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UNCLAS STATE 015563 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS, THE HAGUE FOR CWC DEL 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC OPCW CBW IZ
SUBJECT: CWC: GUIDANCE FOR THE 59th SESSION OF THE OPCW 
EXECUTIVE COUNCIL (FEBRUARY 23-26, 2010) 
 
REFS: 
A) 2010 State 005807(Guidance for Consultations and 
Meetings on Issues Related to CW Destruction and the 
2012 Deadline) 
B) 2009 State 105819 (Guidelines for the 58th Session of 
the OPCW Executive Council) 
C) 2008 State 126586 (Supplemental Guidance for the 13th 
Conference of the States Parties, December 2-5, 2008) 
D) 2010 State 007952 (Guidelines for Consultations on 
Situations Not Foreseen by the Convention) 
E) 2010 The Hague 000039 (Experts' Meeting on the Iraqi 
Al Muthanna Bunkers) 
 
----------------- 
Summary/Overview 
----------------- 
 
¶1.  (U) The fifty-ninth session of the Executive Council 
(EC-59) will involve much routine Council business. 
Several politically loaded issues, both on and off the 
agenda, are likely to receive significant attention on 
the Council floor and on the margins.  The issue of "how 
and when" to initiate discussions on the 2012 final 
extended chemical weapon (CW)destruction deadline has 
not received much attention during the intersessional 
period, but the opportunity for mischief remains.  And, 
of course, the two U.S. 90-day CW destruction progress 
reports will provide Iran ample opportunity for 
political theater.  The issuance of a Note by the 
Director-General (DG) on the composition of the 
Technical Secretariat (TS) may be used by the South 
African ambassador to pressure the DG on the need for 
increased geographical representation in the hiring of 
TS staff members from the developing world - especially 
from the African Group. 
 
¶2.  (U) One issue which is politically loaded and may 
consume time on the margins is Michael Hurley's 
(Ireland) facilitation on "Situations Not Covered" by 
the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).  This was 
intended to be a limited effort to address chemical 
weapons (CW) recovered in a non-state party during armed 
conflict.  Some, however, are attempting to take the 
issue in a direction (e.g., expanded scope, legally 
binding, and application of treaty provisions for 
declarations, inspections, and destruction) that is 
inimical to U.S. interests.  Following several rounds of 
consultations and severe criticism of the facilitator's 
draft text by several delegations, Hurley recently 
circulated a paper containing five elements that that he 
hopes could offer a way ahead.   The United States, UK 
and perhaps other delegations still have significant 
problems with Hurley's five elements.  In addition, the 
Russian delegation is also likely to be anxious to speak 
to the U.S. delegation (Del) on the continued 
verification measures at converted chemical weapons 
production facilities (CWPFs). 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Del objectives for EC-59: 
--ensure that the facilitator for Situations Not 
Covered, the TS, and key delegations are well aware that 
the United States will not accept any decision that is 
of expanded scope or legally binding.  Work to ensure 
that any additional draft that may be tabled is heading 
in a direction that the United States can work with; 
--ensure that the two U.S. 90-day CW destruction 
progress reports are simply noted and work to ensure 
that Iran - to the extent possible - becomes isolated 
should it decide to use the United States reports to 
grandstand on the U.S. projected inability to meet the 
extended 2012 CWC destruction deadline; and 
--ensure that any discussions or consultations that may 
be held on "how and when" to initiate discussions on the 
2012 final extended CW destruction deadline remain 
focused on the process elements of "how and when." 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
--- 
Agenda Item/Issue 
Paragraphs 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
--- 
 
