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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 STATE 011453 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/2020 
TAGS: OVIP CLINTON HILLARY PREL EAID PGOV KNNP XG HA XD
SUBJECT: (U) SECRETARY CLINTON'S JANUARY 21, 2010, MEETING 
WITH EU HIREP ASHTON 
 
REF: USEU BRUSSELS 65 
 
Classified By: EUR A/S PHILIP H. GORDON. REASON: 1.4 (D) 
 
¶1. (U) January 21, 2010, 11:00 am - 12:30 pm, Washington. 
 
¶2. (U) Participants: 
U.S. 
The Secretary 
Deputy Secretary Steinberg 
EUR Assistant Secretary Gordon 
PA Assistant Secretary Crowley 
Special Envoy for Eurasian Energy Morningstar 
Director for Policy and Planning Slaughter 
NSC Director (EUR) Kvien 
Deputy Chief of Staff Sullivan 
EUR/ERA Deretic (notetaker) 
 
EU 
High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 
Ashton 
Director General for External and Politico-Military Affairs 
Cooper 
Director General for External Relations Vale de Almeida 
Cabinet Member Everts 
Spokesman Lutz 
 
¶3. (C) Summary.  The Secretary and European Union High 
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 
Catherine Ashton met in Ashton's first official visit abroad 
as HiRep.  Both agreed that the Lisbon Treaty's creation of 
an EU "foreign minister" provided an exciting opportunity for 
increased U.S.-EU engagement, especially on development. 
Ashton assured the Secretary that she was the only EU 
interlocutor on foreign affairs.  On Haiti, the Secretary and 
Ashton agreed to focus on medium- and long-term plans and use 
Haiti as a model for a new development strategy.  On Iran, 
they agreed there was progress with Russia, and the U.S. and 
EU should focus on engaging China.  Both agreed Turkey needs 
to see the way forward to the EU but also do more 
domestically and on Cyprus to move towards the west.  The EU 
is close to appointing a single representative in Kabul, but 
Ashton could not commit to an announcement before the London 
conference.  The U.S. and EU should engage broadly with Yemen 
and look for opportunities to improve the economic situation. 
 Ashton said she is still working out her Bosnia strategy. 
The EU asked for consultations on Kosovo.  The Secretary 
asked for closer U.S.-EU cooperation on Pakistan assistance, 
data sharing/privacy, and a joint crisis response capacity. 
Ashton urged follow-up on climate change.  The Secretary and 
Ashton agreed to meet again in conjunction with the April 
NATO Ministerial in Tallinn.  End Summary. 
 
¶4. (SBU) The Secretary and Ashton agreed the U.S.-EU 
relationship post-Lisbon was exciting and promising, with a 
daunting range of topics.  While the U.S. partnership with 
Solana was great, the U.S. and EU now could really unite 
efforts, especially on development--Lisbon was smart to 
combine diplomacy and development. 
 
----- 
HAITI 
----- 
 
¶5. (C) The Secretary and Ashton agreed that it was important 
to focus on the medium and long term in Haiti.  The Secretary 
suggested a strategic plan for using Haiti as a model for a 
new kind of development, along the lines of the Marshall 
plan.  The idea would be to help businesses, build a middle 
class, allow the Haitian government to take responsibility 
while focusing on key objectives, and set the stage for 
long-term success.  Ashton thought a new strategy would 
encourage involvement from EU countries, including those 
without current ties to Haiti.  Ashton stressed the 
importance of linking trade and aid, as well as developing 
 
STATE 00011453  002 OF 004 
 
 
rule of law to promote investment.  Ashton suggested key U.S. 
and EU officials meet in the days after the Montreal 
conference to work on a development timeline ahead of the 
donors' conference.  All agreed the UN, U.S., EU, Inter 
American Development Bank, and World Bank would be the lead 
actors on assistance. 
 
---- 
IRAN 
---- 
 
¶6. (C) The Deputy Secretary said 2010 would be a 
determinative year for Iran and emphasized the importance of 
the dual-track strategy.  He and Ashton agreed conversations 
with Russia had been productive, but China was reluctant to 
engage.  The challenge would be to shift Chinese thinking 
from viewing support for sanctions as a favor to the West to 
recognizing its own energy and security interests were at 
stake. 
 
