercial 
Sexual Exploitation.  The program included the following 
unions: Unitarian Workers Confederation of Honduras (CUTH), 
General Workers Confederation (CGT), Honduras Worker's 
Confederation (CTH), Union Coordinator of Banana and 
Agro-Industrial Workers (COSIBAH), Council of Farmers' 
Organizations (COCOCH), and National Council of Farmers (CNC). 
 
¶4. How many investigations were opened in regard to child 
trafficking/CSEC/use of children in illicit activities? Was 
the number of investigations adequate? 
 
--In March, IHNFA reported to "La Tribuna" newspaper that 
they estimated 12,000 minors are victims of commercial sexual 
exploitation in Honduras. In September, Casa Alianza Director 
Manuel Capellin reported to local press that they estimated 
at least 10,000 minors are victims of commercial sexual 
exploitation. 
 
--The OSPC reported that during 2009, their office received 
53 complaints of trafficking or CSEC.  There was no 
information available on the breakdown between trafficking 
and CSEC. 
 
¶5. How many children were rescued as a result? 
 
--ILO reported that Casa Alianza, in coordination with IHNFA, 
removed and assisted 168 children from situations of 
trafficking and CSEC. 
 
¶6. How many arrests were made or other kinds of prosecutions 
carried out? 
 
--According to the OSPC, 26 cases went to trial for CSEC or 
trafficking during 2009. 
 
¶7. How many cases were closed or resolved? 
 
-The OSPC reported that 10 cases were closed.  3 cases were 
for charges of CSEC, 3 cases were for charges of trafficking 
of minors, and four cases were for related charges such as 
child pornography. 
 
¶8. How many convictions? 
 
--The OSPC reported that of the 10 cases closed, 8 resulted 
in convictions. 
 
¶9. Did sentences imposed meet standards established in the 
legal framework? 
 
--Yes.  The sentences imposed ranged from 3-18 years in 
prison. 
 
¶10. Were sentences imposed actually served? 
 
--There was no information available that suggested the 
sentences imposed were not served. 
 
¶11. What is the average length of time it takes to resolve 
cases of child trafficking/CSEC/use of children in illicit 
activities? 
 
--As with other child labor cases, the OSPC estimated that 
cases take between 1 and 2 years to reach a conclusion. 
 
¶12. Did the government offer any training for investigators 
or others responsible for enforcement of child 
trafficking/CSEC/use of children in illicit activities? If 
so, what was the impact (if any) of these trainings? 
 
--On March 5, INHFA held a training for members of the Public 
Prosecutor's office, police officials, and members of various 
NGOs to discuss a new manual that outlines proper attention 
to trafficking victims of commercial sexual exploitation. 
The OSPC reported that with the support of UNICEF, their 
office held 8 trainings for those involved in enforcing laws 
against CSEC and civil society representatives.  The OSPC 
reported holding 217 "collateral activities" dealing with 
CSEC and trafficking of children.  These activities included 
 
TEGUCIGALP 00000117  009 OF 011 
 
 
inter-institutional meetings and trainings, speakers hosted 
by educational centers and civil society groups and other 
activities to promote the rights of children.  In addition, 
the Special Prosecutor for Children, Nora Urbina, attended 
various international trainings on the topic of trafficking 
and CSEC during 2009. 
 
¶13. If the country/territory experienced armed conflict 
during the reporting period or in the recent past involving 
the use of child soldiers, what actions were taken to 
penalize those responsible? Were these actions adequate or 
meaningful given the situation? 
 
--This question is not applicable to Honduras. 
 
2E: GOVERNMENT POLICIES ON CHILD LABOR: 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶1. Did the government have a policy or plan that specifically 
addresses exploitive child labor? Please describe. 
 
--Please see 2 C, Section I, questions 1 and 2.  Exploitive 
child labor policies are covered by the same institutions and 
policies that combat child labor in all its forms, 
trafficking, and CSEC. 
 
¶2. Did the country/territory incorporate exploitive child 
labor specifically as an issue to be addressed in poverty 
reduction, development, educational or other social policies, 
such as Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, etc? Please 
describe. 
 
--The national plan to eradicate child labor charges various 
ministries of the government, for example IHNFA, to 
incorporate child labor issues in the various social policies 
administered by the government.  However, the 28-year "Vision 
of the Country" strategy document approved by the National 
Congress on January 13, 2010 does not include reference to 
child labor, trafficking, or CSEC.  The most recent poverty 
reduction strategy paper remained in draft form at the end of 
2009, but included sections on child labor. 
 
¶3. Did the government provide funding to the plans described 
above? Please describe the amount and whether it was 
sufficient to carry out the planned activities. 
 