Status of implementation of the Convention (Item 5): 
a. Detailed plans for verification of chemical weapons 
destruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
4-5 
b. Facility  agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
6-7 
c. Conversion of chemical weapons production facilities 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. .8-12 
d. Progress made in meeting revised deadlines for the 
destruction of chemical weapons and related issues. . 
13-23 
e. Timely submission of declarations under Article VI of 
the Convention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
24 
f. Status of implementation of Article X . . . . . . . . 
25 
g. Status of implementation of Article XI  . . . . . . . 
26 
h. Industry-Cluster issues, including enhancement of 
OCPF declarations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
.27-30 
i. Procedure for off-site sample analysis and adherence 
to  OPCW Confidentiality Regime requirements. . . . . . 
. . .31 
j. Implementing the regime for handling confidential 
information in 2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
.32 
OPCW's Central Analytical Database (Item 6):. . . . . 
33-35 
Report on the implementation in 2009 of the 
recommendations of the External Auditor (Item 7): . . . 
. . . . . . . . .36 
Administrative and Financial Matters (Item 8): 
a. Implementation of the Verification Information 
System.37 
b. OPCW income and expenditures for FY 2009 . . . . . . 
.38 
c. Transfer of funds in 2009. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
.39 
d. Report on implementation of the tenure policy. . . . 
.40 
e. Composition of the Technical Secretariat . . . . . . 
.41 
f. Implementation of International Public Sector 
Accounting Standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . .42 
g. Adjustments to the Director-General's gross salary . 
.43 
h. Amendment of Staff Rule 9.4.02 . . . . . . . . . . . 
.44 
Report on the Scientific Advisory Board(Item 9):. . . . 
.45 
OPCW's contribution to global anti-terrorism effort 
(Item 10): . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
46 
Any other business (Item 11): 
a. Credentials of Executive Council representatives. . . 
47 
b. Corrigendum to the supplement to the 2008 
Verification Implementation Report . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . .48 
c. Key terms used in Executive Council reports. . . . . 
.49 
d. Enhanced transparency on OPCW procedures . . . . . 
50-54 
e. Consultations with Iraqi delegation. . . . . . . . . 
.55 
f. Consultations with the Indian delegation . . . . . . 
.56 
g. Consultations with the Libyan delegation . . . . . . 
.57 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
Item 5: Status of implementation of the Convention 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
--5(a): Detailed plans for verification of the 
destruction of chemical weapons-- 
 
¶4.  (U) The Council is requested to consider and approve 
amendments to the agreed detailed plan for verification 
of the destruction of chemical weapons at the Leonidovka 
chemical weapons destruction facility (CWDF), Russian 
Federation (EC-59/DEC/CRP.1, dated November 16, 2009). 
The detailed plans for verification and facility 
agreements for both the Leonidovka and Maradykovsky 
CWDFs are being modified to reflect the specific 
chemical weapons to be destroyed and the operational 
specifics for the respective second destruction trains. 
Del may join consensus in approving the amendments to 
the detailed plans for verification for Leonidovka. 
 
¶5.  (U) The Council is requested to consider and approve 
amendments to the agreed detailed plan for verification 
of the destruction of chemical weapons at the 
Maradykovsky CWDF, Russian Federation (EC-59/DEC/CRP.2, 
dated November 16, 2009). Del may join consensus for 
approval. 
 
--Subitem 5(b): Facility agreements-- 
 
¶6.  (U) The Council is requested to consider and note 
modifications to the facility agreement with the Russian 
Federation for the Leonidovka CWDF (EC-59/DG.1, dated 
November 16, 2009). No substantive action is required on 
the Note. 
 
¶7.  (U) The Council is requested to consider and note 
modifications to the facility agreement with the Russian 
Federation for the Maradykovsky CWDF (EC-59/DG.2, dated 
November 16, 2009). No substantive action is required on 
the Note. 
 
--Subitem 5(c): Conversion of chemical weapons 
production facilities-- 
 
¶8.  (U) The Council is again requested to consider and 
note a Note by the TS on a proposal for general 
guidelines on the nature of continued verification 
measures at converted CWPFs ten years after the DG's 
certification of their conversion (EC-56/S/3(asterisk), 
dated April 14, 2009), and to approve a draft decision 
on the matter (EC-57/DEC/CRP.1, dated June 3, 2009. 
 
