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Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
10STATE16555	2010-02-23 19:26	2011-08-30 01:44	CONFIDENTIAL	Secretary of State

VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #6555 0541931
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 231926Z FEB 10
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE PRIORITY 0000
INFO RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0000

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 016555 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/23/2035 
TAGS: MTCRE PREL MNUC KSCA ETTC TSPA SN
SUBJECT: HCOC - ENCOURAGING SINGAPORE TO SUBSCRIBE 
 
REF: A. 09 STATE 044998 
     ¶B. 07 STATE 72346 
     ¶C. 05 SINGAPORE 3160 
     ¶D. 03 SINGAPORE 3869 
     ¶E. 03 STATE 254339 
     ¶F. 03 SINGAPORE 1566 
     ¶G. 03 STATE 89910 
     ¶H. 02 SINGAPORE 3942 
     ¶I. 02 STATE 215622 
     ¶J. 02 STATE 209829 
     ¶K. 02 STATE 237600 
     ¶L. 02 STATE 238689 
     ¶M. 02 STATE 259795 
 
Classified By: ISN/MTR DIRECTOR PAM DURHAM FOR REASONS 
1.4 (B), (D), AND (H). 
 
¶1.  (U) This is an action request.  Please see para 3. 
 
 
OBJECTIVE AND ACTION REQUEST 
---------------------------- 
 
¶2.   (U) Objective: We want Singapore to subscribe to the 
Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation 
(HCOC). 
 
¶3.   (SBU) Action Request:  Drawing on the talking 
points and other information in paras 4-11 below, request post 
approach appropriate senior-level host government officials at 
the earliest opportunity and urge them to subscribe to the 
HCOC.  Post is requested to report the GOS's reply via cable 
slugged for ISN/MTR with "HCOC" in the subject line.  (Copies 
of talking points, text of the HCOC, list of subscribing 
countries, and sample Note Verbale may be shared with 
Singapore officials). 
 
BACKGROUND 
---------- 
 
¶4.  (C) Background:  The United States has encouraged 
Singapore to subscribe to the Hague Code of Conduct Against 
Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC) numerous times since 
2002 (Refs A-I).  While Singapore has said that it has no 
objections to the HCOC, it has expressed a reluctance to 
subscribe due to "limited resources."  Singapore was one of 
159 nations that voted in favor of United Nations General 
Assembly Resolution 63/64 of December 2008 supporting the 
HCOC, as well as various predecessor resolutions. 
 
¶5.  (C) During the January 26-27, 2010 U.S.-Singapore 
Counterproliferation Dialogue, Acting Assistant Secretary Vann 
Van Diepen again pressed the GOS to subscribe, noting that he 
had raised this issue with Singapore as far back as 2005, and 
expressing his disappointment that this was still an open 
issue.  Singapore asked what subscribing to the HCOC would 
entail, reiterating its concerns about Singapore's resource 
constraints.  Van Diepen emphasized that the demands on HCOC 
Subscribing States ) especially non-missile states like 
Singapore ) are minimal and consist of each subscribing 
country providing an annual declaration of its space launch 
and ballistic missile policies and submitting pre-launch 
notification of all space launch vehicle and ballistic missile 
launches.  Van Diepen noted that as Singapore has no space 
launch or ballistic missile program, it could simply submit a 
"nil" form for its annual declaration each year.  Singapore 
officials agreed to take another look at the HCOC, and 
indicated that "next time" they might have a "different 
answer." 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Per Refs J-M, the Hague Code of Conduct Against 
Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC; also known as the 
International Code of Conduct, or ICOC; text at para 9) was 
formally brought into effect on November 25, 2002, at a 
Launching Conference hosted by the Netherlands in The Hague. 
Since then, HCOC Subscribing States have held annual meetings 
to further elaborate issues relating to the HCOC's 
implementation, including pre-launch notifications and 
Subscribing States' annual declarations on space and ballistic 
missile policies.  As of February 2010, 130 countries have 
subscribed to the HCOC (see para 10). 
 
