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RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 2415
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA 5344
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 5910
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RUEHCN/AMCONSUL CHENGDU 1935
RUEHCHI/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI 2419
RUEHCI/AMCONSUL KOLKATA 0768
RUEADCR/DEPT OF LABOR WASHINGTON DC
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 4750
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2840
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 19 RANGOON 000089 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR INL; EAP/MLS; G/TIP; DRL; PRM; G-LAURA PENA; 
EAP/RSP 
DEPT OF LABOR FOR ILAB 
GENEVA FOR LABOR ATTACHE 
BANGKOK FOR LABOR/TIP OFFICER 
PACOM FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PHUM KWMN KCRM KFRD ASEC PREF ELAB SMIG KTIP
KMCA, BM 
SUBJECT: BURMA: 2009 TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 
 
REF: STATE 2094 
 
RANGOON 00000089  001.2 OF 019 
 
 
Summary and Recommendation 
-------------------------- 
 
¶1.  (U)  Burma remained a source country for women, men, and 
children trafficked for forced labor and sexual exploitation. 
 To a lesser extent Burma is a transit country for 
trafficking victims going between neighboring countries. 
Forced labor and child-soldier recruitment continued to occur 
within Burma.  During the reporting period, the Government of 
Burma (GOB) took meaningful steps to combat domestic and 
cross-border trafficking. 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  Good News:  In 2009, the GOB identified 155 
Trafficking in Persons (TIP) cases.  These cases involved 429 
traffickers, of which 410 are on trial or have been 
convicted.  During the same period, the GOB identified and 
assisted 302 TIP victims through its own investigative 
efforts and assisted an additional 425 TIP victims 
repatriated by neighboring countries to Burma.  Burmese 
authorities built on progress made on anti-TIP efforts 
between 2007-2008.  The GOB increased arrests of traffickers 
and expenditures on enforcement and prevention.  The GOB 
created new police units dedicated to TIP cases and improved 
external cooperation, including by signing memoranda of 
understanding (MOUs) with Thailand and China during the 
reporting period.  The GOB, non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), and international organizations (IOs) improved public 
awareness efforts, particularly among potential TIP victims. 
The head of the GOB anti-trafficking task force publicly 
spoke out about TIP during the premier of a USG-sponsored TIP 
documentary produced by MTV and subsequently aired on Burmese 
state-run television. 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  The GOB allowed NGO- and IO-led training of 
military and civilian officials ranging from enlisted 
soldiers to senior members of the judiciary.  IOs and NGOs 
continued to assist TIP victims with return and 
reintegration.  The International Labor Organization (ILO) 
and United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) continued to 
assist child soldiers and reported improved access to higher 
echelon military leaders.  The military itself took 
unprecedented steps to punish criminally some of those 
involved in child soldier recruitment.  Most international 
partners agreed that the TIP awareness of their GOB 
interlocutors continued to improve and felt that cooperation, 
while not perfect, has increased. 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  Bad News:  Children continued to serve in the 
Burmese military and in some of the armed insurgent and 
ceasefire groups located in ethnic minority areas.  By all 
accounts, the Burmese military continued to be the main 
perpetrator of forced labor inside Burma, and Burmese law 
enforcement officials generally were not able to investigate 
or prosecute cases of military perpetrated forced labor or 
child soldier recruitment absent assent from high ranking 
military officers.  The cooperation, communication, and 
openness to interaction with foreign partners seen on 
cross-border TIP issues was less obvious when it came to 
internal trafficking.  For example, to date the GOB has not 
 
RANGOON 00000089  002.2 OF 019 
 
 
announced any findings with regard to a reported case of 
child labor involving up to 100 children on an agricultural 
plantation near Rangoon, despite ILO and diplomatic pressure, 
and forced labor complainants in Magwe Division have suffered 
judicial retribution at the hands of local authorities for 
coming forward. 
 
¶5.  (SBU)   Overall assessment:  Since 2007, the GOB has done 
much to improve its detection and interdiction of 
cross-border TIP and has taken on a much more positive role 
in protecting some of its most vulnerable citizens.  While 
major concerns remain, particularly concerning forced labor, 
Post believes that the positive elements of the GOB's 
performance on TIP issues during the reporting period should 
be further encouraged by placing Burma on the Tier II Watch 
List instead of Tier III, thereby offering a reward for the 
improvements in performance and an incentive for the future. 
 
¶6.  (U)  Embassy Rangoon's input for the annual Trafficking 
in Persons Report follows.  Answers are keyed to reftel 
questions; information provided below is unclassified. 
 
Burma's TIP Situation 
--------------------- 
 
¶A.  Post met with senior officers from the Burmese Department 
of Transnational Crimes (including the commanding general) 
and its subordinate Anti-Trafficking Unit (ATU).  Post also 
met with: commanders of five of the ATU's subordinate 
Anti-Trafficking Task Forces (ATTFs); international NGOs that 
work on TIP issues in Burma, including Save the Children and 
World Vision; and UN agencies, including the International 
Organization for Migration (IOM), UNICEF, and the ILO.  Given 
the range of sources, Post considers the following 
information to be generally reliable. 
 
B:  Trafficking remained a problem internally and all along 
Burma's border.  Burma was primarily a source country for 
men, women, and children trafficked into forced labor and 
sexual exploitation.  Children were trafficked to Thailand as 
forced street hawkers and beggars or to China for adoption. 
Women were trafficked to China as forced brides and to China, 
Thailand, and Malaysia for sexual exploitation. 
Additionally, men and women were trafficked to Thailand and 
Malaysia for labor. 
 
Traffickers exploited Burmese citizens from all areas of the 
country, though socio-economic pressures in impoverished 
areas such as the 'Dry Zone' (Magwe, Mandalay, and Sagaing 
Divisions) tended to increase vulnerability to trafficking. 
There were no major changes in trafficking destinations since 
the last TIP Report.  Brokers typically used deception rather 
than force, promising good jobs to recruit victims.  In a few 
cases, TIP victims moved through Burma from Bangladesh to 
Malaysia and from China to Thailand. 
 
Anecdotal reporting suggested domestic economic stagnation 
led to increased migration (legal and illegal) of Burmese to 
regional neighbors and to destinations as distant as the 
Middle East.  While most of these cases entailed voluntary 
migration, it is possible some travelers became TIP victims 
 
RANGOON 00000089  003.4 OF 019 
 
 
after arrival. 
 
