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RR RUEHAST RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHLH RUEHLN RUEHPOD RUEHPW RUEHSK
RUEHSL RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHNT #0059/01 0331135
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 021135Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY TASHKENT
TO RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHINGTON DC
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1827
INFO ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
CIS COLLECTIVE
NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0086
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 08 TASHKENT 000059 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
DOL/ILAB FOR LEYLA STROTKAMP, RACHEL RIGBY AND TINA MCCARTER 
DRL/ILCSR FOR SARAH MORGAN 
G/TIP FOR LUIS CDEBACA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PHUM ELAB PGOV UZ
SUBJECT: Uzbekistan: Response to DOL Request for Information on Child 
Labor and Forced Labor 
 
REF: 09 STATE 131997; 2009 TASHKENT 73 
 
¶1.       (U) Per Ref A request, post provides the following update 
on child labor and forced labor in Uzbekistan. 
 
 
 
TASKING 1/TVPRA 
 
------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶2.       (U) Per instructions that post should only report on the 
use of child labor and forced labor during the production of goods 
not already on the current TVPRA list, post will not address the 
use of such labor in the cotton industry under Tasking 1/TVPRA. 
 
 
 
¶3.       (U) Post reached out to a range of nongovernmental 
organizations and human rights activists, and our contacts reported 
no instances of allegations of child labor or forced labor in the 
production of goods other than cotton in Uzbekistan. 
 
 
 
¶4.       (U) There has been some discussion in the past of children 
raising silk worms as a form of child labor.  It is not uncommon 
for children to be assigned such projects, however, it tends to be 
akin to a school project, involving a child receiving a silk worm 
and a mulberry branch from school and keeping them in a dark, dry 
place until they are ready to be turned back in to the school. 
Post does not believe such practice should be considered exploitive 
child labor. 
 
 
 
TASKING 2/TDA 
 
---------------------- 
 
2A. Prevalence and Sectoral Distribution of Exploitive Child Labor 
 
 
 
¶5.       (U) Outside of the cotton sector, post has received no 
reports that suggest that children are engaged in work meeting the 
definition of exploitive child labor. Children are frequently seen 
doing light work in the markets, usually to assist family members 
in selling various goods.  Children often assist in family 
businesses, as well.  Neither of these activities rises to the 
level of exploitive child labor. 
 
 
 
¶6.       (U) Post has received widespread reports of children 
picking cotton during the fall cotton harvest, which can be 
considered both hazardous child labor (as acknowledged in Uzbek 
regulations) and forced child labor (because children are sent from 
school to work in the fields).  Post has received more limited 
reports of children planting cotton during the spring cotton 
planting season, which would also be considered forced labor when 
children are taken from schools, but not enough information about 
the practice is known to determine whether it qualifies as 
hazardous child labor. 
 
 
 
2B. Laws and Regulations 
 
 
 
¶7.       (U) On June 26, the Ministry of Labor released a list of 
 
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activities involving unfavorable work conditions, in which children 
under the age of 18 cannot be involved.  Cotton picking was 
included on that list.  Despite widespread observations of forced 
child labor in the cotton harvest, however, no violations of this 
regulation were reported. 
 
 
 
¶8.        (U) On December 21, President Karimov signed a package of 
amendments to the administrative code strengthening the penalties 
for using child labor.  Existing administrative law stated that 
public officials could be fined two to five times the minimum wage 
(50-124 USD) for violations of labor legislation, but the new 
amendments increase the penalty to five to ten times the minimum 
wage (124-377 USD) if the victim of such violations is a minor. 
The amendments also address the actions of ordinary citizens (as 
opposed to public officials), imposing a fine of one to three times 
the minimum wage (24-66 USD) on any individual using child labor. 
 
 
 
¶9.       (U) On December 24, Karimov signed changes and amendments 
to the labor code and to the law on "the guarantees of the rights 
of the child."  The existing law set the minimum age for employment 
at 16, but allowed 15 year olds to work with the written permission 
of a parent and allowed 14 year olds to be involved in "light work" 
that did not interfere with education and did not hinder the health 
or development of the child.  The new law still sets the minimum 
age at 16 and allows 15 year olds to do light work with the 
permission of a parent, but it does away with the provision 
allowing 14 year olds to do light work. 
 
