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DE RUEHC #2134 0362257
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O 052249Z FEB 10
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 0000
INFO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 0000
RHMFISS/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DTRA DULLES WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMCSUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 012134 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/2030 
TAGS: BO KACT KZ PARM RS UP US START
SUBJECT: SFO-VIII GUIDANCE 004:  ICBM SILOS; RV 
COVERS; AND NEW KINDS 
 
REF: A. GENEVA 1220-1221 (SFO-GVA-VII-161) U.S. 
PROPOSED JDT OF THE TREATY 
     ¶B. GENEVA 1208-1219 (SFO-GVA-VII-162) U.S. 
PROPOSED JDT OF THE PROTOCOL 
     ¶C. GENEVA 1235 (SFO-GVA-VI-159) 
     ¶D. STATE 9672 (SFO-VIII GUIDANCE 002) 
        ¶E. STATE 9671 (SFO-VIII GUIDANCE 001) 
 
Classified By: Karin L. Look, Acting ASSISTANT 
SECRETARY, VCI.  Reason: 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
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ICBM silo training launchers and engineering models 
of ICBM silos 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
-- 
 
¶1. (S) Background:   DoD estimates that, in order 
for the United States to comply with the 800 limit on 
deployed and non-deployed launchers and nuclear- 
capable heavy bombers, an additional reduction of 
such systems will have to be made.  For operational 
and costreasons, it is desirable to minimize the number of 
ICBM or SLBM launchers or heavy bombers that will need to be 
eliminated.  The engineering models of silos at Hill 
AFB were included in START as ICBM training 
launchers via the Thirteenth Agreed Statement at 
Soviet insistence.  There is no launch control 
center at Hill AFB, so these silos could not launch 
an ICBM.  These silos are used for testing 
silo/missile modifications.  The same is true for 
the ICBM silo training launchers located at the 
three U.S. ICBM bases; there are no launch control 
centers connected with these launchers. 
Additionally, the launcher doors for those training 
sites would have to be manually removed to support a 
launch.  Although these engineering models and silo 
training launchers were counted as silo training 
launchers under the START Treaty, they do not meet 
the definition of ICBM launcher since they are not 
intended or used to contain, prepare for launch, and 
launch an ICBM. Therefore, the U.S. does not intend 
to count the engineering models of silos at Hill AFB 
and silo training launchers at U.S. ICBM bases as 
non-deployed ICBM launchers for purposes of the 800 
overall limit. (Washington notes that silo training 
launchers at ICBM bases are already limited in 
number by paragraph 7 of Article IV.) 
 
¶2. (S) Guidance:  Bearing in mind high level 
agreement to an aggregate ceiling of 800 deployed 
and non-deployed launchers, to include bombers along 
with deployed and non-deployed ICBM and SLBM 
launcher (Ref E), delegation is directed to advise 
the Russian Federation that the United States does 
not intend to include, as non-deployed launchers, the 
ICBM silo training launchers at U.S. ICBM bases and the 
engineering models of ICBM silos at Hill AFB within 
the 800 overall limit because these silos are 
incapable of launching ballistic missiles and do not 
meet the definition of ICBM launcher. 
 
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Reentry Vehicle Cover Measurements 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (S) Background:  As reflected in U.S. paragraph 
15 of Section VI of Part Five of the Protocol, the 
U.S. and Russian positions differ regarding the use 
and measuring of covers during warhead inspections. 
As reported in Ref C, Russia proposes using only 
"individual covers" on reentry vehicles.  Russia 
does not consider the hard covers used on the U.S. 
Trident II/D-5 SLBM to be " individual covers." 
(Washington notes that Trident II hard covers will 
have a number of conical "towers" equal to the 
declared number of warheads for the inspected SLBM.) 
Regarding measuring, the United States has proposed 
measuring all reentry vehicle covers, while Russia 
only agrees to measuring hard covers.  During START, 
Russia used hard components under its soft covers, 
but maintained that these components were separate 
from the soft covers themselves, and did not display 
them nor allow measurements of these hard elements.  On the 
majority of Russian missiles the soft covers that 
used hard components were essentially conformal and did 
not hamper confirmation of the number of RVs, but on the 
SS-25 and SS-27 the use of separate hard components 
prevented soft covers from conforming to the shape 
of the RVs, and created such a large volume that it 
was not possible to confirm the number of RVs on the 
front section.  The United States has been notified 
that Russia has begun deployment of variations of 
the SS-27 equipped with multiple warheads. 
 
 
¶4. (S) Guidance:  Delegation is instructed to 
continue to reject the Russian proposal for using 
only "individual covers" for reentry vehicles during 
warhead inspections, unless agreement is reached to 
permit the use of the type of unitary hard cover for 
SLBMs during warhead inspections that the United 
States used during the START Treaty SLBM 
RV OSI.  Delegation is authorized to remove the 
requirement to measure soft conforming reentry 
vehicle covers contingent upon agreement with Russia for a 
one-time exhibition of each type of hybrid reentry 
vehicle cover.  Delegation should seek agreement 
that during the hybrid reentry vehicle cover 
exhibitions, inspectors will be provided the 
opportunity to view and measure the " hybrid" 
reentry vehicle covers in their fully assembled 
state, i.e. as they would appear when placed on the 
front section of a missile, and to view and measure 
all elements of "hybrid" covers.  During subsequent 
inspections, inspectors will be permitted to view 
and measure all elements of the hybrid covers to 
ensure that they have not changed.  Additionally, 
delegation should negotiate ad ref to Washington a 
definition to be included in Part One of the Protocol 
of the term "hybrid reentry vehicle cover" that would 
apply to those covers that include soft elements as well 
as hard components, tensioners, or any device or material 
that gives shape to the cover independently of the RV.  If 
delegation is unable to obtain Russian agreement on 
the approach to hybrid covers outlined above, 
delegation is not authorized to modify the approach 
but should seek further guidance from Washington. 
 
------------------------------------- 
New Kinds of Strategic Offensive Arms 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (S) Background:  With respect to the guidance on 
Treaty Article V provided in Ref D, Washington notes 
that the intent of the provision is not to capture 
new non-nuclear systems as new kinds of strategic 
offensive arms (SOA). There is no definition of "new 
kind" of SOA in the new START Treaty, just as "new 
kind" was not defined in START.  In START, the U.S. 
made it clear both to the Soviet Union during the 
negotiations and to the U.S. Senate during the 
ratification process that the U.S. view 
was that future non-nuclear systems could not be 
considered a new kind of SOA and, thus, would not be 
subject to the Treaty.  Washington believes the 
Delegation should make a similar statement of the 
U.S. views on this matter to the Russian delegation 
so that the new START Treaty negotiating record is 
clear.  Such a statement in the negotiating record 
can be cited during the ratification process. 
 
¶6. (S) Guidance:  The Delegation is directed to 
inform Russia of the U.S. view that a future non-nuclear 
system that does not otherwise meet the definitions 
in this Treaty would not be considered a new kind of 
strategic offensive arm and, thus, would not be 
subject to the Treaty.  If one Party deploys a new 
kind of arm that it asserts is not subject to the 
Treaty, and the other Party challenges this 
assertion, the deploying Party would be obligated to 
attempt to resolve the issue.  There is, however, no 
obligation to delay deployment of such a system 
pending such resolution. 
 
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Previous Guidance 
----------------- 
 
¶7. (S) Unless otherwise modified or superseded, 
previous guidance remains in effect. 
 
End guidance. 
CLINTON