Internal TIP occurred primarily from villages to urban areas 
and economic hubs for labor in industrial and agricultural 
pursuits and for sex work.  Children were trafficked 
internally to work in shops, home industries, and fields.  In 
a recent example, the ILO took a complaint in December 2009 
from a 12 year old boy who described being abducted in 
Rangoon Division and transported to an agricultural 
plantation where he was forced to work with approximately 100 
other boys.  ILO and post have encouraged Burmese law 
enforcement and labor officials, including the Minister of 
Labor, to investigate, but the GOB has not yet shared any 
investigative findings. 
 
Citizens of Burma were subject to forced labor and forced 
military recruitment within Burma not only by the GOB but 
also by ethnic insurgent groups in areas they controlled. 
 
The GOB continued to step up anti-TIP efforts, an ongoing 
trend over the last three years.  In 2009, the GOB 
investigated 155 trafficking cases that involved 37 male and 
265 female victims.  The GOB prosecuted 410 traffickers 
during 2009.  Thai authorities repatriated 132 TIP victims to 
Burma and Chinese authorities repatriated an additional 293 
TIP victims. 
 
¶C.  Burmese TIP victims were subject to forced labor and 
sexual exploitation abroad.  Less is known about internal 
trafficking as the GOB views it as a more sensitive issue and 
is reticent to discuss it.  Domestic trafficking victims were 
subject to forced labor conditions, sometimes at the hands of 
the Burmese military. 
 
¶D.  Deteriorating economic conditions throughout the 
reporting period drove many Burmese to migrate voluntarily, 
which exposed them to domestic and international traffickers. 
 Young women were most vulnerable to trafficking for sex 
work, domestic servitude, and forced marriage.  Children were 
most at risk for exploitation as street beggars and unskilled 
laborers.  Traffickers sought men for physically demanding 
labor, namely in the fishing and construction industries. 
The poor and those living in impoverished areas and border 
areas were most at risk and were typically trafficked to 
urban areas in Burma or to destinations in neighboring 
countries. 
 
The ILO stated that the Burmese continued to be vulnerable to 
forced labor, as GOB officials, predominantly members of the 
military, in all states and divisions used forced labor. 
Those living in areas with the highest military presence, 
i.e., in remote border areas populated by ethnic groups, were 
most at risk for forced labor, including forced portering and 
sentry duty. 
 
In February 2007, the ILO and the Burmese Government signed a 
one-year agreement establishing a mechanism to address forced 
labor cases, including child soldier cases.  The two parties 
renewed this agreement in February 2009 and did so again in 
January 2010.  Under this agreement, the ILO has successfully 
returned more than 66 child soldiers to their families, 31 of 
 
RANGOON 00000089  004.2 OF 019 
 
 
them in 2009.  In 2009, for the first time, the Burmese 
military criminally prosecuted an officer for child 
recruitment and sentenced him to hard labor in a civilian 
prison.  The GOB also sentenced two enlisted soldiers to time 
in a military prison and meted out harsher administrative 
punishments than previously observed to others involved in 
the case.  According to UNICEF, the military also voluntarily 
returned several hundred children to their families in 2009 
after discovering those recruits were under age. 
 
--E.  Traffickers and their Methods:  Traffickers were 
primarily small, often family based, criminal groups 
operating in loose association with other similar groups.  In 
one notable case, Burmese and Chinese law enforcement 
officials dismantled a larger cross-border criminal gang 
based on both sides of the Muse (Burma)-Ruili (China) border 
crossing.  In this operation, police on both sides of the 
border arrested at total of 46 traffickers over a three-day 
period in August 2009. 
 
In many identified cases, the victim sought out a broker to 
find employment or responded to a broker's pitch of a 
lucrative job elsewhere in Burma or abroad.  Brokers, loosely 
associated and each covering specific geographic areas, 
passed TIP victims on from one TIP group to the next until 
reaching the destination inside Burma or a border area. 
Often, traffickers used public transportation systems 
(predominantly buses) to move their victims by road.  In the 
case of international TIP operations, brokers then smuggled 
most TIP victims across Burma's porous borders with minimal 
or no documentation.  Few, if any, TIP victims crossed an 
international border at a legal border crossing.  In 
cross-border cases, the final link in the chain of Burmese 
brokers handed the victim over to a foreign broker for onward 
movement.  In some cases the victims were transported to 
destinations as far away as China's coastal provinces.  In 
other cases the foreign broker delivered the TIP victim to a 
buyer/captor within a few miles of the border. 
 
According to Burmese ATTF officers, the monetary value of TIP 
victims increased exponentially as the victims moved along 
the chain.  In the Burma-China context the ATTF estimated the 
Burmese brokers that moved TIP victims across the border 
received approximately 5,000 yuan (USD 732) per victim while 
the end buyers in China paid between 35,000-42,000 yuan (USD 
5,125-USD 6,151) per victim. 
 
Reliable GOB statistics on migration are not available but 
conversations with those involved in the export labor sector 
indicated the flow of Burmese workers seeking employment 
abroad has begun to rebound from the drop observed during the 
global financial crisis when many Burmese workers returned 
home after losing jobs abroad.  Skilled and semi-skilled 
workers continued to move overseas to fill employment 
contracts in Asia and the Middle East.  Post has not seen 
evidence that local employment agencies (or travel agencies) 
are involved in trafficking schemes.  While industry contacts 
acknowledged some migrant workers end up in abusive 
situations, those appeared to be cases of bad employers 
overseas rather than planned trafficking operations. 
 
 
RANGOON 00000089  005.2 OF 019 
 
 
Setting the Scene for Burma's Anti-TIP Efforts 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
--A.  The GOB acknowledges that trafficking is both a problem 
within Burma and across its borders, and has taken legal and 
educational action to combat it since 1998.  The government 
has yet to address the systemic political and economic 
problems that cause many Burmese to seek employment in 
neighboring countries.  Burmese officials were more willing 
to discuss TIP in the cross-border context and less willing 
to have frank discussions on domestic TIP.  This is 
presumably due to the power structure in place where the most 
powerful institution in the country, the military, is also a 
main perpetrator of forced labor. 
 
