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O 251505Z FEB 10
FM IRAN RPO DUBAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0107
INFO IRAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI IMMEDIATE
RUEIDN/DNI WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RPO DUBAI 000051 
 
SIPDIS 
NOFORN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/25 
TAGS: PGOV IR
SUBJECT: 'KHAMENEI: NOW MORE THAN EVER' SAYS IRAN'S EXPERTS ASSEMBLY 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Alan Eyre, Director, DOS, IRPO; REASON: 1.4(B), (D) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY. The February 23-24 biannual meeting of the Assembly 
of Experts ended without incident, and despite the pre-meeting 
agitations of pro-Ahmadinejad elements, without any appreciable 
diminution of the political standing of its head, former President 
Hashemi Rafsanjani .  The dominant theme of the two-day meeting was 
support for the Supreme Leader, confirming that for the time being, 
as a body the AoE remains pubically fully behind Khamenei.  It also 
indicates that while there is a significant and influential 
anti-Rafsanjani/pro-Ahmadinejad minority within the AoE, it is 
currently incapable of inflicting significant political damage on 
AoE President Rafsanjani. END SUMMARY. 
 
 
 
¶2. (C) On February 23-24 Iran's Assembly of Experts (AoE), charged 
with electing, supervising and if necessary removing the Supreme 
Leader, had its second biannual meeting since the tumultuous June 
12 Presidential elections. This 86-member body, headed by composed 
exclusively of popularly elected senior clerics, is head by former 
President Hashemi Rafsanjani, and its two meetings since the 
election have been studied as an indication of his political 
standing.  Noticeably absent in this meeting was Rafsanjani 
arch-nemesis Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi, whose stayed away but who 
sent his son to take his seat. 
 
 
 
¶3. (U) In the lead-up to this latest AoE meeting elements 
associated with President Ahmadinejad's political faction increased 
their anti-Rafsanjani public rhetoric.  Pro-Ahmadinejad press and 
politicians issued calls that per Khamenei guidance Rafsanjani must 
'clarify his position,' 'i.e. express fealty to the Supreme Leader 
and explicitly condemn the Green Movement and its leaders Khatami, 
Mousavi and Karrubi. In this vein: 
 
 
 
- the pro-Ahmadinejad 'Vatan-e Emruz' newspaper wrote of the 
possibility of removing Rafsanjani as AoE head (despite the fact 
that leadership elections were not scheduled); 
 
 
 
- an unofficial group in Qom called 'Popular Staff for Discernment 
Meetings' published statements in some Qom seminaries seeking 
Rafsanjani's removal, implying it was Khamenei's wishes; 
 
 
 
- a Kayhan Editorial by Hossein Shariatmadari on Feb 20 accused 
Rafsanjani of cooperating with Hassan Ruhani and Mohsen Rezai in 
seeking to reform the election law to weaken the Guardian Council, 
in order to 'open the path of the influence of the enemy.' 
 
 
 
- in recently released remarks, hardline conservative cleric 
Ayatollah Mesbah-Yazdi said that "after Ashura (December 27 
demonstrations) ... there were no doubts remaining" about 
Rafsanjani's sympathies with the 'insurrectionists.' 
 
 
 
RAF SPEECH: SOMETHING FOR EVERYONE 
 
 
 
¶4. (U) Rafsanjani's opening AoE speech on February 23 was a 
perfunctory tour d 'horizon, filled with the usual talking points 
on regional and domestic issues, to include praising the popular 
turnout on February 11, which "showed the wisdom of the Iranian 
people."  In the non-boilerplate part of his speech, picked up by 
reformist media, he said, "during the interval between the two 
meetings of the Assembly of Experts [September 2009-March 2010], 
some distressing incidents happened in the country that were 
unprecedented [i.e. demonstrations on November 4, December 7 and 
December 27]. These incidents led to disputes and probably created 
grudges... the families of both protesters and [security] forces 
were hurt too, which is regrettable and requires investigation." 
 
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¶5. (C) Much of both this speech and his subsequent February 24 
speech at the grave of Grand Ayatollah Khomeini (another AoE 
meeting ritual) was filled with references to the popular nature of 
the Islamic Revolution, with Rafsanjani saying that it was the 
Iranian people who brought about the Revolution and have sustained 
it, a not-to-subtle warning about the dangers of losing popular 
support.  Rafsanjani in this latter speech also referred to his own 
long Revolutionary credentials while disparaging ''those people who 
didn't have anything to say during the time of struggle," (and who 
now) are professing to be champions of the Revolution, an implicit 
reference to a wide range of Rafsanjani's recent enemies, to 
include Ayatollah Mesbah-Yazdi. 
 
