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FM AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO
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RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 SARAJEVO 000142 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/09/2020 
TAGS: PREL MARR BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA: ARMED FORCES FACE DOWN GRAVE CRISIS 
 
Classified By: Amb. Charles English for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1. (C)  Minister of Defense Selmo Cikotic described to 
Ambassador, January 30, what he considered to be the greatest 
threat to the command, discipline and unity of Bosnia's Armed 
Forces since the creation of a unified command and Ministry 
of Defense in 2006.  Prompted by veterans associations and 
politicians, uniformed soldiers in Bosnia's Armed Forces met 
to plan illegal protests of the release of 2,700 soldiers who 
have reached the service age limit.  Chief of Defense Miladin 
Milojcic, a Bosnian-Serb, informed the Minister that if the 
protests took place, there was a credible threat that 
Bosnian-Serb soldiers would "withdraw from the Armed Forces 
until the crisis was resolved," in effect, a mutiny. 
Resolute action of Bosnia's united defense leadership 
ultimately stopped the protests, but the breakdown of command 
along ethnic lines, recourse to political parties and 
religious leaders, and failure of the collective Presidency 
to take action as Commander-in-Chief all illustrated the 
fragility of Bosnia's oft-touted defense reform.  End summary. 
 
Background:  Soldiers Laid-Off 
------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU)  The MOD is in the process of terminating the 
contracts of 2,700 soldiers -- nearly half the infantry -- 
who will have reached the legal age limit of 35 for enlisted 
soldiers.  Although this age limit was called for by the 2005 
defense law that brought Bosnia's Armed Forces under a 
unified command, most soldiers have been extended twice, 
notwithstanding the age limit.  Minister of Defense Selmo 
Cikotic told us that he could not extend the soldiers again, 
as many were in their forties and the age limit was critical 
to the modernization and training of the armed forces. 
Cikotic acknowledged that the timing is bad, as Bosnia 
weathers an economic downturn which is depressing wages and 
employment as well as the ability of Bosnia's government to 
provide social welfare.  Nevertheless, Cikotic claims that 
extending the soldiers again would only prolong and 
exacerbate the problem, which grows as more and more 
(war-time) soldiers reach the age limit. 
 
Political Parties Incite Protests 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (S/NF)  In early January, Bosnia's Ministry of Defense and 
Joint Staff learned that members of the Armed Forces were 
coordinating a march to be held in Sarajevo on January 11, to 
demonstrate against the termination of soldiers. It is 
illegal in Bosnia for active soldiers to organize or 
participate in protests against the government.  According to 
defense officials, the organization of the protest was 
largely, although not exclusively, a Bosniak affair.  It 
began seemingly with the acquiescence of some commanding 
officers in the Bosniak Battalion in Bosnia's Fifth Brigade, 
the largely Bosniak brigade located in Tuzla under the 
command of (Bosniak) General Senad Masovic.  Ministry sources 
tell us that leaders of the Federation veterans union had 
committed to assisting logistically in the protest. The 
(Bosnian-Croat) Deputy Minister of Defense, Marina Pendes, 
strongly implied to us that members of the new political 
party of Bosniak Media mogul Fahrudin Radoncic, Alliance for 
a Better Future (SBB), had helped to incite the protests, 
presumably to discredit the leadership of Defense Minister 
Selmo Cikotic, who belongs to the strongest Bosniak party, 
the Party for Democratic Action (SDA).  Cikotic said in a 
later press release, "Unfortunately, some irresponsible 
political forces who declare themselves pro-Bosnian encourage 
lawlessness purely because of narrow party and political 
interests." 
 
Serbs Seizing Opportunity 
------------------------- 
 
¶4. (S/NF)  According to several sources, when acting CHOD 
Rizvo Pleh learned of the planned protests, he immediately 
contacted Chief of Defense Miladin Milojcic who was on 
holiday in Banja Luka in observance of Orthodox Christmas. 
During that trip, press photographed Milojcic and Deputy 
Minister of Defense Zivko Marjanac (the two ranking 
Bosnian-Serbs in the state defense institutions) meeting with 
 
SARAJEVO 00000142  002 OF 003 
 
 
RS Prime Minister Milorad Dodik.  That day, Milojcic called 
Cikotic and told him that Bosnian-Serb soldiers would not 
demonstrate on January 11, and that if soldiers of other 
ethnicities did demonstrate, Bosnian-Serb soldiers would "be 
withdrawn" from the Armed Forces.  All of our sources, 
including the Minister, have indicated their belief that 
Milojcic was informing, rather than threatening, the 
Minister.  No one has told us exactly who would call on 
Bosnian-Serb soldiers to withdraw.  (Comment:  As Chief of 
Defense of all Bosnia's soldiers, we could hope for better 
from Milojcic.  One the one hand, he claims to be able to 
prevent only Bosnian Serb soldiers from protesting.  On the 
other, he implies that he cannot (or will not) stop Bosnian 
Serb soldiers from withdrawing. End comment.) 
 
Presidency Fails to Act As Commander-in-Chief 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (S/NF)  Once Cikotic learned of the protests and the 
threat of withdrawal of Bosnian-Serbs, he called Chairman of 
the Presidency (Bosnian-Croat member) Zeljko Komsic.  Komsic 
told Cikotic that he needed to fix the situation and 
speculated that if Bosnian-Serbs withdrew, the military and 
country could collapse.  Cikotic also tried, but was 
initially unable, to contact the other members of the 
Presidency, (Bosniak) Haris Silajdzic and (Bosnian Serb) 
Nebojsa Radmanovic, although we do not know if he eventually 
succeeded.  In any case, neither the Presidency nor any 
member of the Presidency took any action as 
Commander-in-Chief to speak against the proposed protests or 
suggest that any attempt to organize a protest would be 
insubordination, if not mutiny or desertion. 
 