The Ministry of Labor has acknowledged that forced labor is a 
problem in Burma and continues to work with the ILO to 
prevent civilian perpetration of forced labor.  The military 
cooperated with the ILO on resolving child soldier 
recruitment cases and allowed the ILO and UNICEF to provide 
training designed to prevent child soldier recruitment to 
military officers and civilian officials.  However, in 
general, the GOB remained less responsive on forced labor 
cases involving the military. 
 
--B.  The GOB lead on TIP issues is the Central Body for the 
Suppression of Trafficking in Persons (CBTIP), chaired by the 
Minister of Home Affairs.  There are 26 members.  Agencies 
represented in the Central Body include the police (under 
Home Affairs), the Ministry of Social Welfare, and the 
Department of Relief and Resettlement.  Non-GOB members 
include UN agencies working in Burma, international NGOs, and 
local organizations.  The CBTIP operates according to a 
five-year National Action Plan to Combat Human Trafficking. 
Each year the CBTIP releases an annual Work Plan congruent 
with the five-year plan and reflective of current priorities. 
 The 2009 Work Plan laid out 66 activities across five 
elements and assigned roles to GOB entities, NGOs, and other 
partners. 
 
Additionally, the GOB has a Working Group on the Prevention 
of Trafficking in Persons and Protection of Trafficked 
Victims, chaired by the Deputy Minister of Home Affairs; a 
Working Group on Legal Framework and Prosecuting Measures, 
chaired by the Deputy Attorney General; and a Working Group 
on Repatriation, Reintegration, and Rehabilitation of 
Trafficked Victims, chaired by the Deputy Minister of Social 
Welfare. 
 
Other agencies active in the GOB's anti-trafficking efforts 
include the Ministry of Progress of Border Areas and National 
Races Development, the Ministry of Economic Planning and 
National Development, the Attorney General, the General 
Administration, the Immigration Service, the Ministry of 
Labor, and the Myanmar Women's Affairs Federation, a 
government-affiliated organization. 
 
The police ATU, under the Department of Transnational Crimes, 
manages the law enforcement component of the anti-TIP effort 
in Burma and has also taken a lead role in education and 
prevention campaigns.  The ATU, with offices in Nay Pyi Taw 
 
RANGOON 00000089  006.2 OF 019 
 
 
and Rangoon, oversees investigative and prevention efforts by 
ATTFs in locations deemed strategic in combating TIP.  In 
2009, the ATU formed three new ATTFs, located in Laukkai 
(Shan State), Pathein (Irrawaddy Division), and Sittwe 
(Rakhine State), bringing the total number of ATTFs to 22. 
In total, 114 police personnel are assigned to the ATU/ATTFs 
of which 28 percent are female. 
 
The Department of Social Welfare (DSW), under the Ministry of 
Social Welfare, operates shelters for TIP victims and 
coordinates the limited retraining and reintegration support 
available to Burmese TIP victims. 
 
For labor issues, the GOB in 2007 established the Working 
Group on Forced Labor, chaired by the Ministry of Labor. 
Other members include the Ministry of Defense, the Adjutant 
General's Office, the Attorney General, and the police.  This 
working group meets monthly and coordinates with the ILO on 
outstanding labor issues.  The lead agency on child soldier 
recruitment is the Ministry of Defense. 
 
The GOB accepted assistance from the UN and international 
NGOs, and bilateral assistance from other countries to help 
implement anti-TIP efforts.  It facilitated the 
anti-trafficking work of World Vision, Save the Children, the 
AusAid-funded Asia Regional Trafficking in Persons Project 
(ARTIP), United Nations Interagency Project of Trafficking 
(UNIAP), UNICEF, and the International Organization for 
Migration (IOM), and the ILO. 
 
IO and INGO staff reported increased GOB cooperation and 
generally agreed that GOB awareness of TIP issues continued 
to increase, as did government devotion of resources to the 
problem.  Nonetheless, the GOB exercised tight control over 
all NGO projects in the country and restricted access and 
activities.  These impediments continued to affect efficient 
operations by program implementers and frustrated foreign 
donors who were unable to monitor easily the projects they 
funded. 
 
--C.  Though the GOB has substantially improved its response 
to TIP over the course of the last three years, myriad 
challenges remain in place.  Burma lacked rule of law and the 
judiciary was not independent during the reporting period. 
Corruption remained a serious problem, and Burma was once 
again rated among the most corrupt nations by Transparency 
International (ranked 178 out of 180 countries surveyed). 
While we assess that the ATU/ATTF officers tackling this 
problem are generally competent and dedicated, they are few 
in number and their competence is not mirrored by immigration 
authorities, the general police force, the military, and the 
various civilian arms of government involved.  Corruption 
aside, Burmese civil service salaries are extremely low. 
Those who receive little pay may show little initiative and 
are vulnerable to bribery. 
 
Overall trends, however, are more positive.  The GOB 
increased its anti-TIP budget, which grew from USD 6,500 in 
2007 to USD 1.3 million in 2008, and to USD 1.82 million in 
¶2009.  While expenditures did not match the scope of the 
problem, there has been dramatic improvement.  INGOs and IOs 
 
RANGOON 00000089  007.2 OF 019 
 
 
continued to operate and several received government approval 
to expand programs to new geographic areas. 
 
The numbers of cases investigated and prosecuted continued to 
grow when measured year on year.  ATU/ATTF officers 
demonstrated growing sophistication in their efforts.  In 
meetings with Emboffs, ATTF officers described undercover 
sting operations to apprehend traffickers and an instance 
where the case against a trafficker was made based on 
tracking money transfers.  ATU/ATTF officers also appeared 
well-versed in behavioral profiling and analysis in 
discussions of trafficker identification.  These more 
sophisticated approaches demonstrated progress made from the 
earlier paradigm in which the police simply responded after 
the fact with very basic investigative techniques to 
complaints brought by victims. 
 
The police charged with anti-TIP roles have realized it is 
better to interrupt a TIP operation than to investigate once 
the criminal act has taken place, and have taken steps 
accordingly.  While evidentiary standards may differ from a 
U.S. context, Burmese police are confident that their efforts 
have stopped some exploitation that would have taken place. 
They are likely correct. 
 
Burma started from a very low point and, despite the 
obstacles presented by corruption and limited available 
funds, has made reasonable progress in the last three years. 
 
 
--D.  GOB officials have exhibited an uncharacteristic 
willingness to share statistics and details of their efforts 
to address TIP and related concerns.  The police recognized 
the difference between trafficking and human smuggling and 
continued to make efforts to exclude smuggling cases from TIP 
figures.  Details of anti-TIP efforts received occasional 
press coverage and GOB officials had regular interaction on 
the topic with foreign diplomats, UN officials, and NGO staff. 
 