 
 
¶10.   (U) These amendments were designed to address Uzbekistan's 
obligations under ILO Convention 138, On Minimum Age of Employment, 
and 182, On Prohibition and Immediate Action on the Elimination of 
the Worst Forms of Child Labor, both of which were ratified in 
March 2008.  The measures make it clear that public officials 
(including local hokims and even school administrators) and private 
individuals (including farmers and even parents), can be fined for 
using children in the cotton harvest.  While the fines may seem 
minimal, particularly those contemplated for ordinary citizens 
(24-66 USD), relative to average monthly wages of 200 USD or even 
less in rural areas, such fines could be significant. 
 
 
 
¶11.   (U) The legal and regulatory framework in 2009 seemed to be 
adequate to address child labor in the formal sector, as there are 
no reports of exploitive child labor in any industry other than 
cotton.  The framework was not effective in addressing exploitive 
child labor in the cotton sector, however, as there were widespread 
reports of children being used in the cotton harvest in nearly 
every region of the country.  While it remains to be seen how 
vigorously the new measures will be enforced during the 2010 cotton 
harvest, the measures themselves represent significant improvements 
to legal and regulatory framework. 
 
 
 
2C. Institutions and Mechanisms for Enforcement - hazardous child 
labor and forced child labor. 
 
2C, Section I: Hazardous child labor 
 
 
 
¶12.   (U) The Prosecutor General's Office and the Ministry of Labor 
and Social Protection (MOL) are responsible for enforcement of laws 
relating to hazardous child labor. 
 
 
 
¶13.    (U) MOL inspectors visit various business enterprises 
 
TASHKENT 00000059  003 OF 008 
 
 
throughout the year to ensure compliance with labor laws and 
regulations.  If they observe a violation of labor regulations, 
they generally give an employer a chance to rectify the problem. 
For a violation of law, they refer the case to the local 
prosecutor's office.  It's not clear that this procedure has ever 
been used with regard to hazardous child labor, however, because 
child labor is not considered a problem in the formal sector. 
Labor inspectors are not known to inspect the agricultural sector. 
 
 
 
 
¶14.   (U) Complaints regarding child labor theoretically can be 
lodged at a local prosecutor's office, although there have been no 
reports that this is done in practice.  While the MOL informed 
UNICEF representatives last summer that it was setting up hotlines 
to receive reports of child labor, there has been no evidence that 
such hotlines are, in fact, in place.  (Note:  Hotlines are in 
place to report trafficking in persons, and are widely used.) 
 
 
 
¶15.   (U) The GOU does not set aside specific funding for 
inspections specifically related to child labor, and the MOL's 
budget for general labor inspections is not public information. 
MOL inspectors, while theoretically able to report violations of 
child labor laws, have not served such a function in the past. 
(Note:  Unemployment in Uzbekistan is high, and jobs are hard to 
come by even for adult workers in the formal sector.  Thus, there 
is generally no demand for child labor.)  As mentioned, MOL does 
not inspect the agricultural sector, where most violations of child 
labor laws are occurring.  For labor inspectors to cover local 
farms would likely require significantly more funding. 
 
 
 
¶16.   (U) According to 2005 figures, the MOL employed 850 labor 
inspectors across the country.  No figures have been published 
since that time.   It is not known whether the number was 
sufficient to adequately monitor the formal sector. 
 
 
 
¶17.   (U) There were no reports of inspections involving hazardous 
child labor in 2009.  Thus, post has no figures regarding the 
number of children being removed/assisted as a result of labor 
inspections, the number of cases being opened or closed, the number 
of convictions, the average length of time it takes to resolve a 
case, or the penalties applied in such cases.  The fact that there 
were no reported cases in the formal sector could just mean that 
hazardous child labor is not a problem there.  But the fact that we 
know hazardous child labor is taking place in the cotton fields and 
there are no reported cases suggests that there is a lack of 
commitment to combat exploitive child labor in the informal sector. 
 
 
 
 
¶18.   (U) With support from UNICEF, the MOL trained about 200 labor 
inspectors in August 2009, and child labor was one of the subjects 
discussed (though not in the context of the cotton harvest).  Since 
the labor inspectors do not actually monitor the fields, it is 
doubtful that the training had an impact on child labor in the 
agricultural sector. 
 
