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Viewing cable 10RIODEJANEIRO32, VIEWS ON POSSIBLE VP CANDIDATES FOR JOSE SERRA

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10RIODEJANEIRO32 2010-02-02 19:13 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Consulate Rio De Janeiro
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHRI #0032/01 0331914
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 021913Z FEB 10
FM AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0109
INFO RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO
UNCLAS RIO DE JANEIRO 000032 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL BR
SUBJECT: VIEWS ON POSSIBLE VP CANDIDATES FOR JOSE SERRA 
 
REF: 09 BRASILIA 1486 
 
SUMMARY 
 
 
 
1.  (SBU) Political observers and party actors across the country 
contend there is a possibility of the Brazilian Social Democratic 
Party (PSDB) presumed presidential candidate and frontrunner Jose 
Serra asking Green Party (PV) candidate Marina da Silva to be his 
vice presidential candidate.  While it seems unlikely at this point 
that Silva would accept such a role, most believe she would at 
least support Serra in a second round runoff with Worker Party (PT) 
candidate Dilma Rousseff.  The Marina possibility notwithstanding, 
political insiders see as the most likely scenario that Minas 
Gerais governor Aecio Neves (PSDB) will eventually join Serra as 
his VP candidate, in spite of Neves' public statements he will run 
for Senate.  Although the narrowing gap between Serra and Dilma 
Rousseff in the latest polls has renewed speculation that Serra 
might bow out in favor of Neves as the PSDB candidate, Serra 
remains the most likely candidate, and many of our interlocutors 
state a Serra-Neves ticket would be the surest way for Serra to 
successfully challenge President Lula's efforts to translate his 
own popularity into votes for Dilma Rousseff as his successor.  End 
Summary. 
 
 
 
RIO OBSERVERS DISCUSS VP OPTIONS 
 
 
 
2. (SBU) During a private January 12 lunch, prominent Veja magazine 
political columnist Diogo Mainardi told Rio Principal Officer that 
Mainardi's recent column proposing Green Party (PV) presidential 
candidate and former Lula environment minister Marina Silva as the 
ideal vice presidential candidate on Jose Serra's (PSDB) ticket was 
based on a long conversation between Serra and Mainardi, in which 
Serra said Marina Silva would be his "dream running mate."  Serra 
outlined in that conversation with Mainardi the same advantages 
that Mainardi later listed in his column:  Marina's life story and 
impeccable leftist credentials would trump Lula's personal appeal 
to poor Brazilians and place Dilma Rouseff (PT) at a disadvantage 
with the left, while helping Serra mitigate the association with 
the government of Fernando Henrique Cardoso which Lula/Dilma hope 
to use as a point of attack in the campaign.  That said, Mainardi 
does not expect Marina to sign on with Serra, as she wants to 
establish her own credibility by running for president.  However, 
Mainardi said he thinks - as does Serra - that Marina might well 
support Serra in a second round runoff with Dilma. 
 
 
 
3. (SBU) On a more realistic level, Mainardi indicated to PO that 
Minas Gerais Governor Aecio Neves told Mainardi earlier this month 
that Neves remains "completely open" to the possibility of running 
as vice presidential candidate with Serra.  (Note: On December 17, 
2009 Neves officially terminated his "pre-candidacy" for the 
Presidency and indicated he had no interest in running for vice 
president - reported reftel.  End Note).   Despite Neves' public 
statements that he will run for Senate, Mainardi said Neves plans 
to wait for a scenario in which PSDB, perhaps by March, asks Neves 
to join the ticket, to assure the strongest possible chance against 
Dilma.  Neves' own ambitions and his inextricably linked desire not 
to be a spoiler for the PSDB in the coming race would lead Neves to 
join the ticket, in Mainardi's opinion.   This was echoed by Merval 
Pereira, columnist for Rio's newspaper of record "O Globo," who 
recounted to PO on January 21 a conversation Pereira had with Neves 
the day before, in which Neves said he was "firmly committed" to 
helping Serra in any way, including joining the ticket.  A 
Serra-Neves ticket, opined Pereira, would win, and Pereira 
personally believed that not only would Neves run with Serra, but 
that Marina Silva would also support Serra in a runoff. 
 
