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S E C R E T RIYADH 000193 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/15/2019 
TAGS: MASS MOPS PREL SA YM
SUBJECT: YEMENI-HOUTHI CEASEFIRE:  WILL IT LAST? 
 
REF: A. 09 SANAA 2117 
     ¶B. 09 SANAA 2279 
     ¶C. RIYADH 1621 
     ¶D. RIYADH 1633 
     ¶E. SANAA 275 
 
Classified By: DCM Susan L. Ziadeh for reasons 1.4 (A), (B) AND (D) 
 
¶1. (S) Summary:  On Thursday, February 11, the Yemeni 
Government announced a ceasefire in its conflict with the 
Houthis to take effect as of midnight on February 12th. 
While violations and political setbacks are likely in the 
days and weeks ahead, the ceasefire ought to hold for the 
near term.  The Houthis fighters have been weakened by 
significant losses and appear to be choosing to put down 
their guns while they are still standing rather than risk 
being further ground down by Saudi and Yemeni forces. 
Importantly, Saudi Arabia has acheived its military 
objectives of driving the Houthis away from the border area. 
The ceasefire also reflects that the Yemeni government, with 
Saudi encouragement, understands the urgency to redirect the 
focus of its security forces to the fight against Al-Qaida. 
One key unresolved matter is the promised return of five 
Saudi soldiers held by the Houthis.  If these captives are 
not returned to Saudi Arabia in the days immediately ahead, 
the Saudi military will likely seek to compel their release 
with a resumption of attacks on Houthi targets.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (U) As reported in reftel (e), the ceasefire went into 
effect at midnight on Friday, February 12, 2010 after the 
Houthis agreed to six ceasefire terms laid out by the Yemeni 
Government.  The local press has carried various descriptions 
of the six conditions of the ceasefire, which are summarized 
below,  The Houthis must: 
 
-- end attacks against Yemeni Government and Saudi Arabia 
forces; 
 
-- release civilian and military prisoners taken during the 
conflict, including the five Saudi captives; 
 
-- withdraw from government buildings and military posts 
occupied during the fighting; 
 
-- remove checkpoints so that roads can be reopened; 
 
-- return looted items, including arms taken from the Yemeni 
and Saudi military; and 
 
-- withdraw from the Saudi/Yemen border area; and 
 
¶3. (C) Prince Khalid bin Sultan informed Ambassador Smith on 
February 7 that a ceasefire was in the works, and his 
prediction that something would happen "within a week" has 
proven accurate.  Prince Khalid also informed the Ambassador 
that, as requested by Saudi Arabia, Yemeni Government troops 
would be deployed along the Yemeni side of the Saudi/Yemeni 
border once the Houthi fighters have fully withdrawn from the 
area.  Additionally, Prince Khalid said that he would 
advocate not permitting the many evacuated villages on the 
Saudi side of the border to be re-populated.  He prefers that 
a 10-kilometer strip on the Saudi side of the border be 
retained as an unoccupied military zone. 
 
 
¶4. (C) On February 13, Prince Khalid appeared on Saudi 
television to declare Saudi support for the Yemeni-Houthi 
ceasefire.  Prince Khalid noted that the Saudi military would 
remain in place along the Saudi border to reinforce the Saudi 
Border Guard.  He also noted that one important condition of 
the ceasefire had not yet been met, which is the return of 
the five Saudi soldiers captured by the Houthis.  Prince 
Khalid said that he expects the return of these captives 
"within 48 hours."  If the Houthis do not return the Saudi 
soldiers in the days immediately ahead, this Saudi military 
would likely resume air and artillery operations against 
Houthi targets in an effort to compel their release.  This 
eventuality could put the ceasefire in jeopardy. 
 
¶5. (S) Embassy Comment:  The ceasefire, which brings to a 
close nearly five years of on-again, off-again battles with 
the Houthis, has the potential to last for some time.  Both 
sides appear tired of fighting each other.  The Houthis have 
been beaten, but not vanquished, leaving them able to quit 
the fight while drawing pride and accomplishment from their 
defiance of the central government.  With a ceasefire in 
place, the Saudi government can return to its practice of 
buying tribal loyalties, and is prepared to do so by funding 
substantial development projects in northern Yemen to help 
induce Houthi cooperation with the Yemeni government, and in 
the words of the Saudi Assistant Minister of Interior 
Mohammed bin Nayef "to give the people something to lose." 
 
¶6. (S) After three months of military operations, the Saudi 
military has achieved its primary goal of driving the Houthis 
from the border area, teaching them a lesson, and emerging 
from the campaign with substantially stronger border controls 
in place.  The primary Saudi concern at this point is gaining 
the release of the soldiers held by the Houthis; our 
assumption is that the transfer will happen very soon.  The 
Yemeni Government has been feeling pressure from both the 
U.S. and the Saudis to turn its attention to Al-Qaida, and 
now will be better positioned to do so.  While ceasefire 
violations and protests of bad faith from both sides are 
likely over the coming weeks, particularly as the Yemeni 
government seeks to reassert its control over Saada, 
nonetheless the conditions outlined above suggest that the 
agreement to end hostilities should prove durable.   End 
comment. 
SMITH