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DE RUEHC #9964 0321711
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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0000
RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE PRIORITY 0000

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 009964 
 
SIPDIS 
THE HAGUE FOR CWC DEL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2020 
TAGS: CBW KTIA PARM PREL UK OPCW CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION:  HOST COUNTRY 
AGREEMENT  WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM ON CHALLENGE 
INSPECTIONS (SBU) 
 
REF: STATE 060625 
 
Classified By: ISN/CB Office Director Robert Mikulak. 
Reason:  1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (U) Action Request in Paragraph 8. 
 
--------- 
OBJECTIVE 
--------- 
 
¶2.  (C-REL U.K.) Department requests Embassy to pursue the 
following objective: 
 
-- Work with the Government of the United Kingdom to finalize 
an exchange of letters to clarify differing interpretations 
of our 1997 Host Country Agreement (HCA) Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) on the conduct of Chemical Weapons 
Convention (CWC) challenge inspections. 
 
------------------ 
REPORTING DEADLINE 
------------------ 
 
¶3.  (U) Embassy should report results of discussions with 
British officials by cable to ISN/CB ) Eugene Klimson by 12 
February, 2010 or at (202) 647-5165 or via email with any 
questions or for any further background information. 
 
---------- 
BACKGROUND 
---------- 
 
¶4.  (C-REL U.K.) The United States and the United Kingdom 
concluded a CWC Host Country Agreement (HCA) in 1997. 
Following U.S. participation in a U.K. challenge inspection 
exercise, the United States and United Kingdom initiated a 
dialog regarding the differing interpretations of the HCA, 
and agreed to negotiate an exchange of letters (reftel). 
 
¶5.  (C-REL U.K.) Several exchanges regarding the differing 
views took place, and in December 2008, Clive Rowland, of the 
U.K.'s Office of Counterproliferation and Arms Control within 
the Ministry of Defense, provided a letter, dated November 
25, 2008, to Dr. Deborah Ozga of the U.S. Joint Staff 
containing comments on the U.S. draft letter of February 
¶2008.  The USG has reviewed the letter, held subsequent 
discussions on the margins of the CWC Executive Council 
meetings in 2009, and drafted a formal response below. 
 
¶6.  (C-REL U.K.)  During the discussions, the United States 
suggested that in view of the difficulties concerning the 
sampling issue, the two sides continue to work that issue, 
but go forward on the exchange of letters since all other 
outstanding issues have been resolved.  The United States 
also proposed that contact information be exchanged for 
making initial notifications that a challenge inspection is 
called involving the other Participant,s assets.  The United 
Kingdom agreed to the U.S. proposal. 
 
¶7.  (C-REL U.K.) Washington is eager to finalize the exchange 
of letters if the U.K. accepts the current U.S. proposal. 
Washington seeks post to deliver the cover letter and current 
U.S. proposed text attached below.  (The new U.S. proposed 
text is in brackets.) 
 
------------------ 
Action Request 
------------------ 
 
¶8.  (C-REL U.K.) Post is requested to contact appropriate 
U.K. officials to deliver the talking points in paragraph 9 
and the letter and draft annex in paragraphs 10 and 11. 
 
-------------- 
Talking Points 
-------------- 
 
¶9. (C-REL U.K.) Talking points for the Government of the 
United Kingdom: 
 
(Begin talking points.) 
 
- The United States appreciates U.K. efforts to resolve 
outstanding issues related to the implementation of our 1997 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on the conduct of Chemical 
Weapons Convention (CWC) challenge inspections involving our 
two countries. 
 
- Based on the letter, dated November 25, 2008, provided by 
Mr. Clive Rowland to Dr. Deborah Ozga of the Joint Staff in 
December 2008 and subsequent discussions between the U.S. and 
U.K. representatives on the margins of the CWC Conference of 
the States Parties Meeting in The Hague, we have prepared 
comments to the U.K. proposals contained in the December 2008 
letter. 
 
- As discussed in The Hague, we have added text for the 
continuation of sampling discussions upon formalization of 
this exchange of letters. 
 