(9).  (U) Del should work to have both documents 
deferred.  The issue remains under consideration in 
several capitals and Washington is still conducting its 
own internal review.  Del is encouraged to hold 
consultations on the margins of the EC with the UK, 
Germans and other interested delegations.  Del should 
gather as much information as possible on the positions 
of other delegations. 
 
¶10.  (U) Del should indicate that the United States 
believes that converted facilities need to be assessed 
on an individual basis irrespective of the country in 
which they are located.  Such an assessment should 
include current activities of the facility and take into 
account the overall configuration of the plant site, 
which can be quite large in certain situations, as well 
as the activities that are underway there and in 
adjacent or adjoining facilities. Converted facilities 
that are co-located on a plant site where other chemical 
production or processing activities are underway may 
pose special risks and therefore require special 
verification arrangements to ensure confidence.  The 
United States is still in the process of assessing all 
converted facilities that are subject to continued 
verification measures. 
 
¶11.  (U) Washington understands that Russia is 
considering the destruction of some of its formerly 
converted CWPFs, but has not provided any specific 
information.  Del should seek the names and locations of 
the converted CWPFs that Russia is considering for 
destruction.  Russia is also interested in learning more 
about the process that the United States utilized for 
the destruction of the former Marquardt CWPF (part of 
the binary program).  In November 2000, the U.S. 
notified the TS that the Marquardt buildings had been 
demolished and in 2001 the TS inspected Marquardt and 
closed out the CWPF as destroyed; it no longer falls 
under treaty requirements for a converted CWPF. Del 
should inform Russia that TS inspections verified the 
conversion of the Marquardt facility in 1997 and 1998. 
In 2000, the Marquardt facility was sold to another 
company who demolished the facility; standard demolition 
techniques were used and the destruction requirement was 
satisfied, notified and confirmed by the TS in 2001. 
 
¶12.  (U) A State Party: Del should seek a bilateral 
meeting with this delegation and inform them of the 
points in paragraph (10) above and indicate that the 
United States believes that the converted facility may 
need to be subject to continuing verification measures. 
Del should inform A State Party that the United States 
is still developing its position on the type of 
verification measures that should apply, and that the 
two countries will need to cooperate closely on this 
issue.  Washington understands from the previous 
consultation that A State Party is opposed to new (or 
continued) verification measures. 
 
--Subitem 5(d): Progress made in meeting revised 
deadlines for destruction of chemical weapons-- 
 
¶13.  (U) The Council is requested to consider and note 
two national papers by the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya on the 
status of its destruction activities (EC-59/NAT.1, dated 
October 22, 2009, and EC-59/NAT.5, dated January 18, 
2010). No substantive action is required on the two 
Notes. 
 
¶14.  (U) The Council is requested to consider and note 
two national papers by the United States of America on 
the status of its destruction activities (EC-59/NAT.2, 
dated October 20, 2009 and EC-59/NAT.6, dated January 
12, 2010). No substantive action is required on the two 
Notes. 
 
¶15.  (U) The Council is requested to consider and note 
two national papers by the Russian Federation on the 
status of its destruction activities (EC-59/P/NAT.1, 
dated October 19, 2009; and EC-59/P/NAT.2, dated 
February 17, 2010). No substantive action is required in 
the two Notes. 
 
¶16.  (U) The Council is requested to consider and note 
two national papers by China entitled "Report on the 
Status of the Chemical Weapons Abandoned by Japan in 
China" (EC-59/NAT.3( asterisk), dated October 14, 2009; 
and EC-59/NAT.7, dated January 19, 2010), and two 
national papers by Japan entitled "The Report on the 
Current Status of the ACW Projects in China" (EC- 
59/NAT.4, dated October 15, 2009; and  EC_59/NAT.8, 
dated January 20, 2010). No substantive action is 
required on these four Notes. 
 