¶7. (C) The Deputy Secretary said UNSR 1874, the DPRK 
sanctions resolution, could be used as a point of departure 
for an Iran resolution.  Ashton said the EU preferred China's 
agreement on sanctions.  The EU FMs would discuss Iran 
January 25; the European Parliament was in favor of smart 
sanctions. Ashton aimed to take up Solana's former role in 
the P5 1/E3 3 dialogue.  Cooper said the EU could place a 
tough interpretation on UNSC sanctions. 
 
¶8. (C) The Deputy Secretary informed Ashton that Congress 
likely would pass legislation on Iran that would affect 
European businesses.  While there could be flexibility on 
implementation, European companies, especially those in Italy 
and especially ENI, need to show restraint.  Ashton said she 
would deliver a blunt message to Italian FM Frattini that 
night.  The Secretary added Japan needed to stop investment. 
Ashton and the Secretary agreed India and Brazil should play 
a larger role on Iran.  Urging India and Brazil to play a 
larger role on key issues was a long-term goal for Ashton. 
The Secretary asked Ashton to have Spain work with Brazil on 
how to be a major player. 
 
------------- 
Turkey/Cyprus 
------------- 
 
¶9. (C) The Secretary said Turkey was giving up hope on EU 
membership, and this represented a missed opportunity. 
Ashton replied that Turkey should be in the EU, but it was 
not working towards it.  The EU's official position remains 
that Turkey is a membership applicant.  Assistant Secretary 
Gordon said EU membership was the only leverage to sway 
Ankara on key regional issues, and urged Ashton to speak 
publicly about Turkey's EU path. 
 
¶10. (C) Vale de Almeida asked for U.S. help on Cyprus 
negotiations.  The Secretary said the U.S. was working on how 
to push things forward.  The Secretary asked Ashton to 
coordinate with the U.S. on joint messaging to Cyprus, 
Greece, and Turkey.  She said the U.S. could not be seen too 
much in the forefront on the issue.  Ashton hoped to travel 
to the region, and highlighted the importance of solving the 
problem for NATO-EU cooperation, including for protection of 
EU police trainers in Afghanistan. 
 
----------- 
Afghanistan  (also SEPTEL on Ashton's meeting with SRAP 
Holbrooke) 
----------- 
 
¶11. (C) The Secretary asked Ashton to appoint a single EU 
civilian representative in Kabul ahead of the January 28 
Afghanistan conference in London.  Ashton said the EU had 
agreed to a single representative and promised a decision as 
soon as member states could agree on a name, but did not 
commit to have someone for London.  Ashton noted the change 
would help the EU work on EUPOL-NATO issues.  Ashton took up 
the Secretary's request for support in ensuring that the role 
of women in Afghanistan was emphasized through their 
representation in the London delegation and conference papers. 
 
STATE 00011453  003 OF 004 
 
 
----- 
Yemen 
----- 
 
¶12. (C) Ashton was skeptical that the Yemen meeting on 
January 27 would bring real progress, but rather saw it as an 
opportunity to demonstrate interest in the Yemeni economy. 
She noted the EU had given Euros 100 million to Yemen in the 
past three years, with 100 million more to scheduled for the 
next three.  With little going for it, Yemen needed 
international assistance.  The Deputy Secretary responded 
that U.S. wants broader engagement with Yemen.  The Yemeni 
government needed to walk the walk on political and 
development issues.  The U.S. wants immediate cooperation on 
counterterrorism issues, but that was not the public message. 
 With assistance, it was important not to over-commit without 
information about absorption capacity.  Working groups might 
come out of the meeting in London.  The Secretary noted that 
Saudi Arabia and Qatar had had a difficult time with their 
assistance in Yemen.  Yemeni President Salih was hard to 
influence, and it was important to look for leverage.  The 
Secretary said the U.S. had had good cooperation with the GoY 
on counterterrorism in recent weeks. 
 
------ 
Bosnia 
------ 
 
¶13. (C) The Secretary called Bosnia a high mutual priority 
and welcomed Ashton's interest in continuing with the Butmir 
process.  The Secretary asked for Ashton's support in 
enforcing 5 2 conditionality on transition from the High 
Representative to an EU Special Representative (EUSR), 
keeping the dual-hatted Office of the High 
Representative/EUSR, at least until October elections, and 
extending the EUSR mandate while possibly looking for a new 
representative. Ashton thought it would be possible to raise 
awareness of the EU with lower-level politicians to inject an 
EU context in the upcoming elections.  While the U.S. and EU 
have had tactical disagreements, strategically it was 
important for the Bosnians to take ownership of the process. 
Bosnian leadership needed to understand clearly the path to 
the EU and NATO.  Ashton noted Croatia was leaning on Bosnia, 
and the EU could use Serbia's membership application as 
leverage to press Belgrade to do so, too. 
 
