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C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000239 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/16/2030 
TAGS: PGOV MARR KS
SUBJECT: POLITICS OF OPCON TRANSITION IN KOREA 
 
REF: SEOUL 0202 (DASD SCHIFFER WITH NA MEMBERS) 
 
Classified By: DCM Mark A. Tokola. Reasons 1.4 (b), (d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  The transition of wartime operational 
control (OPCON) to the Republic of Korea (ROK) in 2012 does 
not currently register as a political issue at the National 
Assembly and there is little discussion of delaying OPCON 
transition outside a small circle of Korean veterans and 
conservative politicians.  Nevertheless, voices advocating a 
delay are loud and influential, while proponents of OPCON 
transition are silent, largely because they believe the 2007 
U.S.-ROK agreement settled the issue.  Advocates of delay are 
motivated by security concerns and budget constraints. 
Proponents of maintaining the 2012 transition schedule are 
motivated by asserting Korea's sovereignty over its armed 
forces and creating conditions for improved relations with 
North Korea.  Both are calculating the political mileage they 
can make out of the issue.  One variable that will affect 
public opinion is the threat level from North Korea as the 
OPCON transition date approaches, with support for delay 
higher if the threat seems greater.  Complicating discussion 
of OPCON transition with senior political leaders and other 
sources is their almost complete lack of information about 
the status of preparations for the transition.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (C) Comment:  Lee Myung-bak, a strongly pro-American 
president, campaigned on delaying OPCON transition during the 
2007 campaign, and will be weakened with his core supporters 
if he is unable to deliver on this promise.  On the other 
hand, progressives in South Korea perceive OPCON transition 
as an issue of national sovereignty, and might react to a 
decision to delay.  In the worst case, a decision to delay 
would drag U.S. Forces Korea into the domestic political 
debate.  If OPCON transition is to be delayed, we should time 
the announcement to the Korean political cycle, ideally for 
autumn 2010.  Whether it is delayed or not, our soundings 
among Korean political elites demonstrate a need to redouble 
our public diplomacy efforts on this issue.  End Comment. 
 
Who Is Talking about OPCON Transition? 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Between February 5-16 poloffs met separately with 
eleven members of the National Assembly, as well as 
academics, pollsters and a journalist, to gauge opinion on 
the politics of the OPCON transition agreement.  As the 2012 
date for OPCON transition approaches, the issue will rise to 
the level of a public political discussion as the ROK 
prepares to assume operational control of its troops in 
wartime.  But for now, OPCON transition does not register as 
a political issue outside the GNP's core supporters, and, 
unless President Lee Myung-bak raises the matter by 
requesting a delay, it is not likely to become an issue at 
the National Assembly at least until after the June 2010 
regional elections. 
 
¶4. (C) Advocates for delaying OPCON transition are primarily 
veterans.  Because veterans comprise the core of the GNP's 
base, some GNP leaders are eager to press the issue.  Voices 
advocating delay are loud and influential.  There is also 
some support for delay in the opposition DP, also among 
veterans.  On the other hand, proponents of maintaining the 
2012 date are silent on the issue, largely because they 
believe it was settled after the debate that led up to the 
2007 U.S.-ROK agreement on the 2012 date. 
 
Arguments for Delay 
------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Proponents of delay have several motivations, 
including security concerns, budget constraints, and 
political calculations.  OPCON transition is widely 
misinterpreted in Korea to mean a reduction of U.S. support 
for Korea's defense, and proponents of delay argue that the 
threat from a nuclear-armed North Korea has only increased 
since the OPCON transition agreement was signed in 2007. 
Moreover, 2012 will be an inauspicious year for managing the 
handover because of presidential and National Assembly 
elections in Korea, a presidential election in the U.S., and 
the (likely disappointing) culmination of North Korea's 
self-proclaimed effort to become a "strong and prosperous 
nation." 
 
¶6. (C) Conservatives have equated support for the U.S. and 
support for the U.S. troop presence with a delay in OPCON 
transition.  Professor Kang Won-taek, a political science 
professor at Soongshil University, said many conservatives 
believed that then-President Roh Moo-hyun, who was elected on 
a wave of anti-American sentiment, "strong-armed" the U.S. 
into accepting the OPCON transition agreement.  One of the 
Political Section's local staff noted to poloff that she had 
signed the more recent and much publicized 10-million 
signature petition advocating OPCON transition delay.  She 
said her parents told her she should sign it because she 
worked for the U.S. Embassy.  Polls showing public support 
for delay often conflate OPCON transition with the reduction 
(or complete withdrawal) of U.S. troops from the peninsula -- 
something the majority of Koreans oppose. 
 
