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RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0321
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RIYADH 000153 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/31/2020 
TAGS: PREL PGOV SA AF PK
SUBJECT: PRINCE TURKI AL-FAISAL ON AFGHANISTAN, 
COUNTERTERRORISM 
 
RIYADH 00000153  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador James B. Smith for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1.  (C) During a meeting on January 30, Ambassador Smith and 
Prince Turki Al-Faisal--former GIP Head and Ambassador to the 
U.S., and current Chairman of the Board of the King Faisal 
Center-- discussed ways to further strengthen the U.S.- Saudi 
bilateral relationship; Saudi Arabia's Afghanistan lessons 
learned, and how the U.S. might use these to achieve our 
current goals; the Saudis' counterterrorism strategy; and why 
Islamic extremism surprised the Saudis.  Originally scheduled 
as a brief courtesy call, the meeting lasted over an hour as 
the Prince candidly shared his insider's view on these and 
other topics of U.S.-Saudi interest.  His daughter, Princess 
Mashael, joined her father and the Ambassador for part of the 
meeting.  END SUMMARY. 
 
 
PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE RELATIONSHIPS ARE KEY 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (U) Thanking the Ambassador for his visit, Prince Turki 
noted that the Saudi-American relationship had always been 
driven by warm personal relationships at the highest levels. 
While these relationships continued, lower-level, 
people-to-people exchanges were now of growing importance. 
During his time in the U.S., first as a student and later as 
the Saudi Ambassador, he had made a concerted effort to 
travel widely and engage Americans outside of the nation's 
capital.  He hoped Ambassador Smith would be able to do the 
same in Saudi Arabia. 
 
 
TRUST BREEDS COOPERATION... 
--------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) Ambassador asked for Prince Turki's thoughts 
regarding the current U.S.-Saudi bilateral relationship, 
focusing on ways we might be able to intensify our 
cooperation on issues of common interest, such as 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Middle East Peace.  Turki observed 
that Saudi-U.S. cooperation and collaboration reached an 
unusual peak during the 80's and 90's, when he worked as GIP 
Head, but that the relationship remained very close.  The 
consultations between the King and President Obama were a 
reflection of this closeness, he said, adding that the 
leaders "had a level of trust in one another" that inspired 
cooperation. 
 
 
...EVEN IN AFGHANISTAN 
---------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) Focusing on Afghanistan, Turki shared some Saudi 
lessons learned.  Afghanistan was a "puzzle," with a 
"peculiarly Afghan" organizational structure that the Saudis 
had difficulty making sense of.  In his view, establishing 
trust with Afghan leaders had been the key to the Saudis' 
success at the time, as was recognizing the links between 
Pakistan and the Taliban.  All financial aid to the Taliban 
government was conditional, with the Saudis unwilling to hand 
anything over until the fighting had stopped.  The same thing 
was needed in Afghanistan today-- benchmarks for the 
leadership must be set, and aid must be withheld until these 
are met.  Recent Saudi efforts to assist in Taliban mediation 
had failed, he said, when "both sides fell short."  Karzai 
had asked for Saudi help, but let them down when he began 
readying for elections instead of following through with the 
mediation process. 
 
 
PUT THE FOCUS BACK ON BIN LADEN 
------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) The Taliban leadership was now fractured, Turki 
continued.  The media labeled anyone fighting against NATO or 
the U.S. as "Taliban," but many were simply crooks, drug 
dealers, gangsters or terrorists that profited from the 
country's instability. The U.S. and NATO needed to target 
these criminal elements more vociferously.  Further, we 
needed to re-focus our attention on capturing Osama Bin Laden 
and Ayman Al-Zawahiri.  The people harboring them were not 
doing so for ideological or even financial reasons, Turki 
insisted, but simply because there was no longer any real 
 
RIYADH 00000153  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
cost to doing so.  "Since 2003, Bin Laden has been 
comfortable...he has had time to plan operations" such as the 
Christmas bombing attempt.  He suggested Saudi Arabia, the 
U.S., China, Russia, Afghanistan and Pakistan could join 
forces and share assets in order to capture or kill bin Laden 
and Al-Zawahiri.  This would break the terrorists' "aura of 
invincibility" and allow the U.S. to "declare victory" and 
move on. 
 
 
PATIENCE IS A VIRTUE 
-------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) All things considered, the U.S. response to 9/11 was 
relatively measured, said Turki.  If the same thing had 
occurred anywhere else, the world would have expected to see 
far more violent reprisals.  The Saudis had learned from the 
American response to 9/11, and "resisted the trap" of 
retaliating in a way that would only generate more hatred. 
He credited Assistant Interior Minister Prince Mohamed bin 
Nayif for developing the Kingdom's innovative 
counterterrorism program, and winning support for it from his 
father, Interior Minister Prince Nayif bin Abdulaziz, the 
Crown Prince, and the King.  The strategy required patience, 
but the King was willing to wait. 
 
 
IN RETROSPECT, WRITING WAS ON THE WALL 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) Turki then discussed the 1979 siege of the Great 
Mosque in Mecca, observing that he--and the rest of the Saudi 
leadership--had a blind spot when it came to believing 
someone could do something so violent in the name of Islam. 
In retrospect, the signs that a problem had been brewing were 
clear.  He took issue with the thesis that the event marked 
the birth of Al-Qaeda, claiming the siege and Al-Qaeda were 
different phenomena.  Juhayman was driven by a misreading of 
theology that Bin Laden considered apostasy, while Bin Laden 
suffered from megalomania. 
 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶8.  (C) The Ambassador's meeting with Prince Turki, 
originally scheduled as a short courtesy call, lasted more 
than an hour as the Prince spoke candidly about lessons 
learned during his years as a pillar of the Saudi foreign 
policy establishment.  While he insisted that he had been out 
of government for two and a half years, and was thus speaking 
from his outsider's perch, Turki appeared well-briefed on the 
official Saudi position and eager to share his opinions with 
the Ambassador and other USG officials.  END COMMENT. 
 
SMITH