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PP RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHNEH
DE RUEHC #2081/01 0361732
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 051724Z FEB 10
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU PRIORITY 4317
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 2863
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO PRIORITY 6711
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA PRIORITY 2704
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 9193
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO PRIORITY 0045
RUEHCG/AMCONSUL CHENNAI PRIORITY 0095
RUEHNEH/AMCONSUL HYDERABAD PRIORITY 0193
RUEHCI/AMCONSUL KOLKATA PRIORITY 3554
RUEHBI/AMCONSUL MUMBAI PRIORITY 3211
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 9756
RHMFISS/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 012081 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2020 
TAGS: CN IN NP PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: A/S BLAKE'S MEETING WITH NORWEGIAN SPECIAL ENVOY 
TO THE NEPAL PEACE PROCESS AMBASSADOR TORENG 
 
Classified By: ROBLAKE 
 
 ¶1. (C) SUMMARY:  Norway's Special Envoy to the Nepal peace 
process, Ambassador Tore Toreng, met with Assistant Secretary 
for South and Central Asian Affairs (SCA) Robert Blake on 
February 3 to discuss his mission and prospects for 
coordination among members of the international community. 
Toreng emphasized the need for contingency planning among 
like-minded countries in the event that the Constituent 
Assembly fails to meet the May 28 deadline to draft the 
constitution.  Blake and Toreng agreed on the need to offer 
the Maoists a way forward, as well as the importance of 
beginning discussions within the international community on 
appropriate benchmarks for UNMIN's departure.  Blake 
instructed SCA/INSB to work with Embassy Kathmandu on a draft 
that could be shared with Norway, the UN and others.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
Toreng Calls for Coordination and Contingency Planning 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶2. (C) In a February 3 meeting with SCA Assistant Secretary 
Blake, Ambassador Tore Toreng, Norway's Special Envoy to the 
Nepal peace process, stressed the need for international 
coordination on Nepal, including the preparation of 
contingency plans in the event that the peace process is not 
completed on schedule.  (As an example, Toreng raised the 
hypothetical scenario of the Government of Nepal (GON) 
resorting to presidential rule with the support of the Nepal 
Army, if the constitution is not completed by the May 28 
deadline.)  Noting that he perceives a new commitment among 
the main political leaders in Nepal, Toreng suggested that 
the drafting process had recently progressed far enough that 
a stripped-down version of the constitution might be finished 
by the May 28 deadline, with some key issues, such as the 
federal structure of the state, left for further discussion. 
 
¶3. (C) Toreng noted that Norwegian Minister of the 
Environment and International Development Erik Solheim wants 
to work with like-minded countries to play a supportive role 
in the peace process without taking over the agenda. 
According to Toreng, Solheim, who plans to visit Kathmandu on 
March 22, wants to adopt in Nepal the approach he used in Sri 
Lanka of regular high-level visits to Nepal to maintain 
momentum in the peace process and strengthen the 
international community's "disaster preparedness" and 
contingency planning in the event progress falters.  Blake 
told Toreng that he will stop in Nepal on his way to the 
SAARC summit in late April, and agreed that periodic 
telephone consultations among key headquarters officials 
regarding Nepal is a good idea.  Blake stressed the 
importance of keeping the United Nations involved in the 
peace process, as the Nepalis listen to the UN headquarters 
in particular, and noted that the upcoming visit by Under 
Secretary for Political Affairs Lynn Pascoe would be helpful 
in that regard. 
 
¶4. (C) Toreng further emphasized that there is a need for 
contingency planning regarding the closure of UN Mission in 
Nepal (UNMIN).  Toreng commented that the UN's Tamrat Samuel 
envisions 5,000 - 6,000 Maoist combatants being integrated 
into the security forces.  If that benchmark is reached, 
Toreng suggested, then that could be the signal that UNMIN is 
complete.  Toreng proposed that the U.S. and like-minded 
countries begin to coordinate on framing clear benchmarks for 
the closure of UNMIN.  A/S Blake agreed with Toreng's call 
for contingency planning regarding UNMIN and instructed 
SCA/INSB to work with Post on this issue. 
 
---------------------------- 
Working with India and China 
---------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Toreng reported that Solheim and others see a change 
in political climate in New Delhi regarding Nepal, which may 
allow for better coordination with India on the peace 
 
STATE 00012081  002 OF 002 
 
 
process.  A key issue, he noted, is how to get India "playing 
the same tune" as the rest of the international community on 
Nepal.  Toreng emphasized that the Maoists need assurances - 
enshrined in the constitution - before they will be willing 
to empty the cantonments completely.  By offering messages of 
support, the international community can bolster those Nepali 
political actors including moderates in the Maoists who are 
working for consensus, he noted.  Toreng said that he had 
recently met with the Indian Ambassador to Nepal in 
Kathmandu, and with the Indian Permanent Representative to 
the United Nations, and found them both supportive of a 
common approach to the Nepal peace process.  He reported that 
he plans to travel to New Delhi the week of February 8 for 
consultations with National Security Advisor Shiv Shankar 
Menon, who, Toreng commented, seems cooperative on Nepal. 
 
¶6. (C) A/S Blake agreed with Toreng's assessment of progress 
in Nepal's peace process in the last month or two.  Blake 
emphasized that the Indians welcome our coordinating with 
them - but want it done quietly.  He noted that the Indian 
views of Nepal are shaped in part by having to keep one eye 
on China; for example, Indian officials have expressed 
concerns to us over Maoist leader Prachanda's recent trips to 
China.  Toreng reported that he had recently spoken with the 
Chinese Permanent Representative to the United Nations, and 
observed that the Chinese, while still circumspect in their 
public pronouncements on Nepali politics, have recently begun 
to issue statements in support of the peace process.  A/S 
Blake assured Toreng that he plans to raise the Nepal peace 
process with Chinese officials during his planned visit to 
Beijing in March. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Showing the Maoists a Way Forward 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Toreng attributed recent progress to a shift in power 
toward the democratic faction of the Maoist party.    He 
opined that the 2006 "understanding" between G.P. Koirala and 
Prachanda has probably played a positive role, as well, and 
that the recent momentum in the peace process is rooted in 
these two figures' motivation to achieve results.  The ailing 
G.P. Koirala sees the completion of Nepal's peace process as 
his legacy, Toreng stated, and Prachanda needs to deliver 
results in order to keep the Maoist party from fracturing. 
The need to show progress in advance of the United Nations 
discussion on UNMIN, Toreng added, may have also played a 
role in the recent progress.  He cautioned, however, that 
some forces in Nepal do not want a successful outcome to the 
peace process.  In particular, he pointed to splits within 
the Maoist party, noting rumors that Prachanda was concerned 
that hardliners among the Maoists may target him for 
assassination.  Toreng emphasized the need for the 
international community to support work toward consensus in 
order to bolster more moderate forces, such as Prachanda. 
 
¶8. (C) Blake emphasized that the U.S. is trying to show the 
Maoists a way forward, adding that we have offered them a 
clear path - including a set of written benchmarks - for 
removal from our terrorism lists.  Toreng agreed that the 
international community should clearly articulate its 
concerns and expectations, especially regarding the Young 
Communist League (YCL), to the Maoists.   He noted that the 
Norwegians have a long history of contact with the Maoists 
and can thus communicate clearly and directly with the Maoist 
leadership.  Toreng added that Norway had previously 
succeeded in working with youth groups to sign a "common 
platform", and that there were opportunities - through 
similar efforts - to move the YCL toward a more positive role. 
CLINTON