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Viewing cable 10STATE16163, SRI LANKA: ENGAGING INTERNATIONAL PARTNERS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10STATE16163 2010-02-23 00:01 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Secretary of State
VZCZCXRO0309
PP RUEHIK
DE RUEHC #6163/01 0540006
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 230001Z FEB 10
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 6401
RUEHSW/AMEMBASSY BERN PRIORITY 7488
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 6535
RUEHCP/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN PRIORITY 1816
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 9360
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO PRIORITY 0144
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 1499
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 8525
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 4190
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM PRIORITY 9048
RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE PRIORITY 7817
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 2339
RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA PRIORITY 0817
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 0410
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 9966
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
INFO EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK PRIORITY 6297
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 3062
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO PRIORITY 6763
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA PRIORITY 2783
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 6594
RUEHJA/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA PRIORITY 6871
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU PRIORITY 4380
RUEHKL/AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR PRIORITY 3992
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 7475
RUEHGO/AMEMBASSY RANGOON PRIORITY 9415
RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE PRIORITY 2788
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 0749
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PRIORITY 1040
RUEHCG/AMCONSUL CHENNAI PRIORITY 0148
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHRN/USMISSION UN ROME PRIORITY 0818
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 STATE 016163 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: CE KAWC KDEM PGOV PHUM PREF PREL
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: ENGAGING INTERNATIONAL PARTNERS 
 
STATE 00016163  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
1.  (U) This is an action request; see paragraph 11. 
 
2.  (SBU) Summary:  Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa 
has followed his January 26 re-election with the extra-legal 
arrest of the opposition candidate and intimidation of 
independent media.  While Rajapaksa's administration has 
faced criticism within the country, we seek to coordinate our 
message with international partners in Sri Lanka to persuade 
Rajapaksa to abide by the constitution, begin reconciliation, 
allow freedom of movement for all internally displaced 
persons (IDPs), and initiate an accountability process.  End 
Summary. 
 
Smooth Election, Bumpy Post-Election 
------------------------------------ 
 
3.  (SBU) The political situation in Sri Lanka remains fluid 
since the January 26 presidential election, in which 
incumbent President Mahinda Rajapaksa defeated former Army 
Commander and Chief of Defense Staff General Sarath Fonseka 
by a wide margin.  The results were expected to be closer, 
but most domestic and international observers have 
acknowledged Rajapaksa's victory, though the opposition has 
charged fraud.  Since his victory, however, Rajapaksa has 
moved aggressively to consolidate his political control, 
arresting General Fonseka on allegations of engaging in 
political activity while serving as an Army officer, and 
conspiring against the president.  The Rajapaksa government, 
including the president's brother, Defense Secretary 
Gotabhaya Rajapaksa, has forced a number of senior Army 
officers into retirement, and arrested dozens of other active 
duty retired army officers, some campaign workers and 
clerical staff, and members of the Fonseka family.  Hundreds 
of police officers suspected of being sympathetic to Fonseka 
have also been reassigned. 
 
Fonseka Under Arrest 
-------------------- 
 
4.  (SBU) General Fonseka remains under arrest for alleged 
violations of the Sri Lankan Army Act; no formal charges, 
however, have yet been filed against him.  We are continuing 
to urge, publicly and privately, that any action against 
Fonseka be taken in accordance with Sri Lankan law and in the 
spirit of national reconciliation.  We have called on the GSL 
to make public the legal basis for the action against Fonseka 
and stressed the need to work to overcome the fissures that 
exist within Sri Lankan society.  Our message echoes 
statements by our Indian and European partners, and the UN 
Secretary General, who intends to dispatch Undersecretary 
General for Political Affairs Lynn Pascoe to Colombo soon. 
 
Independent Press Intimidated 
----------------------------- 
 
 
STATE 00016163  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
5.  (SBU) We also have expressed our concern about reports of 
post-election intimidation of independent media.  For 
example, representatives of Lanka e-news, the media outlet 
that employed Prageeth Eknaligoda, a journalist who 
disappeared on January 24, reported to Embassy Colombo that 
paramilitaries surrounded their office after the election. 
Other journalists affiliated with pro-opposition party media 
are known to be in hiding or have been detained and 
questioned regarding pro-Fonseka articles that appeared prior 
to the election.  Despite the lack of any terrorist incidents 
or credible security threats since the end of the war last 
May, the GSL also continues to renew monthly its Emergency 
Regulations, which allow detentions, restrictions on the 
press and assembly, and other repressive measures, all of 
which at this point appear to have more to do with 
restricting political dissent than enhancing national 
security. 
 