¶7.  (SBU) The HCOC is aimed at bolstering efforts to curb 
ballistic missile proliferation worldwide, and to further 
delegitimize such proliferation.  The HCOC consists of a set 
of general principles, modest commitments, and limited 
confidence-building measures. It is intended to supplement, 
not supplant, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), 
and is administered collectively by all of the countries that 
subscribe to it.  There is no formal secretariat or 
implementing organization, and thus we do not foresee any 
financial burden for Singapore.  The HCOC will hold its Ninth 
Regular Meeting on May 31 - June 1, 2010 in Vienna. 
 
¶8.   (C) Begin Text of Talking Points: 
 
--  The United States urges Singapore to join us and 129 other 
countries in actively supporting the international missile 
nonproliferation efforts by subscribing to the Hague Code of 
Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC). 
 
--  We have approached your government on several occasions 
since 2002 concerning the HCOC because the U.S. and the other 
129 Subscribing States view the HCOC as an important and 
meaningful way to help curb the proliferation of ballistic 
missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD) - proliferation declared by the UN Security Council in 
Resolution 1540 to represent a threat to international peace 
and security. 
 
--  In our previous discussions with your government,  you 
stated that you did not have any objections to the HCOC, but 
that you were concerned about a lack of resources. 
 
--  Subscribing to the HCOC is the right thing to do, and has 
no resource implications. 
 
--  We would therefore like to again encourage Singapore to 
subscribe to the HCOC by submitting its Note Verbale to the 
government of Austria as soon as possible. 
 
--  By subscribing, countries show their support for halting 
the spread of ballistic missiles capable of delivering 
nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. 
 
--  The HCOC is a political commitment that is open to all 
countries' voluntary subscription.  Because the HCOC is not a 
treaty or other legally binding obligation, the vast majority 
of countries are able to subscribe as an executive act without 
any need for parliamentary approval or ratification. 
 
--  As Acting Assistant Secretary Van Diepen noted during the 
January 26-27, 2010 U.S.-Singapore Counterproliferation 
Dialogue, there are no assessed contributions or other 
monetary costs of subscribing. 
 
--  As a country with no missile or space launch programs, 
Singapore's obligations under the HCOC would be minimal. 
 
--  Subscribing countries are required only to provide an 
annual declaration of their space launch and ballistic missile 
policies, and to submit pre-launch notification of all space 
launch vehicle and ballistic missile launches. 
 
--  Because Singapore has no space launch or ballistic missile 
program, it could simply submit a "nil" form for its annual 
declaration each year. 
 
--  The current 130 Subscribing States represent every region 
in the world, including the following Asian/Pacific region 
countries:  Australia, Cambodia, East Timor, Japan, 
Kazakhstan, Mongolia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, the 
Philippines, and South Korea. 
 
--  In addition, 78 PSI member states have subscribed to the 
HCOC, including Argentina, Canada, Chile, Jordan, Liberia, 
Libya, Morocco, Russia, Turkey, Ukraine and all European Union 
countries. 
 
--  The subscription of such a large and diverse group of 
countries shows that there is widespread support for the HCOC 
and the idea that (1) the proliferation of WMD-capable 
ballistic missiles should be impeded, and (2) that countries 
should voluntarily cooperate to impede this proliferation. 
 
--  This notion is underlined by the December 2, 2008 approval 
by 159 countries in the United Nations General Assembly of a 
resolution endorsing the HCOC (GA Resolution 63/64).  We are 
grateful that Singapore voted in favor of this resolution, and 
we hope you will take the next step and subscribe. 
 
--  We know Singapore shares the same concerns about missile 
proliferation as the subscribers to the HCOC, and therefore we 
strongly urge you to join with us and subscribe.  This will 
allow you to make a concrete political contribution to 
addressing the global missile threat. 
 
--  Your subscription to the HCOC would be greatly appreciated 
by the United States. 
 
--  Singapore can subscribe by sending a Note Verbale to the 
Government of Austria, which is the Executive Secretary of the 
HCOC (hcoc@bmeia.gv.at).  (Hand over example note at para 11.) 
 
