VZCZCXYZ0003
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #8212 0571815
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 261810Z FEB 10
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE PRIORITY 0000
INFO RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 0000
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0000
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0000

UNCLAS STATE 018212 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL PTER KGIC US
SUBJECT: GICNT: ENCOURAGE SINGAPORE TO ENDORSE GICNT PRIOR 
TO APRIL 12-13 NUCLEAR SECURITY SUMMIT 
 
REF: A. A. CANBERRA 57468 
     ¶B. B. CANBERRA 54399 
     ¶C. C. STATE 37989 
 
¶1.  (U) This is an action request.  Please see paragraph 3. 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶2.  (U) Appropriate Embassy officials are requested to 
approach the Government of Singapore (GoS) to encourage 
Singapore's endorsement of the Global Initiative to Combat 
Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) Statement of Principles.  Acting 
Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and 
Nonproliferation, Vann Van Diepen, recently led U.S. 
participation in the Third Counterproliferation Dialogue with 
the GoS (January 26-27) and strongly encouraged the GoS to 
become a partner to the GICNT.  Endorsing the GICNT prior to 
the Nuclear Security Summit (April 12-13) would demonstrate 
Singapore's staunch commitment to combating the threat of 
nuclear terrorism at a time when many heads of 
state/government will be assembling to focus specifically on 
nuclear security.  Endorsing the GICNT will also establish 
Singapore as a regional leader on nuclear terrorism issues 
and allow it to play a valuable role in enhancing regional 
capacity to combat this shared threat in Southeast Asia. 
(Note: Singapore would be the second country in Southeast 
Asia to endorse the GICNT, after Cambodia.)  While 
participation in GICNT activities is strictly voluntary, 
Singapore could benefit from taking part in a series of 2010 
GICNT workshops that are only open to GICNT partners in areas 
such as nuclear forensics, detection, legal frameworks, 
terrorist financing, and information sharing.  The GoS could 
also leverage the expertise and resources of the GICNT 
partnership in order to enhance indigenous nuclear security 
capabilities and achieve its broader foreign policy goal of 
maintaining stability in Southeast Asia. 
 
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OBJECTIVES 
---------- 
 
¶3.  (U) Post is requested to pursue the following objectives 
with appropriate host government officials: 
 
-- Reinforce to GoS the benefits of endorsing the GICNT (see 
para 8). 
 
-- Allay GoS concerns about resource limitations, stressing 
instead the importance of sending a strong political message 
about Singapore's commitment to combating the shared threat 
of nuclear terrorism. 
 
-- Underscore that GICNT endorsement places no additional 
burdens on the GOS and that participation in GICNT activities 
is strictly voluntary. 
 
-- Secure a commitment from the GoS to endorse the GICNT 
Statement of Principles in advance of the Nuclear Security 
Summit (April 12-13).  For reference, the Statement of 
Principles have been provided in this cable (para 11) in the 
event that Singapore requests to view them. 
 
-- Explain that endorsement requires only transmission of 
diplomatic notes to the GICNT Co-Chairs (the United States 
and Russian Federation), and provide the sample letter of 
endorsement at para 12. 
 
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REPORTING DEADLINE 
------------------ 
 
¶4.  (U) Department requests that Post report the GoS,s 
response by March 8, 2010. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
BACKGROUND ON GICNT OUTREACH TO SINGAPORE 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (U) The United States and Russia, sometimes in 
coordination with Japan and Australia, have approached the 
GoS on numerous occasions to encourage endorsement of the 
GICNT (reftels A, B, and C).  The most recent approach was by 
Acting Assistant Secretary of State for International 
Security and Nonproliferation, Vann Van Diepen, during the 
Third Counterproliferation Dialogue with the GoS (January 
26-27).  During prior outreach efforts, the GoS cited 
resource constraints as preventing it from endorsing the 
GICNT, as it does not want to join if it cannot dedicate the 
manpower to make a substantive contribution.  The GOS also 
questioned what benefits it would gain as partner in the 
GICNT, instead choosing to focus its limited resources on 
participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) 
and the ASEAN Regional Forum. 
 