GOB efforts remained hampered by technical limitations.  In 
one ATTF HQ visited by Emboffs, there were no computers 
visible.  In another instance ATTF commanders described some 
of their most acute needs as: computers, software, and office 
furniture.  One ATTF commander described purchasing 
off-the-shelf facial recognition software out of his own 
pocket to further the efforts of his unit.  This dearth of 
technical capacity was likely the same throughout the 
reporting period in all GOB entities associated with anti-TIP 
efforts.  Given GOB budget constraints and resources, there 
undoubtedly remained areas for improvement in collecting, 
analyzing, and sharing data within the GOB and with outside 
partners. 
 
The GOB does not systematically report cases of internal 
forced labor and GOB officials remained unwilling to address 
the topic.  This probably reflected internal political 
dynamics related to military control of the country. 
 
--E.  By law, Burmese citizens are obligated to apply for a 
National Registration Card (NRC) upon reaching 10 years of 
age.  Each NRC bears a unique number as well as a photo of 
 
RANGOON 00000089  008.2 OF 019 
 
 
the applicant and biographic data.  NRC holders must apply 
for a new card upon reaching 18 years of age.  The card 
issued at 18 is held for life and does not require subsequent 
renewal.  In practice certain residents of Burma are not 
considered citizens and are not entitled to NRCs or other 
documents - this category includes Rohingya people living on 
the Bangladesh-Burma border and some residents of Chinese and 
Indian origin.  Each household in Burma must have a family 
registration book which contains information about residents 
and sometimes, but not always, photographs of the residents. 
Household registration books and NRCs are the primary 
identification documents used by the GOB.  A limited number 
of Burmese also hold passports.  Official and diplomatic 
passports are issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
regular passports are issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs. 
 Obtaining a passport is a notoriously slow and uncertain 
process.  Most residents of border areas do not hold 
passports and instead cross international borders at 
unofficial crossings or with informal assent by officials. 
 
Investigation and Prosecution of Traffickers 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
--A.  Burma passed its Anti-Trafficking in Persons Law in 
September 2005.  The law covers sexual exploitation, forced 
labor, slavery, servitude, debt bondage, and organ removal. 
The law applies to internal and external trafficking, and the 
Penal Code provides some additional protections.  The law was 
used to prosecute 410 suspected traffickers in 2009.  In 
addition to the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Law, the GOB also 
has several related laws, including the 2004 Mutual 
Assistance in Criminal Matters Law, the 1999 Law Relating to 
Overseas Employment, the 2002 Control of Money Laundering 
Law, the Penal Code, and the 1948 Suppression of Corruption 
Act.  Although the GOB did not pass any new TIP laws in 2009, 
it ratified the ASEAN Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement in 
January 2009, and signed anti-TIP bilateral MOUs with 
Thailand and China in April and November, 2009, respectively. 
 
Under Burmese law, trafficking is defined as recruitment, 
transportation, transfer, sale, purchase, lending, hiring, 
harboring, or receipt of persons after committing any of the 
following acts for the purpose of exploitation with or 
without their consent: threat; use of force or other 
coercion; abduction; fraud; deception; abuse of power or 
position to take advantage of the vulnerability of a person 
or giving or receiving money or benefit to obtain the consent 
of a person having control over another person. 
 
Military recruitment of children under 18 years is prohibited 
by Armed Forces notification number 13/73 (1974). 
 
--B   Burmese law does not generally distinguish based on the 
purpose of the trafficking.  Punishments are based on the 
age/gender of the victim rather than the type of 
exploitation.  The penalty for trafficking in children, 
youths, and women is 10 years minimum to life imprisonment 
with no parole, and also allows for a fine.  The penalty for 
the trafficking of adult males is five years to 10 years 
maximum, and also allows for a fine.  The penalty for 
adopting or marrying fraudulently for the purpose of 
 
RANGOON 00000089  009.2 OF 019 
 
 
committing trafficking, or causing the unlawful attainment of 
documents to enable a trafficked victim to depart or enter a 
country is three to seven years, and allows for a fine. 
Making use of a trafficking victim for pornography is 
punishable with five to 10 years imprisonment and allows for 
a fine.  Offenders found guilty of trafficking with an 
organized criminal group can be imprisoned for 10 years to 
life, and may be liable for a fine. 
 
Under the Penal Code, a life sentence can be completed after 
20 years imprisonment, but under the Trafficking Law, there 
is no possibility of early parole.  Offenders guilty of 
trafficking and another serious crime (with a sentence of 
four years or more) can be sentenced to a minimum of 10 years 
to a maximum of life imprisonment or a death sentence. 
 
The police also have authority to seize the property of the 
offenders.  In 2009, ATTFs seized property belonging to 
several traffickers.  This property, as well as seized cash, 
was turned over to the GOB treasury, according to ATTF 
contacts, though they did not provide a valuation of the 
seizures. 
 
--C.  See previous section for trafficking penalties.  Burma 
is not a destination country for labor migrants from abroad. 
 
--D.  The prescribed penalties for rape range from a fine to 
life imprisonment depending on the circumstances.  The law 
requires mandatory minimum sentences in cases involving 
victims 14 years of age and younger.  Cases involving victims 
under 12 years of age require a minimum prison sentence of 10 
years.  Cases involving victims between 12 and 14 years of 
age call for a minimum prison sentence of two years. 
 
--E.  According to the ATU, law enforcement investigated 155 
trafficking cases in 2009.  Of those cases, 36 cases ended in 
convictions and 119 cases are currently in the trial phase. 
Police officers identified 429 traffickers in 2009.  Out of 
the 429 traffickers, 88 have been sentenced under Burma's TIP 
law while 322 face pending cases.  The remaining 19 
traffickers were fugitives at the end of 2009.  The convicted 
traffickers received the following sentences: 
 
Prison Sentence                     Number of Traffickers 
 
20 years                                  22 
15 years                                  6 
14 years                                  1 
13 years                                  2 
12 years                                  15 
10 years                                  17 
5  years                                  2 
 
Burmese authorities reported that no traffickers were 
punished with suspended sentences or fines during the 
reporting period. 
 
