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FM AMEMBASSY TASHKENT
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TASHKENT 000101 
 
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/26 
TAGS: PREL PGOV OSCE UZ
SUBJECT: THE OSCE IN UZBEKISTAN: HARD TO TELL WHAT THE FUTURE HOLDS 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Katrisa Peffley, Pol/Econ Officer, DOS, Pol/Econ; 
REASON: 1.4(B), (D) 
 
¶1.       (C)  Summary:  In a meeting with Ambassador Norland on 
February 18, Ambassador Venczel, head of the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) mission in Uzbekistan, 
said that Uzbekistan's "lack of trust" makes it very difficult for 
the OSCE to implement many of its local projects.  Venczel's 
initial meeting with Deputy Foreign Minister Kamilov was "positive" 
but "cautious" and their discussion ranged from the stabilization 
of Afghanistan to the OSCE's mandate in Central Asia.  The OSCE has 
proposed projects corresponding to all three of its 
"dimensions"-politico-military, economic and environmental, and 
human-but has not yet received a positive response from the 
Government of Uzbekistan (GOU).  (On February 25, Venczel told 
PolEcon Chief that the OSCE has received a list of "tendentious" 
GOU questions about its project proposals.)  Some elements within 
the GOU apparently do not want Uzbekistan to improve its relations 
with the international community.  End Summary. 
 
THE FUTURE OF THE OSCE IN UZBEKISTAN 
 
¶2.       (C)  Ambassador Venczel met with Deputy Foreign Minister 
Kamilov shortly after the latter's return from the United States, 
where he served as Ambassador for the past six years.  Venczel 
described Kamilov as generally positive, but detached and 
unemotional.  Although he said that Kamilov was not as critical as 
Foreign Minister Norov generally is, Venczel found it difficult to 
assess Kamilov's intentions in regards to the OSCE.  Kamilov 
described the OSCE (and all other international organizations) as 
overly bureaucratic and "behind the times," and criticized the OSCE 
for developing projects that do not reflect the interests of host 
nations.  (Comment: Kamilov is considered to be fairly progressive 
and pro-Western by Uzbek standards.  He appears to be cautiously 
reengaging in Uzbek politics after his time in Washington, and he 
may be wary of making a false move.  Rumor has it Kamilov could 
replace Foreign Minister Norov in coming months.  End Comment.) 
 
¶3.       (C)  Venczel believes that the GOU does not trust its 
international partners, perhaps because it wants to exercise strict 
control over anything that happens within Uzbek borders.  The OSCE 
continues to have trouble getting GOU approval and support for 
proposed projects; they are still waiting for a GOU response to the 
new project proposals that they submitted in November.  (Note: On 
February 25, Venczel told PolEcon Chief that the GOU finally 
received a diplomatic note responding to the proposals-with a list 
of 17 "tendentious" questions about the proposed projects that 
seemed to foreshadow their eventual rejection.  Although he 
believes that the GOU sent those questions in order to lay the 
groundwork for a negative response, he intends to answer the 
questions as soon as possible.  End Note.)  In addition, the GOU 
frequently tries to change existing projects after the budget is 
already set.  Venczel reminded Kamilov that the OSCE is not 
profiting from any of its joint programs with Uzbekistan; rather, 
the OSCE's programs add value to Uzbekistan.   Venczel told us that 
despite Uzbekistan's gradually improving record of international 
cooperation, he believes there are still elements within the GOU 
that do not want relations with the West to improve. 
 
UZBEKISTAN AND AFGHANISTAN 
 
¶4.       (C)  Venczel commented that Kamilov seemed skeptical about 
the prospects for an OSCE role in Afghanistan; however, Kamilov 
said that the coalition has a better chance of controlling the 
situation in Afghanistan than the Soviets did.  A stable 
Afghanistan is important to Uzbekistan for both economic and 
security reasons.  There is also a large ethnic Uzbek minority in 
Northern Afghanistan, and the GOU may have some contacts within the 
Taliban.  The GOU does not want the Taliban to return to power in 
Afghanistan, but it may be reluctant to get deeply involved in the 
coalition's efforts because it does not trust the coalition to stay 
in Afghanistan until its problems are resolved.  Venczel saw signs 
that Russian agents may also be spreading disinformation about US 
involvement in the region in order to make the GOU nervous.  For 
example, Russians may be spreading rumors that the USG is 
supporting the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, just as it supported 
mujahedeen in Afghanistan during Soviet times. 
 
COMMENT 
 
¶5.       (C)  Comment:  The OSCE's current predicament suggests 
that the USG's improving relationship with the GOU is not 
necessarily part of a broader Uzbek trend towards international 
cooperation.  Some international organizations and European 
embassies are really struggling to make headway with the GOU, 
suggesting that, once again, Uzbekistan is playing a balancing game 
in its foreign policy.  Some elements, particularly within the 
security apparatus, appear bent on finding ways to undermine 
 
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cooperation with the West.  End Comment. 
NORLAND