 
 
¶6. (C) Rafsanjani's AoE speeches were of course rife with the 
requisite expressions of fealty to the Supreme Leader, with his 
saying at one point that "I don't know anyone better than the 
Leader to be the basis of unity." However in his comments he also 
made a subtle distinction between the person and the position 
itself, calling the latter 'the most important capital from the 
Islamic Revolution.' He also implied that Khamenei should remove 
himself from partisan battles, at one point praising Khamenei's 
capabilities and familiarity with religious, scientific, economic, 
management, and military matters, while adding "we must not allow 
ourselves to abuse such an important resource for trivial matters." 
 
 
 
¶7.  (C) Perhaps in response for demands for clarification, 
Rafsanjani spoke of the need to preserve the 'border between those 
faithful to the Revolution and those foundation-breakers who have a 
problem with the Constitution and the Supreme Leader." However, 
this statement, and Rafsanjani's protestations of loyalty to the 
Supreme Leader, were insufficient for his detractors within the 
AoE, with some of the 16 speakers allotted 15 minutes for comments 
voicing dissatisfaction with his stance. For example, Mazandaran 
province representative Hojjatoleslam Moallemi complained that 
considering his position Rafsanjani should have 'spoken more 
clearly' and 'taken a position, ' while Golestan Province 
Representative Hojjatoleslami Shahroudi requested that Rafsanjani 
'prove for all' his devotion to the Supreme Leader by taking a 
clear and transparent position. 
 
 
 
NOW MORE THAN EVER 
 
 
 
¶8. (C) As per custom, select government officials were summoned to 
the AoE to brief on their portfolios. This time both Foreign 
Minister Mottaki and IRGC Commander Jaafari gave reports, the 
former on Iran's foreign affairs and the latter on domestic 
security. The latter's reported comments were interesting insofar 
as he included 'technocrats' [possibly a reference to Rafsanjani 
and his supporters] along with "anti-revolutionaries and 
revisionists" as being among those opposing the Revolution and the 
Velayat-e Faqih (i.e. Supreme Leader Khamenei). 
 
 
 
¶9. (C) The two-day AoE session also featured the reading of the 
monthly report of its Article 111 Commission, which meets monthly 
to monitor the performance of the Supreme Leader in light of his 
Constitutional duties. The Committee's fawning findings were 
perhaps best summarized in its gushing statement that 'as we 
progress forward,  the Leader's essential qualities shine brighter 
and brighter, especially his wisdom and management.' 
 
 
 
FINAL AoE STATEMENT: 'KHAMENEI-FEST' 
 
 
 
¶10. (C) The AoE's final statement was likewise a paean to the 
Supreme Leader and an exhortation to all to continue to follow his 
guidance. It said (inter alia): 
 
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- It is essential to bring about quiet and unity by following the 
guidance of the Supreme Leader 
 
 
 
- the post-election events, although inflicting significant 
material and spiritual damage, was also a blessing as it helped 
identify impurities and to separate the forces of good and evil, 
and to test Iran's people and elites. The results of this historic 
trial showed the people's wisdom and also unfortunately also the 
forlorn nature of some elites. 
 
 
 
- The 'Revolutionary patience' of the people ended on December 30 
[the day of the pro-government demonstration]. But even though "the 
insurrection is over," the people's responsibilities, and the need 
to make one's positions clear and to follow the Supreme Leader, has 
not ended.   Reflection on what had transpired would convince any 
reasonable person of the need for full support the position of the 
Supreme Leader. 
 
 
 
- Iran's intelligence and security forces would continue to deal 
'decisively' with any type of suspicious or incendiary acts. 
 
 
 
¶11. (C) COMMENT:  Popular participation in AoE elections is minimal 
by Iranian standards, and the Guardian Council has been especially 
virulent in its ideological screening for candidates for this body. 
This, plus the natural conservative nature of Iran's clerical 
class, means that the AoE as a whole is the most inertial of 
Iranian institutions.  This AoE meeting confirms that, despite 
Rafsanjani's leadership, as a body the AoE remains publically fully 
behind the Supreme Leader.  It also indicates that while there is a 
significant and influential anti-Rafsanjani/pro-Ahmadinejad 
minority within the AoE, it is currently incapable of inflicting 
significant political damage on AoE President Rafsanjani.  END 
COMMENT. 
EYRE