¶14. (C) Ashton said she would meet with Swedish FM Bildt and 
Paddy Ashdown next week to brainstorm ideas for next steps. 
Cooper noted it was important to make the EU prospect real 
and suggested sending Polish farmers to meet with Bosnian 
farmers about the economic benefits of EU membership.  The 
Secretary suggested Turkey and Russia could play a productive 
role if invited into the discussion. 
 
¶15. (C) For the April NATO ministerial, the Deputy Secretary 
said the U.S. would be hard pressed to support MAP for Bosnia 
absent some concrete movement since the last NAC.  Cooper 
noted that it was impressive when Serbian President Tadic 
said excluding Bosnia was a mistake.  However, it was hard to 
make yet another concession on Bosnia without anything in 
return.  The Secretary and Ashton agreed to consult further 
on the way forward on Bosnia. 
 
--------- 
Macedonia 
--------- 
 
¶16. (C) Steinberg urged EU engagement to take advantage of 
the opportunity for an agreement between Greece and Macedonia 
on the name issue. 
 
------ 
Kosovo 
------ 
 
¶17. Cooper raised the need to change the Kosovo-Serbia story, 
where the concrete was beginning to set.  The Secretary noted 
that Serb participation in elections was changing the story 
on the ground, but Serbian FM Jeremic would not change his 
 
STATE 00011453  004 OF 004 
 
 
tune.  The Secretary told Ashton she had had a tough meeting 
with Jeremic in Washington.  The Secretary point out 
Montenegro recently recognized Kosovo.  Cooper suggested a 
group from the EU visit Washington to consult further. 
 
---------------------- 
U.S.-EU Energy Council 
---------------------- 
 
¶18. The Secretary and Ashton agreed on the importance of the 
new Energy Council, focusing on European security issues, 
including the Southern Corridor, and clean energy 
technologies.  Morningstar asked Ashton for high-level EU 
visibility in the Southern Corridor area, as requested by 
leaders in the region.  Turkish comments on gas flowing 
through Iran going to the Nabucco pipeline, a joint 
post-election action plan on Ukrainian energy, and Kurdish 
gas issues also could be topics for the Council. 
 
------------------- 
Pakistan Assistance 
------------------- 
 
¶19. (C) The Secretary asked Ashton for closer U.S.-EU 
cooperation, and pointed out the opportunities for additional 
EU investment and assistance, including the World Bank 
Multi-Donor Trust Fund and Malakand Pilot Project Strategy, 
among other initiatives.  Ashton said a free trade agreement 
wasn't possible, but that the EU was working on assistance to 
ready Pakistan for freer trade. 
 
-------------------- 
Data Sharing/Privacy 
-------------------- 
 
¶20. (C) The Secretary and Ashton agreed to work closely on 
data sharing/protection to conclude a binding agreement on 
the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (TFTP), and secure the 
passenger name record (PNR) agreement.  The Secretary said it 
was important to get the word out on the value of these 
agreements and suggested convening a group of experts on the 
issue.  Ashton noted the European Parliament was becoming 
more reasonable and had a change of heart on opposition to 
body scanners. 
 
-------------------------------- 
Joint Crisis Management Capacity 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶21. (SBU) Noting the Haiti crisis, the Secretary suggested 
the U.S. and EU continue work on developing a joint capacity 
for crisis management, especially combined planning, 
exercise, and training.  She expressed U.S. interest in 
seconding U.S. personnel to EU operations and vice versa, 
starting with U.S. readiness to send one or two experts to 
the EU mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.  The 
U.S. and EU should be committed to increasing effectiveness 
and limiting duplication of effort. 
 
-------------- 
Climate Change 
-------------- 
 
¶22. (SBU) Ashton raised Copenhagen follow-up as an important 
priority.  While Copenhagen did not go as well as the EU 
would have liked, it was important to plan for the next 
opportunity. 
 
------------------- 
U.S.-EU Ministerial 
------------------- 
 
¶23. (C) The Secretary and Ashton agreed to try to meet in 
conjunction with the NATO ministerial in Tallinn in April. 
Ashton assured the Secretary that she was the only EU 
interlocutor on foreign affairs. 
CLINTON