- Also per our discussions, we have added text concerning 
exchanging initial Point of Contact information to be used if 
a Challenge Inspection is called involving both of our 
assets.  Changes to the original text are noted by brackets. 
 
- We believe the time is ripe to formalize the understandings 
that have been achieved over the past few years of 
discussions and look forward to finalizing our letters of 
exchange. 
 
(End talking points.) 
 
¶10. (C-REL U.K.) U.S. response to U.K. letter for delivery: 
 
(Begin draft text of letter.) 
 
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC):  Implementation of 
Challenge Inspections under the 1997 Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU):  U.S. response to U.K. Letter dated 
November 25, 2008. 
 
Introduction: 
 
The United States appreciates the United Kingdom's efforts to 
negotiate an exchange of letters to clarify differing 
interpretations of our 1997 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) 
Challenge Inspection Host Country Agreement (HCA), and its 
recent written response, dated November 25, 2008 to Dr. 
Deborah Ozga of the Joint Staff, U.S. Department of Defense. 
The numbering of our response corresponds to the numbering in 
your letter, and we have added an additional Item (Item 8) 
listing points of contact. 
 
We believe the attached Annex ) with the few exceptions 
listed below ) represents the understandings we have 
achieved during our discussions over the past several years. 
If the United Kingdom agrees, including to the few new 
changes proposed by the United States, we believe that this 
Annex (once the United Kingdom furnishes the Point of Contact 
information requested in new Item 8) could form the basis for 
the exchange of letters both sides have sought. 
 
Comments on the Annex are as follows: 
 
Item 1:  Determining Acceptable Inspectors 
 
      The United States regrets that the phrase &subject to 
the changes below8 caused confusion when placed under Item 
¶1.  Our intent was to note that the document had been through 
several rounds of discussions, both formal and informal, and 
that all of the changes (throughout the document, not just in 
Item 1) were applicable.  However, our placement of that 
language under Item 1 could lead to the conclusion that 
&subject to the changes below8 applies only to Item 1.  We 
believe that all of the changes proposed and acceptable by 
both sides are now reflected in the annex ) accordingly, 
&subject to the changes below8 is not necessary. 
 
Item 2:  Requesting State Observer (RSO) 
 
      The United States welcomes the U.K. proposal to hold an 
informal dialogue on the handling of the Requesting State 
Observer in order to share lessons learned, understand each 
others, procedures and identify likely problem areas.  We 
suggest that such dialogue occur on the margins of the 
&close allies8 meeting scheduled to take place during 
summer 2010 in Washington. 
 
Item 3:  Managing Inspection Preparation Time 
 
      Issue 2:  108 Hours 
 
The United States can accept the U.K. amendments with the 
additional change to read as follows: 
 
"The participants will consult to determine a suitable 
handling and presentation strategy that addresses public and 
media relations and that reflects the national positions and 
interests and priorities of both the United States and United 
Kingdom.  This will focus on the need to demonstrate 
compliance with the CWC expeditiously (begin bracketed text) 
while allowing both participants to exercise their rights as 
necessary to safeguard their national security (end bracketed 
text)." 
 
Item 6:  Public Affairs 
 
The phrase &to develop a joint8 was inserted in the first 
sentence for clarity. 
 
Item 7:  Laboratory Analysis Samples 
 
The United States believes that more discussion will be 
required to reach consensus on this issue and proposes that 
the current understandings on all other items be finalized 
with the understanding that further discussions will continue 
to resolve this matter. 
 
Additional Item: Item 8:  Point of Contact 
 
The United States recommends that initial Points of Contact 
should be exchanged to enable expedient exchange of critical 
data during a challenge inspection.  Therefore, the United 
States has added the following text: 
 
For the purpose of implementing paragraph III.B.1 of the MOU, 
the United Kingdom should as an initial point of contact 
inform the United States of a challenge inspection at the 
United States Nuclear Risk Reduction Center (telephone  1 
202-647-9166, fax  1-202-647-4892) and the United States 
European Theater Command Center ( 49-711-680-5064, fax 
 49-711-680-5064).  The United States should inform the 
United Kingdom at (tel., fax to be filled in by the United 
Kingdom). 
 
