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INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0323
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 4829
RUEHJI/AMCONSUL JEDDAH PRIORITY 0589
RUEHDH/AMCONSUL DHAHRAN PRIORITY 0478

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RIYADH 000155 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NEA/ARP, S/SRAP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2020 
TAGS: PREL PGOV AF PK SA
SUBJECT: KARZAI TO THE KING: I NEED YOUR HELP 
 
REF: RIYADH 136 
 
RIYADH 00000155  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador James B. Smith for 
reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1.  (C) Afghan President Hamid Karzai traveled to Riyadh for 
a meeting with Saudi King Abdullah on February 3.  Karzai's 
visit comes a week after his speech at the London Afghanistan 
Conference, where he called upon the Saudis to assist in 
facilitating the Afghan reconciliation process.  As Karzai 
seeks attention, the Saudis are playing it cool.  FM Saud 
Al-Faisal's straightforward statement at the London 
Conference made it clear Saudi involvement would only come 
with certain conditions.  While this statement is fairly 
straightforward, our discussions with Saudi leaders indicate 
their actual position may be somewhat more nuanced.  While 
it's unlikely Karzai's visit will result in any real 
breakthrough, one of their conditions--a formal request for 
the King to assist--has now been met.  END SUMMARY. 
 
 
FIRST UMRAH, THEN A MEETING WITH THE KING 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (U) Afghan President Hamid Karzai arrived in Saudi Arabia 
on February 2, accompanied by the newly named Afghan Foreign 
Minister, Zalmay Rasoul.  He was met at the airport by the 
Mayor of Jeddah, Prince Mishal bin Majed bin Abdulaziz. 
Karzai performed the Umrah (minor pilgrimage) in Mecca before 
traveling to Riyadh, where he was scheduled to have an 
audience with the King the next day.  Afghan Ambassador to 
Saudi Arabia Aziz Karzai attended all meetings with Karzai. 
Reuters reported that Karzai had also planned to meet with 
OIC Secretary General Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu to discuss an OIC 
role in reconciliation, but that this meeting was canceled. 
 
 
KARZAI ASKS FOR HELP 
-------------------- 
 
¶3. (U) Karzai,s trip follows his statement at the January 28 
London Conference on Afghanistan, where he asked the SAG to 
"play a role, to guide peace, and assist the process" of 
reconciliation with the Taliban.  FM Saud Al-Faisal,s 
official response was broadly supportive of the 
reconciliation process, but stopped short of offering any 
direct Saudi involvement in reconciliation talks.  The SAG 
would continue to support Afghanistan's reconstruction and 
development, FM Saud said, pledging an additional $150 
million USD in aid (reftel).  However, any talks with the 
Taliban "would be a fruitless exercise" as long as the 
Taliban leadership still sheltered and supported Al-Qaeda. 
The Saudis would be willing to assist in mediation at the 
request of President Karzai; however, the Taliban first had 
to sever its relationship with Al-Qaeda and cease providing 
refuge to its leaders. 
 
 
THE SAUDIS PLAY IT COOL 
----------------------- 
 
¶4.  (U) President Karzai and his spokespeople have been 
playing up the trip, making no secret of their plans to ask 
the King for his help in mediating with the Taliban. 
Official Saudi media have been more low key, with second page 
coverage of Karzai's arrival in Jeddah in most major 
Arabic-language dailies and MFA officials telling us it was 
simply a "cordial" visit. 
 
 
MEDIA OPINIONS ARE SPLIT 
------------------------ 
 
¶5. (U) The Saudi media appears split as to whether Afghan 
mediation is a good idea.  In a February 2 editorial entitled 
"Rescue or Entanglement," Al-Sharq Al-Awsat Chief Editor 
Tariq Al-Humayd urged caution before entering into any 
further Taliban mediation efforts.  He reminded readers that 
negotiations with the Taliban had faltered in the past, and 
even the "much admired" former GIP head, Prince Turki 
Al-Faisal, was unable to convince the Taliban to hand over 
Osama bin Laden.  It was natural for the Afghans to turn to 
the KSA for help, Al-Humayd continued, but the SAG should be 
wary of becoming entangled in internal Afghan affairs. 
 
RIYADH 00000155  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
¶6.  (U) In another column in the same newspaper, columnist 
Mohammed Diab called President Karzai,s call for Saudi 
involvement "long overdue," adding that Saudi Arabia was the 
country "most capable" of assisting the Afghan reconciliation 
effort.  FM Saud,s insistence that the Taliban renounce 
Al-Qaeda connections was "logical," Diab continued, and the 
onus was on the Taliban to accept these preconditions and 
grab this "last chance." 
 
 
SAUDIS LOOKING FOR "REASONABLE DEGREE OF ASSURANCE" 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶7.  (C)  In a February 3 meeting with DCM that focused on 
Iran (septel), Deputy Foreign Minister for Bilateral 
Relations Dr. Khalid Al-Jindan commented on President 
Karzai,s visit, adding that he and FM Saud had just spoken 
with Karzai about the challenges facing Afghanistan last week 
in London.  Karzai clearly hoped Saudi Arabia could play a 
major role in both reconciliation and development.  As FM 
Saud,s statement had made clear, the Saudis were willing to 
help on certain terms.  In Al-Jindan,s view, the Saudis were 
"probably willing to play a greater role," but required a 
"reasonable degree of assurance" that any Taliban elements 
they engaged with were truly moderates, with no ties to 
Al-Qaeda.  Al-Jindan anticipated that the King and Karzai 
would discuss Saudi expectations in further detail during 
their meeting that day. 
 
¶8.  (C) In addition, Al-Jindan said the King would likely 
reiterate the Saudi view that political reconciliation was 
essential, and that there was "no military solution" to the 
Afghan problem.  It was important to isolate moderate 
elements of the Taliban and bring them back into the 
political process; give greater power to the Pashtun 
community and allow them to return to their "natural" 
leadership role; and encourage development so that the 
ordinary Afghan would have a "reason to opt for peace."  They 
were concerned with government corruption, Al-Jindan 
continued, but there was a need to distinguish between 
"worthwhile expenditures" aimed at gaining loyalty of certain 
tribes and actual corruption in the Afghan context. 
 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶9.  (C) Karzai and his spokespeople have been playing up the 
visit, making no secret that he plans to ask for the King,s 
support in mediating with the Taliban.  FM Saud,s statement 
at the London conference remains the definitive official 
Saudi position: the Saudis support reconciliation and would 
be willing to assist at the request of President Karzai; 
however, the Taliban must sever its relationship with 
Al-Qaeda and cease providing refuge to its leaders.  While 
this statement is fairly straightforward, the Saudi position 
behind the scenes may be more nuanced.  Al-Jindan's 
assessment that the Saudis need a "reasonable degree of 
assurance" suggests the Saudis may be more flexible than they 
are willing to publicly appear. As usual, they appear to be 
holding their foreign policy cards close to the chest. 
 
¶10.  (C) COMMENT CONTINUED:  While Karzai,s trip is unlikely 
to result in any major breakthrough, the fact he visited and 
very publicly asked the King officially for his help does 
satisfy one of the Saudis, criteria for engagement.  Post 
will follow up with the Afghan Embassy in Riyadh for 
additional details of the visit next week.  END COMMENT. 
SMITH