 
 
2C, Section II: Forced Child Labor 
 
 
 
¶19.   (U) This section generally repeats that above.  The 
Prosecutor General's Office and the Ministry of Labor and Social 
Protection (MOL) are responsible for enforcement of laws relating 
to forced child labor. 
 
TASHKENT 00000059  004 OF 008 
 
 
¶20.   (U) As above, theoretically an MOL inspector can report an 
incident of forced child labor to the prosecutor's office for 
investigation and prosecution, but in practice, this does not 
occur. 
 
 
 
¶21.   (U) As above, complaints regarding child labor theoretically 
can be lodged at a local prosecutor's office, although there have 
been no reports that this is done in practice.  Although the MOL 
informed UNICEF representatives last summer that it was setting up 
hotlines to receive reports of child labor, there has been no 
evidence that such hotlines are, in fact, in place. 
 
 
 
¶22.   (U) As noted, the GOU does not set aside specific funding for 
the inspections specifically related to child labor, and the MOL's 
budget for general labor inspections is not public information. 
MOL inspectors, while theoretically able to report violations of 
child labor laws, have not served such a function in the past. 
 
 
 
¶23.   (U) According to 2005 figures, the MOL employed 850 labor 
inspectors across the country.  No figures have been published 
since that time.   Inspectors did not inspect farms. 
 
 
 
¶24.   (U) There were no reports of inspections involving forced 
child labor in 2009.  Thus, post has no figures regarding the 
number of children being removed/assisted as a result of labor 
inspections, the number of cases being opened or closed, the number 
of convictions, the average length of time it takes to resolve a 
case, or the penalties applied in such cases.  The fact that there 
were no reported cases in the formal sector could just mean that 
forced child labor is not a problem there.  But the fact that we 
know forced child labor is taking place in the cotton fields and 
there are no reported cases suggests that there is a lack of 
commitment to combat exploitive child labor in the informal sector. 
 
 
 
 
¶25.   (U) As mentioned, the MOL conducted UNICEF-supported training 
sessions for about 200 labor inspectors in August 2009, and child 
labor was discussed, though not in the context of the cotton 
industry.  It is doubtful whether the training had an impact on 
child labor in the agricultural sector. 
 
 
 
2D.  Institutional Mechanisms for Effective Enforcement - Child 
Trafficking 
 
2D, Section I: Child Trafficking 
 
 
 
¶26.   (U) Government offices with responsibility for fighting human 
trafficking include the Ministry of Interior Affair's Office for 
Combating Trafficking; the National Security Service's Office for 
Fighting Organized Crime, Terrorism, and Drugs; the Office of the 
Prosecutor General; the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection; 
the Consular Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the 
Women's Committee.  A government interagency Commission on 
Combating Trafficking in Persons meets quarterly and consists of 
representatives from the government entities listed above.  The 
government does not address child trafficking issues as a subset of 
more general trafficking.  Thus, there are no figures for the 
number of investigators/social workers, or dedicated police 
 
TASHKENT 00000059  005 OF 008 
 
 
officers specifically employed to fight child trafficking.  The 
government does aggressively enforce trafficking-in-person laws, 
however.  It is unknown whether the current number of 
investigators, social workers, or dedicated police officers 
employed to fight child trafficking is sufficient to adequately 
investigate trafficking allegations. 
 
 
 
¶27.   (U) The government does not keep track of funding related to 
child trafficking as distinct from human trafficking.  The 
government does not give statistics on funding provided to agencies 
responsible for investigating laws related to child trafficking. 
Post has not received reports regarding whether investigators had 
adequate resources to carry out investigations.  However, reports 
of law enforcement breaking up trafficking rings and arresting 
human traffickers are in the press on a weekly, if not daily basis. 
The cases being reported in the press demonstrate that much 
attention is being paid to this issue, and that authorities are 
aggressively pursuing violators of trafficking laws, regardless of 
the age of the victims. 
 
 
 
¶28.   (U) The government runs hotlines around the country for 
people to call in and report all forms of human trafficking, but 
these are not used for reports of forced child labor.  An anti-TIP 
NGO also runs such hotlines. 
 
