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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ROME 000172 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
SECDEF FOR USDP, ISA, ISA/EURNATO 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2020 
TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS NATO IT AF IR KV
SUBJECT: SECDEF MEETING WITH ITALIAN MINISTER OF DEFESNE 
IGNACIO LA RUSSA ON FEBRUARY 6, 2010 
 
ROME 00000172  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Alexander Vershbow for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D 
) 
 
¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: Secretary of Defense Robert Gates (SecDef) 
met with Italian Minister of Defense Ignacio La Russa during 
an official visit to Rome on February 6-7, 2010.  La Russa 
expressed deep appreciation for SecDef's visit and for the 
chance to focus on bilateral defense relations rather than 
only NATO matters.  SecDef thanked La Russa for his personal 
efforts to secure 1000 more Italian troops for operations in 
Afghanistan.  Discussions on Afghanistan also touched on 
training for Afghan Security Forces, caveats on Italian 
troops, and intelligence sharing.  SecDef asked La Russa for 
Italian government advocacy in recognizing NATO SOFA 
jurisdiction in the case of Colonel Joseph Romano.  La Russa 
stated that direct U.S. intervention during the appeals 
process would be the best way to successfully resolve the 
matter.  SecDef asked La Russa to assist in the resolution of 
thorny force posture issues at Naval Support Station (NSS) 
Gricignano and Mobile User Objective System (MUOS) Niscemi. 
SecDef and La Russa agreed that further force reductions in 
Kosovo must be dictated by conditions on the ground.  La 
Russa concurred that further pressure on Iran was needed and 
committed that Italy would do what was asked to apply that 
pressure.  SecDef and La Russa also discussed the Joint 
Strike Fighter program.  END SUMMARY. 
 
------------ 
Afghanistan 
------------ 
 
¶2. (S/NF) La Russa started the meeting by confirming that 
Italy is satisfied with General McChrystal's approach to 
Afghanistan.  He expressed contentment with the prospective 
bifurcation of RC-South into a two commands.  La Russa noted 
that of the 1000 new troops Italy has committed, some will be 
used for training the Afghan National Army and others will be 
used for police training.  La Russa also thanked SecDef for 
his initiative to get Allies better counter-improvised 
explosive device (C-IED) equipment in Afghanistan and to 
improve intelligence sharing. 
 
¶3. (S/NF) SecDef commended Italy's leading role in RC-West 
and La Russa's personal efforts to increase Italian 
contributions, noting that training Afghans to take 
responsibility for their own security is the best means to a 
successful transition.  SecDef commented that Afghan security 
forces needed to be trained at the same level and with the 
same skills, noting the importance of removing caveats that 
restrict ISAF forces' ability to partner with Afghan forces. 
SecDef assured La Russa that the creation of RC-SW will have 
no operational impact on Italian forces and explained that 
the stand-up of an intelligence fusion cell in RC-W will 
improve intelligence sharing immensely.  SecDef assured La 
Russa that the U.S. is providing all available intelligence 
to Italy, but that if Italy has unmet needs, General 
McChrystal will try to help.  Finally, SecDef stressed that 
providing Allies with better C-IED equipment would be his top 
priority upon returning to Washington. 
 
¶4. (S/NF) La Russa detailed an Italian caveat requiring a 
six-hour waiting period for deploying Italian troops in RC-W, 
explaining that it is meaningless in practical terms given 
that operational planning takes at least that long to 
conduct.  While believing it was unnecessary and largely a 
"psychological" issue, La Russa committed to asking the 
Council of Ministers to remove the caveat if the United 
States requested. 
 
----- 
Haiti 
----- 
 
¶5. (C) SecDef commended the rapid deployment of the Italian 
Aircraft Carrier CAVOUR to Haiti after the recent earthquake. 
 La Russa stated that the ship had arrived and was beginning 
 
ROME 00000172  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
to unload goods and that the embarked engineering task force 
had begun debris clearing work.  La Russa also said that 
Italy is likely to send 100-120 Carabinieri to Haiti to 
assist in relief efforts.  SecDef replied that the 
Carabinieri would be a welcome addition.  The United Nations 
Mission to Haiti (MINUSTAH) -- which suffered major losses -- 
would need to sustain relief efforts for a long period of 
time. 
 