The GOB assisted 302 victims in 2009, of whom 62 were 
children (defined in GOB statistics as individuals under 16 
years of age).  The nature of the TIP cases in 2009 varied: 
25 cases dealt with forced prostitution and sexual 
 
RANGOON 00000089  010.2 OF 019 
 
 
exploitation; 104 cases dealt with forced marriage (this 
category includes many of the victims classified as 
children); 16 cases dealt with forced labor; and 10 cases 
dealt with forced adoption. 
 
--F.  In collaboration with the Australian-funded Asia 
Regional Trafficking in Persons Program (ARTIP), the police 
conducted Basic and Advanced Training workshops in 2009 for 
GOB officials.  The training curriculum centered on 
investigation techniques and international best practices. 
The Central Police Training Institute in Mandalay continued 
to include trafficking in its curriculum for incoming cadets 
and as a component of in-service police training.  ARTIP 
itself conducted four training sessions during the reporting 
period and provided training to 95 government officials (66 
Burmese and 29 Chinese) assigned to anti-TIP roles in Burma 
or in neighboring Chinese territory.  ARTIP funding from 
AusAid will cease in 2011. 
 
ILO remained active in working against forced labor and 
child-soldier recruitment.  During the reporting period the 
ILO team in Burma held: two training courses for military 
officers on best recruitment practices; a training course for 
deputy township judges and another for senior township 
judges; a course on human rights and international law for 
civil servants; and awareness raising seminars in Karen 
State, Shan State, Rakhine State, and Magwe Division.  The 
GOB also agreed to the ILO's longstanding request to publish 
a brochure describing forced labor and avenues of redress. 
The GOB and ILO are currently engaged in negotiations over 
content. 
 
UNICEF continued to educate Burmese military and civilian 
officials on topics related to child soldier recruitment. 
During the reporting period, UNICEF facilitated four training 
sessions for GOB audiences.  A total of 110 commissioned and 
non-commissioned officers participated in the courses, as did 
32 civilian officials from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, 
Labor, Home Affairs, and Social Welfare.  UNICEF officials 
were particularly pleased to note signs that the Ministry of 
Defense had begun to incorporate elements of UNICEF training 
into its own curricula.  In addition to work on prevention, 
UNICEF remained active in provision of support to released 
child-soldiers.  This assistance, in the form of education 
and health support, vocational training, and distribution of 
basic necessities, reached (or will reach in the cases where 
family tracing is ongoing) 104 released child-soldiers and 
their families. 
 
Officials from the Committee Against the Recruitment of 
Minors conducted awareness raising sessions at military 
training depots that the GOB reports reached over 150,000 
individuals (civilians, military, and civil service) in 2009. 
 Also per GOB reporting, the police held more than 1,500 
advocacy meetings related to the dangers of child recruitment 
and reached over 100,000 civilians as well as almost 1,700 
officials. 
 
--G.  Cooperation with Other Governments:  Burma cooperates 
with ASEAN countries under the ASEAN Declaration on 
Trafficking in Persons; with Thailand, Cambodia, and Laos in 
 
RANGOON 00000089  011.2 OF 019 
 
 
the Asia Regional Trafficking in Persons Project (ARTIP); and 
with China, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam in the 
Coordinated Mekong Ministerial Initiative Against Trafficking 
(COMMIT). 
 
Building on efforts begun in 2007 to improve international 
cooperation, in 2009 the Burmese Government concluded 
negotiations with Thailand and China on bilateral MOUs to 
establish formal policies dealing with cross-border 
trafficking.  The GOB also pressed Indonesia and Malaysia to 
join cooperative regional efforts. 
 
China: On November 11, 2009, Burma's Deputy Minister for Home 
Affairs and China's Vice Minister for the Ministry of Public 
Security signed an anti-TIP MOU in Beijing.  The GOB 
maintains a dialogue on trafficking with the Chinese Ministry 
of Public Security, as well as with Chinese police, 
narcotics, and border control officials.  In July 2007, the 
Burmese and Chinese Governments, working with UN assistance, 
established Bilateral Liaison Offices (BLO) in Muse, Burma, 
and Ruili, China.  In December 2008, the Burmese, with 
Chinese assistance, opened an additional BLO in Lwe Je, 
Kachin State.  These BLOs, staffed by officials on both sides 
who speak both Burmese and Chinese, share information about 
trafficking and enable Burmese and Chinese officials to work 
together on international trafficking cases.  Burma and China 
have agreed to open a third BLO at the Chin Shwe Haw, Burma, 
and Ming Ting, China, border crossing in 2010.  In 2009, the 
GOB jointly investigated a number of TIP cases with the 
Chinese authorities - including Chinese and Burmese officers 
accompanying their counterparts on investigations in both 
nations, and China repatriated 293 Burmese trafficking 
victims to Burma. 
 
Thailand: On April 24, 2009, the GOB and the Thai Government 
signed an MOU on joint TIP cooperation.  They subsequently 
formed a joint Plan of Action Working Group comprised of 
representatives from the relevant ministries of both nations 
to ensure effective implementation of the MOU.  In August 
2009, the two nations adopted a three-year MOU Plan of Action 
covering prevention, protection, prosecution, repatriation, 
and reintegration.  The Thai Government repatriated 132 
Burmese TIP victims in 2009. 
 
--H.  Burma's Extradition Act dates back to 1903; the GOB has 
not negotiated any recent extradition treaties.  In 2009, the 
GOB did not send Burmese nationals to other countries for 
prosecution.  The GOB does, however, accept the extradition 
of Burmese nationals apprehended for TIP related offenses in 
other countries.  ATU contacts reported that the GOB accepted 
the extradition of 81 TIP offenders from China during 
2006-2009.  The ATU has not specified the fate of the 
extradited traffickers; we are unsure if they are in prison 
or free. 
 
--I.  In 2009, two government officials, one police officer 
and one immigration officer, were prosecuted for their 
involvement in trafficking cases.  The GOB has not released 
details of the cases.  The GOB does not routinely release 
information about officials charged with corruption or 
trafficking related offenses. Most outside observers assess 
 
RANGOON 00000089  012.2 OF 019 
 
 
that corruption is pervasive in Burma.  It is likely that 
some corruption relates to domestic and international 
trafficking.  Police may also self-limit their investigations 
if they lead toward well-connected individuals. 
 