 
 
4. (SBU) Rio Federal Deputy Marcelo Itagiba (PSDB), who is closely 
involved with the Serra campaign, told Rio Poloff that Marina was 
his clear preference as Serra's VP.   He cited the practical 
benefits to the Serra campaign, most notably the increase in 
television airtime he would gain by tapping into Marina's share 
(Comment: Given that party campaign airtime is based on legislative 
seats won in 2006 and the PV's minimal showing in that election, 
increased airtime for a Serra-Marina ticket would be negligible. 
End Comment).  At the same time, Itagiba shared Mainardi's 
assessment of Neves, stating Neves would likely join the Serra 
 
ticket, if a Serra first round victory does not appear assured. 
"If this is the will of the party, Neves will accept," he said. 
 
 
 
5. (SBU) While Rio Deputy Otavio Leite (PSDB), minority leader in 
the House of Deputies (Camara), told Poloff he did not believe 
Marina would accept any VP offer from Serra, he stated, the PSDB 
was counting on her support in a second round.  On Neves, Leite 
offered a dissenting view from the other Rio interlocutors, saying 
Neves' election to the Senate was a foregone conclusion and would 
be a much more attractive option than VP, considering Neves' 
presidential ambitions, especially if the Senate term carried with 
it the Senate presidency, as many believe it will.  Leite assessed 
that a mixed ticket with allied opposition party DEM would be a 
real possibility, naming Senator Jose Agripino from Rio Grande do 
Norte as a leading contender.  Rio Federal Deputy Rodrigo Maia, 
president of the DEM party, also confirmed to Poloff that 
Agripino's name was on a shortlist of Serra VP candidates and 
discounted Marina's willingness to join a Serra ticket or even 
support him in a second round.  "She will go back to Lula in the 
end," Maia said.  "We cannot count on her."  (Comment: Maia's 
opinion of Marina Silva reflects a significant difference between 
long-time allies PSDB and DEM.  PSDB members are by and large 
comfortable with Marina while DEM, which has an agrarian base, sees 
her as philosophically incompatible and a potential threat to their 
economic interests.  End Comment). 
 
 
 
VIEWS FROM SAO PAULO 
 
 
 
6. (SBU) Sao Paulo Federal Deputy (PSDB) and City Secretary for 
Sports Walter Feldman told Sao Paulo Econoff that a unified PSDB 
presidential ticket with Neves would strengthen Serra's chances in 
the October elections.  Describing Serra and Neves as Brazil's two 
best governors, Feldman expressed confidence that their combined 
record of administrative achievement in elected office would 
resonate with voters underwhelmed by Dilma Rousseff's performance 
at Minister in President Lula's cabinet.  In subsequent discussions 
with PSDB Sao Paulo State PSDB President and Federal Deputy Antonio 
Carlos Mendes Thame and Sao Paulo Municipal Secretary of Government 
and local PSDB insider Clovis Carvalho, both told Econoff that 
Neves was choice of the party leaders for the VP slot and they were 
confident he would answer the call.  Both emphasized that PSDB must 
deliver Minas Gerais and Sao Paulo states to win the presidency and 
that the best way to do that was to bring Neves onto the Serra 
ticket.   Separately, Bolivar Lamounier, co-founder of the Sao 
Paulo Institute for Economic and Political Studies (IDESP), and 
Ricardo Sennes, Director of international affairs consulting firm 
Prospectiva Consultoria Brasileira told Econoff they expected 
Marina to carry through with her own campaign but throw her support 
behind Serra in a second round after having "burned bridges" with 
her exit from the PT. 
 