¶17.  (U) At EC-58 the Council requested the Chairperson 
to engage in informal consultations with interested 
delegations on how and when to initiate discussion by 
the Council on issues related to meeting the final 
extended deadlines for the destruction of chemical 
weapons, and to keep the Council informed of these 
consultations. The Chair will report to the Council on 
informal consultations held in accordance with this 
request. 
 
¶18.  (U) Chairman Lomonaco is expected to report on the 
positive and generally constructive tone of the first 
consultation, and may restate his concept that the 
consultations should provide a forum for discussion that 
parallels the formal sessions of the Council. As 
appropriate, Del should complement the Chairman and 
fellow delegations on the productive beginning, 
emphasize the U.S. intent for continued, active 
participation, and support a reasonable schedule for 
addressing the completion of CW destruction by the 2012 
deadline. Del should push back if Iran attempts to 
reintroduce the concept of an ad-hoc working group, and 
deploy previous guidance (Ref. A) should Iran attempt to 
open discussion of the U.S. destruction  schedule. 
 
¶19. (U) At EC-58 the Council decided to establish a 
facilitation to develop guidelines for the security and 
destruction of CW that comes into the possession and/or 
control of a State Party in situations unforeseen by the 
Convention. The facilitator (Michael Hurley) will report 
to the Council on the consultations held. 
 
¶20. (U) Del should use the margins and informal meetings 
with Hurley and other delegations to argue for a draft 
decision that is political in nature (e.g., not legally 
binding) and focused exclusively on the recovery of CW 
in non-state parties during future armed conflicts, 
events that were not envisaged by the CWC.  A legally 
binding draft decision that is of broad and potentially 
unlimited scope is not acceptable to the United States. 
Any draft decision should also not be declarative in 
nature and avoid the use of "shall, must, will" in favor 
of "should, may, etc." 
 
¶21. (U) Del should exchange legal views with the TS 
Legal Advisor and work constructively with him, South 
Africa and others to focus on the elements presented by 
Hurley that may offer common ground.  For instance, the 
need for an "acceptable level of transparency and timely 
reporting" (element 3 of the five elements defined by 
Hurley), having a role for the policy-making organs 
(element 4), and reporting to the Council (element 5) 
contain useful and constructive concepts.  Concerning 
element 5, Del must avoid use of such terms as "full 
facts before the Executive Council for review."  The EC 
is not a tribunal. The recovering State Party should 
provide to the EC information on what was recovered, how 
it was handled, secured, or destroyed, and any potential 
impact on the safety of the local population and the 
environment. This information should be provided in a 
manner and at a time that is consistent with 
contemporaneous security conditions. 
 
¶22. (U) Element 1 (threshold for triggering the use of 
the guidelines) and Element 2 (verification in 
accordance with the Verification Annex and CWC) as 
drafted, are problematic.  The basic problem is that 
there should be no "threshold for triggering the 
guidelines" and " application of the CWC" because the 
recovery of CW in a non-state party during periods of 
armed conflict was not foreseen by the drafters of the 
CWC.  Therefore, elements 1 and 2 are not acceptable.  A 
possible way ahead may be to put general treaty 
references in the preambular section of a draft decision 
with the admonition that recovering States Parties 
should be mindful of these CWC provisions and should 
attempt to guide their actions in that spirit. 
Operative sections of the text could focus on the 
limited scope of the draft decision, the non-binding 
nature of the political agreement, along with elements 
on transparency that would be desirable but not 
mandatory, and recommended guidelines for reporting to 
the EC with due accommodations for safety and security 
considerations, as assessed by the recovering State 
Party. 
 
¶23. (U) Del should oppose any efforts by some 
delegations to make this a separate and regular EC 
agenda item.  This is not necessary.  The issue 
currently falls under Status of Implementation and that 
is where it should be handled until the interested 
States Parties believe enough progress has been made to 
warrant discussion by the Council. 
 