--  We look forward to your subscribing promptly to the HCOC, 
and would be happy to answer any questions you may have about 
the HCOC. 
 
END TEXT OF TALKING POINTS 
 
¶9.   (U) The government of the Netherlands distributed the 
HCOC text to all countries invited to the November 2002 
Launching Conference.  The USG has provided it to the GOS on 
various occasions.  The text is repeated below. Department 
also has the text in French, Spanish, and Russian available 
upon request to ISN/MTR. 
 
Begin Text of HCOC: 
 
International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile 
Proliferation 
 
Preamble 
 
The Subscribing States: 
 
Reaffirming their commitment to the United Nations 
Charter; 
 
Stressing the role and responsibility of the United 
Nations in the field of international peace and 
security; 
 
Recalling the widespread concern about the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their 
means of delivery; 
 
Recognizing the increasing regional and global security 
challenges caused, inter alia, by the ongoing 
proliferation of Ballistic Missile systems capable of 
delivering weapons of mass destruction; 
 
Seeking to promote the security of all states by 
fostering mutual trust through the implementation of 
political and diplomatic measures; 
 
Having taken into account regional and national 
security considerations; 
 
Believing that an International Code of Conduct against 
Ballistic Missile Proliferation will contribute to the 
process of strengthening existing national and 
international security arrangements and disarmament and 
non-proliferation objectives and mechanisms; 
 
Recognising that Subscribing States may wish to 
consider engaging in co-operative measures among 
themselves to this end; 
 
¶1.    Adopt this International Code of Conduct against 
Ballistic Missile Proliferation (hereinafter referred 
to as 'the Code'); 
 
¶2.    Resolve to respect the following Principles: 
 
a)    Recognition of the need comprehensively to 
prevent and curb the proliferation of Ballistic Missile 
systems capable of delivering weapons of mass 
destruction and the need to continue pursuing 
appropriate international endeavors, including the 
Code; 
 
b)    Recognition of the importance of strengthening, 
and gaining wider adherence to, multilateral 
disarmament and non-proliferation mechanisms; 
 
c)    Recognition that adherence to, and full 
compliance with, international arms control, 
disarmament and non-proliferation norms help build 
confidence as to the peaceful intentions of states; 
 
d)    Recognition that participation in this Code is 
voluntary and open to all states; 
 
e)    Confirmation of their commitment to the United 
Nations Declaration on International Cooperation in the 
Exploration and Use of Outer Space for the Benefit and 
in the Interest of All States taking into particular 
Account the Needs of Developing Countries, adopted by 
the United Nations General Assembly (Resolution 51/122 
of 13 December 1996); 
 
f)    Recognition that states should not be excluded 
from utilising the benefits of space for peaceful 
purposes, but that, in reaping such benefits and in 
conducting related cooperation, they must not 
contribute to the proliferation of Ballistic Missiles 
capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction; 
 
g)    Recognition that Space Launch Vehicle programmes 
should not be used to conceal Ballistic Missile 
programmes; 
 
h)    Recognition of the necessity of appropriate 
transparency measures on Ballistic Missile programmes 
and Space Launch Vehicle programmes in order to 
increase confidence and to promote non-proliferation of 
Ballistic Missiles and Ballistic Missile technology; 
 
¶3.    Resolve to implement the following General 
Measures: 
 
a)    To ratify, accede to or otherwise abide by: 
-  the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of 
States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, 
including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies (1967), 
-  the Convention on International Liability for Damage 
Caused by Space Objects (1972), 
-  the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched 
into Outer Space (1975); 
 
b)    To curb and prevent the proliferation of 
Ballistic Missiles capable of delivering weapons of 
mass destruction, both at a global and regional level, 
through multilateral, bilateral and national 
endeavours; 
 
c)    To exercise maximum possible restraint in the 
development, testing and deployment of Ballistic 
Missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass 
destruction, including, where possible, to reduce 
national holdings of such missiles, in the interest of 
global and regional peace and security; 
 
d)    To exercise the necessary vigilance in the 
consideration of assistance to Space Launch Vehicle 
programmes in any other country so as to prevent 
contributing to delivery systems for weapons of mass 
destruction, considering that such programmes may be 
used to conceal Ballistic Missile programmes; 
 
e)    Not to contribute to, support or assist any 
Ballistic Missile programme in countries which might be 
developing or acquiring weapons of mass destruction in 
contravention of norms established by, and of those 
countries, obligations under, international disarmament 
and non-proliferation treaties; 
 
