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INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 9704
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0497
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1031
RUEHCN/AMCONSUL CHENGDU 3251
RUEHGZ/AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU 0418
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 1090
RUEHGH/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 2724
RUEHSH/AMCONSUL SHENYANG 7194
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHHMUNA/USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 000195 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE PLEASE PASS TO PM/RSAT, EAP/TC AND EAP/RSP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/25/2020 
TAGS: MARR PGOV MASS PREL TW CH
SUBJECT: UNITED STATES SECURITY DIALOGUES WITH TAIWAN 
 
REF: STATE 112900 
 
Classified By: AIT Director Bill Stanton for Reasons 1.4 b and d 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  The United States has a range of 
security-related dialogues with Taiwan, including one led by 
State, ten led by DoD, and one led by AIT/Washington.  These 
talks cover a range of security issues and contribute to our 
unofficial bilateral relationship.  There are some modest 
changes we could make to our overall pol/mil dialogue 
structure to make it more effective and efficient, especially 
in light of increased defense exchanges at multiple levels in 
recent years.  End Summary. 
 
State-Led Talks: 
--------------- 
 
U.S.-Taiwan Political-Military Talks 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶2. (C) EAP and PM co-hosted the inaugural session of these 
talks -- the first and only State-led pol/mil dialogue -- 
from September 30 to October 2, 2009 in Washington. 
Interagency delegations from both sides participated.  At 
United States request, a MOFA Director General (equivalent to 
an A/S) led Taiwan's delegation.  The Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (MOFA) has proposed that we hold these talks annually 
in Washington, with the parameters set by agreement between 
State and MOFA (through AIT, which coordinates our unofficial 
relations).  MOFA hopes a Vice Foreign Minister can lead 
future Taiwan delegations and has no protocol concerns that 
U.S. participation will be at no higher a level than a State 
PDAS. 
 
¶3. (C) Because of policy restrictions on visits to Taiwan by 
policy-level USG officials (DAS and above) at State and 
Defense, our talks in Washington offer a rare opportunity for 
dialogue on political-military issues where full attention is 
given to the political side of the equation.  They also have 
the potential to foster genuine interagency dialogue among 
various Taiwan agencies and ministries.  Recent events (e.g., 
Typhoon Morakot) have illustrated serious shortcomings in 
communication and coordination between Taiwan's civilian and 
military authorities.  Given our commitments under the Taiwan 
Relations Act and our interest in stability and security in 
the region, we also have an interest in strengthening the 
political and interagency aspects of our bilateral security 
relationship and in promoting the shift to a more integrated 
pol/mil policy process.  MOFA has informally suggested 
holding the next set of talks in May 2010 so that any 
recommendations from the talks may be implemented within the 
calendar year.  The Department has not yet decided when the 
next set of meetings wil be held so we have not yet responded 
to Taiwan's proposal. 
 
Defense-Led Talks 
----------------- 
 
U.S.-Taiwan Strategic Dialogue (a.k.a. Monterey Talks) 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶4. (C) Established in 1997, this annual meeting of 
interagency delegations is the highest level security 
dialogue between the United States and Taiwan.  An Assistant 
Secretary of Defense traditionally heads the U.S. delegation. 
 The Deputy Secretary General responsible for military 
affairs at the National Security Council leads Taiwan's 
delegation.  Along with briefings, participants conduct a 
tabletop exercise as a conduit to discuss issues of mutual 
concern.  These talks last took place July 29-31, 2009 and 
are scheduled again sometime in July 2010. 
 
¶5. (C) In our view, this event suffers somewhat from its own 
success.  The large number of participants at the most recent 
session (more than 50) hampered the free flow of ideas during 
the tabletop exercise.  Likewise, while the inclusion of many 
 
TAIPEI 00000195  002 OF 003 
 
 
technical experts allows for remarkably detailed briefings, 
these may be too in-depth for senior officials. 
 
Defense Review Talks (DRT) 
-------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Established in 2000, this annual meeting is the 
highest level dialogue between DoD and Taiwan's Ministry of 
National Defense (MND).  The DoD and MND delegations are led 
by a PDASD and Deputy Minister of Defense, respectively.  The 
purpose of the DRT is to provide direction to security 
cooperation for the following year and discuss issues of 
mutual concern.  The DRT last met October 29-30, 2009 and the 
next meeting is scheduled for sometime in October 2010. 
 
Security Cooperation Talks (SCT) 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Established in 1995, these talks between DoD's Defense 
Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) and Taiwan MND's Strategic 
Planning Department (U.S. Joint Staff-equivalent) review 
current and future Foreign Military Sales (FMS) programs and 
security cooperation.  These annual meetings are supplemented 
by a mini-SCT, usually held in conjunction with the DRT.  The 
SCT last met June 15-18, 2009 and the next meeting is 
scheduled for sometime in June 2010. 
 
