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DE RUEHC #5856 0531551
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 221547Z FEB 10
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE 0000
INFO RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL IMMEDIATE 0000

S E C R E T STATE 015856 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/19/2035 
TAGS: ETTC MARR MCAP MOPS PARM PINR PREL PTER MASS TU IR
SUBJECT: (S) TURKISH FIRMS ENGAGED IN MILITARY 
MATERIEL-RELATED DEALS WITH IRAN 
 
Classified By: EUR/PRA Director Stephanie Miley 
 
¶1. (U) This is an action request to Embassy Ankara.  Please 
see paragraph 7. 
 
---------- 
BACKGROUND 
---------- 
 
¶2. (S) The U.S. has information about several transactions 
involving Turkish firms planning to export and import from 
Iran arms and related material controlled by the Wassenaar 
Arrangement.  Specifically, Iran is interested in procuring 
Full Metal Jacket (FMJ) .38 caliber and wadcutter bullets; 40 
mm automatic grenade launchers; 5.56 mm composite magazines 
(for M16 assault rifles), and 7.62 X 39 mm and 7.62 X 51 mm 
composite magazines from Turkey.  In addition, we understand 
that a Turkish firm may also be pursuing a deal to import 
plastic explosives and nitrocellulose from Iran. 
 
¶3. (S) The U.S. wants to provide this information to Turkish 
officials, request that they investigate this activity and 
use all available means to prevent these firms from exporting 
and importing such arms to and from Iran.  In addition to any 
domestic Turkish authorities that may apply, these activities 
may also be in violation of both United Nations Security 
Resolution (UNSCR) 1747 and U.S. domestic authorities. 
 
¶4. (S) UNSCR 1747: UNSCR 1747, paragraph 5, prohibits Iran 
from supplying, selling or transferring from its territory 
any "arms or related materiel."  It also requires all states 
to prohibit the procurement of such items from Iran by their 
nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft; whether 
or not such transfers originated in the territory of Iran. 
The procurement of plastic explosives from Iran would violate 
UNSCR 1747. 
 
¶5. (S) The Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act 
(INKSNA): INKSNA authorizes sanctions against any foreign 
person that transfers to or from Iran, North Korea, or Syria 
goods, services, or technology controlled by multilateral 
control lists (e.g., Nuclear Suppliers Group, Missile 
Technology Control Regime, Australia Group, or Wassenaar 
Arrangement); of the same kind as those on multilateral 
control lists, but falling below the control list parameters, 
when it is determined that such goods, services, and 
technologies have the potential to make a material 
contribution to WMD, or cruise or ballistic missile systems; 
on U.S. national control lists for WMD/missile reasons that 
are not on multilateral lists; or with the potential of 
making a material contribution to WMD, or cruise or ballistic 
missile systems.  Accordingly, the U.S. is concerned that if 
the Turkish firms proceed with transferring the grenade 
launchers, bullets, and ammunition magazines, we would be 
required to report this to the U.S. Congress and the Turkish 
firms could be subject to U.S. sanctions. 
 
¶6. (S) The U.S. is also concerned about the potential exports 
to Iran because one of the items may be of U.S. origin. 
According to Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) 
records, Turkey received 181 MK-19 40 mm grenade launchers 
from the United States in 1995.  However, we do not know 
definitively if any of these are among the 40 mm grenade 
launchers contemplated as part of the sale to Iran.  We note, 
however, that if any U.S.-origin defense equipment (including 
technical data) is re-transferred to Iran, that would violate 
Section 3 of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA).  As a 
consequence, Turkey could lose its country eligibility under 
the AECA to purchase or lease defense articles, including 
Patriot or Reaper unmanned aerial vehicles, or services, or 
to receive credits or guarantees relating to any purchase or 
lease. 
 