¶4.    Resolve to implement the following: 
 
a)    Transparency measures as follows, with an 
appropriate and sufficient degree of detail to increase 
confidence and to promote non-proliferation of 
Ballistic Missiles capable of delivering weapons of 
mass destruction: 
 
i) With respect to Ballistic Missile programmes to: 
-  make an annual declaration providing an outline of 
their Ballistic Missile policies.  Examples of openness 
in such declarations might be relevant information on 
Ballistic Missiles systems and land (test-) launch 
sites; 
-  provide annual information on the number and generic 
class of Ballistic Missiles launched during the 
preceding year, as declared in conformity with the pre- 
launch notification mechanism referred to hereunder, in 
tiret iii); 
 
ii)   with respect to expendable Space Launch Vehicle 
programmes, and consistent with commercial and economic 
confidentiality principles, to: 
-  make an annual declaration providing an outline of 
their Space Launch Vehicle policies and land (test-) 
launch sites; 
-  provide annual information on the number and generic 
class of Space Launch Vehicles launched during the 
preceding year, as declared in conformity with the pre- 
launch notification mechanism referred to hereunder, in 
tiret iii); 
-  consider, on a voluntary basis (including on the 
degree of access permitted), inviting international 
observers to their land (test-) launch sites; 
 
iii)  with respect to their Ballistic Missile and Space 
Launch Vehicle programmes to: 
-  exchange pre-launch notifications on their Ballistic 
Missile and Space Launch Vehicle launches and test 
flights.  These notifications should include such 
information as the generic class of the Ballistic 
Missile or Space Launch Vehicle, the planned launch 
notification window, the launch and the planned 
direction; 
 
b)   Subscribing States could, as appropriate and on a 
voluntary basis, develop bilateral or regional 
transparency measures, in addition to those above. 
 
c)   Implementation of the above confidence building 
measures does not serve as justification for the 
programmes to which these confidence building measures 
apply; 
 
¶5.    Organisational aspects 
 
      Subscribing States determine to: 
 
a)    Hold regular meetings, annually or as otherwise 
agreed by Subscribing States; 
 
b)    Take all decisions, both substantive and 
procedural, by a consensus of the Subscribing States 
present; 
 
c)    Use these meetings to define, review and further 
develop the workings of the Code, including in such 
ways as: 
-  establishing procedures regarding the exchange of 
notifications and other information in the framework of 
the Code; 
-  establishing an appropriate mechanism for the 
voluntary resolution of questions arising from national 
declarations, and/or questions pertaining to Ballistic 
Missile and/or Space Launch Vehicle programmes; 
-  naming of a subscribing state to serve as an 
immediate central contact for collecting and 
disseminating Confidence Building Measures submissions, 
receiving and announcing the subscription of additional 
States, and other tasks as agreed by Subscribing 
States; and 
-  others as may be agreed by the Subscribing States, 
including possible amendments to the Code. 
 
 
¶10.  (U) List of Subscribing States as of February 2010. 
 