The military holds almost all power in Burma.  The police are 
not in a position to investigate or prosecute cases of 
military perpetrated forced labor or child soldier 
recruitment absent assent from high ranking military 
officers. 
 
In 2009, the Burmese military prosecuted an army captain for 
his role in child soldier recruitment.  The court, presumably 
a court martial, convicted the officer, expelled him from the 
army, and sentenced him to one year of hard labor in a 
civilian prison.  This is the first known instance of a 
soldier being criminally prosecuted and sentenced to jail 
time for child soldier recruitment.  Courts sentenced two 
enlisted soldiers to shorter terms in military prisons for 
their role in the same case and two non-commissioned officers 
received administrative punishments for their involvement. 
This is a significant development and far exceeds past GOB 
action involving child soldier recruitment. 
 
In addition to the above-mentioned case, Post estimates that 
an additional 25 military personnel have received 
administrative sanctions including: official reprimand, loss 
of pay, and loss of seniority for promotion and retirement 
purposes. 
ILO statistics on the release of child soldiers were 
previously mentioned.  UNICEF also reported on GOB efforts, 
previously unknown, to screen potential recruits.  Based on 
access to recruitment centers during joint training sessions, 
UNICEF staff assessed that military recruiters turned away 
significant numbers of potential enlistees for presenting 
counterfeit documentation of age. 
--J.  On paper the GOB has a robust plan to deal with 
officials involved in TIP.  GOB laws and regulations 
prescribe the following steps for public officials suspected 
of trafficking: 
 
- Immediate suspension of suspected official; 
- A Departmental Inquiry Body conducts an internal 
investigation; 
- If the Departmental Inquiry Body finds the official guilty, 
it sends the case to the District Court for prosecution, per 
the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Law; 
- If found guilty, the official is dismissed from government 
service and punished according to applicable law. 
 
Additionally, any public official who demands or accepts 
money and property for himself or for another carrying out an 
investigation, prosecution, and adjudication under this law 
will be imprisoned for three to seven years, and may be 
liable for a fine.  Reality does not likely reflect the steps 
laid out on paper.  Corruption and the unequal power 
structure in place ensure that not all officials are equally 
subject to legal sanction. 
 
--K.  Burma does not contribute troops to international 
peacekeeping efforts. 
 
RANGOON 00000089  013.2 OF 019 
 
 
 
--L.  Burmese police reported that foreigners sexually 
exploited children in Burma during the reporting period.  The 
GOB has not released information on incidence levels but 
conversations with Burmese police officers indicated the 
problem was relatively uncommon and typically involved a 
foreigner that spent extended periods of time living in Burma 
rather than the "sex tourist" phenomenon observed in some 
neighboring countries.  Burmese police contacts reported that 
perpetrators tended to be European and Australian and added 
that no Amcits have been identified as perpetrators. 
 
GOB officials reported active cooperation with Australian law 
enforcement on interdicting the travel of known pedophiles. 
Australian police reportedly notified Burmese counterparts if 
a known sex offender was enroute to Burma, giving Burmese 
authorities the opportunity to refuse the traveler entry or 
work with ASEAN neighbors to deny airline boarding at a 
transit stop. 
 
There is no information available that indicates Burmese 
nationals are perpetrators of child sex tourism. 
 
The Burmese Penal Code does not contain specific 
extraterritorial amendments such as the PROTECT Act. 
However, Burmese police asserted that the Burmese Penal Code 
applies to all Burmese citizens regardless of their location. 
 In recent meetings, ATU officers expressed frustration that 
some EU citizen pedophiles have been, to the best of the 
GOB's knowledge, released without punishment after Burma 
deported them to their home country. 
 
Protection and Assistance to Victims 
------------------------------------ 
 
-- A.  Police officers interview rescued and repatriated TIP 
victims and then pass them to the Department of Social 
Welfare (DSW).  The DSW houses victims in one of eight 
residential vocational training centers.  While at the DSW 
shelters, victims participate in a mandatory two-week program 
that contains elements of counseling, skills training, 
trafficking awareness education, and health screening.  The 
Myanmar Women's Affairs Federation, Myanmar Maternal and 
Child Welfare Association, and other government-sponsored 
organizations assist with services at these shelters. 
 
While TIP victims participate in the mandatory two-week 
program, DSW officials conduct family tracing in order to 
locate an adult relative, a parent when possible, into whose 
custody DSW will release the victim.  DSW will not release 
victims on their own recognizance, even if they are adults, 
once the mandatory two-week course is complete.  As family 
tracing is often a long process, made more so by frequent 
victim unwillingness to share accurate biographical/address 
data with DSW officials, many victims stay in the DSW 
shelters for longer than the mandated two weeks.  GOB 
estimates placed the average stay at one month.  This may be 
an optimistic estimate. 
 
Medical treatment in the shelters is provided with the 
consent of the victims.  HIV testing is encouraged but 
 
RANGOON 00000089  014.2 OF 019 
 
 
reportedly not mandatory for TIP victims.  A number of 
victims enter DSW custody while pregnant.  DSW officials 
described provision of pre- and ante-natal care as a specific 
strain on shelter resources. 
 
--B.  The victim care facilities described above are not 
specialized.  They can be dual-use or multi-use facilities 
used to care for other wards of the state (orphans, juvenile 
offenders, etc).  The GOB does not provide specialized care 
or assistance for male, female, or child victims.  All 
shelters are operated by the GOB.  NGOs were not able to 
operate TIP victim shelters during the reporting period. 
 
--C.  During their stay in DSW shelters, victims benefit from 
legal, medical, and psychological services at a level 
comparable to what is available to the general population in 
Burma.  There is room for improvement, beginning with the 
model that treats adult TIP victims as if they were juveniles 
who must be released to an adult family member, but there are 
no indications that the GOB withholds or provides diminished 
services based on an individual's TIP victim status.  While 
in the DSW shelters, victims are sheltered, fed, clothed, and 
benefit from what counseling and training is available. 
There appear to be few trained social workers employed in the 
DSW system and even fewer psychologists or psychiatrists. 
 
Some victims benefit from support by NGOs after their release 
from DSW shelters, including: educational assistance, 
livelihood support, grants/loans, and business training.  The 
GOB does not fund foreign or local NGOs but does contribute 
in-kind services such as venues for training, transportation 
support, and assistance from government officials. 
 
During 2009, the GOB provided approximately USD 1.82 million 
for trafficking in persons-related issues. 
 
