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FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH
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INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0861
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 5365
RUEHYN/AMEMBASSY SANAA PRIORITY 1748
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUETIJS/CSG JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

S E C R E T RIYADH 000160
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2020
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV SA
SUBJECT: SAUDI INTERIOR MINISTRY OFFERS ASSESSMENT OF
YEMEN’S SECURITY
REF: RIYADH 118
Classified By: Ambassador James B. Smith, reasons 1.4 (b and d).
¶1. (S) Summary: The Saudi Ministry of Interior briefed
visiting NEA A/S Jeffrey Feltman on its concerns about
regional stability, centering on Yemen, Iraq, Iran and Syria.
MOI is concerned that Yemeni leaders do not have a coherent
vision for the development of the country, and are instead
preoccupied with survival strategies as they confront
multiple domestic challengers, including Al Qaeda. MOI is
frustrated that the Yemeni Government seems more concerned
about combating domestic Yemeni challengers, rather than Al
Qaeda, which Saudi Arabia believes is a more serious
long-term threat. Saudi Arabia continues to offer assistance
to Yemen as an inducement to get Yemeni forces to be more
active in confronting Al Qaeda. MOI believes that Iran
directed the Houthis to attack the Saudi border in December,
which would make little sense otherwise. MOI remains
concerned about Iranian actions elsewhere, including in Iraq,
although it is gradually seeing its influence wane in
Baghdad. MOI has good working relations with some Iraqi
security forces, as well as with Syria, with whom it has
recently restarted repatriation of Saudi prisoners. MOI
officials expressed concern about the ongoing Transportation
Safety Administration regulations for passenger screening,
which they believe are eroding popular Saudi support for
bilateral cooperation. MOI officials lauded ongoing
cooperation with MOI’s critical infrastructure protection
program (OPM-MOI). End Summary.
Yemen:
- - - -
¶2. (S) On January 26, NEA A/S Feltman met with Dr. Saad
Al-Jabri and Major General Khalid Humaydan of the Ministry of
Interior, who briefed him on a variety of regional security
concerns, including an extensive overview of MOI’s current
thinking on Yemen. MG Humaydan said the current trouble with
Yemen has its roots in the collapse of the old monarchy in
the early 1960’s, leading to the 1961-67 civil war. The
stated goals of the subsequent revolution, or coup (depending
on which side you were on), were to end an authoritarian
regime. The reality is that "everything failed," and
"repression is back," exercised by political parties, tribes,
the military and corruption. Today, "everything is for sale
in Yemen, including loyalty." MG Humaydan said Saudi
Arabia’s initial optimism about the prospects for stability
after unification in the 1980’s were dashed by the 1994 war,
which imposed a single country by force. Saudi Arabia
believes that the reconciliation effort failed, in part
because President Saleh’s opponents were largely excluded.
MOI has concluded that Yemeni leaders are now playing a
"survival game," with no clear strategic plan to take Yemen
into the 21st century. Instead, most of the government’s
tactics seem focused on maintaining the status quo.
¶3. (S) The MOI team identified several problems with that
approach, including a range of opponents of the Yemeni
regime, such as Al Qaeda and several different separatist
groups. While Saudi Arabia’s focus is clearly on Al Qaeda,
the MOI team said that Saleh’s government is primarily
focused on the Houthis and southern separatists. MOI is very
concerned that Al Qaeda is so active in Yemen, which has a
lot of similarities to Afghanistan, both in terms of
geography and tribal makeup, as well as a long tradition of
resistance to central rule. MOI has long believed that, as
Al Qaeda fails in Iraq, it will infest Yemen, in part because
it is so close to its main targets, the two holy mosques and
extensive oil reserves in Saudi Arabia. MG Humayadan also
noted that Yemen’s persistent corruption and poverty provide
Al Qaeda a lot of tools.
¶4. (C) The MOI team said that they are trying to convince
Yemen to take action on the ground against Al Qaeda and
deprive it of an operational address for men and money.
Saudi Arabia has been offering help in terms of money and
technical assistance as an inducement to the Yemeni
Government to move against Al Qaeda, although Dr. Al-Jabri
noted that Saudi Arabia is not aware of any Yemeni moves
against Al Qaeda from the September attempted assassination
of Deputy Interior Minister Mohammed bin Naif until the
actions in December. MOI has concluded that this is because
Yemen hoped to use Al Qaeda to fight the Houthis. It was
only when Al Qaeda refused to extend the truce with the ROYG
that Yemen was forced to act against them.