General Officer Steering Group (GOSG) 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (S) Established during the 2003 Monterey Talks and first 
held in December 2003, annual GOSG meetings focus on 
operational and tactical level discussions to enhance 
Taiwan's joint defensive war-fighting readiness and 
capabilities and enhance de-confliction between U.S. - Taiwan 
joint forces in the event they are deployed in the same or 
adjacent battle spaces.  The GOSG both receives guidance 
from, and provides work reports and military advice to, the 
DRT.  The U.S. - Taiwan GOSG can also report to the Monterey 
Talks forum as directed. 
 
Service-to-Service Security 
Cooperation Programs and Engagement 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) Each military Service conducts an annual Security 
Assistance Review (SAR) (for the Army and Navy/Marines) or 
Security Assistance Management Review (SAMR) meeting (Air 
Force) with its Taiwan counterparts, usually each Fall. 
These meetings involve detailed and focused discussions on 
ongoing and future FMS cases and programs. 
 
¶10. (C) Additionally, U.S. Pacific Command's (USPACOM) 
component commands -- U.S. Army Pacific, U.S. Pacific Fleet, 
Marine Forces Pacific, and Pacific Air Force -- maintain very 
active security cooperation programs with their Taiwan 
counterparts.  The inter-service meetings include the 
following: 
 
- Army:  Established by charter in 2003, the Army meetings 
("Lu Wei"/Powerful Army) occur twice a year.  The two sides 
last met October 14-16, 2009 and the next meeting is 
scheduled for May 2010. 
 
- Navy and Marine Corps:  Established by charter in 2004, the 
Navy and Marine Corps meetings ("Bi Hai"/Blue Sea) occur 
twice a year.  The two sides last met October 27-30, 2009 and 
the next meeting is scheduled for May 2010. 
 
- Air Force:  Established by charter in 2000, the Air Force 
meetings ("Lan Tien"/Blue Sky) occur twice a year.  The two 
sides last met November 19 - 20, 2009 and the next meeting is 
scheduled for May 2010. 
 
Overall Usefulness of Military-to-Military Talks 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
TAIPEI 00000195  003 OF 003 
 
 
 
¶11. (C) These talks are valuable and necessary forums for 
receiving periodic updates, resolving issues, and providing 
guidance on security cooperation activities.  While action 
officers handle most security cooperation program execution 
issues, policy limitations unique to U.S. cooperation with 
Taiwan create the need for regular higher-level dialogue. 
This is increasingly true given the changing nature of 
U.S.-Taiwan security cooperation that is becoming more 
complex in response to both U.S. and Taiwan military 
modernization as well as regional military modernization 
trends.  Because U.S. policy limits the extent of our crisis 
planning cooperation, these military-to-military talks are 
particularly important as a window on Taiwan's contingency 
planning. 
 
AIT/W-Led Talks 
--------------- 
 
Political-Military Working Group 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶12. (C) Twice a year, AIT-Washington's Political-Military 
Officer leads a working-level delegation of DoD and State 
personnel involved in Taiwan policy making or security 
cooperation activities to meet with Taiwan MND's Strategic 
Planning Department in Taipei.  One of the main focuses of 
this group's visits is to review the Joint Work Plan (JWP). 
The JWP deals with military issues, including hardware, 
software, training, doctrine and internal processes.  The 
delegation also meets senior officials from each of Taiwan's 
military services and generally visits one or more military 
installations.  The military element of these talks echoes 
existing military dialogues listed above, while the political 
element consists primarily of office calls with the Foreign 
Ministry.  The group last visited Taiwan December 7-11, 2009 
and the next meeting is scheduled for April 12-16, 2010. 
 
Recommendations 
--------------- 
 
¶13. (C) Within the policy limitations constraining official 
U.S.-Taiwan interactions, we have developed a broad range of 
security dialogues.  Although these dialogues are, to a large 
extent, complementary, there are certain steps we could take 
to increase their efficiency and effectiveness: 
 
- As noted in para 5 above, there is a risk that the 
increasing numbers of participants in the Monterey Talks will 
dilute their value as a venue for high-level dialogue. 
Enforcing a limit on the number of participants from each 
side should mitigate against this. 
 
- At present, AIT/W-led pol/mil working groups devote a 
considerable amount of time reviewing the JWP.  Much of this 
involves technical issues concerning individual systems, 
something better left to technical experts in the 
service-level talks described in para 9.  This would allow 
the AIT/W-led talks to focus on particularly problematic 
programs and on issues not dealt with in other forums. 
Shifting this responsibility would allow us to hold the 
AIT/W-led talks once each year. 
STANTON