-- D.  The GOB provides immediate support to foreign TIP 
victims but seeks to repatriate them to their home countries 
rather than provide long term assistance.  The Burmese 
Government does not provide temporary or permanent residence 
status to foreign TIP victims. 
 
-- E.  The GOB does not provide long-term housing benefits 
beyond the time victims spend in the DSW shelters.  DSW, 
other GOB entities, and NGOs are sometimes able to provide 
additional assistance to victims rebuilding their lives. 
Funding for all providers is quite limited and unmet needs 
remain. 
 
-- F.  The Burmese police transfer TIP victims to the DSW 
shelters described above. 
 
-- G.  The GOB identified 302 TIP victims in 2009.  The types 
of TIP victims identified by the GOB during the reporting 
period included: victims of forced marriage (67 percent), 
forced prostitution (16 percent), forced labor (10 percent), 
and forced adoption (6 percent). 
 
-- H.  Personnel from the 22 ATTFs and officials from 
immigration, the general police force, social welfare, and 
customs, received training on proactive victim identification 
 
RANGOON 00000089  015.2 OF 019 
 
 
and referral systems, organized and sponsored by ARTIP 
between 2005--2009. 
 
Prostitution is illegal under Burmese law and there are no 
systems in place to screen sex-workers to identify TIP 
victims. 
 
-- I.  The Trafficking in Persons Law provides protection for 
trafficking victims' rights.  Victims are not jailed, fined, 
or prosecuted for other violations.  However, TIP victims 
remanded to DSW custody are not free to leave on their own 
volition and, as noted, social welfare officials will only 
release them from custody to an adult family member. 
 
In forced labor cases, the law does not protect victims from 
countersuit by officials.  During this reporting period, 
complainants in a series of forced labor cases in Magwe 
Division suffered harassment and judicial retribution by 
local authorities for their role in reporting forced labor 
perpetrated by GOB officials. 
 
--J.  The government continued to encourage internationally 
trafficked victims to assist in investigations and 
prosecutions.  Police request assistance from victims during 
their stay at repatriation centers and DSW shelters.  Victims 
are not obligated to cooperate with law enforcement 
authorities.  Victims also have the right to file civil suits 
and seek legal action against traffickers.  Under Burmese 
law, no one may impede or obstruct the victim's case.  The 
victim can give testimony without directly confronting the 
accused. 
 
Burmese law provides for the provision of financial 
compensation to TIP victims from the disposal of seized 
assets.  The GOB has not developed a formal compensation 
scheme based on this legal foundation and we do not believe 
any victims received such compensation during the reporting 
period. 
 
There are no legal restrictions preventing a trafficking 
victim from seeking employment while involved in an ongoing 
prosecution. 
 
-- K.  GOB officials benefit from previously described 
training provided by IOs, NGOs, and GOB trainers.  This 
includes TIP victim identification curricula for police 
officers.  Some police officers have benefitted from 
'child-friendly' interview techniques training and at least 
one ATTF office was upgraded to include a 'child-friendly' 
interview room. 
 
Post is unaware of the methods in place at Burmese embassies 
and consulates abroad to assist Burmese TIP victims. 
 
-- L.  The Burmese Government provides in-kind assistance to 
repatriated TIP victims but is not typically able to provide 
meaningful financial assistance.  The GOB provides shelter, 
medical care, social counseling, information on STDs, 
vocational training, reintegration service, and TIP awareness 
training to repatriated victims.  The GOB also provides 
housing, food, clothing, and basic necessities to shelter 
 
RANGOON 00000089  016.2 OF 019 
 
 
residents.  Local and international NGOs support the 
government in the provision of these and other services. 
 
Once a victim departs from a shelter, the government and NGOs 
provide limited reintegration assistance - including some 
income generation assistance and vocational training.  The 
government is legally bound to protect TIP victims but we are 
not aware of any cases during the reporting period in which 
victims required protection from retribution from traffickers. 
 
-- M. UNIAP, UNICEF, World Vision, and Save the Children 
worked with the GOB and with local NGOs and community-based 
organizations to assist TIP victims during the reporting 
period.  They conducted research on TIP in Burma, defrayed 
the cost of family tracing, conducted family assessments, 
provided lifestyle and skills training, and provided capital 
for income generation activities.  INGOs and UN agencies 
reported reasonable levels of cooperation and communication 
with GOB contacts working on international TIP issues. 
Access remained problematic in some regions and authorities 
were much less inclined to cooperate to prevent and remedy 
domestic TIP cases than cross-border ones.  The GOB remained 
generally willing to accept international support related to 
anti-TIP, and shared information on its investigations and 
activities. 
 
The ILO Liaison Office in Burma works with the Burmese 
Government to address the systemic forced labor practiced by 
government and military officials.  Compared to 2008, the ILO 
Liaison Officer had improved access to GOB officials during 
the reporting period.  For the first time, the ILO Liaison 
Officer, along with ILO headquarters representatives, met 
with the three Burmese major generals responsible for 
recruitment, military strength, and military training.  In 
January 2010, the ILO and GOB extended the Supplementary 
Understanding on Forced Labor (SUP) for an additional year. 
 
The ILO continued to receive forced labor complaints, 
primarily child soldier cases, and forward them to the 
Working Group on Labor for action.  While the ILO reported 
progress in 2009, it remained concerned over judicial 
retribution against a group of forced labor complainants from 
Magwe Division.  Local authorities sought revenge against 
farmers who brought a series of linked cases to the ILO. 
Local officials prosecuted and jailed a number of the 
complainants, their lawyer, and their associates.  The 
central government in Nay Pyi Taw remained unwilling or 
unable to intervene with local authorities in Magwe to stop 
the politically motivated harassment of the forced labor 
complainants during the reporting period.  There were 
indications in early 2010 that the GOB would move to free 
some of the farmers. 
 
As detailed above, in 2009 the Burmese authorities for the 
first time ever criminally punished military officials 
involved in underage recruitment. 
 
Prevention 
---------- 
 
-- A.  The Burmese police conducted extensive 
 
RANGOON 00000089  017.2 OF 019 
 
 
awareness-raising campaigns during the reporting period. 
Among the highlights of these campaigns as reported by the 
ATU: 27 anti-TIP billboards created, 48,675 flyers 
distributed, and 12,000 video clips disseminated with a total 
of 53,219 people reached.  The Women's Affairs Federation and 
National Committee for Women's Affairs also conducted an 
undetermined number of educational sessions for women around 
the country, which include discussion about the risks of 
trafficking.  The targets of GOB campaigns were predominantly 
potential victims. 
 