--Subitem 5(e): Timely submission of declarations under 
Article VI of the Convention-- 
 
¶24.  (U) The Council is requested to note the Note by 
the DG on the timely submission by States Parties of 
declarations under Article VI of the Chemical Weapons 
Convention  (EC-59/DG.8, dated January 29, 2010). No 
substantive action is required on the Note. 
 
--Subitem 5(f): Status of implementation of Article X-- 
 
¶25.  (U) The Council is requested to consider and note a 
report by the DG on the status of implementation of 
Article X of the Convention as at 31 December 2009 (EC- 
59/DG.12,dated February 9, 2010). No substantive action 
is required on the Note. 
 
--Subitem 5(g): Status of implementation of Article XI - 
- 
 
¶26.  (U) The Council is requested to consider and note a 
report by the DG on the status of implementation of 
Article XI of the Convention as at December 31, 2009 
(EC-59/DG.13, dated February 11, 2010). No substantive 
action is required on the Note. 
 
--Subitem 5(h): Industry-Cluster issues, including 
enhancement of OCPF declaration-- 
 
¶27.  (U) The Council has considered a Note by the TS on 
enhancing information on the characteristics of plant 
sites in other chemical production facility (OCPF) 
declarations (EC-53/S/5, dated June 17, 2008) and a Note 
by the DG concerning information on the enhancement of 
OCPF declarations (EC-53/DG.11, dated June 17, 2008) at 
previous sessions, and is requested to consider the 
Notes further. 
 
¶28. (U) No action is required on these two Notes.  There 
has been no progress through consultations on these two 
Notes since EC-57.  Previous Del guidance on the two 
Notes still applies (Ref. B). As appropriate, Del should 
restate the need for the TS to provide assessments that 
clearly demonstrate the beneficial impact that would 
result from implementing the actions proposed in TS and 
in the DG Notes. Del may support the TS continuing its 
efforts to better focus OCPF inspections by working with 
States Parties in considering alternative approaches to 
those contained in the two Notes. 
 
¶29. (U) Del should raise the United States' concern with 
the lack of progress in addressing longstanding 
industry-related issues, in particular in expanding the 
OCPF selection methodology to implement fully the 
provisions of Paragraph 11 of Part IX of the 
Verification Annex to include proposals by States 
Parties, and the need for the Council to identify 
qualified facilitators so that key issue can be 
addressed. 
 
¶30.  (U) The Council is requested to consider and note 
the report by the DG on the performance of the modified 
methodology for the selection of OCPFs for inspection 
(EC-59/DG.5, dated January 18, 2010).  No action is 
required on this report. The report provides an update 
of the report noted during EC-58 (first year (2008) 
report) and covers the first two years of 
implementation. The results are consistent with 2008 
report except that in 2009 there were fewer sites 
selected of high relevance to the CWC (high A14 scores) 
and the maximum limit (20) on numbers of Schedule 3 plus 
OCPF inspections was reached by China and the United 
States, resulting in higher than statistically 
predictable OCPF selections in other States Parties - 
Iran complained about this issue in EC-57 and EC-58. The 
initial inspection of a large number of Schedule 3 plant 
sites in China likewise appears to have resulted in 
higher than statistically predicted OCPF selections in 
the United States. The future impact of this development 
will need to be discussed within the interagency. Del 
guidance on comments still applies (Ref. B). 
 
--Subitem 5(i): Technical arrangement between the TS and 
designated laboratories concerning the procedures for 
off-site analysis of samples and for adherence to the 
requirements of the OPCW Confidentiality Regime-- 
 
¶31.  (U) The Council is requested to consider and note a 
Note by the DG entitled the "Technical Arrangement 
between the TS and Designated Laboratories Concerning 
the Procedures for Off-site Analysis of Samples and for 
Adherence to the Requirements of the OPCW 
Confidentiality Regime" (EC-57/DG.5, dated June 3, 
2009). No substantive action is required on the Note. 
However, Del should request clarification from the 
German and French delegations on their concerns with the 
Note. 
 
