VZCZCXRO2092
RR RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHVJ #0148/01 0430821
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 120821Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1396
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SARAJEVO 000148 
 
SIPDIS 
 
EUR/SCE FOR HYLAND, FOOKS 
NSC FOR HOVENIER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2020 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR KDEM BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA: COVIC AND DODIK - STRANGE BEDFELLOWS 
 
REF: A. 08 SARAJEVO 556 
     ¶B. 09 SARAJEVO 107 
     ¶C. SARAJEVO 110 
     ¶D. SARAJEVO 75 
     ¶E. 09 SARAJEVO 1382 
     ¶F. 09 SARAJEVO 1434 
     ¶G. 09 SARAJEVO 776 
     ¶H. 08 SARAJEVO 1088 
     ¶I. SARAJEVO 134 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Charles English for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1.  (C) An emerging relationship between prominent BiH Croat 
and Serb leaders is compounding worrisome rhetoric on both 
sides and engendering concern among Bosniaks.  Croatian 
Democratic Union (HDZ)-BiH President Dragan Covic and 
Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) President -- 
and Republika Srpska (RS) Prime Minister -- Milorad Dodik 
have met several times in recent months to discuss, inter 
alia, their ideas on a territorial reorganization within BiH. 
 Covic's closer ties to Dodik have further strained Covic's 
already waning partnership with Bosniak Party of Democratic 
Action (SDA) President Sulejman Tihic.  The growing rift 
between Covic and Tihic only serves to further Dodik's goal 
of disuniting Bosniaks and Croats, which he hopes will 
strengthen his argument that the RS is BiH's "better half." 
End summary. 
 
Tihic and Covic on the Outs 
--------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) Covic has drifted closer to Dodik over the past year 
as his relationship with Tihic has become strained.  After 
Tihic's reelection as party President in the SDA congress in 
May 2009 (ref A), Tihic toned down his endorsement of some of 
the agreements he, Covic, and Dodik reached in Prud (ref B). 
Of particular offense to Covic was Tihic's retraction of 
support for reorganizing BiH into four territorial units, 
which our Croat contacts continue to cite as a sore spot in 
the party's relationship with SDA.  For his part, Tihic 
accused Covic of fueling media speculation that Tihic had 
agreed to an ethnic-based reorganization of BiH at Prud when 
in fact the three men had not specified how the territory 
would be divided.  The battle over the mayoralty of Mostar 
has also figured into the rift between Tihic and Covic (ref 
C).  Tihic's support in November 2009 for Stipe Prlic as 
chairman of the telecommunications company HT Mostar -- over 
the strong objections of Covic -- and HDZ-BiH's subsequent 
delay in honoring SDA's request to fill key vacancies in the 
Federation (ref D) appear to have been the last straw.  Our 
SDA contacts -- as well as Covic himself -- have told us that 
Tihic and Covic now barely communicate. 
 
Butmir "Private Parties" in Mostar and Banja Luka 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶3.  (SBU) While the Butmir talks were underway, Covic and 
Dodik held two private, bilateral meetings, one in Mostar on 
October 2 and the other in Banja Luka on October 14.  These 
meetings focused primarily on constitutional reform, with 
Dodik stating that any discussion of constitutional reform 
must include territorial reorganization.  After the Mostar 
meeting, Covic declared publicly that the two men had been 
working with Tihic for over a year on proposed constitutional 
changes but that "unfortunately, the process has slowed 
down."  Dodik added that "there is turbulence within SDA, and 
we cannot see anyone who can make a binding decision arising 
from a meeting with us." 
 
Dodik and Covic Become Holiday Pals ... 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) Dodik then invited Covic to Banja Luka for a 
bilateral meeting on December 18.  According to the press, 
the two party leaders agreed that the time for engaging in 
constitutional reform before the elections had expired.  They 
also expressed their strong opposition to the HighRep's 
extension of the mandate of international judges and 
prosecutors, which took place on the same day as the meeting. 
 HDZ-BiH official and Mostar mayor Ljubo Beslic told us that 
RS VP Davor Cordas, who accompanied Covic to the meeting, 
 
SARAJEVO 00000148  002 OF 003 
 
 
said that Dodik and Covic also discussed the return of 
Bosniaks and Croats to RS and for assistance to be provided 
for the Serbs who wish to return to the Federation.  Covic 
told the Banja Luka-based daily newspaper Nezavisne Novine 
that the two men would meet again at the end of February. 
 
