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DE RUEHSI #0176 0411446
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P 101446Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY TBILISI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2839
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L TBILISI 000176 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2020 
TAGS: PREL PGOV RS GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: UPDATE ON KAZBEGI/LARSI CHECKPOINT 
NEGOTIATIONS WITH RUSSIA 
 
REF: TBILISI 2280 
 
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Kent Logsdon for reasons 1.4 (b) 
 and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Georgia's lead negotiator for the talks with 
Russia on opening the Kazbegi/Larsi checkpoint told us that 
Georgia is waiting for Russia to respond to the most recent 
Georgia proposal that would open the border point between 
Russia and Georgia in early March.  The agreement would allow 
Georgian citizens to cross; however, they would need Russian 
visas which remain extremely difficult to obtain.  MFA 
officials speculated that Russia was generally surprised 
about the concessions made by the Georgian side, and were 
uncertain as to what to do.  While skeptical an agreement 
will be reached soon, the negotiator cited the massive 
investment by Russia on their border facility as a potential 
impetus that could contribute to an agreement.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (C) Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Deputy Director 
for European Affairs Kakha Chitaia provided Poloff with an 
assessment of the current situation in Georgian/Russian 
negotiations on reopening the Kazbegi/Larsi checkpoint. 
Chitaia, who leads the Georgian negotiating team on this 
issue, noted in particular that the tentative agreement 
currently being reviewed in Moscow would allow for limited 
crossing by Georgian citizens.  Chitaia, however, stressed 
that while this might sound like a significant breakthrough 
on paper, this was more perception than reality, as Georgians 
would still need valid Russian visas which were currently 
unobtainable for all but those with Russian families or 
medical emergencies.  Georgia's main goal was to facilitate 
the crossing of Georgian citizens who live in the immediate 
area, but it remains to be seen if the final version of any 
agreement will continue to include this stipulation. 
 
¶3.  (C) Chitaia stressed that the ball was in the Russians' 
court, as the Georgians had sent their comments on a draft 
agreement (based on an earlier 1993 agreement) in early 
January, but had not yet heard back.  Chitaia noted that he 
did not expect a quick response, but he was growing 
increasingly worried in light of the plan to open the 
crossing at the beginning of March, and wondered if the 
Russians actually were surprised at the number of concessions 
the Georgians had made, and did not know what to do.  Chitaia 
stated his personal opinion that he would in no way be 
surprised if nothing happened in the near term, and seemed 
generally pessimistic about the situation. 
 
¶4.  (C) Taking his pessimism into account, he sought to 
balance this by describing his impressions of the Russian 
facility at the checkpoint.  Chitaia stressed that of all the 
Russian border crossings he had seen, including in 
Kaliningrad, there was nothing like the extensive 
construction that had taken place at Kazbegi/Larsi.  He 
estimated that the Russians must have spent upwards of USD 35 
million on the facilities, and this gave him hope that 
eventually the Russians would want it to be used.  (Embassy 
note:  The new Georgian border crossing facility was 
completed at Kazbegi was completed with USG assistance and 
formally handed over to the Georgian Government in August 
¶2009.  End note.) 
BASS