-------------------- 
Abu Omar/Romano Case 
-------------------- 
 
¶6.  (S/NF) SecDef thanked La Russa for his efforts to have 
the Italian Minister of Justice send letters to relevant 
judicial authorities affirming U.S. jurisdiction over Colonel 
Romano under the NATO SOFA in the Abu Omar case.  Recalling 
his meeting with Prime Minister Berlusconi, SecDef hoped that 
the appeals process would offer additional opportunities for 
GOI advocacy.  Drawing on his own legal background, La Russa 
advised the U.S. to be more present in the appeals process 
and not leave it solely to the Italian government to make the 
case for recognition of U.S. jurisdiction.  He noted that the 
assertion of jurisdiction late in the trial had given 
prosecutors a chance to politicize the issue.  SecDef 
reminded La Russa that the U.S decision not to immediately 
assert jurisdiction was made at the advice of GOI and has not 
served U.S. interests well. 
 
--------------------------- 
U.S. Force Posture in Italy 
--------------------------- 
 
¶7. (S/NF) SecDef requested that La Russa take a personal 
interest in resolving problems with NSS Gricignano and MUOS 
Niscemi.  He stated that lack of recognition of NSS 
Gricignano as a military facility was a major problem and 
that the security of U.S. forces was non-negotiable.  On MUOS 
Niscemi, SecDef requested that La Russa assist in securing 
final approval for the site, noting that if construction of 
the antenna did not begin by March, the U.S. might have to 
look elsewhere in the Mediterranean. 
 
¶8. (S/NF) La Russa told SecDef that he believed there was a 
solution for NSS Gricignano, although current law does not 
permit handing over security fully.  La Russa proposed the 
area be given a special status, after which a bilateral 
agreement between the U.S. and Italy would allow the U.S to 
assume security responsibilities.  La Russa did not comment 
on the status of MUOS Niscemi. 
 
---- 
Iran 
---- 
 
¶9. (S/NF) La Russa began discussion on Iran by noting the 
significant value of NATO's nuclear deterrent for the 
credibility of Articles 4 and 5 of the Washington Treaty.  La 
Russa characterized the attitude of the government in Tehran 
as provocative and believed its actions have serious 
implications for global peace and security.  La Russa 
cautioned that sanctions can backfire, making the targeted 
government stronger and hurting the population.  He cited 
1936 sanctions against Italy as an example.  La Russa 
confided that Italian defense contractor Finmechanica had 
quietly decided against renewing a lucrative contract in 
Iran, noting that industry was becoming more sensitized to 
the consequences of doing business with Tehran. 
 
¶10. (S/NF) SecDef referred to a past CIA study that had 
concluded that sanctions bring the desired results if there 
is broad-based application among nations for required 
measures.  He cited South Africa as a successful case study. 
SecDef stated his belief that if Iran is allowed to continue 
its nuclear program, the result will be greater nuclear 
proliferation in the Middle East, a war, or both.  Businesses 
 
ROME 00000172  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
need to see past their short-term profit margin and grasp 
this reality.  La Russa agreed completely and stated that 
Italy is ready to support the sanctions track. 
 
------- 
Kosovo 
------- 
 
¶11. (S/NF) SecDef and La Russa agreed that the Alliance must 
follow its "in together, out together" policy for Kosovo and 
that conditions on the ground should dictate when to draw 
down force levels.  SecDef noted that he had broached this 
topic with other Defense Ministers whose governments had 
contemplated unilateral reductions of forces.  La Russa added 
that Italy was prepared to shift to a deterrence posture at 
the appropriate time, but that Italy understood the value of 
leaving enough forces to protect troubled areas. 
 
-------------------- 
Joint Strike Fighter 
-------------------- 
 
¶12. (C) La Russa stated that Italy was ready to be both a 
partner and a customer in the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) 
program.  He explained the importance of modernizing the 
Italian Air Force through JSF.  SecDef responded that the 
U.S. retained confidence in the program after the recent 
restructuring and that the U.S. was committed to purchasing 
360 aircraft between FY11 and FY15.  He added that the U.S. 
fully understands Italy's desire for greater industrial 
participation and voiced his support for the establishment of 
a final assembly facility in Italy.  SecDef noted some $350M 
in contracts so far for Italian industry, with the potential 
for substantially more in the future. 
 
¶13. (U) SecDef has cleared this cable.  Drafted by OSD staff. 
DIBBLE