(End of Text.) 
 
¶11.  Draft Letter of Exchange for delivery. 
 
(Begin Text.) 
 
Annex 
 
Understanding between the Governments of the United States of 
America and the United Kingdom Regarding the Memorandum of 
Understanding between the Government of the United States of 
America and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland Concerning the Conduct of 
Certain Challenge Inspections Pursuant to the Convention on 
the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling 
and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, dated 
December 5, 1997, hereinafter referred to as the "MOU." 
 
The United States and the United Kingdom hereinafter referred 
to as "the participants," have reached the following 
understandings regarding implementation of the MOU: 
 
Item 1:  Determining Acceptable Inspectors 
 
With respect to Part III, A.1. of the MOU, the participants, 
in all applicable situations, will inform the inspection team 
during the pre-inspection briefing if U.S. assets are within 
the inspectable area and, as a result, will inform the team 
that U.S. considerations must be applied in determining 
access to those assets. 
 
The participants expect the Technical Secretariat to ensure, 
consistent with paragraph 2 of Part II of the Verification 
Annex that no inspector that is unacceptable to the United 
States will participate in inspection activities of an asset 
(begin added text) of the United States (end added text) or 
(begin added text) a (end added text) facility under U.S. 
control.  Failing this, consistent with the managed access 
provisions in Part X of the Verification Annex, particularly 
paragraphs 41 and 48, the United States will only allow 
individual inspectors that have been accepted by the United 
States, or sub-teams consisting only of accepted inspectors, 
access to U.S. assets (begin added text) and facilities (end 
added text). 
 
In those situations where it can be reasonably established 
from the inspection request that U.S. assets are likely to be 
within the requested perimeter, the participants will jointly 
remind the Technical Secretariat regarding U.S. sensitivities 
in this regard prior to the arrival of the inspection team at 
the Point of Entry (POE) (begin deleted text) unaware of the 
presence of U.S. assets within the requested perimeter (end 
deleted text). 
 
Item 2:  Requesting State Observer (RSO). 
 
With respect to Part III, A.2. of the MOU, the participants 
will consult on whether or not to accept the RSO and, as far 
as possible, (begin added text) agree (end added text) (begin 
deleted text) decide (end deleted text) on an (begin deleted 
text) agreed (end deleted text) approach to managing the RSO 
during the challenge inspection.  If the RSO is unacceptable 
to one of the participants, options such as designation of an 
observer from a third country or acceptance of the RSO by one 
participant and use of managed access (begin added text) with 
regard to (end added text) (begin deleted text) around (end 
deleted text) the (begin deleted text) other's (end deleted 
text) assets (begin added text) of the other participant (end 
added text) should be explored. 
 
Item 3:  Managing Inspection Preparation Time. 
 
Issue 1:  Equipment and POE Activities. 
 
With respect to Part III, B.3. and 4., and Part III, C.3. and 
¶4. of the MOU, the participants will ensure that if the 
assets of one participant are involved in an inspection where 
the other participant is the inspected State Party, the other 
participant will be allowed to conduct its own inspection of 
the inspection team's equipment and the participants will 
(begin added text) jointly ensure that (end added text) 
(begin deleted text) make clear (end deleted text) this 
requirement for review by both participants to the inspection 
team. 
 
In addition, if different methodologies regarding POE 
activities create a situation in which the inspected State 
Party believes that it is necessary to commence the 
inspection, the inspected State Party will ensure that the 
other participant's assets are not inspected or monitored 
until such time as (begin added text) assets of (end added 
text) the other participant (begin deleted text) 's assets 
(end deleted text) have been prepared for inspection within 
the period permitted in the Convention. 
 
In the event of a delay in agreeing to the final perimeter, 
the participants will consult to determine the best way to 
conduct exit monitoring (begin added text) so that (end added 
text) (begin deleted text) of (end deleted text) all 
inspectable vehicles (begin added text) will exit (end added 
text) (begin deleted text) exiting (end deleted text) the 
requested perimeter as soon as possible and not later than 12 
hours after the inspection team,s arrival at the POE. 
 
