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RUETIAA/DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 STATE 017005 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED 
ASTANA AND ALMATY FOR DTRO AND POL-MIL 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: BO KACT KZ PARM RS UP
SUBJECT: INSTRUCTIONS FOR U.S. DELEGATION FOR NRRC 
CONSULTATIONS IN ALMATY ON THE FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT TO 
GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATIONS LINKS (GGCLS), 2-4 MARCH 2010 
 
REF: 2009 STATE 120541 
 
¶1. (U) In accordance with the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center 
(NRRC) Agreement, which calls for annual consultations, the 
U.S. NRRC will visit the Arms Control and Inspection Activity 
Support Center of the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan.  The NRRC Consultations focus on NRRC operational 
issues, specifically on the future of the GGCLs in the wake 
of the December 5, 2009, expiration of the START Treaty. 
Should policy-related issues arise during the consultations, 
the U.S. delegation can serve as a conduit to forward views 
and report proposals to the Washington policy community.  The 
delegation has no authority to discuss, or to commit the USG 
on, policy matters. 
 
---------- 
Background 
---------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) The START Treaty expired on December 5, 2009.  The 
START follow-on treaty will be a strictly bilateral treaty 
between the U.S. and Russia.  There will thus be a drastic, 
but not complete, reduction in message traffic utilizing the 
Government to Government Communications Links (GGCLs) with 
Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine.  The U.S. and its partner 
countries therefore need to discuss the future of the GGCLs. 
Terminating the GGCL agreements with Kazakhstan requires 
twelve months notice, but such decisions will require policy 
guidance. 
 
¶3. (SBU) The original agreements to establish the GGCLs are 
based on both the INF and START treaties.  Even with the 
expiration of START, the INF Treaty continues in force, and a 
small number of notifications are required yearly.  The GGCLs 
can be maintained in an efficient and cost-effective manner, 
and there are significant benefits, both practical and 
political in nature, to the U.S. in maintaining direct, 
secure connections with Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus and 
in encouraging those countries to maintain their current 
NRRC-like structures, which help them to fulfill their 
obligations under other treaties. 
 
¶4. (SBU) The US delegation, led by the Staff Director of the 
NRRC and consisting of representatives from the Department of 
State's Special Message Operations Division of the Bureau of 
Information Resources Management (IRM) will discuss with its 
counterparts whether they are willing and able to maintain 
the current satellite-based configuration, or whether they 
wish to explore alternatives, such as an internet-based 
system similar to those in use for the notifications required 
under the various Organization on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE) treaty regimes. 
 
--------------------------- 
INSTRUCTIONS -- U.S. AGENDA 
--------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (SBU) The following is guidance on the U.S. agenda for 
the NRRC Consultations. 
 
Begin Points for Discussion: 
 
- Since 1994, our Continuous Communication Links (CCLs) have 
been valuable and productive in providing bilateral 
notifications required under the Strategic Arms Reduction 
Treaty (START) and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces 
(INF) Treaty.  The CCLs, or Government to Government 
Communications Links (GGCLs), as the United States usually 
refers to them, have proven to be a reliable and secure means 
of communication between our countries, in particular for 
exchanging treaty-related notifications. 
 
 
STATE 00017005  002 OF 003 
 
SUBJECT: INSTRUCTIONS FOR U.S. DELEGATION FOR NRRC 
CONSULTATIONS IN ALMATY ON THE FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT TO 
GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATIONS LINKS (GGCLS), 2-4 MARCH 20 
- However, with the expiration of the START Treaty on 
December 5, 2009, there is now a drastic reduction in message 
traffic utilizing the CCLs, and we need to make decisions 
about the future of the CCLs. 
 
- The United States believes that the CCLs can be operated in 
an efficient and cost-effective manner, and that there are 
mutual benefits in maintaining direct, secure connections 
between our nations. 
 
- The CCLs have been the core around which our successful 
national centers for security and confidence building 
communications have developed.  These centers now host INF 
notifications and the network terminals to support 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
notifications. 
 
- We have devoted years to improving the CCLs to the current 
digital circuitry and state-of-the-art technology within a 
framework of a highly skilled communications staff, watch 
officers and engineers.  Both sides of our CCL know how the 
links work, how the other end is staffed, and each side's 
information-passing capabilities and competencies.  The CCLs 
provide a reliable and easy way for our two countries to 
exchange classified information directly, and an established 
backup capability for our senior officials to communicate 
with the each other.  They serve as an instrument of mutual 
trust and cooperation between our respective governments. 
 
- If the CCLs were discontinued, much of this expertise would 
be lost and the ability for direct bilateral coordination of 
our notification regimes, could have additional negative 
impact to the infrastructure and operational capacity of our 
national centers. 
 
- Potential uses of the GGCLs: The GGCLs present a capability 
to transfer secure, large electronic files between host 
governments, and could have potential uses for 
communications, information sharing and transparency. 
 
¶6. (SBU) If raised: If Kazakhstan proposes discontinuing its 
GGCL, the United States should urge that the link be 
maintained for a provisional period, during which alternative 
technologies can be explored and possibly installed.  The 
proposed provisional period would be 24 months, with a 12 
month consultative review. 
 
¶7. (SBU) If there is agreement to maintain the satellite GGCL: 
 
U.S. can provide technical assistance.  The U.S. can not 
provide financial assistance. 
 
¶8. (U) If raised:  If Kazakhstan requests to switch to an 
Internet-based GGCL: The delegation will bring the Kazakh 
proposals back to the U.S. policy community. 
 
¶9. (U) If the Kazakh side desires to terminate: 
 
A suitable plan for termination of the CCL agreement will be 
discussed in Washington, and the U.S. will accommodate 
Kazakhstan's request. 
 
¶10. (U) Plan for GGCL Consultations: 
 
A 12 month consultative review meeting will be discussed. 
 
¶11. (U) Delegation should seek agreement on a continuation of 
watch officer exchanges.  If agreement is reached, seek 
proposed dates for such exchanges). 
 
¶12.  (U) The delegation will provide a briefing on the 
current operations of the U.S. NRRC. 
 
¶13.  (U) The U.S. NRRC delegation should draw on detailed 
talking points cleared separately through the Interagency for 
each U.S. and Kazakhstan agenda item. 
 
¶14. (U) Post assistance is greatly appreciated.  The U.S. 
 
STATE 00017005  003 OF 003 
 
SUBJECT: INSTRUCTIONS FOR U.S. DELEGATION FOR NRRC 
CONSULTATIONS IN ALMATY ON THE FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT TO 
GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATIONS LINKS (GGCLS), 2-4 MARCH 20 
NRRC also encourages DTRO representatives to attend these 
discussions. If there are any questions, please contact NRRC 
Senior Staff Officer Dennis Curry at (202) 647 1895 or 
currydl@state.gov  or dlcurry57@hotmail.com. 
CLINTON 
CLINTON