--Subitem 5(j): Implementation of the regime governing 
the handling of confidential information by the TS in 
2009-- 
 
¶32.  (U) The Council is requested to consider and note a 
report by the DG on the implementation of the regime 
governing the handling of confidential information by 
the Secretariat in 2009 (EC-59/DG.6 C-15/DG.1, dated 
January 27, 2010). No substantive action is required on 
the Note. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
Item 6:  OPCW Central Analytical Database 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶33.  (U) The Council is requested to note a Note by the 
Secretariat on continued inclusion in the OPCW Central 
Analytical Database (OCAD) of analytical data for 
analytical derivatives of scheduled chemicals (EC- 
57/S/1, dated June 11, 2009). No substantive action is 
required on the Note. 
 
¶34.  (U) The Council is requested to consider a Note by 
the DG on the lists of validated data for approval by 
the Council for inclusion in the OCAD (EC-58/DG.4, dated 
September 4, 2009) and to approve a draft decision on 
the inclusion (EC-58/DEC/CRP.1, dated September 10, 
2009). Del may agree to approve the decision. 
 
¶35.  (U) The Council is requested to consider a Note by 
the DG on the lists of validated data for approval by 
the Council for inclusion in the OCAD (EC-59/DG.3, dated 
December 16, 2009) and to approve a draft decision on 
the inclusion (EC-59/DEC/CRP.4, dated January 21, 2010). 
Del may agree to approve the decision. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
Item 7:  Report on the implementation in 2009 of the 
recommendations of the External Auditor 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶36.  (U) The Council is requested to consider and note a 
Note by the Secretariat on the status of implementation 
of the recommendations of the External Auditor (EC- 
59/S/1, dated January 29, 2010). No substantive action 
is required on the Note. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
Item 8:  Administrative and financial matters 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
--Subitem 8(a): Current status of implementation of the 
Verification Information System-- 
 
¶37.  (U) The Council is requested to take note of the 
status report on the Verification Information System 
(EC-59/S/3, dated February 1, 2010). No substantive 
action is required on the Note. 
 
-- 8(b): OPCW income and expenditure for the financial 
year to 31 December 2009-- 
 
¶38.  (U) The Council is requested to note a report by 
the DG on OPCW income and expenditure for the financial 
year to 31 December 31, 2009 (EC-59/DG.9, dated February 
4, 2010. No substantive action is required on the Note. 
 
--Subitem 8(c): Transfers of funds in 2009-- 
 
¶39.  (U) The Council is requested to note a Note by the 
DG on transfers of funds during 2009 (EC-59/DG.7 C- 
15/DG.2, dated January 29, 2010). No substantive action 
is required on the Note. 
 
--Subitem 8(d): Report on the implementation of the 
policy on tenure-- 
 
¶40.  (U) The Council is requested to note a DG report on 
implementation of the tenure policy in 2008 (EC-57/DG.4, 
dated 3 June 2009), and an addendum dated February 8, 
2010).  No substantive action is required on the Note. 
 
--Subitem 8(e): Composition of the Technical 
Secretariat-- 
 
¶41.  (U) Following deliberations at CSP-14, the Council 
is requested to discuss and take a decision on the 
structure and content of a yearly report on the 
composition of the TS. The Council is requested to 
consider a Note by the DG on this subject (EC-59/DG.10, 
dated February 8, 2010). This yearly reporting was 
instigated by the South African ambassador, who is 
seeking more transparency on TS hiring practices and 
continues to push for greater hiring of African 
candidates.  This item is likely to be deferred, as it 
is difficult for the Council to take a decision on a 
document that has not been circulated only two weeks 
before the session.  Del may support deferral of the 
document. 
 
--Subitem 8(f): Implementation of the International 
Public Sector Accounting Standards-- 
 
¶42. (U) The Council is requested to consider and note 
the Note by the Secretariat on the status of 
implementation of the International Public Sector 
Accounting Standards (EC-59/S/4, dated February 12, 
2010). No substantive action is required on the Note. 
 