 
 
PSDB OUTLOOK IN BRASILIA 
 
 
 
7. (SBU) Other PSDB players discount the likelihood of a mixed 
ticket.  While acknowledging that Serra strongly prefers a 
coalition ticket and that Neves wants to run for senate, Senators 
Eduardo Azeredo (Minas Gerais) and Alvaro Dias (Parana) told 
Brasilia Poloff that the party faithful want a pure PSDB ticket, 
and claimed such an outcome was likely.  Pernambuco Federal Deputy 
and PSDB vice leader in the House of Deputies Bruno Araujo also 
downplayed the possibility of Serra tapping a DEM representative, 
implying the DEM's diminishing popularity left Serra with little to 
gain from such a ticket, even in the northeast, where the DEM party 
has the most seats.   In conversations with Poloff this week, two 
senior PSDB staff members acknowledged Serra' interest in Marina as 
a VP candidate, and described her as the latest big idea among a 
large minority within the party, especially in Rio and Sao Paulo. 
Neither believed Marina would ever accept such an offer but both 
were optimistic about gaining her support in the second round. 
 
 
 
RECIFE: THE NORTHEASTERN PERSPECTIVE 
 
8. (SBU) Recife political analyst Andre Regis (also a lawyer, 
Federal University of Pernambuco professor and active PSDB member) 
told post recently that PSDB believes a Serra-Aecio ticket would do 
well in the Northeast.  While he acknowledged that Dilma's poll 
numbers have gradually improved in the region, Serra still has some 
advantages over her with voters enthralled by President Lula's 
charisma and history.  Admitting that Serra also suffers from an 
image as more of a technocrat than a politician, he asserted that 
Aecio would help shore up the opposition ticket if he accepted the 
nomination for vice president. 
 
 
 
9. (SBU) Pernambuco PV president Sergio Xavier confided to post 
last week that, in his opinion, Marina Silva will maintain her own 
candidacy, but is certain to support Serra in a second round.  He 
added that PSDB, being very weak in Rio, needs an alliance with PV 
there to benefit from a Fernando Gabeira candidacy for governor 
(Note: On January 26, the PSDB and PV announced Marcelo Fortes, 
PSDB's VP in Rio, would be Gabeira's running mate for governor of 
Rio state.  End Note).  Regarding possible DEM running mate 
Agripino, contacts in Natal told PO this month that he may not even 
win re-election to the Senate, due to his old-style image and lack 
of charisma.  Serra would not get the needed boost in the Northeast 
if he were to tap Agripino, who was once implicated in a 
vote-buying scandal in Rio Grande do Norte. 
 
 
 
COMMENT 
 
 
 
 10. (SBU) With Dilma's recent ascent in the polls, Lula's 
unwavering popularity, and significant ground to yet cover between 
now and the PSDB's Convention in June, the factors that determine 
Serra's choice for VP candidate are still too fluid even for Serra 
himself to know who the best candidate will be.  With the latest 
polls showing a single-digit margin between Serra and Dilma, 
speculation has even surfaced again that Serra might bow out in 
favor Neves as the PSDB candidate if he thinks the race too close 
at the end of March.  Nonetheless, Serra is still the most likely 
candidate and his hunt for the strongest VP candidate continues. 
Given the long shot prospect of a Serra-Marina ticket and the 
politically inexpedient possibility of a PSDB-DEM coalition, 
current indicators point to a pure PSDB ticket.   Neves' ambition, 
 
star power, and loyalty to the party make a Serra-Neves ticket a 
real possibility, in spite of Neves' public comments to the 
contrary.  Neves' popularity in the Northeast (Lula's power base) 
and the votes Neves would bring Serra in Minas Gerais, the 
country's second largest voter state, would constitute a very 
powerful challenge to Lula's efforts to crown Dilma as his 
successor.  End Comment. 
 
 
 
11. (U) This cable was coordinated with and cleared by Embassy 
Brasilia and Consulates Sao Paulo and Recife. 
HEARNE