Reluctant Support from Bosniak Parties 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C/NF)  Cikotic told the Ambassador that he briefed his 
party, Party for Democratic Action (SDA), on his proposal to 
stop the protests, but had to argue for its support. Various 
sources told us that Cikotic briefed SDA's Defense Board, and 
met with Vice Chairman of SDA, Asim Sarajlic, to explain the 
threat.  Cikotic told Ambassador that at first Sarajlic was 
reluctant "to be seen on the wrong side of the problem" in an 
election year.  The SDA defense board asked the Minister what 
possibilities there were for extending the soldiers again, 
and were at first undecided about supporting the Minister in 
suppressing the protest. Cikotic claimed that he eventually 
convinced the SDA Defense Board and Sarajlic of the reasons 
for the dismissals, called for by the Defense Law, and the 
seriousness of the threat to the Armed Forces if there was 
not clear action halting the protests.  Cikotic told 
Ambassador that he argued to SDA, "If you don't stand up for 
the unified Armed Forces, who will?", implying a Bosniak 
interest in supporting state institutions -- and therefore 
the state itself -- greater than that of other ethnic groups. 
 
 
¶7. (C/NF) On January 8, SDA issued a press release expressing 
support for state institutions that were trying to solve the 
problem of soldiers whose contracts were expiring and added: 
"The announced disturbance of the integrity of the Armed 
Forces of and BiH's defense sector would represent an attack 
against the country's path to EU and NATO membership, as well 
as an attack against the state itself."  To date, no press 
outlet has mentioned the threat that Bosnian Serb soldiers 
would withdraw from the Armed Forces if the protests took 
place.  Sarajlic told us, some days later, that he commended 
Cikotic for the action he took with respect to the protests, 
but admitted that Cikotic was now in poor standing among many 
SDA officials.  Cikotic's staff told us during the crisis 
that Cikotic also appealed to Social Democratic Party (SDP) 
President Zlatko Lagumdzija to ask him to not politicize 
action taken to halt the protest in an effort to discredit 
Cikotic or SDA, "because in this case the threat to the state 
was too great to use for political gain." 
 
Reis Ceric Weighs In 
------------------- 
 
¶8. (C/NF)  Cikotic also told Ambassador that the leader of 
Bosnia's Islamic community, Reis ul-ulema Mustafa Ceric, was 
supportive of the soldiers who planned to protest, saying 
"How can you do this to Muslims?"  Afraid that criticism by 
Ceric would undermine his attempts to quell the protest, 
 
SARAJEVO 00000142  003 OF 003 
 
 
Cikotic called on the Mufti of the Armed Forces to intervene 
with Ceric, who was ultimately quiet as the Ministry acted to 
stop the protest. 
 
Defense Ministry Takes Action 
----------------------------- 
 
¶9. (S/NF)  Having received a blessing (and a positive press 
statement) from his party and the tacit agreement of 
Lagumdzija and Reis Ceric not to openly criticize his 
efforts, Cikotic chaired a briefing January 8 along with the 
(Croat and Serb) Deputy Ministers, all 13 Generals, all 
Commanders down to the battalion level and all Ministry staff 
to the Department Head level to send clear instructions to 
all soldiers that it was illegal for them to organize or 
protest against the Government of Bosnia, and to clearly set 
out punishment (dishonorable discharge with no severance 
benefits) for soldiers who protest or commanders who 
acquiesce to the protest or its organization.  Bosnian-Serb 
Deputy Minister of Defense Zivko Marjanac stated during the 
briefing that if the protest occurred, it would mean that 
Bosnia had no military. 
 
¶10. (S/NF)  Ultimately, protest organizers agreed to call off 
the protest on January 11, but reporting indicated that 
future protests would be planned if the soldiers' demands 
were not met.  Cikotic agreed to meet with four soldiers 
representing those dismissed to discuss ways that the 
Ministry of Defense could assuage the difficulties of their 
transition to civilian life, a move criticized by generals in 
his staff who did not want to begin a precedent of 
negotiations with soldiers whose contracts had ended. 
However, General Pleh told us that military intelligence, in 
coordination with state level intelligence and law 
enforcement services, immediately began criminal 
investigations into the role of organizers and commanding 
officers in planning the protests.  While the investigation 
remains incomplete, that has helped stave off further efforts 
to organize protests as the remaining soldiers prepare to 
leave service, opined Pleh's chief of staff. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶11. (C/NF) The defense reforms of 2006 which brought Bosnia's 
military under a unified command and Ministry of Defense are 
often touted as the most successful reforms since Dayton. 
This has been the second test of that command structure. 
(The first was in May 2009, when RS Prime Minister Dodik, 
speaking outside a supermarket, glibly called on Serb 
soldiers to desert the NATO exercise in Georgia.  Milojcic 
acted quickly in that case to assure the Minister that Serb 
soldiers would obey their lawful orders, and Dodik's staff 
told us that his comment was not thought-out or serious.)  In 
the end of the day, the defense structures worked with unity 
to stave off a protest that would have amounted to mass 
disobedience and illegal action on the part of Bosnia's 
soldiers.  Nonetheless, the potential boycott, the threat of 
Serb soldiers leaving, the Minister's need to win over his 
party and the head of Bosnia's Islamic community, and the 
recourse to ethnic power bases rather than the legal chain of 
command show the fragility of Bosnia's defense reform. 
ENGLISH