--Subitem 8(g): Adjustment to the Director-General's 
gross salary-- 
 
¶43.  (U) A decision of the Conference at its First 
Special Session (C-SS-1/DEC.4, dated 25 July 2002) 
stipulated that the terms of appointment of the DG shall 
be subject to adjustments by the Council to keep the 
terms in line with those of other executive heads within 
the United Nations system. The Council is requested to 
adopt a decision adjusting the Director-General's gross 
salary (EC-59/DEC/CRP.3, dated January 21, 2010). Del 
can join consensus on a decision that will adjust the 
DG's gross salary in line with other executive heads 
within the United Nations system. 
 
--Subitem 8(h): Amendment of Staff Rule 9.4.02-- 
 
¶44.  (U) The Council is requested to consider the 
amendment to Staff Rule 9.4.02 (this document is not yet 
available to delegations), and to recommend the 
amendment to the Conference at its Fifteenth Session 
(this document is not yet available to delegations).  If 
not raised by others, Del should request that 
consideration of these documents be deferred until EC-60 
due to their late distribution. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
Item 9:  Report of the Scientific Advisory Board 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶45.  (U) The Council is requested to note the report of 
the Fourteenth Session of the Scientific Advisory Board 
(SAB) (SAB-14/1, dated November 11, 2009) and the Note 
by the DG in response to the report of the Fourteenth 
Session of the SAB (EC-59/DG.4, dated January 14, 2010). 
No substantive action is required on the Note. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
--- 
Item 10:  The OPCW's contribution to global anti- 
terrorism efforts 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
--- 
 
¶46.  (U) The Council is requested to consider and note 
the Note by the DG on the status of the OPCW's 
contribution to global anti-terrorism efforts (EC- 
59/DG.11, Dated February 8, 2010). No substantive action 
is required on the Note.  Del should, as appropriate, 
take the floor and thank the DG and associated staff for 
producing this very comprehensive report.  The TS should 
be encouraged to provide regular updates. Per Ref. C, 
Del should explain, as necessary, U.S. "redlines" on 
chemical safety and security.  Specifically,  Del should 
point out that the OPCW is not organized or staffed as a 
chemical terrorism organization and that the OPCW should 
not develop requirements or guidance documents for 
States Parties or industry that provide direction on 
chemical safety and security. 
 
----------------------------- 
Item 11:  Any other business 
----------------------------- 
 
--Credentials of representatives to the Executive 
Council-- 
 
¶47.  (U) The Council is requested to consider and 
approve an addendum to the report by the DG on the 
credentials of representatives of members of the 
Council.  Del should review this document when available 
and may agree to approve the document. 
 
--Corrigendum to the supplement to the 2008 Verification 
Implementation Report-- 
 
¶48. (U) The Council is requested to consider and note 
the corrigendum to the supplement to the 2008 
Verification Implementation Report (VIR) (EC- 
58/HP/DG.1/Corr.1, dated December 29, 2009). No 
substantive action is required on the Note. 
 
--Key terms regularly used in Executive Council reports- 
- 
 
¶49.  (U) The Council is requested to consider and note 
the Note by the Secretariat on key terms used in the 
reports of the Council (EC-59/S/2, dated January 29, 
2010). No substantive action is required on the Note. 
 
--Enhanced transparency in the procedure of the policy- 
making organs of the OPCW-- 
 
¶50.  (U)The Note by the Chairperson entitled "Enhancing 
Transparency in the Procedures of the Policy-Making 
Organs of the OPCW" (EC-59/2, dated 4 February 2010) has 
been circulated to members of the Council.  As 
Washington understands it, the Council is not being 
asked to approve or note this document; it is a proposal 
of basic guidelines on transparency measures for when 
informal groups meet under the policy-making organs in 
effort to resolve a deadlocked issue. 
 