¶1. Afghanistan 
¶2. Albania 
¶3. Andorra 
¶4. Argentina 
¶5. Armenia 
¶6. Australia 
¶7. Austria 
¶8. Azerbaijan 
¶9. Belarus 
¶10. Belgium 
¶11. Benin 
¶12. Bosnia and Herzegovina 
¶13. Bulgaria 
¶14. Burkina Faso 
¶15. Burundi 
¶16. Cambodia 
¶17. Cameroon 
¶18. Canada 
¶19. Cape Verde 
¶20. Chad 
¶21. Chile 
¶22. Colombia 
¶23. Comoros 
¶24. Cook Islands 
¶25. Costa Rica 
¶26. Croatia 
¶27. Cyprus 
¶28. Czech Republic 
¶29. Denmark 
¶30. Dominican Republic 
¶31. Ecuador 
¶32. El Salvador 
¶33. Eritrea 
¶34. Estonia 
¶35. Ethiopia 
¶36. Fiji 
¶37. Finland 
¶38. France 
¶39. Gabon 
¶40. Gambia 
¶41. Georgia 
¶42. Germany 
¶43. Ghana 
¶44. Greece 
¶45. Guatemala 
¶46. Guinea 
¶47. Guinea-Bissau 
¶48. Guyana 
¶49. Haiti 
¶50. Holy See 
¶51. Honduras 
¶52. Hungary 
¶53. Iceland 
¶54. Ireland 
¶55. Italy 
¶56. Japan 
¶57. Jordan 
¶58. Kazakhstan 
¶59. Kenya 
¶60. Kiribati 
¶61. Latvia 
¶62. Liberia 
¶63. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 
¶64. Liechtenstein 
¶65. Lithuania 
¶66. Luxembourg 
¶67. Madagascar 
¶68. Malawi 
¶69. Maldives 
¶70. Mali 
¶71. Malta 
¶72. Marshall Islands 
¶73. Mauritania 
¶74. Micronesia (Federated States of) 
¶75. Monaco 
¶76. Mongolia 
¶77. Montenegro 
¶78. Morocco 
¶79. Mozambique 
¶80. Netherlands 
¶81. New Zealand 
¶82. Nicaragua 
¶83. Niger 
¶84. Nigeria 
¶85. Norway 
¶86. Palau 
¶87. Panama 
¶88. Papua New Guinea 
¶89. Paraguay 
¶90. Peru 
¶91. Philippines 
¶92. Poland 
¶93. Portugal 
¶94. Republic of Korea 
¶95. Republic of Macedonia 
¶96. Republic of Moldova 
¶97. Romania 
¶98. Russian Federation 
¶99. Rwanda 
¶100. Samoa 
¶101. San Marino 
¶102. Senegal 
¶103. Serbia 
¶104. Seychelles 
¶105. Sierra Leone 
¶106. Slovakia 
¶107. Slovenia 
¶108. South Africa 
¶109. Spain 
¶110. Sudan 
¶111. Suriname 
¶112. Sweden 
¶113. Switzerland 
¶114. Tanzania 
¶115. Tajikistan 
¶116. Timor-leste 
¶117. Tonga 
¶118. Tunisia 
¶119. Turkey 
¶120. Turkmenistan 
¶121. Tuvalu 
¶122. Uganda 
¶123. Ukraine 
¶124. United Kingdom 
¶125. United States 
¶126. Uruguay 
¶127. Uzbekistan 
¶128. Vanuatu 
¶129. Venezuela 
¶130. Zambia 
 
 
¶11.  (SBU) Begin text of example Note Verbale: 
 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of (country) presents its 
compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
Government of Austria and has the honour to inform the 
Republic of Austria that (country) wishes to become a 
subscribing state to the Hague Code of Conduct against 
Ballistic Missile Proliferation, which was adopted at an 
international launching conference held at The Hague on 25 and 
26 November 2002, and that it wishes (country) to be included 
in the list of Subscribing States that will serve as an annex 
to the aforementioned Code of Conduct. 
 
Done at (capital) 
 
Date 
 
Seal 
 
 
POINT OF CONTACT 
---------------- 
 
¶12.  (U) Please contact ISN/MTR's John Paul Herrmann or Sarah 
Ayers with any questions or follow-up issues related to this 
case (202-647-1430 - herrmannjp@state.sgov.gov or 
herrmannjp2@state.gov; or 202-647-1142 - 
ayerssl@state.sgov.gov or ayerssl@state.gov), and slug 
reporting on this issue for ISN/MTR with "HCOC" in the subject 
line. 
 
¶13.  (U) A word version of this document will be posted at 
www.state.sgov.gov/demarche. 
CLINTON

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Viewing cable 10STATE16555, HCOC - ENCOURAGING SINGAPORE TO SUBSCRIBE