¶7. (C) Proponents of a delay rarely talk publicly about the 
cost of preparing for OPCON transition, but it is widely 
believed that to prepare for OPCON transition the ROK should 
increase its defense expenditures from current levels.  The 
ROK currently spends 2.8 percent of its GDP on defense.  In 
2005 the ROK announced a Defense Reform Plan (DRP) 2020 to 
modernize Korea's defense forces.  The plan called for 9.9 
percent annual defense budget increases between 2006-2010. 
The average annual increase has only been 7.2 percent, 
putting the plan some $3 billion dollars behind schedule. 
OPCON transition and DRP 2020 are not directly related, but 
the difficulty in funding the DRP 2020 is an example of the 
limitations to committing more resources to defense. 
 
¶8. (C) Besides being an issue that plays well with the GNP 
base in general, political observers believe that President 
Lee Myung-bak is looking for an issue to energize the GNP 
before June 2010 nationwide regional elections.  The debate 
over President Lee's proposal to scrap former President Roh 
Moo-hyun's plan to relocate government offices to Sejong 
City, 150 kilometers south of Seoul, has caused a deep divide 
in the party, pitting pro-Lee and pro-Park Geun-hye factions 
against one other.  Some observers believe President Lee 
might use a request to delay OPCON transition to rally 
disaffected Park Geun-hye supporters for the June elections, 
thereby uniting the party. 
 
Arguments for Maintaining the Schedule 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) Proponents of maintaining the 2012 transition schedule 
are motivated by asserting Korea's sovereignty over its armed 
forces, creating conditions for improved relations with North 
Korea, and their own political calculations.  Former 
President Roh Moo-hyun, when he negotiated the 2007 OPCON 
transition agreement with the U.S., framed the issue as one 
of Korea regaining sovereignty over its armed forces.  For 
many supporters of the agreement, national pride outweighs 
any questions they may have about the security implications 
of OPCON transition.  Moreover, some supporters of the 2012 
transition schedule believe it is in Korea's interest to not 
be dependent on U.S. forces. 
 
¶10. (C) Many supporters of the 2012 schedule believe that 
OPCON transition will create conditions conducive to 
rapprochement between the South and North by removing an 
irritation for the North.  If supporters of delay have 
political motivations, so too do supporters of the 2012 
schedule.  President Lee Myung-bak is already under attack by 
the opposition DP for attempting to dismantle former 
President Roh Moo-hyun's legacy -- most controversially on 
the Sejong City issue.  The DP would see a request to delay 
OPCON transition as another example of President Lee 
attempting to undo actions of the previous government and 
would oppose Lee on the grounds of defending the party's 
honor and legacy. 
 
Political Effects of a Delay 
---------------------------- 
 
¶11. (C) If President Lee were to request a delay in OPCON 
transition, the opposition DP likely would oppose the 
decision.  The DP might attempt to shutdown the National 
Assembly in protest and might block the passage of other 
legislation important to the U.S. 
 
¶12. (C) Some members of the DP and other leftist opposition 
parties might try to use the delay request to galvanize mass 
street demonstrations against the government, reminiscent of 
the May-June 2008 candlelight beef protests.  It is unlikely 
such protests would be successful, because it is not clear 
that there is enough public interest in the issue and, since 
the 2008 beef protests, the police have been proactive in 
blocking street demonstrations.  If, however, the opposition 
parties were successful with an appeal to the public's sense 
of nationalism and pride in Korea's sovereignty, it would be 
difficult for the government to control the debate.  Kang 
Won-taek, Professor of Political Science at Soongshil 
University, predicted that a discussion of delaying OPCON 
transition would put USFK at the center of Korean politics 
and create the possibility for a larger debate about the 
presence of U.S. troops in Korea.  Moreover, he said, 
opponents of delay (or proponents of delay attempting to 
deflect criticism) would accuse the U.S. of breaking an 
agreement between two governments. 
 
¶13. (C) Opposition candidates in the June 2010 regional 
elections (which will take place right after the anniversary 
of former President Roh Moo-hyun's suicide) and 2012 
presidential and National Assembly elections would likely use 
the delay as a campaign issue and appeal to the public's 
nationalism and pride in Korea's sovereignty.  GNP political 
leaders to whom we spoke were confident that the Korean 
public would evaluate the issues objectively and not be 
swayed by irrational emotion. 
 
¶14. (C) Following is a summary of the opinion of key 
political leaders with whom we spoke on the possibility of a 
delay: 
 
--  GNP Rep. Park Geun-hye, 2012 presidential contender, said 
the threat from North Korea had increased since the OPCON 
transition agreement was signed in 2007.  Nevertheless, she 
said, the U.S. and ROK should continue with an all out effort 
to prepare for OPCON transition in 2012 and make a final 
decision based on a readiness evaluation.  In the event of a 
delay, she said a nationalistic or anti-American backlash was 
unlikely.  Roh Moo-hyun played the anti-American card in his 
successful 2002 presidential campaign and she does not think 
it would work again.  Based on her confidence in the Korean 
public, Park said the people would judge the issues based on 
the facts.  She said there are many examples, like NATO, of 
countries serving under foreign commands in multilateral 
forces; she thinks the Korean people could understand the 
U.S.-ROK military alliance in that regard. 
 