The GOB participated in MTV's End Exploitation and 
Trafficking (EXIT) campaign, funded by USAID.  Senior Burmese 
police officials, including Police Colonel Sit Aye, Head of 
Department for Transnational Crimes, together with Embassy 
Rangoon Charge d'Affaires, spoke at the Rangoon premiere of 
the EXIT campaign's film Traffic - a series of vignettes that 
provide examples of TIP.  Sit Aye publicly acknowledged the 
problem of trafficking and pledged continued GOB support for 
prevention and prosecution efforts.  The Burmese-language 
version of the film, narrated by a local rock star, 
subsequently aired multiple times on Burmese state-run TV. 
 
-B.  Immigration and police offices continued to monitor 
border checkpoints and were briefed on their role in 
combating TIP.  The ATU has posted ATTF officers at 
identified "hotspots" along the border and within Burma.  In 
July 2007, the GOB, with UN assistance, established its first 
Border Liaison Office (BLO) in Muse, near the China border. 
In December 2008, the GOB opened its second BLO in Lwe Je, 
Kachin State.  The BLOs facilitate information sharing 
between the Burmese and Chinese authorities on cross-border 
trafficking.  The Thai-Burma MOU signed during the reporting 
period provides for the creation of TIP coordinating offices 
on their shared border. 
 
--C.  The Central Body for Suppression of Trafficking in 
Persons is the GOB's leading coordination body at the 
national level.  The National Task Force on Anti-Trafficking 
in Persons helps coordinate actiQties among various domestic 
and international organizations.  Additionally, the GOB has 
three working groups under the Central Body that work on 
trafficking issues: 
 
- The Working Group on Prevention of Trafficking in Persons 
and 
Protection of Trafficked Victims, headed by the Deputy 
Minister of Home Affairs and including 24 members from GOB 
ministries and NGOs; 
- The Working Group on Legal Framework and Prosecuting 
Measures, 
headed by the Attorney General; and 
- The Working Group on Repatriation, Reintegration, and 
Rehabilitation of Trafficked Victims, headed by the Minister 
of Social Welfare. 
 
Additionally, there are several other organizations that 
assist with trafficking issues: 
 
- The Myanmar National Committee for Women's Affairs (MNCWA), 
chaired by the Minister of Social Welfare, Relief and 
 
RANGOON 00000089  018.2 OF 019 
 
 
Resettlement, which addresses women's issues; 
- The Myanmar National Working Committee for Women's Affairs 
(MNWCWA), chaired by the Deputy Minister, consists of 30 
members from related ministries and NGOs; 
- The Human Trafficking Working Group, consisting of UN 
agencies and international NGOs, which meets quarterly to 
coordinate, communicate and plan Anti-TIP efforts; 
- The Coordinated Mekong Ministerial Initiative against 
Trafficking (COMMIT) Task Force, the national group tasked 
with implementation of the COMMIT Plan of Action developed in 
2004 with the six Greater Mekong Sub-region countries; and 
- The Task Force on Repatriation, comprised of the Director 
General of the Ministry of Social Welfare, international 
NGOs, and UN agencies, which works specifically on 
repatriation efforts. 
 
--D.  The GOB developed a National Action Plan (NAP) in 1998, 
and revised it in 2004 under the COMMIT plan of action.  A 
committee created to bring the NAP in line with the 2005 
Anti-Trafficking Law was formed in April 2006.  In February 
2008, the GOB signed and approved a new five-year National 
Action Plan for 2007-2011.  According to officials, the NAP 
prioritizes victim protection and establishes GOB plans for 
policy and cooperation, prevention, prosecution, protection, 
and capacity building. 
 
--E.  We are unaware of specific GOB measures to reduce the 
demand for commercial sex acts during the reporting period. 
Prostitution remained illegal in 2009. 
 
--F.  We are unaware of specific GOB measure to reduce the 
participation in child sex tourism by Burmese nationals. 
Given Burma's stagnant economy and GOB restrictions on 
issuing passports, very few Burmese nationals travel abroad 
as tourists. 
--G.  Not applicable.  Burma does not contribute troops to 
international peacekeeping efforts. 
 
Partnerships 
------------ 
 
--A.  The GOB actively engaged with other governments, 
international organizations, NGOs, and local organizations on 
TIP issues.  Please see details of partnerships in preceding 
responses.  The GOB does devote resources to TIP.  The 
overall amounts remain small by Western standards, as is true 
of most GOB resource allocations benefiting average citizens. 
 (Burma spends less than 1 percent of GDP on education and 
health combined.)  However, year on year increases since 2007 
show a 27,900 percent increase in GOB investment in fighting 
TIP.  The 2008 to 2009 increase in spending was 40 percent. 
 
--B.  Burma does not provide assistance to other countries. 
 
Child Soldiers 
-------------- 
 
--A.  As detailed in the annual Human Rights Report and 
previously in this submission, the forcible recruitment of 
child-soldiers remained a problem in GOB controlled areas of 
the country throughout the reporting period.  Ethnic 
 
RANGOON 00000089  019.2 OF 019 
 
 
insurgent groups also engaged in child soldier recruitment. 
The magnitude of this problem is difficult to assess because 
many areas, GOB controlled and otherwise, are off-limits to 
foreigners.  It is likely that child soldiers were direct 
participants in hostilities. 
 
GOB-ILO and GOB-UNICEF engagement on this topic and steps 
taken to remedy the problem are previously detailed. 
 
One noteworthy example of child-soldier recruitment in a 
non-GOB context is a recent case that involved a Burmese 
national employee of an INGO who allegedly participated in 
the 2009 trafficking of five youths, at least two of whom 
were under 18, to an ethnic-insurgent army.  The 
perpetrator's motives in this case were reportedly political 
rather than financial, highlighting how continued tensions 
between the GOB and ethnic groups fuel the demand for 
soldiers, child or adult, on all sides. 
 
¶6.  (U) Embassy point of contact for TIP issues is Marc 
Porter, Economic Officer.  He is available at tel: 
95-1-650-006, ext. 4227, fax: 95-1-650-306.  Combined embassy 
hours spent compiling information for this report: 108 
DINGER