¶6.  (U) We recognize Singapore's concern about limited 
resources and the ability to substantively contribute to the 
GICNT through the organization and hosting of activities. 
Endorsement of the GICNT Statement of Principles, however, 
does not require organizing and hosting activities, nor does 
it require any specific legal or financial commitments. 
Participation in and hosting of GICNT activities is strictly 
voluntary.  Rather, endorsement sends an important political 
message indicating a country's association with a 
multinational consensus to develop and implement best 
practices to address the shared global threat of nuclear 
terrorism. 
 
¶7.  (U) The GICNT is complementary to PSI, UNSCR 1540, and 
other nonproliferation activities and strives to implement 
steps that fill gaps not addressed elsewhere.  The U.S. and 
Russian Co-Chairs also take steps to ensure that activities 
hosted by GICNT partners are shaped in a way that permits a 
coordinated approach to combating nuclear terrorism and 
builds capacity in areas of specific nations, needs.  Of the 
77 GICNT partner nations, 65 are also members of PSI. 
Additionally, the GICNT includes several prominent partners 
who are not part of PSI, such as China, India, and Pakistan. 
 
¶8.  (U) There are several benefits, outlined below, that the 
GoS would gain as partner to the GICNT at no cost. 
 
-- Endorsing the GICNT prior to the Nuclear Security Summit, 
at a time when many heads of state/government will be 
assembling to focus specifically on nuclear security, would 
demonstrate to the international community Singapore's 
staunch commitment to combating the threat of nuclear 
terrorism. 
 
-- Endorsement would allow Singapore to leverage the 
expertise and resources of the GICNT partnership in order to 
enhance indigenous nuclear security capabilities and achieve 
its broader foreign policy goal of maintaining stability in 
Southeast Asia.  In particular, Singapore would be able to 
participate in a series of 2010 GICNT workshops that focus in 
areas such as nuclear forensics, detection, legal frameworks, 
and terrorist financing. 
 
-- Singapore would be a valuable partner to the GICNT given 
its geostrategic location and if it chooses, could play an 
important role in enhancing regional capacity to combat 
nuclear terrorism in Southeast Asia. 
 
-- The GICNT provides a forum for Singapore to cooperate on 
these issues with non-PSI nations such as Pakistan, India, 
and China.  As an active PSI member, Singapore would join 
with the 65 GICNT partner nations who participate in both 
initiatives in order to take a holistic approach to 
counterproliferation issues and combating nuclear terrorism. 
 
----------------------- 
BACKGROUND ON THE GICNT 
----------------------- 
 
¶9.  (U) The GICNT is a cross-cutting strategic framework of 
77 partners and 4 official observers that are determined to 
strengthen individual and global capacity to prevent, detect, 
and respond to a nuclear terrorist event.  Partners of the 
GICNT are committed to a set of nuclear security principles 
that encompass a broad range of deterrence, prevention, 
detection, and response objectives.  Through voluntary 
participation in multilateral activities and exercises, 
partners share best practices and lessons learned in order to 
strengthen both individual and collective capabilities to 
combat the threat of nuclear terrorism.  Since the inception 
of the GICNT, partners have conducted over thirty GICNT 
activities and five senior-level meetings.  These events have 
resulted in greater networking and transparency among the 
international community and enhanced coordination within 
individual partner nation governments. 
 
¶10.  (U) During his April 2009 Prague speech, President Obama 
called for the GICNT to become a &durable international 
institution.8  The United States and Russia, Co-Chairs of 
the GICNT, are currently taking tangible steps that will 
transform the GICNT into an action-oriented and 
institutionalized program.  Additionally, the GICNT has a 
series of workshops scheduled for 2010 covering topics such 
as nuclear forensics, nuclear detection, legal frameworks, 
counterterrorist financing, and information sharing.  The aim 
of these workshops is to develop nuclear security core 
competencies that would assist partners in implementing the 
GICNT Statement of Principles. 
 
