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FM AMEMBASSY SKOPJE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8862
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE 0593
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SKOPJE 000052 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/26/2015 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM MK
SUBJECT: MACEDONIA:DUI LEADER AHMETI ON ISSUES STRAINING 
THE COALITION AND NAME ISSUE RESOLUTION 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR PHILIP REEKER FOR REASONS 1.5 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Lack of progress on the &name issue8 and 
ongoing divisive interethnic relations are straining the 
coalition, DUI leader Ali Ahmeti told the Ambassador in 
meetings on January 19 and 20.  Ahmeti said Gruevski,s 
relentless emphasis on the Macedonian identity was hurting 
DUI, as ethnic-Albanians are increasingly disenchanted with 
DUI,s continued presence in coalition with Gruevski.  While 
Ahmeti is clearly frustrated, he has no plans to leave the 
government.  Ahmeti reports that his first meeting with 
President Ivanov was generally positive and pragmatic. (End 
Summary) 
 
---------------------------------------- 
DUI FRUSTRATED AND WEAKEND BY NAME ISSUE 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Ambassador met with DUI leader Ali Ahmeti and his 
chief lieutenant, Deputy Prime Minister Abdulaqim Ademi, on 
January 19 (in Tetovo) and 20 (at the CMR).  Ahmeti stated 
that while the resolution of the name issue remains 
critically important to the e-Albanian community, he was in a 
difficult position.  Ahmeti noted that Gruevski had bombarded 
the ethnic-Macedonians with propaganda regarding identity and 
culture and as a result was maintaining strong public 
approval (recent IRI polling shows strong but slipping 
support for the PM and his party).  Conversely, DUI,s 
support level had taken a severe hit (down four percentage 
points from twelve to eight percent in last six months), 
which Ahmeti claims is due to his inability to put more 
pressure on the PM to solve the name issue.  Ambassador 
Reeker explained to Ahmeti that there was an increasing 
concern in the international community that Macedonia was not 
genuinely committed to resolving the name issue and both 
Macedonia and Greece needed to take tangible steps forward 
over the next six months.  Ahmeti agreed that this period is 
critical and insisted that he was putting pressure on 
Gruevski.  However, he seemed uncertain how DUI could change 
its strategy on the name issue and declined to set a date at 
which point his party would pull out of the coalition if no 
progress was made.  Ahmeti said leaving the coalition would 
only hurt the country and wanted to avoid such a step. 
 
¶3. (C) Ahmeti told the Ambassador that in Ahmeti's January 20 
meeting with Gruevski, the Prime Minister spent much of their 
session lamenting the amount of pressure Ahmeti was putting 
on him to resolve the name issue.  In turn, Ahmeti told 
Gruevski that the opinion polls wanted him to apply even more 
pressure.  Ahmeti asked the Ambassador for several 
clarifications on various aspects of the name issue that 
Gruevski had conveyed to them.  Gruevski reportedly told 
Ahmeti that Greece was insisting that identity and language 
be included in the negotiations, that changing the country,s 
name in the passport would require changing the constitution, 
and activity in the negotiations process could only logically 
resume following the Greek presidential elections.   The 
Ambassador said that we did not believe these assertions to 
be accurate. 
 