--  GNP Rep. Kim Hak-song, Chairman of the Defense Committee, 
is strongly in favor of delaying OPCON transition because 
OPCON transition is a threat to Korea's security.  He said a 
nationalistic or anti-American backlash was unlikely because 
the Korean people have developed beyond irrational 
emotionalism. 
 
--  GNP Rep. Lee Sang-deuk, President Lee Myung-bak's older 
brother, is strongly in favor of delaying OPCON transition 
because it threatens Korea's security. 
 
--  GNP Rep. Hwang Jin-ha, a retired Lieutenant General, is 
strongly in favor of delaying OPCON transition.  It was clear 
in hindsight he said, that former President Roh's judgment on 
security matters was deeply flawed because he did not see 
North Korea as a threat; Hwang said this flaw remained the 
basis of the OPCON transition agreement.  In light of the 
current nuclear security threat in North Korea, taking any 
unreciprocated act to weaken -- as Hwang saw it -- Korea's 
security posture would be a mistake, he said. (Reftel) 
 
-- DP Rep. Park Jie-won, DP Policy Committee Chair, told us 
on January 26 that he would personally favor delaying OPCON 
transition (reftel).  But after press coverage the week of 
February 1 on the possibility of a delay, Park told us on 
February 5 that the DP would oppose an effort by the Lee 
administration to delay OPCON transition.  He said the 
possibility of a nationalist backlash was real, but the 
intensity was difficult to gauge.  A delay would require much 
work on the government's part to prepare the public, and 
"they have not even begun," he said. 
 
-- DP Rep. Lee Mi-kyung, DP Secretary General, said she would 
personally be open to delaying OPCON transition until 2014 or 
2016, if there were objective reasons for doing so.  But, as 
far as she knew, there was no reason that OPCON transition 
should not happen on schedule.  She said a delay would be a 
difficult issue for the party because most of the DP's 
left-leaning constituency would see it as a matter of Korea's 
sovereignty, while the GNP's constituency would see it as a 
security issue.  It would be dangerous, she said, to make an 
ideological issue out of sovereignty or security. 
 
-- DP Rep. Kim Sung-gon was Chair of the Defense Committee in 
2007 when the OPCON transition agreement was made.  He 
strongly opposes a delay and was confident there would be a 
nationalistic backlash to a delay.  He said there was no 
doubt that the DP presidential candidate in 2012 would run on 
a sovereignty platform. 
 
North Korea Threat Level a Variable 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶15. (C) The threat level from North Korea as the OPCON 
transition date approaches is a variable that will 
significantly affect the public's perception of OPCON 
transition, with support for delay directly related to the 
threat level.  Several of our DP interlocutors, however, 
believed that delaying OPCON transition would actually 
increase tensions on the peninsula because the North would 
interpret a delay as a provocation. 
 
Strategic Flexibility and OPCON Transition 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶16. (C) Whatever people's opinion of OPCON transition, it is 
widely believed that OPCON transition is intended to support 
the U.S. goal of strategic flexibility.  There is no support 
in Korea for strategic flexibility.  Conservatives believe 
that strategic flexibility will weaken Korea's defenses. 
Liberals object to strategic flexibility because they believe 
it will draw Seoul into U.S. military actions in which the 
ROK,s interests are not at stake.  Conservatives' opposition 
to strategic flexibility reinforces their opposition to OPCON 
transition.  Liberals' opposition to strategic flexibility, 
however, does not outweigh the importance they attach to 
regaining from the U.S. wartime control of Korea's armed 
forces. 
 
Request for Information and Transparency 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶17. (C) With few exceptions, GNP and DP leaders with whom we 
spoke said they had no information on the status of 
preparations for OPCON transition nor the mechanisms for 
deciding whether Korea was ready for OPCON transition.  They 
requested more visibility on the process.  Pollsters, too, 
said the public was woefully uneducated about what OPCON 
transition meant and how it was progressing.  In Embassy 
meetings with Korean audiences to discuss general policy 
matters, audience members often use the the words "OPCON 
transition" as being synonymous with "reduced U.S. military 
presence in South Korea."  Park Sung-min said that, if the 
U.S. and ROK did decide to delay, there should first be a 
public hearing on the status of the ROK's military 
capabilities as well as budgetary and security issues. 
STEPHENS