¶11.  (U) Begin text of the GICNT Statement of Principles: 
 
Participants in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear 
Terrorism are committed to the following Statement of 
Principles to develop partnership capacity to combat nuclear 
terrorism on a determined and systematic basis, consistent 
with national legal authorities and obligations they have 
under relevant international legal frameworks, notably the 
Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, 
the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material 
and its 2005 Amendment, United Nations Security Council 
Resolutions 1373 and 1540. They call on all states concerned 
with this threat to international peace and security to make 
a commitment to implement on a voluntary basis the following 
principles: 
 
-- Develop, if necessary, and improve accounting, control and 
physical protection systems for nuclear and other radioactive 
materials and substances; 
 
-- Enhance security of civilian nuclear facilities; 
 
-- Improve the ability to detect nuclear and other 
radioactive materials and substances in order to prevent 
illicit trafficking in such materials and substances, to 
include cooperation in the research and development of 
national detection capabilities that would be interoperable; 
 
-- Improve capabilities of participants to search for, 
confiscate, and establish safe control over unlawfully held 
nuclear or other radioactive materials and substances or 
devices using them. 
 
-- Prevent the provision of safe haven to terrorists and 
financial or economic resources to terrorists seeking to 
acquire or use nuclear and other radioactive materials and 
substances; 
 
-- Ensure adequate respective national legal and regulatory 
frameworks sufficient to provide for the implementation of 
appropriate criminal and, if applicable, civil liability for 
terrorists and those who facilitate acts of nuclear terrorism; 
 
-- Improve capabilities of participants for response, 
mitigation, and investigation, in cases of terrorist attacks 
involving the use of nuclear and other radioactive materials 
and substances, including the development of technical means 
to identify nuclear and other radioactive materials and 
substances that are, or may be, involved in the incident; and 
 
-- Promote information sharing pertaining to the suppression 
of acts of nuclear terrorism and their facilitation, taking 
appropriate measures consistent with their national law and 
international obligations to protect the confidentiality of 
any information which they exchange in confidence. 
 
Global Initiative participants recognize the role of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the fields of 
nuclear safety and security and the IAEA has been invited to 
serve as an observer to the Initiative. All participants 
commend the IAEA for its action in the field of nuclear 
security. Participants intend for the IAEA to contribute to 
the Initiative through its ongoing activities and technical 
expertise. 
 
The initial partner nations intend to establish a terms of 
reference for implementation and assessment to support 
effective fulfillment of the initiative, including by 
facilitating the provision of assistance to participants that 
may require it, and facilitating suitable exercises. 
 
They express the desire to broaden participation in the 
Global Initiative to other countries who share the common 
goals of the Initiative, are actively committed to combating 
nuclear terrorism, and endorse the Statement of Principles. 
 
End text of the GICNT Statement of Principles. 
 
¶12.  Begin text of sample letter of endorsement. 
 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Singapore presents it 
compliments to the (Department of State of the United States 
of American) (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian 
Federation) and has the honor to inform herewith of the 
Government of Singapore,s decision to endorse the Statement 
of Principles of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear 
Terrorism. 
 
The Government of Singapore endorses the Statement of 
Principles of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear 
Terrorism as adopted during the first meeting in Rabat, 
Morocco, on October 30-31, 2006. 
 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Singapore avails itself to 
this opportunity to renew to the (Department of State of the 
United States of American) (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
the Russian Federation) the assurances of its highest 
consideration. 
 
End text of sample letter of endorsement. 
 
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POINT OF CONTACT 
---------------- 
 
¶13.  (U) The Department greatly appreciates Post's 
assistance.  All cables associated with the GICNT should be 
slugged to the Department for ISN/WMDT and the relevant 
regional bureaus.  E-mails regarding the GICNT may be sent to 
. 
CLINTON