 
 
¶29.   (U) The government does not release data on child trafficking 
as a subset of human trafficking, so no information is available 
regarding the number of investigations opened and whether this 
number was adequate. 
 
 
 
¶30.   (U) The government does not track how many children are 
rescued as a result of child trafficking investigations. 
Therefore, the number of arrests in child trafficking cases, the 
number of cases closed or resolved, the number of convictions, and 
the details regarding sentencing and the length of time of 
investigations are not known. 
 
 
 
¶31.   (U) The country did not experience armed conflict during the 
reporting period or in the recent past involving the use of child 
soldiers. 
 
 
 
2D, Section II and III: Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children 
(CSEC) and Use of Children in Illicit Activities 
 
 
 
¶32.   (U) Facts and figures on the laws relating to CSEC and the 
Children in Illicit Activities were not available.  However, crimes 
against children are not tolerated by Uzbek society, and by 
extension, by Uzbek law enforcement agencies.  The Ministry of 
Internal Affairs has a special juvenile victims department under 
its crime prevention section, and the criminal investigation 
department investigates all crimes against children.  Prosecutors 
move quickly in such cases, and perpetrators generally face harsh 
penalties. 
 
 
 
2E, Government Polices on Child Labor 
 
 
 
¶33.   (U) In September 2008, the government adopted a National 
 
TASHKENT 00000059  006 OF 008 
 
 
Action Plan on Implementation of ILO Conventions 138 and 182 
("NAP"), which serves as its framework for addressing child labor. 
The NAP is extensive, involving 21 different agencies, to be led by 
the First Deputy Prime Minister.  It has three main sections: 
strengthening the anti-child labor legislative framework; enhancing 
the monitoring mechanisms of child labor; and engaging in awareness 
raising campaign on the worst forms of child labor.  The NAP also 
includes mechanisms for implementation of the ILO conventions, 
deadlines for performance, and the ministries responsible for each 
activity.  Articles 11 and 12 in the Plan expressly prohibit forced 
labor by schoolchildren and call for mechanisms to ensure school 
attendance.  Other articles of the Plan also refer to data 
gathering, accounting, inspection, permanent monitoring to ensure 
national compliance of the ILO conventions, and participation by 
Uzbek officials in international discussions on child labor. 
 
 
 
¶34.   (U) The government also addressed child labor in ways not 
related to the NAP.  In the fall, the Ministry of Education (MOE) 
sent letters to school directors throughout the country, asking 
them to certify that they would not send students to participate in 
the cotton harvest.  The MOE also sent letters to local hokims 
(mayors and governors) asking them not to close schools during the 
cotton harvest.  The government entered into an agreement with the 
World Bank this year, under which the World Bank will provide 
low-interest financing for farmers on the condition that they 
certify that they will not use child labor on their land.  Under 
this agreement, the World Bank should be able to inspect the land 
of those farmers who receive the financing to ensure that their 
commitments are being met. 
 
 
 
¶35.   (U) On October 9, MFA officials informed post that 150 local 
administrators were reprimanded for allowing the use of child labor 
in the 2008 harvest.  Trade Minister Elyor Ganiev stated publicly 
that a few local hokims were replaced following last year's harvest 
because they allowed the use of child labor in their districts. 
These actions were not widely publicized. 
 
 
 
¶36.   (U) The government did not announce whether any funding was 
specifically set aside for implementation of the NAP. 
 
 
 
¶37.   (U) The government did not announce whether it provided 
non-monetary support to child labor plans. 
 
 
 
¶38.   (U) With the exception of the passage of some amendments to 
the law on child labor in December 2009, the goals of the NAP were 
not substantially advanced in 2009.  The Plan itself has strong 
potential.  It needs stronger leadership, however, either by way of 
an interagency planning committee or through the Deputy Prime 
Minister's Office to coordinate activities and see that the 
deadlines set in the Plan are met.  A presidential statement 
encouraging implementation of the NAP would also go a long way 
toward implementation. 
 
