VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHSN #0246/01 0562231
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 252229Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0448
INFO WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS SAN SALVADOR 000246 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EFIN PGOV SOCI CITIBANK ES
SUBJECT: Citibank Skeptical of Government Lending Plans 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY.  Citibank El Salvador's head expressed skepticism 
over Government of El Salvador proposals to increase lending 
through secured transactions, government guarantees, and a 
government development bank.  In Citibank's view, cash-flow-based 
lending is the most effective method, as secured transactions take 
too long to collect on collateral and rely on El Salvador's erratic 
court system.  Similarly, government guarantees might help in a few 
borderline cases but would not have a big effect, while a national 
development bank lacks a coherent lending strategy.   Reforms like 
improving collateral-based lending would help further modernize El 
Salvador's financial system, but issues like the court system will 
also need to be addressed to broadly expand access to credit. 
While Citibank is the most conservative major bank, its views are 
shared by the other major players in the sector.  END SUMMARY. 
 
 
 
¶2. (SBU) According to Citibank El Salvador Executive Director 
Alvaro Jaramillo, the GOES has proposed three main ideas to 
increase lending and expand access to credit: increased use of 
secured transactions, a government-backed guarantee fund, and the 
creation of a government-run national development bank.   The 
latter two are new projects, while the former involves reforms and 
expansion of existing laws.  El Salvador does allow moveable 
collateral-based lending, but a previous attempt at reform by the 
Flores Administration (1999-2004), working with USAID, was not 
fully implemented.  The Funes Administration has revived these 
efforts, also with USAID assistance. 
 
 
 
¶3. (SBU) In Jaramillo's view, secured transaction reform would not 
increase bank lending.  Under the current system, he said, it takes 
a minimum of 3.5-4 years to collect on the collateral in event of 
default, and by that time the collateral equipment is in such bad 
shape it is of little value.  Citibank's only major 
collateral-based lending is for coffee production, using the crop 
as a guarantee, but Citibank puts extra checks on the process like 
requiring the use of bonded warehouses for the final crop.  Even if 
the laws were reformed to make collection easier, Jaramillo said, 
the banks still lack faith in the court system to fairly enforce 
those laws.   Jaramillo predicted that the international banks 
would continue to use cash flow-based lending for the vast majority 
of their portfolios. 
 
 
 
¶4. (SBU) Government-guaranteed lending, according to Jaramillo, 
might make a difference in marginal cases, with borderline cash 
flow projections.  Jaramillo said the GOES proposal would guarantee 
30-40% of a loan, not its full value.  The GOES would use the 
state-owned second tier Multi-sector Investment Bank (BMI) to 
provide the guarantees, which the banks consider sovereign 
guarantees for their risk portfolios. 
 
 
 
¶5. (SBU) The GOES's most ambitious proposal would convert BMI into 
a first-tier national development bank, modeled after Brazil's 
national development bank.  In Jaramillo's opinion, however, the 
GOES proposal lacks one fundamental component - a lending strategy 
tied to clear development goals.  Brazil, he said, used its 
national development bank to build up key sectors like biofuels in 
which it saw clear long-term potential.  The GOES, on the other 
hand, had not shared any kind of strategy with either the banks or 
the Brazilian banking consultant with whom Jaramillo had spoken. 
Jaramillo speculated that this idea may be driven more by the 
desire to have a viable national bank that would be more responsive 
to GOES program goals or incentives.  Jaramillo added that in a 
recent bank presidents' meeting, Minister of Finance Carlos Caceres 
said Brazilian President "Lula" de Silva had been advising 
President Funes that the internationalization of the Salvadoran 
banking sector was a mistake, since the banks did not have El 
Salvador's interests at heart. 
 
 
 
¶6. (SBU) Overall, Jaramillo expressed pessimism over El Salvador's 
economic prospects.  He noted that Citibank El Salvador lost about 
$18 million in 2009 (NOTE: Jaramillo subsequently told Commercial 
Counselor Citibank El Salvador's losses totaled $70 million, 
including write-offs of bad loans from the local banks they had 
acquired.  END NOTE) , but he added that the bank was still lending 
where it saw prospects.  Fundamentally, Jaramillo said, increased 
consumer demand for businesses' products and services is needed to 
really spur lending.   Neither he nor Banco Agricola's 
 
(BanColombia's) Colombian Chairman of the Board saw signs of 
economic recovery, he said.  In the longer term, the real question 
for the country was where it would find its competitive advantage, 
he added, and he did not have an answer. 
 
 
 
¶7. (SBU) COMMENT:  Financial inclusion and extending the benefits 
of trade to non-traditional beneficiaries are policy priorities for 
the Funes government, and the GOES has expressed interest in 
working on these issues together with the United States.  Reforms 
like improving collateral-based lending would be an important step 
in further modernizing El Salvador's financial system.  Citibank's 
frank assessment of the immediate effects on lending, however, 
demonstrate that secured transaction reforms alone are not enough. 
Other issues, like El Salvador's inconsistent judicial system, will 
also have to be addressed in order to ultimately expand access to 
credit. 
BLAU