Issue 2:  108 Hours. 
 
With respect to Part V, B.1. of the MOU, both participants 
will be allowed up to 108 hours, if necessary, to prepare 
their assets for the inspection, pursuant to Part V, B.1. of 
the MOU.  If the inspected State Party determines that its 
assets are prepared prior to those of the other participant, 
the inspected State Party may make its assets available to 
the inspection team for inspection so long as the (begin 
added text) assets of the (end added text) other participant 
(begin deleted text) 's assets (end deleted text) are not 
affected in any way. 
 
The participants will consult to determine a suitable 
handling and presentation strategy that addresses public and 
media relations and that reflects the national positions and 
interests and priorities of both the United States and United 
Kingdom.  This will focus on the need to demonstrate 
compliance with the CWC expeditiously (begin bracketed text) 
while allowing both participants to exercise their rights as 
necessary to safeguard their national security (end bracketed 
text). 
 
Item 4:  Managing Access 
 
Issue 1:  Perimeter Negotiations 
 
With respect to Part IV, A., B., and C. of the MOU, the 
participants will consult on a joint approach to perimeter 
negotiations.  Both participants (begin added text) will (end 
added text) (begin deleted text) should (end deleted text) be 
involved in these negotiations if assets of both countries 
are included or adjacent to the requested perimeter, or if, 
pursuant to Part IV, B.1., it cannot be determined whether an 
asset of the United States is included within the inspectable 
area. 
 
Issue 2:  Ships and Aircraft 
 
The participants will consult promptly in the event of a 
challenge inspection to determine whether any U.S. sovereign 
warships or aircraft are in the affected area.  If this is 
the case, the participants would jointly inform the Director 
General of the OPCW that the United States would need to be 
designated as the inspected State Party for such vessels or 
aircraft.  If this request is denied, the participants should 
consult on methods to demonstrate compliance. 
 
U.S. military and other state ships and aircraft, including 
some vessels and aircraft that are operated and used at the 
time exclusively for government noncommercial service, enjoy 
sovereign immunity.  Aircraft, vessels, or land vehicles for 
which the United States is not asserting sovereign immunity 
are defined as inspectable assets. 
 
Issue 3:  Overflights.  The participants will consult on the 
provision of aerial photographs to the inspection team as 
well as the offering of any aerial overflight of the 
inspected site, where US assets are included, or where such 
provision may impact or compromise preparations to receive 
the challenge inspection. 
 
Item 5:  Intellectual Property (IP) and Documentation 
 
The participants understand that the definition of asset in 
Part I, paragraph 2 of the MOU does not extend to 
documentation or intangible technology and that existing 
procedures already in place will be used to ensure 
appropriate protection of documentation and intangible 
technology. 
 
Item 6:  Public Affairs 
 
Pursuant to Part VII of the MOU, the participants will 
consult (begin bracketed text) to develop a joint (end 
bracketed text) public affairs and media handling strategy 
for the conduct of the challenge inspection.  This (begin 
added text) will include (end added text) (begin deleted 
text) would cover (end deleted text) public statements, joint 
or independent, identification of contact points on site and 
in capitals, dealing with media requests for interviews or 
television footage etc. and how best to handle any areas 
where our respective national positions differ. 
 
Item 7:  Sampling and Analysis 
 
The United States and United Kingdom will continue to (begin 
added text) seek (end added text) (begin deleted text) work 
on toward finding (end deleted text) a common understanding 
on procedures for handling the analysis of samples taken 
during a challenge inspection. 
 
Item: 8:  Points of Contact 
 
For the purpose of implementing paragraph III.B.1 of the MOU, 
the United Kingdom should as an initial point of contact 
inform the United States of a challenge inspection at the 
United States Nuclear Risk Reduction Center (telephone  1 
202-647-9166, fax  1-202-647-4892) and the United States 
European Theater Command Center ( 49-711-680-5064, fax 
 49-711-680-5064).  The United States should inform the 
United Kingdom at (tel., fax to be filled in by the United 
Kingdom). 
 
(End of Text.) 
CLINTON