... Then Dodik Puts Coal in the Bosniaks' Stocking 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Covic told the press after the Banja Luka meeting 
that "HDZ-BiH and SNSD have a clear desire to protect the 
interests of both peoples in BiH.  Only by our doing so can 
BiH survive and function."  He added that he hoped he and 
Dodik would sign a long-term, strategic partnership agreement 
at their next meeting.  Dodik echoed Covic's comment on a 
strategic agreement and noted that he would like to include 
the Bosniaks as well, "if only there were a solid negotiator 
on the Bosniak side."  Dodik also stated that the two men 
agreed that OHR's presence in BiH was unnecessary.  He added 
that SNSD opposes the HighRep's imposed change to the Mostar 
election procedures to break the year-long logjam on the 
mayoralty (ref E), calling it "shameless flattery of 
Bosniaks."  Dodik also decried "obstructions by Bosniaks and 
the international community" on filling positions in 
state-level governing bodies. 
 
HDZ-BiH: "Nothing to See Here" 
------------------------------ 
 
¶6.  (C) Our contacts in HDZ-BiH consistently tell us that the 
relationship between Covic and Dodik carries no hidden 
agenda, contending that the two men have worked amiably 
together since the 2006 "April Package" of constitutional 
reform.  Our contacts insist that the partnership is rooted 
primarily in the party leaders' mutual desire for the 
fulfillment of the Prud Agreement.  They also argue that 
Dodik will be the clear winner in the RS in this year's 
elections and that it augurs well for any party to cooperate 
with him.  Finally, they say that the Covic-Dodik meetings 
were not intended to sideline Bosniak parties, despite 
Dodik's remarks to the press. 
 
Dodik as Croat "Hero" 
--------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) Many Croats -- particularly the overwhelming majority 
who support a third entity, and including those who do not 
oppose Tihic as strongly as HDZ-BiH does -- have a great 
admiration for Dodik, some even regarding him as a "hero," 
because of his defiance of the international community and 
his disdain for the "imposition" of the BiH state.  Many 
Croats wish their own leaders would be as outspoken and carry 
as much bravado as Dodik.  The Croats also appreciate Dodik's 
public expressions of support for a third entity, despite his 
insistence that the territory for such an entity come 
exclusively from the Federation.  Illustratively, in 2007 the 
Mostar-based Vecernji List named Dodik "Person of the Year," 
edging out then-HighRep Schwarz-Schilling, shortly after 
Dodik's first public endorsement of the third entity concept. 
 Concerningly, our contacts from all Croat parties repeatedly 
say to us, "if Dodik can talk about a referendum in the RS, 
why can't we talk about a third entity?"  Following the 
HDZ-1990 Presidency session on February 6, Bozo Ljubic told 
the press that if a referendum is to be held, it should take 
place throughout BiH so that all citizens can decide whether 
they favor an "imposed Dayton Constitution." 
 
Referendum Not a Major Concern 
------------------------------ 
 
¶8.  (C) Our contacts from all Croat parties tell us that 
Croats generally see the rhetoric from the RS on a referendum 
(ref F) as pre-election posturing and that a referendum will 
not take place.  Their concerns with the referendum talk lie 
primarily in the fear of a radical Bosniak response, rather 
than the prospect of RS secession.  HDZ-1990 VPs Martin Raguz 
and Damir Ljubic suggested that regardless of whether a 
referendum actually takes place, the Covic-Dodik alliance is 
"pushing us to a confrontation with the Bosniaks."  Raguz 
opined that Turkey and other Islamic countries could use the 
opportunity to strengthen their position in BiH if the RS did 
call for a referendum.  Strikingly, some of our contacts have 
told us that if the RS held a referendum on secession, Croats 
would start printing their own ballots for a referendum on a 
 
SARAJEVO 00000148  003 OF 003 
 
 
third entity. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶9.  (C) Aside from their political aims, Covic and Dodik 
share personal interests that make them natural allies. 
Dodik is suspected of abusing government funds, a charge for 
which Covic has been tried and convicted (refs G and H), so 
combining forces against the judiciary could benefit both 
men.  However, Covic's chilled relationship with Tihic is 
costing him dearly, as Tihic's newfound friendship with 
HDZ-1990 allows Tihic to make decisions in the Federation 
without Covic.  Moreover, a coalition between SDA and 
HDZ-1990 after the general elections in October, depending on 
the results, could force Covic into opposition.  Covic 
therefore undoubtedly expects much from Dodik.  Dodik has 
less at stake and more to gain.  His partnership with Covic 
drives a wedge between Covic and Tihic, which he hopes will 
advance his argument that the state and Federation do not 
work as well as the RS.  Sidelining Tihic may eventually open 
the door for Dodik to find his "Bosniak interlocutor" in 
media mogul Fahrudin Radoncic (ref I), creating a potentially 
dangerous trio.  More immediately, increased rhetoric from 
both Serbs and Croats on a third entity and an RS referendum 
-- particularly during an election year -- could lead 
Bosniaks to respond with worrisome rhetoric themselves. 
ENGLISH