¶4. (C) Ahmeti noted that he was concerned that opposition 
party leader Crvenkovski,s political tactics were only 
hindering Gruevski,s ability to resolve the name issue.  He 
felt Crvenkovski had created a no-win political scenario for 
Gruevski, in which if Gruevski did not solve the name issue 
he would be jeopardizing the future of the country and if he 
did solve it he would be selling out Macedonia,s identity. 
Ahmeti claimed the rift between Crvenkovski,s SDSM and 
Gruevski,s VMRO was much deeper than those among the 
e-Albanian parties.  Ahmeti believed that if the e-Albanian 
parties were presented with an opportunity to unite to 
resolve the name issue they could temporarily overcome their 
differences, but such unity was impossible for SDSM and VMRO. 
 Because of that, Ahmeti did not believe a "Government of 
Unity" was a likely option for dealing with the "name" issue. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
ETHNICALLY DIVISIVE ISSUES STRAINING THE COALITION 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶5. (C) Ahmeti cited several ethnically divisive issues he 
felt were straining coalition ties and making it more 
difficult for the country to focus on the name issue.   He 
said that the most divisive currently is the proposed laws on 
changing primary and secondary school registrars in 
e-Albanian communities from the Albanian language to the 
Macedonian language and the GoM,s push to make Macedonian 
language classes obligatory at the first grade level 
(currently Macedonian becomes obligatory at fourth grade in 
minority communities).  He said these laws provoked 
particularly strong reactions from the e-Albanian public 
because they evoked memories of Macedonia,s Yugoslav past 
and incited inflammatory rhetoric from both sides (e.g.- 
&This is not Albania! Go to Albania if you want to learn 
Albanian!8).  He also called the planned construction of an 
Orthodox church in Skopje,s central square (along with the 
ceaseless construction of churches and mosques throughout 
Macedonia) &sinful8 given the condition of the rest of the 
country.   He noted, however, that he could not publicly 
condemn the church or he would be branded an intolerant 
Muslim.  Ahmeti said the continued processing of the 2001 
cases returned to Macedonia from the ICTY and the GoM,s 
refusal to address the irregularities presented by a special 
parliamentary group surrounding the convictions of 12 
e-Albanians in the Sopot case were also putting a strain on 
coalition relations.  Ahmeti wants to see the returned cases 
resolved and does not want them to be a frozen issue that 
VMRO reopens every time they need to put pressure on him. 
Ahmeti said that VMRO tried to negotiate a compromise in 
which parliament would accept the findings on the Sopot case 
if DUI stopped blocking the proposed laws on education. 
Ahmeti said finding justice was too important and he would 
not make a deal. 
 
¶6. (C) Ahmeti said he laid out all of these issues for 
Gruevski at their January 20 meeting and that Gruevski agreed 
that the coalition was not functioning well.  Ahmeti said 
Gruevski seemed displeased with DUI,s lack of support for 
the laws on education and was also unhappy with statements 
cming from DUI MPs on other issues.  Ahmeti told Gruevski 
that the media was manipulating these statements and they 
both needed to do a better job controlling their party 
people.  Ultimately, Ahmeti and Gruevski decided that DPM 
Ademi and PM CoS Martin Protoger would sit down and work out 
an agreement on all the issues laid out in the meeting. That 
meeting took place on January 25, and while they did not come 
to terms on resolving any of the aforementioned issues, both 
agreed that communication between DUI and VMRO needed to 
improve. To broaden inter-party communication and cooperation 
they decided to organize a couple of meetings that will 
include five or six of each party's senior leaders to discuss 
possible solutions. 
 
¶7. (C) Ahmeti pleaded with the Ambassador for U.S. assistance 
in resolving these issues.  Ambassador explained that issues 
such as the use of language in schools should not be a 
central concern for the international community; Macedonia 
needed to demonstrate its maturity as a nation and resolve 
those issues through constructive, rational dialogue. 
Ambassador agreed that the GoM,s plans to construct the new 
Orthodox church in Skopje were disturbing given the 
country,s more pressing needs, and that such resource 
allocation priorities ultimately damaged the GoM,s 
credibility when seeking international assistance for 
development projects.  The Ambassador said he would continue 
to convey this point to the PM and encouraged Ahmeti to do so 
as well. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
FIRST PRIVATE MEETING BETWEEN AHMETI AND PRESIDENT IVANOV 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
¶8.  (C) Ahmeti reported that his first private meeting with 
President Ivanov on December 30 went well even if it was long 
overdue.  The discussion focused on adding two e-Albanian 
members to Ivanov,s staff and the name issue.  Ivanov agreed 
with Ahmeti that negotiations with Greece to resolve the name 
issue must remain a top priority.  Later on the evening of 
January 20, Ahmeti and his wife joined the Ambassador for a 
philharmonic concert (unprecedented for Ahmeti).  President 
and Mrs. Ivanov were also the Ambassador's guests and it was 
the first time the two leaders' spouses met. 
REEKER