------------------------- 
ACTION REQUEST/OBJECTIVES 
------------------------- 
 
¶7. (S) Post is requested to approach GOT officials to pursue 
the following objectives and to deliver the talking 
points/non-paper in paragraph 8 below as appropriate: 
 
-- Thank Turkish officials for Turkey's continued cooperation 
and support in preventing the transfer of arms or related 
material to and from Iran; 
 
-- Inform the GOT that we are very concerned that Turkish 
firms may be exporting to and importing from Iran arms and 
related material; 
 
-- Note that the export of Wassenaar Arrangement controlled 
items to Iran could require a report to the U.S. Congress 
under the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act 
(INKSNA) and may result in sanctions being imposed on the 
entities and individuals involved; 
 
-- Point out that the import of arms or related material from 
Iran would violate UNSCR 1747, which prohibits Iran from 
supplying, selling or transferring from its territory any 
"arms or related materiel" and requires all states to 
prohibit the procurement of such items from Iran by their 
nationals; 
 
-- Emphasize this is not the time for business as usual with 
Iran; 
 
-- Remind the GOT that both the DIO and Parchin were 
designated for an asset freeze under UNSCRs 1737 and 1747, 
respectively, and were sanctioned by the U.S. under Executive 
Order (E.O.) 13382; 
 
-- Strongly urge the GOT to use available legal authorities, 
including appropriate domestic laws and authorities related 
to implementing UNSCRs 1737 and 1747, to immediately 
terminate these deals and freeze any assets of DIO; 
 
-- Note that Iran has a long history of providing arms and 
other military equipment to terrorist groups and that these 
items could easily end up in the hands of al-Qaida, Hamas, 
Hizballah, and the Taliban; 
 
-------------- 
TALKING POINTS 
-------------- 
 
¶8. (S//REL TURKEY) Begin talking  points: 
 
-- We appreciate the Government of Turkey's continued 
cooperation and support in preventing the transfer of 
military equipment and related materiel to and from Iran. 
 
-- In the spirit of this cooperation, we want to share with 
you some additional information about Turkish firms involved 
in dealings concerning arms and related materiel with Iran. 
 
--------------- 
EXPORTS TO IRAN 
--------------- 
 
-- We have information that the Turkish firms Mercan Tanitim 
Dis Ticaret ve Muhendislik Ltd. and Makina ve Kimya 
Endustrisi Kurumu (MKEK) may sign a contract to export 
military material to Iran. 
 
-- The items covered by the contract include: FMJ (Full Metal 
Jacket) .38 caliber and wadcutter bullets; 40 mm automatic 
grenade launchers; 5.56 mm composite magazines (for M16 
assault rifles), and 7.62 X 39 mm and 7.62 X 51 mm composite 
magazines, all of which are specified on the Wassenaar 
Arrangement Munitions List. 
 
-- In addition, according to the Defense Security Cooperation 
Agency (DSCA) records, Turkey received 181 MK-19 40 mm 
grenade launchers from the United States in 1995.  We do not 
know, definitively, if any of these were among the 40 mm 
grenade launchers contemplated as part of the sale to Iran. 
 
-- We should note, however, that if any U.S.-origin defense 
equipment (including technical data) is re-transferred to 
Iran, that transfer would violate Section 3 of the U.S. Arms 
Export Control Act (AECA).  As a consequence, Turkey could 
lose its country eligibility under the AECA to purchase or 
lease defense articles.  This could potentially include 
Patriot or Reaper unmanned aerial vehicles, or services, or 
the ability to receive credits or guarantees relating to any 
purchase or lease. 
 
----------------- 
IMPORTS FROM IRAN 
----------------- 
 
-- In addition to our information related to the export of 
arms material to Iran, we also understand some of the same 
Turkish firms involved in the exports are interested in 
procuring arms material from Iran. 
 
-- Specifically, we understand that in September 2009, Mercan 
Tanitim was pursuing a deal with MKEK to import 2,000 kg of 
Composition A-4 military plastic explosives produced by 
Parchin Chemical Industries, an Iranian government military 
company and an element of the Defense Industries Organization 
 
(DIO). 
 
-- We further understand that in September 2009, the Turkish 
companies Kolorkim Kimya San and Mercan Tanitim were 
considering a deal to import nitrocellulose (NC) from Iran. 
NC is a dual-use material that serves as a major component in 
smokeless gunpowder. 
 