¶5. (S) MOI does not see much cooperation per se between Al
Qaeda and the southern separatists, although says one group
of separatists is closely affiliated with Al Qaeda. The SAG
also believes that Al Qaeda may have moved through Houthi
land until recently with its knowledge and possible local
assistance. Al-Jabri said that Saudi Arabia had seen
"savage" Houthi attacks on Sunni villages in Yemen, with no
AQAP retaliation.
¶6. (S) MOI believes the million dollar question is why the
Houthis attacked the Saudi border; the best answer they can
come up with is that Iran directed them to do so, likely in
retaliation for the suicide attacks last fall in Iran.
Shia in Saudi:
- - - - - - -
¶7. (C) Al-Jabri said that relations between Saudi Sunni and
Shia, concentrated predominantly in the Eastern Province, are
getting better, thanks in part to greater tolerance from King
Abdullah, such as lifting the travel ban to Iran, which has
allowed a number of Saudi Shia to see for themselves that the
Iranian revolution is not all it is cracked up to be.
Al-Jabri said that Saudi Shia, many of whom work for either
Aramco or the local government, have a much better standard
of living than other Shia in the region. Saudi Arabia has
had tense relations with Iran over several regional issues,
including Iraq. Al-Jabri said that Saudi Arabia has provided
Iran with information on the presence of AQ affiliates inside
Iran, and asked for assistance in addressing these
individuals, with no results to date. Al-Jabri said that it
was typical for each Iranian agency to claim it was the
responsibility of another. Al-Jabri also said that Saudi
Arabia had reached the conclusion that its restrictions on
international activities of Saudi charities had inadvertently
given Iran a free hand to operate, including in South
American and Africa, as well as in Yemen.
Iraq:
- - -
¶8. (C) Al-Jabri said that Saudi Arabia was not happy with
what it perceived as Iranian influence in Iraq, although it
has seen indications that Iraqi actors are increasingly
unhappy with Iran. Al-Jabri said that MOI has very good ties
with some Iraqi security forces, despite issues at the
political level. Over the longer term, Al-Jabri expected
Saudi Arabia and Iraq would again enjoy good relations, if
for no other reason than the Kingdom is the "only one" of
Iraq’s neighbors that does not have an agenda it is pushing
with Iraq (e.g., recovery of territory). Saudi Arabia would
prefer that the next government be a truly national
government, rather than the current "government of factions,"
which would be better able to hold discussions based on
national interest, which would help reintegrate it with the
Arab world.
Syria:
- - - -
¶9. (C) Al-Jabri said that relations between the Saudi and
Syrian security services have improved, and expected that on
January 28, Syria should have returned 9 Saudis from
detention. Al-Jabri said Syria is the most cooperative
country in repatriating Saudis in prison. Al-Jabri is aware
Syria is less cooperative with other neighboring countries
(e.g., Jordan, Lebanon), but welcomes the recent return of
cooperation, which stopped after 2005.
TSA:
- - -
¶9. (SBU) Al-Jabri and his team underscored the ongoing
sensitivity of TSA regulations requiring additional vigilance
for all Saudi travelers. They questioned whether the
measures TSA is adopting are productive, and noted that these
actions are undermining public support for greater bilateral
cooperation. Al-Jabri cited the example of NSEERS, which
seemed to achieve little in terms of identifying individuals
worthy of greater security attention, while doing a lot of
harm in terms of aggravating thousands of innocent travelers
by imposing rigorous requirements on them. Al-Jabri said
that the SAG very much hopes that these new regulations will
be temporary, so that they will not dissuade Saudi parents
from sending their children on scholarships to the U.S. for
fear that they will not be able to complete their education.
Al-Jabri also said that individual DHS officers can be
discourteous at times, as happened to him three times, which
further ingrains Saudi concerns and suspicions they are being
singled out, or denied entry for no clear reason.
OPM-MOI
- - - -
¶10. (SBU) Al-Jabri was very complimentary of the growing
cooperation to protect critical Saudi infrastructure. He
said that the King was very happy, and that this cooperation
was having positive effects on the rest of the bilateral
relationship. MOI is very pleased with the cooperation from
USG agencies, which form one team, and Saudi Arabia intends
to expand it into other areas, like cybercrime.
¶11. (U) This cable has been cleared by A/S Feltman.
SMITH