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OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHC #4164/01 0481951
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 171948Z FEB 10
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 2941
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 9278
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 7321
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA IMMEDIATE 5290
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 8409
INFO DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 014164 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREF PREL KPKO CD CT
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE: REQUEST TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF CHINA, 
FRANCE, RUSSIA, AND THE UNITED KINGDOM TO SUPPORT 
CONTINUATION OF THE UN MISSION IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN 
REPUBLIC AND CHAD (MINURCAT) 
 
¶1.  This is an action request.  Please see paragraph 13. 
Department requests the assistance of Embassies Beijing, 
London, Moscow, and Paris in securing assurances from their 
host governments that they will demarche the Government of 
Chad (GOC) in an effort to persuade the GOC to continue the 
UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad 
(MINURCAT) mandate, as agreed among the P5 in New York. 
 
OBJECTIVES 
---------------- 
¶2.  Department instructs Embassies Beijing, London, Moscow, 
and Paris to pursue the following objectives: 
 
¶3.  As agreed in a meeting of the P5 in New York, encourage 
host governments to approach the Government of Chad (GOC) and 
inform them the request to have MINURCAT withdraw is 
misguided, and that the GOC should engage with the UN 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations to find a way to 
continue the mission. 
 
¶4.  While we understand that the GOC has made strong comments 
regarding a desire for the withdrawal, we do not believe that 
all avenues have been explored with Chadian President Deby, 
and the first step must be to exhaust the possibilities for 
extending the mandate in accordance with benchmarks as 
opposed to a calendar-based timeline. 
 
¶5.  Encourage officials of the host government,s Foreign 
Ministry to initiate discussions immediately with officials 
from the Government of Chad to continue the mandate of 
MINURCAT, ensuring that adequate security protections are in 
place for the protection of refugees, internally displaced 
persons, and other vulnerable civilians, including 
humanitarian assistance actors and UN personnel present in 
eastern Chad. 
 
¶6.  Determine at what level the host government will approach 
the GOC and when they expect the discussions will occur, and 
request a follow-up meeting to obtain a readout of the GOC 
response to the host government's demarche.  (Note to posts: 
A/S Carson has already delivered this demarche on behalf of 
the USG in a phone call to President Deby.  Special Envoy 
Gration has also delivered this demarche in a meeting with 
President Deby. End note) 
 
¶7.  SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS 
 
--As agreed among the P5 in New York, P5 members should 
demarche the Government of Chad, to inform the GOC that 
President Deby's decision to ask for MINURCAT to withdraw was 
misguided and to encourage Deby to engage with the UN to 
continue MINURCAT.  The P5 also agreed to refrain from 
discussing specific modalities for the continuation of the 
mission, leaving this for the UN to negotiate. 
 
--Please provide information as to who will deliver the 
demarche on behalf of your government, and a date and time 
when we can meet again to discuss the results of your 
government's demarche with the Government of Chad. 
 
MINURCAT 
---------------- 
 
¶8.  MINURCAT was established to contribute to the protection 
of refugees, displaced persons, and civilians in danger and 
to create security conditions conducive to a voluntary, 
secure, and sustainable return of refugees and internally 
displaced persons.  The mission contributes to the training 
and advising of Chadian security forces, and the monitoring 
and promotion of human rights.  The conflict in Darfur, the 
cross-border movements of refugees and armed rebel groups, 
and the presence of opportunistic bandits and criminals 
continue to contribute to the high degree of insecurity in 
eastern Chad. 
 
¶9.  Eastern Chad hosts approximately 270,000 refugees and 
170,000 internally displaced persons in the region bordering 
Darfur in Sudan.  This region continues to have frequent 
violence, and mechanisms to protect vulnerable civilians are 
required.  The MINURCAT military contingent, along with 
 
STATE 00014164  002 OF 002 
 
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE: REQUEST TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF CHINA, 
FRANCE, RUSSIA, AND THE UNITED KINGDOM TO SUPPORT 
CONTINUATION OF THE UN MISSION IN THE CENTRAL AFRIC 
MINURCAT police, provides a measure of security for this 
vulnerable population.  MINURCAT also assists in providing 
security to humanitarian assistance actors in the area.  The 
sudden departure of MINURCAT without adequate preparation for 
establishing a secure environment could create conditions 
leading to escalating violence and banditry.  With the 
departure of the peacekeeping mission, humanitarian 
assistance and those providing the assistance would also be 
placed in greater jeopardy. 
 
¶10.  Substantial efforts and funding has gone into the 
creation and development of the Detachment Integre de 
Securite (DIS), the UN-trained and supported special Chadian 
police responsible for providing security in and around the 
refugee and IDP camps.  The DIS, while still in need of 
further development, has by all accounts improved security in 
eastern Chad.  The sudden withdrawal of the UN, including the 
UN police contingent responsible for training and supporting 
the DIS, would end established programs designed to fully 
develop the DIS into an effective and professional security 
organization.  Further, the UN Trust Fund used to provide 
financial support for DIS operations, will in all likelihood 
cease to exist, thereby precluding additional donor support. 
The existence and future of the DIS would thus be in 
jeopardy, severely compromising the security environment in 
eastern Chad.  The departure of MINURCAT will also have 
negative consequences for security in northeastern Central 
African Republic, with a likely increase in insecurity that 
will spill over in the Chad. 
 
¶11.  In addition to improving security in Chad for civilians 
and humanitarian actors, the UN mission has provided, and 
continues to provide, other forms of important assistance to 
Chad.  MINURCAT has contributed to:  1) efforts to improve 
the rule of law architecture in Chad including judicial and 
prison reform; 2) improving prison infrastructure; 3) efforts 
to educate the population on sexual and gender based violence 
and to prevent and deter such violence; 4) developing human 
rights campaigns; and 5) monitoring child protection issues 
including the use of child soldiers.  Further, MINURCAT,s 
de-mining assistance and efforts have resulted in a 
significant reduction in the presence of unexploded ordnance. 
 
¶12.  The sudden withdrawal of MINURCAT would place immediate 
and substantial burdens on the Government of Chad, and that 
of the Central African Republic, to provide security to a 
large and dispersed group of vulnerable civilians.  It is 
highly doubtful the Government of Chad, or the Government of 
the Central African Republic, could immediately fill the void 
that would be left by the sudden withdrawal of the 
peacekeeping mission.  The United States strongly believes 
the MINURCAT mission should therefore be extended beyond 
March 15, 2010, until March 2011. 
 
¶13.  Action request.  Embassies Beijing, London, Moscow, and 
Paris are requested to approach their host governments 
February 18, 2010, to obtain their commitment to demarche the 
GOC in support of the continuation of the UN Mission in the 
Central African Republic and Chad when its mandate expires in 
March 2010.  The Department also requests that information 
regarding who will deliver the demarche to the GOC on behalf 
of the host governments be obtained and provided to the 
Department, and further, that the host governments advise 
when embassies can follow-up to discuss the results of their 
efforts.  Department appreciates this assistance from 
Embassies Beijing, London, Moscow, and Paris.  End action 
request. 
 
REPORTING DEADLINE 
---------------- 
¶14.  Please contact Thomas Brown, IO/PSC, at (202) 736-7789 
or Genevieve McKeel, AF/C, at (202) 647-2973, or via e-mail 
for any necessary further background information or 
argumentation to meet our objectives.  Embassy should report 
results of efforts by cable to the above by February 19, 
¶2010. 
CLINTON