-- As a subordinate of DIO, Parchin acts on behalf of DIO, 
importing and exporting chemical goods throughout the world. 
In April 2007, Parchin Chemical Industries was identified as 
the final recipient of sodium perchlorate monohydrate, a 
chemical precursor for solid propellant oxidizer, possibly to 
be used for ballistic missiles. 
 
-- As you know, DIO is one of seven Iranian nuclear-related 
entities designated for an asset freeze in the Annex to UNSCR 
¶1737.  In addition to being listed in the Annex for UNSCR 
1737, DIO was sanctioned previously by the United States for 
WMD- or missile-related activities under the Iran and Syria 
Nonproliferation Act (ISNA), the Arms Export Control Act 
(AECA), Executive Order (E.O.) 13382, and the Export 
Administration Act. 
 
-- We would further note that Parchin Chemical Industries has 
been designated for an asset freeze under UNSCR 1747 and U.S. 
E.O. 13382 in July 2008 as a consequence of its work on 
behalf of Iran's ballistic missile program.  We, therefore, 
urge you, per UNSCR 1747, to freeze any assets of Parchin 
Chemical Industries that may come under Turkish jurisdiction. 
 
-- We would like to inform you that Turkish firms engaged in 
business with entities designated under E.O. 13382 are 
eligible for sanctions if such activities are not halted. 
 
-- Given the UN Security Council's grave concern over Iran's 
nuclear and ballistic missile program activities, we urge you 
to encourage all Turkish firms to avoid any affiliation with 
this company. 
 
-- Iran, a U.S.-designated State Sponsor of Terrorism, has a 
long history of providing arms and other military equipment 
to terrorist groups and other non-state actors, including in 
Iraq, Afghanistan, and Lebanon.  We are concerned that the 
materials being negotiated for transfer by the Turkish 
companies in question could be diverted by Iran to such 
groups. 
 
-- Iran has long supplied non-state actors, including 
terrorist groups such as Hizballah, with arms and other 
military equipment.  The terrorist applications of small arms 
and light weapons (SA/LW) are obvious, but Iran has also 
supplied terrorists with larger weapons systems that threaten 
regional security and stability. 
 
-- Failure to prevent these sales could result in the 
re-transfer of military material and explosives by Iran to 
groups like al-Qaida, Hamas, Hizballah, and the Taliban. 
This would harm the Turkish government's reputation as a NATO 
ally and demonstrated opponent of terrorism, and would 
reflect badly on the Turkish business community. 
 
-- These transactions could also be damaging to our bilateral 
relationship as these items can be used to kill and severely 
injure Coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan and elsewhere 
in the region. 
 
-- Turkey is also required to prevent the transfers from Iran 
as noted in UNSCR 1747, paragraph 5, which prohibits Iran 
from supplying, selling or transferring from its territory 
any "arms or related materiel."  All states are required to 
prohibit the procurement of such items from Iran by their 
nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft; whether 
or not such transfers originated in the territory of Iran. 
 
-- We believe the arms and explosives acquisitions being 
pursued by Mercan Tanitim and MKEK with Iranian entities 
would clearly violate this provision of UNSCR 1747, and that 
the Kolorkim and Mercan Tanitim deal involving the transfer 
of nitrocellulose may as well. 
 
-- Action to prevent such transfers would clearly demonstrate 
Turkey's commitment to the full and effective implementation 
of UNSCR 1747. Such action would also remove the possibility 
that these firms could be subject to U.S. sanctions under the 
Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA). 
 
-- We strongly urge you to investigate this information and 
prevent any transfers being contemplated by the entities 
involved by using authorities available under Turkish 
domestic law. 
 
-- Please share with us the results of your investigation at 
your earliest convenience. 
 
END POINTS 
 
--------------------- 
REPORTING REQUIREMENT 
--------------------- 
 
¶9. (U) Post is requested to please report results of its 
efforts as soon as possible. 
 
----------------- 
POINTS OF CONTACT 
----------------- 
 
¶10. (U) Washington points of contact for follow-up are 
Margaret T. Mitchell and Michael Rolleri of ISN/CATR, and 
Matthew Hardiman, EUR/PRA. 
CLINTON