Domestic Critics Include Buddhist Monks 
----------------------------------- 
 
6.  (SBU) The GSL has begun to face blowback for its 
heavy-handedness.  The Colombo Chief Magistrate strongly 
reprimanded police for the severe tactics, including tear 
gas, used against opposition protesters on February 10 that 
resulted in a number of injuries, and ordered released on 
February 17 fourteen persons, including active-duty armed 
forces personnel, who had been arrested at Fonseka's campaign 
office January 29.  The influential head of the oldest and 
largest Buddhist sect in Sri Lanka shocked the country by 
saying on February 9 that it was a "grave crime" to imprison 
a war hero.  The prelate said Fonseka's service to the nation 
in defeating terrorism entitled him to be pardoned and 
lamented that people are living in fear or even fleeing into 
the jungle because they voted for Fonseka.  A Sanga Sabha, or 
monks' council, for all Buddhist monks in Sri Lanka was to be 
held on February 18, but was postponed indefinitely, 
reportedly as a result of threats against the monks by 
pro-government individuals. 
 
Some Progress, but Missed Opportunity 
------------------------------------- 
 
7.  (SBU) The Sri Lankan presidential election was an 
important opportunity for progress toward national 
reconciliation.  Although Fonseka was known as a Sinhalese 
nationalist, and alleged by some to have been, like President 
Rajapaksa, responsible for potential violations of 
international humanitarian law and other actions against 
Tamil civilians during the final stages of the conflict, the 
decision by Tamil political representatives to support 
Fonseka brought many Sri Lankan Tamils into the political 
process for the first time in decades.  Likewise, the GSL 
undertook a number of important initiatives to gain Tamil 
votes, most importantly by allowing increased freedom of 
movement for and expediting greatly the return home of people 
internally displaced by the end of the conflict with the 
Tamil Tigers (LTTE).  Some important steps had also been 
taken on human rights, including the release on bail of the 
 
STATE 00016163  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
prominent Tamil journalist, J.S. Tissainayagam, and a 
noticeable decrease in the level of disappearances.  This 
progress, which had led us to begin to explore opportunities 
for how the United States could start to expand its 
engagement with the GSL, has been reversed by the 
government's actions against Fonseka, his supporters, and the 
independent media -- further polarizing the country. 
 
Accountability, Reconciliation and War Crimes 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
8.  (SBU) The State Department will report to Congress in 
June on GSL progress in addressing alleged incidents of 
potential violations of international humanitarian law and 
other harms catalogued in a Department report last October. 
In November 2009, President Rajapaksa appointed a group of 
eminent persons to look into the allegations and provide 
findings to him by December 31; the date was subsequently 
postponed to April.  We are unaware of how much progress the 
group has made.  With parliamentary elections planned for 
April, we are concerned the government may again extend the 
deadline.  Calls for an international investigation will 
likely increase the longer the GSL defers action.  Speaking 
to the BBC following the presidential election, Defense 
Secretary Rajapaksa ruled out categorically any international 
investigation, though he did not rule out a domestic 
accountability process, such as, for example, a truth and 
reconciliation commission.  Accountability is an important 
element of national reconciliation.  We wish to continue to 
encourage and work with the GSL to identify a mechanism and 
initiate a credible and transparent accountability process. 
 
Accusations Against the U.S. 
---------------------------- 
 
9.  (SBU) GSL officials have sought to besmirch Fonseka by 
alleging that the United States and Norway bankrolled and 
supported his candidacy, and that the U.S. conspired with 
Fonseka to overthrow the Sri Lankan government.  Such 
allegations have been categorically rejected by the U.S. 
Embassy and by the Department.  At the same time, China, 
Russia, and Iran are continuing to increase their influence 
in Sri Lanka.  Chinese foreign direct investment, for 
example, is estimated at $6 billion, and Iran supplies nearly 
all of Sri Lanka's oil imports. 
 
Sri Lanka Will Survive 
---------------------- 
 
10.  (SBU) Fortunately, Sri Lanka has a strong democratic 
tradition, and its legal and political institutions retain 
some of their former vibrancy.  More importantly, it has an 
educated and influential middle class that wishes to retain 
Sri Lanka's Western orientation.  Strengthening democratic 
impulses within Sri Lanka will be an essential component of 
any international effort to help bolster democracy and the 
rule of law in Sri Lanka. 
 
Action Request:  Engage International Partners 
 
STATE 00016163  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
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11.  (SBU) Action Request:  As we discuss internally how best 
to engage the GSL in this new, post-election environment, we 
ask action addressees to 1) convey to host governments our 
concern, citing examples in the above paragraphs, about the 
deteriorating political situation in Sri Lanka and 2) to 
solicit from host governments their views on our assessment, 
and how the international community can work together to help 
prevent further deterioration and resume progress on our 
shared goals, including, but not limited to: 
 
- Freedom of movement for and the voluntary return of the 
100,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) who remain in 
camps; 
- Political reconciliation, including ending media 
intimidation and other human rights abuses, and 
implementation of political and constitutional reforms that 
would devolve political power to local governments and 
increase the political participation of minority communities; 
and 
- Initiating a credible and transparent accountability 
process, in consultation with Sri Lankan Tamils and other 
minority communities. 
 
12. (U) Please slug responses to SCA/INSB Anthony Renzulli 
and S/WCI Shaun Coughlin.  Please direct any questions to 
Anthony Renzulli, Sri Lanka/Maldives Desk Officer, 
202-647-1078. 
CLINTON