 
 
¶39.   (U) The MOE's actions and the administrative measures taken 
against officials following the 2008 cotton harvest appear to have 
had some positive effect.  One influential hokim in the Ferghana 
Valley made headlines by forbidding any of the schools in his 
region from closing in order to send children to the fields.  Most 
reports this year suggested that fewer classes at the earlier grade 
levels were closed.  Thus, the majority of students involved in 
forced child labor were in the upper (9-12) grades.  This is the 
second year in a row where such a trend has been noticed. 
 
TASHKENT 00000059  007 OF 008 
 
 
¶40.   (U) The government did not establish internal commissions or 
task forces designed to address child labor. 
 
 
 
¶41.   (U) The government did not sign a bilateral, regional, or 
international agreement to combat trafficking in 2009.  It did 
however, improve its international cooperation in the field of 
human trafficking.  In coordination with the UNODC and OSCE, it 
sent officials on "study trips" to France, Italy, the UAE, and 
Moldova.  Officials also reported good working relationships with 
counterparts in Russia, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan, as well as with 
law enforcement in the UAE, and a growing capacity for cooperation 
with India. 
 
 
 
2F, Social Programs to Eliminate or Prevent Child Labor 
 
 
 
¶42.   (U) In January 2009, the government entered into an Annual 
Work Plan with UNICEF to address child labor.  The Work Plan 
addressed several goals, including monitoring implementation of the 
NAP, raising awareness of national international legislation on 
child labor; conducting training programs for labor inspectors, 
local administrators, teachers, farmers, and other relevant 
parties; and developing community-based prevention programs.  The 
government also allowed UNICEF to do limited monitoring of child 
labor during the fall cotton harvest.  In February, an MOE official 
shared with post pamphlets the Ministry had produced on the worst 
forms of child labor, and cotton picking was clearly listed as a 
hazardous form of labor in which children under the age of 18 
should not participate.  At that time, the official stated that the 
plan was to distribute the pamphlet to all school children in 
Uzbekistan.  There have been no reports on whether they actually 
were distributed. 
 
 
 
¶43.    (U) The government did not announce funding levels to the 
programs described above. 
 
 
 
¶44.   (U) The government provided some non-monetary support to 
UNICEF to support its implementation of the Annual Work Plan. 
According to the Plan, UNICEF completed an awareness-raising 
campaign, holding meetings on child labor with parents and school 
administrators in all provinces of the country.  UNICEF also 
supported the training of the 200 labor inspectors under this Plan. 
 
 
 
 
¶45.   (SBU) UNICEF reported that implementation of the Annual Work 
Plan has had its ups and downs.  In many ways it has not been as 
successful as they had hoped it would be.  The training of labor 
inspectors, in particular, was envisioned to be about inspection of 
the cotton fields in order to report child labor.  In effect, 
however, there was only one session on child labor, and it did not 
touch on the cotton harvest.  The awareness-raising campaign was a 
bright spot, however, and was deemed to be very effective. 
 
 
 
2G, CONTINUAL PROGRESS 
 
 
 
¶46.   (SBU) The government made limited progress in regard to 
combating exploitive child labor during the reporting period. 
There was no known increase in inspections/investigations, 
 
TASHKENT 00000059  008 OF 008 
 
 
prosecutions, or convictions of people involved in child labor; and 
funding levels for child labor elimination policies have never been 
released.  The child labor problem in Uzbekistan has deep roots 
into the agricultural system, however, and local administrators 
face intense pressure to meet local cotton quotas.  They often 
perceive that they have little choice but to employ child labor. 
Thus, reducing the use of forced child labor will likely require a 
strong and consistent message to administrators that closing the 
schools and sending the children to the fields will not be 
tolerated.  That message seemed to be seeping in to the system this 
year, with the 150 reprimands and the replacing of some hokims, but 
to a rather limited effect.  The legislative changes at the end of 
the year, however, hold some promise for the year to come.  The 
legislation was almost certainly initiated by the executive branch, 
and President Karimov's signature on the amendments was widely 
publicized.  These changes lay the groundwork for investigations 
and prosecutions in the 2010 harvest, and Karimov's endorsement of 
the amendments shows a heretofore absent commitment to addressing 
the problem.  If investigations and prosecutions follow in the 2010 
cotton harvest, it will be a major development in Uzbekistan's 
fight against forced child labor. 
NORLAND