--The administration of President Jose Manuel "Mel" Zelaya, 
who was removed from power by the June 28 coup d'etat, never 
submitted a 2009 budget.  The de facto regime that took power 
after the coup hastily put together a budget based on the 
2008 budget (ref A).  The NPECL proposed funding in 2009 of 
15,667,442 Lempiras (approximately USD 824,602) for various 
government ministries to carry out specific activities to 
combat child labor.  The budget passed by the de facto regime 
after the June 2009 coup did not contain a line item 
specifically funding the NPECL.  The institutions that carry 
out the NPECL were funded in the July 2009 budget; however, 
the individual budgets of these institutions were not 
available. 
 
¶4. Did the government provide non-monetary support to child 
labor plans?  Please describe. 
 
--The government before the June coup provided human 
resource, technical expertise, and other non-monetary support 
for child labor plans.  It appeared that the issue of child 
labor remained a concern at the working level following the 
June coup. 
 
¶5. Provide any additional information about the status and 
effectiveness of the government's policies or plans during 
the reporting period in regard to exploitive child labor. 
 
--Please see 2 B, question 2. 
 
¶6. Did the government participate in any commissions or task 
forces regarding exploitive child labor?  Was the commission 
active and/or effective? 
 
--The Congressional Commission of the Family and Child, led 
by Congresswoman Marcia Facusse de Villeda until January 27, 
is charged with legislative proposals dealing with exploitive 
child labor.  Due to the Department's no contact policy after 
the June coup, the activities of this commission were not 
known in 2009, but post understands that Congresswoman 
 
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Facusse was active in the Inter-Institutional Commission to 
Combat Commercial Sexual Exploitation and Trafficking of 
Children. 
 
--Please see above reference to the various commissions that 
the government participated in that deal with child labor. 
Given the political crisis before and following the June 
coup, these commissions were less active in 2009 than in 
previous years. 
 
¶7. Did the government sign a bilateral, regional or 
international agreement to combat trafficking? 
 
--There were no new agreements to combat trafficking in 2009. 
 OSPC reported better cooperation with prosecutors and 
immigration authorities in neighboring countries on cases of 
trans-national trafficking. 
 
2F) SOCIAL PROGRAMS TO ELIMINATE OR PREVENT CHILD LABOR: 
-------------------- 
 
¶1. Did the government implement any programs specifically to 
address the worst forms of child labor? Please describe. 
 
--The approach of the government was to partner with NGOs to 
combat child labor.  For example, on May 18, the Ministries 
of Governance and Security and the Public Ministry signed 
memorandums of understanding with NGO Save the Children to 
work together through workshops and information sharing to 
combat child labor and the trafficking of children.  In 
April, the Health and Education Ministries working with the 
Catholic Church and other NGOs worked to place 40 children in 
school who had previously worked selling tortillas in the 
streets of Juticalpa, Olancho. 
 
--There were no new "social programs" to prevent Child Labor 
in 2009. 
 
¶2. Did the country/territory incorporate child labor 
specifically as an issue to be addressed in poverty 
reduction, development, educational or other social programs, 
such as conditional cash transfer programs or eligibility for 
school meals, etc? Please describe. 
 
--Please see answer to section 2E, question 2. 
 
¶3. Did the government provide funding to the programs 
described above? Please describe amount and whether it was 
sufficient to carry out the planned activities. 
 
--Please see answer to section 2E, question 3. 
 
¶4. Did the government provide non-monetary support to child 
labor programs?  Please describe. 
 
--Please see answer to section 2E, question 4. 
 
¶5. Provide any additional information about the status and 
effectiveness of the government's activities during the 
reporting period in relation to the programs described above. 
If the programs involved government provision of social 
services to children at risk of or involved in exploitive 
child labor, please describe and assess the effectiveness of 
these services. 
 
--Please see answer to section 2E, question 5. 
 
¶6. If the government signed one or more bilateral, regional 
or international agreement/s to combat trafficking, what 
steps did it take to implement such agreement/s? Did the 
agreement/s result in tangible improvements?  If so, please 
describe. 
 
--Please see answer to section 2E, question 7. 
 
2G) CONTINUAL PROGRESS 
---------------------- 
 
¶1. Considering the information provided to the questions 
above, please provide an assessment of whether, overall, the 
government made progress in regard to combating exploitive 
child labor during the reporting period. 
 
--Honduras continued to combat child labor during 2009. 
Information was unavailable about the exact number of 
 
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inspections of child labor violations nation-wide, so it is 
not possible to compare this number to 2008 levels.  In 
comparison to 2008, the MOL appears to have made progress in 
the enforcement of child labor laws based on sanctions they 
applied to six companies for child labor violations.  The MOL 
fell short in not passing the cases to the Public Ministry 
for prosecution, and instead relied on probation periods and 
fines to enforce anti-child labor laws. 
 
--Due to the political crisis, it is difficult to evaluate 
the government's commitment to taking actions outlined in the 
national plan to eradicate child labor. It appears that at a 
working level, NGOs, international organizations, and 
agencies operating under the de facto regime continued to 
follow the national plans to eradicate child labor, CSEC, and 
child trafficking.  However, it does not appear that any 
great strides were made to fully fund the programs in place 
to eradicate child labor in Honduras. 
 
LLORENS