¶51.  (U) Washington is aware of the perceived lack of 
transparency regarding the meeting of informal 
gatherings to try and resolve deadlocked issues in a 
small group setting.  The absence of transparency and 
inclusiveness can undermine the perceived legitimacy of 
the outcome or even prevent agreement. This is an on- 
going problem that should be addressed in some capacity. 
The Note by the Chairperson is too restrictive though. 
For instance, convening informal groups as "a last 
resort" (paragraph 6a) could mean in reality that such a 
group never convenes. Also, the informal gathering 
should not be "a step prior to the convening of open- 
ended facilitation" - such a process would likely undue 
any agreement reached in the informal gathering. 
Regional consultations (paragraph 8) should not be 
allowed to hold-up progress within the informal group or 
to prevent the Chairperson from giving regular progress 
reports.  It is also not appropriate (paragraph 9) that 
the conclusions of the informal group be presented to 
the facilitation group before the outcomes are tabled in 
plenary.  A facilitation is not a ratifying or approving 
body and such a mechanism adds an unnecessary layer and 
would likely result in prolonged consultations and a 
breakdown of agreement. 
 
¶52.  (U) Del should approach Lomonaco early and seek 
clarify on his intentions.  Are his intentions to have 
the discussion paper noted, or to convene a consultative 
process?  Del can support the aims of the paper (e.g., 
increased transparency) but should lay down a marker 
that the paper as drafted is too restrictive.  The 
overall responsibility of the Chairperson is to achieve 
results.  Restrictive requirements or prescriptive 
guidelines for small-group work (a standard component of 
multilateral negotiations)  can interfere with the 
Chairperson's ability to make progress and resolve 
roadblocks. 
 
¶53.  (U) Del should work with Lomonaco on the elements 
of his Note that may offer a way ahead.  For instance, 
having representation from each regional group attending 
small-group gatherings will help facilitate 
transparency.  The facilitator of the facilitation and 
the Chairperson should be invited to all small group 
gatherings.  The Chairperson should also be encouraged 
to present regular progress updates to the Council from 
the informal groups.  The Chairperson may also encourage 
other interested delegations to attend small group 
gatherings. 
 
¶54. U) Del should also seek out the views of other key 
delegations.  While the Council is not taking action on 
this Note, Del should make it clear to the EC Chair and 
other delegations, that the basic guidelines as 
presented do not constitute any operating guidance for 
the policy-making organs.  The guidelines are simply a 
suggestion and Del should work to steer them in a 
direction as outlined above.  If the guidelines are 
presented in a manner that conforms with above guidance, 
del may agree to note the note - if necessary. 
 
--Consultations with the Iraqi delegation-- 
 
¶55. (SBU) Six participants from Baghdad are expected to 
join their CWC delegation during EC-59 for bilateral 
meeting on the margins. The U.S.-GOI agenda should 
include continued discussion of specifics on GOI 
reporting of recovered CW; status of GOI decisions on 
making corrections via amendment to the CWC declaration 
and a proposal to use encapsulation for the Al Muthanna 
bunkers, as suggested by the TS during recent GOI-U.S.- 
TS experts' meeting (Ref. E); and GOI preparations for 
presentations on the proposed amendment and its general 
plan for CW destruction to be presented during EC-60 in 
April.  Del will focus on addressing any open questions 
from the experts meeting, eliciting Iraq's decisions and 
timeline for deploying its general plan and planning for 
USG assistance to GOI preparations for EC-60. 
 
--Consultations with the Indian delegation on industry 
issues- 
 
¶56. (U) Consultations may be held with the Indian 
delegation on industry issues including preparations to 
host inspections, host team procedures during 
inspections and evaluation of the effectiveness of 
inspections as a follow-up to discussions held on the 
margins of CSP-14. 
 
--Consultations with the Libyan delegation on CW 
destruction - 
 
¶57.  (U) The United States should continue consultations 
with the Libyan delegation on the status of its CW 
destruction and conversion efforts.  Del should seek out 
the UK and Italian delegations to determine whether a 
joint meeting among the four delegations would be more 
productive. 
CLINTON